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ABSTRACT 
Analysing United States Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East 1993-2003: 
Origins and Grand Strategies. 
Steven Martin Wright 
The position of this study is that the foreign policy response of George W. Bush's 
administration in the wake of the trauma of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington D. C. signified a complete redefinition of US grand strategy. 
In essence the new grand strategic era of the War on Terror had emerged and had 
replaced the post-Cold War order. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate this 
radical change through a foreign policy analysis methodology. 
This thesis analyses the foreign policy of the United States under Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush. It demonstrates the origins, nature and trajectory of US foreign policy 
during the time period 1993-2003. This is achieved through an original comparative 
foreign policy analysis of the two presidencies in the time frame 1993-2003, and also 
through an analysis of US foreign policy towards the Middle East as a case study. Three 
key interrelated areas of US foreign relations towards the Middle East were selected as 
case studies: Persian Gulf security; the Arab-Israeli peace process; and political Islam. 
The study shows how US foreign policy towards these case studies altered after the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks and became guided by the new grand strategy of the 
War on Terror. It makes an original contribution to the current scholarship on US 
foreign policy towards Iraq during the post-Cold War era through showing that the 
United States sought regime change in Iraq since 1991 as its strategic objective. Finally, 
prior to the onset of the War on Terror, political Islam is shown to have been a 
secondary foreign policy concern and subservient to US interests in the Persian Gulf. 
This study shows how US foreign policy in this new context resulted in political Islam 
becoming an issue of primary importance in US strategic calculations towards the 
Middle East. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
-1- 
"The Middle East is an area in which the United States has a vital interest. The 
maintenance of peace in that area, which has so frequently seen disturbances in the 
past, is of significance to the world as a whole. " 
Franklin D. Roosevelt 
March 1944 
The foreign policy response of George W. Bush's administration in the wake of the 
trauma of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
D. C. signified a complete redefinition of US grand strategy. 1 Whilst the collapse of 
the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War, resulting in the post-Cold War 
era, the 9/11 attacks marked the onset of the era of the War on Terror. This gave rise 
to the most fundamental redefinition of US grand strategy since the presidency of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. 2 Yet the nature of Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy agenda has 
emerged as the most ambitious since Woodrow Wilson articulated his vision for a 
new international order following the end of the First World War. 3 Understanding the 
origins, strategic direction and application of this change is thus of great importance 
for the field of international relations and policymakers in general. 
The foreign policy of the United States towards the Middle East presents an ideal 
case study in which to show how US grand strategic policy has changed in the wake 
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Middle East is one of the most complex and 
emotionally laden political arenas for United States foreign policy. Complex schisms 
based on ideology, religion and history allow for a diverse range of interpretations 
and evaluations. It also makes the need for a sophisticated diplomacy ever more 
important. The United States has devoted a great deal of energy towards its 
diplomacy with the Middle Eastern, none more so than with the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
1 Grand strategy is defined as the overarching strategic purpose or direction which takes precedence 
over regional geostrategic foreign policy calculations and bilateral geopolitical foreign policies. It 
typically involves the application of all areas of national power to achieve a long term national 
objective. For example, during the Cold War era the grand strategic purpose is commonly defined as 
the containment and deterrence against the ideological spread of Communism. 
2 John L. Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term, " Foreign Affairs 84.1 (2005): 2. 
3 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995) 218-45. 
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But on a wider level, profound national interests are at stake in the Persian Gulf for 
the United States. ` Moreover, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the importance 
of this strategically vital arena for US foreign policy has been compounded further. 
Therefore, US foreign policy towards the Middle East is suitable for conducting a 
foreign policy analysis and examining this fundamental change in US foreign policy. 
1.0 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The examination of foreign policy can offer not only a contribution to academic 
scholarship, but also to policy formation itself. By providing a detailed analysis of 
foreign policy development, purpose and implementation, it is possible to identify 
issues that have importance for diplomacy and policy formation. This is especially 
important in circumstances where a state's foreign policy has a wide-ranging impact 
on geopolitics, as seen in the case of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
With the majority of scholarship on US foreign policy being evaluative based, this 
study will concern itself with an analytical and descriptive examination of US 
foreign policy. 
The objectives of this case study are essentially threefold. Firstly, it will provide an 
interpretation of US foreign policy within the wider contextual framework of US 
grand strategy. Grand strategy is interpreted in its traditional guise as the application 
of all areas of national power to achieve a long term national objective. 5 Indeed, 
George Kennan outlined US grand strategy in 1947, through the famous "Mr. X" 
articles, as a strategy of containment which was applied until the end of the Cold 
War in 1989. But the key issue here is the manner in which US foreign policy 
changed in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and its character 
during the Clintonian era. The premise of this study is that a fundamental change 
occurred and resulted in a redefinition of US grand strategy that has reordered US 
foreign policy. Therefore, this study will demonstrate how US foreign policy 
° United States, Department of Defence, United States Security Strategy for the Middle East, 
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 3 May 1995) 48pp. 15/06/03 
<http: //www. defenselink. mil/policy/isa/nesa/mideast. html >. 
5 For further information see [George Kerman] Anonymous, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct, " 
Foreign Affairs 25.4 (1947).: 852-68. 
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changed by showing its nature and origins during the Clintonian era and the initial 
years of the first Bush administration. 
The manner in which this objective will be achieved is through drawing comparative 
observations from a foreign policy analysis of the two presidencies. This also serves 
a second objective of providing a comparative study of the Clinton and George W. 
Bush presidencies. This will underscore the historical context and scale of the change 
that occurred post-9/1 1. In essence, this will aim to show that a clear departure in US 
grand strategy occurred from the post-Cold War era to the War on Terror. 
The final objective will be to provide a detailed analysis and account of US foreign 
policy towards the Middle East within the context of a foreign policy analysis 
methodological framework. The purpose will be to provide a qualitative foreign 
policy analysis of US foreign policy towards the Middle East as a case study to test 
the conclusions derived from the first objective. Therefore, a clear understanding and 
analysis of US foreign policy formation and trajectory 6 toward the Middle East is 
required. In addition to serving the primary objective of this thesis, it will also offer a 
contribution to the field of scholarship in this area by way of providing a clear 
analytical and descriptive account of the nature of US foreign policy towards the 
Middle East in the time period 1993-2003. 
Overall, by fulfilling these three interlinked objectives, the findings from this case 
study will contribute to the wider field of scholarship on this subject. The following 
section will provide detail on the methodology employed, taking into consideration 
the objectives outlined. 
2.0 METHODOLOGY 
Given the objectives of this case study, the key issue is identifying the most 
appropriate form of analysis. Clearly a more qualitative understanding of the origins 
of foreign policy formation is required; however, a wider contextual understanding, is 
6 Foreign policy trajectory is defined as the direction or trend a foreign policy is taking in order to 
actually fulfil a strategic objective. 
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also a necessity. A balanced methodological approach is therefore needed that can 
incorporate the advantages of differing levels of analysis. This thesis will be 
premised on G. John Ikenberry's methodological foreign policy analysis framework 
which specifically aims to analyse US foreign policy within the context of grand 
strategy. Grand strategy will be used as the overarching theoretical framework from 
which the foreign policy analysis will be analysed against. This is based on the 
premise that a change in grand strategy occurred away from the post-Cold War order 
in the wake of the trauma of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on Washington 
D. C. and New York. 
Before moving onto a clear exposition of Ikenberry's methodology, the following 
section will show where it sits in an intellectual context. This will underline the 
differential levels of analysis available and also why Ikenberry's methodological 
proposition is the most suitable vehicle for this study. Ikenberry's methodology will 
be shown to be firmly lodged within the contemporary scholarship on foreign policy 
analysis and is a model which incorporates the epistemological approaches towards 
foreign policy analysis that will be outlined. 
2.1 Intellectual Context 
The methodological approach advocated by Kenneth Waltz is a useful model for 
deducing the character of the international system. Although he highlights different 
levels of causation, he argues that the systematic nature of the international level is 
the most appropriate means for explaining the restrictions and imperatives by which 
states operate. 7 Whilst such an analytical framework can offer useful explanations, 
especially in the form of predictive generalisations, it suffers from a lack of detail 
and can be overly general. 8 Given the objective of this study, an international level 
systematic analysis would be useful for identifying grand strategic 
Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power, " American Foreign Policy: Theoretical 
Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown University, 2005) 60-82; and 
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001) 159-238. 
8 For a greater discussion see Ole R. Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy, " 
American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown 
University, 2005) 14-22. 
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conceptualisations, but would not allow for a sufficient understanding of the origins 
and sub national context in which foreign policy was formulated. Moreover, the 
extent to which it could account for nonstate actors such as al-Qa'ida is also 
questionable. 
Although this approach suggests that the most useful guide is the systematic level, J. 
David Singer's classic study on the problem of differing levels of analysis suggests 
that a more balanced approach that incorporates national levels of analysis will 
provide a better understanding of state action. 9 Thus, only through appreciating 
policy formation on a national level can its origins and context be truly appreciated. 
In some respects, this is commensurate with Stephen David's model of 
omnibalancing which seeks to incorporate both systematic and domestic political 
levels for explaining the foreign policy behaviour of Third World countries. 
10 
Although David's model is not applicable to examining US foreign policy due to its 
rubric, it underscores the methodological need for incorporating differential levels of 
analysis. 
Robert Jervis, also suggests that analysis should be conducted on a qualitative sub 
national level. This brings us to the traditional scope of the sub-field of foreign 
policy analysis. He argues that the analytical levels of the bureaucracy and the 
decision maker should be incorporated in order to provide a richer understanding of 
policy formation. 11 Indeed, the key weakness of the structural/systematic approach to 
international relations is the adequacy of the explanation it can offer. 12 But, 
according to Jervis's analytical model, the decision making level offers a much more 
detailed understanding of the origins of foreign policy. It is an approach that can be 
9 J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations, " International Politics 
and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969) 20-29. 
10 Stephen R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment, " World Politics 43.2 (1991): 233-56. 
11 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton 
University Press, 1976) 13-3 1; see also Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis, " Contemporary 
International Relations: A Guide to Theory, eds. A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1994) 93-108 . 
12 For a survey of the differential critiques see Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign 
Policy, " 14-20. 
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subdivided into the broad categories of bureaucratic; societal; domestic political; and 
idiosyncratic frameworks. 
Graham Allison offered a seminal example of a bureaucratic approach through his 
examination of the differential conceptions of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 13 He 
demonstrated a three tiered approach to explaining US foreign policy by examining it 
through the complementary lenses of. the rational actor; the organisational process; 
and the bureaucratic/governmental politics. '4 
Whilst Allison's study and the bureaucratic approach are in general highly 
informative, they have also been subject to criticism. 15 The bureaucratic approach, 
however, has been viewed as only applicable in certain cases: the need for detailed 
information on the decision making process is a clear methodological limitation 
through the actual availability of the data. 
16 When applying this to the United States, 
the usefulness of this approach is clearly constrained by whether primary data on the 
bureaucratic decision making process has been declassified and stored in the national 
archives. 
In contrast, the societal approach draws from a political sociological backdrop to 
demonstrate the ethnic, media, and public opinion factors that have a bearing on 
foreign policy formation. Such factors can, to differing degrees, play a key role in 
13 Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, " American Foreign Policy 
Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown University, 2005) 402- 
41; Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications, " World Politics 24.2 (1972): 40-79; and see also Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, 
The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979) 347-70. 
14 For a critique of Allison's model see Steve Smith, "Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: 
Bureaucratic Politics Approaches, " Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems 
Approach, eds. Michael Clarke and Brian White (Aldershot: Elgar, 1989) 109-34; and Jonathan 
Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models, " The American Political Science 
Review 86.2 (1992): 301-22. 
15 Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison Wonderland), " American Foreign 
Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown University, 2005) 
447-59. 
16 Deborah J. Gerner, "The Evolution of the Study of Foreign Policy, " Foreign Policy Analysis: 
Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, eds. Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick 
Jude Haney (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995) 23-24; Deborah J. Gerner, "Foreign Policy 
Analysis: Exhilarating Eclecticism, Intriguing Enigmas, " International Studies Notes 16.3 (1991): 4- 
19. 
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influencing the foreign policy agenda. '7 For example, the role of public opinion on 
foreign policy has differing impacts depending on the typology of the state. 18 But an 
equally important factor is the historical political culture within a given state. In the 
case of the United States, Gabriel Almond's classic study on domestic culture 
underscored the importance to which isolationism has a degree of currency 
embedded within US foreign relations. 19 
A further level is that of the domestic political environment. It is one of the more 
useful levels in foreign policy analysis. It focuses on the role of special interest 
groups, legislation and the domestic structure on foreign policy formation. 20 Henry 
Kissinger's excellent study into the complex interaction of domestic structures and 
foreign policy formation, underlines the rich explanation that can be derived from 
analysis on this level . 
21 But more importantly, his study shows that the degree to 
which the domestic sphere impinges on foreign policy can vary according to the 
stability of the period concerned. In other words, the international level context may 
have a bearing on the degree to which the domestic structure dictates the foreign 
policy prerogative of the executive. 
The final level of foreign policy analysis concerns that of idiosyncratic factors. 
Drawing from a psychological field, this level aims to identify the background; 
personality; worldview outlook; and leadership style of key individuals in the foreign 
17 Herbert C. Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social- 
Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy, " International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James 
N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969) 276-90. 
'$ Bruce E. Moon, "The State in Foreign and Domestic Policy, " Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity 
and Change in Its Second Generation, eds. Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick Jude Haney 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995) 187-200; and Christopher Farrands, "Environment and 
Structure, " Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach, eds. Michael 
Clarke and Brian White (Aldershot: Elgar, 1989) 84-108. 
19 Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977) 
53-76; see also Samuel Huntington, "American Ideals Versus American Institutions, " American 
Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown 
University, 2005) 214-45. 
20 Joe D. Hagan, "Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy, " Foreign Policy 
Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, eds. Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and 
Patrick Jude Haney (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995) 117-38. 
21 Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy, " International Politics and Foreign 
Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969) 261-75. 
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policy decision making process, and from this derive explanations for policy 
formation. This is a very useful means of explaining why decision makers may 
favour certain policy directions and is particularly useful in explaining a long term 
strategic vision. Such factors are also seen as a useful means of explaining why 
rationality by itself cannot preclude an irrational foreign policy trajectory. 22 But 
although it is useful, Yaacov Vertzberger's seminal study on this area highlights that 
while it may provide correlations, such idiosyncratic factors do not necessarily 
determine a particular foreign policy. 23 
With these theoretical controversies in mind, there is clear need to demarcate a 
suitable methodological approach for this case study. In the context of the foreign 
policy analysis tradition, Deborah Gerner reminds us that this is dependent in the 
first instance on whether the objective of the study is descriptive, evaluative or 
analytical. 24 As already outlined, this case study does not fall within an evaluative 
rubric. It does, however, require the application of both descriptive and analytical 
epistemologies. 
An analytical approach has the purpose of drawing on the contending levels of 
explanation in various ways to fashion a plausible understanding of foreign policy. 
25 
The analytical approach towards foreign policy analysis does, however, pose key 
methodological problems. The most important is that its findings suffer from 
eclecticism. 26 The nth+1 theory problem brings into question the validity of the 
interpretation it offers, and blurs the distinction with descriptive based analysis. 27 It 
22 Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception, " International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James 
N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969) 239-54; see also Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of 
August (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994) 21-158; and Robert S. McNamara, et at., Argument 
without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs, 1999) 373-98. 
23 Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception 
in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) 342-64. 
24 Gerner, "The Evolution of the Study of Foreign Policy, " 17-18; and G. John Ikenberry, 
"Introduction, " American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New 
York: Georgetown University, 2005) 8-11. 
25 Ikenberry, "Introduction, " 9. 
26 Gerner, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Exhilarating Eclecticism, Intriguing Enigmas, " 4-19. 
27 Ikenberry, "Introduction, " 9. 
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thus also suffers from failing to differentiate between factors which have differential 
importance at any given stage on foreign policy formation. Moreover, a further 
problem is the extent to which this qualitative analysis can be conceptualised and 
understood. 
On a descriptive level, the purpose is to "establish the facts regarding foreign policy 
decisions, policies declared publicly, actions taken, and the official and de facto 
relationships among state and nonstate international actor. "28 But in terms of 
understanding and describing the character of US foreign policy, Walter Russell 
Mead offers an original conception of schools which can be used to characterise it 
and US grand strategy. This is useful on a descriptive level as it allows for US grand 
strategy to be conceptualised on a more general level. Mead highlighted four 
competing historical components in US foreign policy: 
1. Jeffersonian: this school holds liberal democracy in high esteem. The 
emphasis here is on the defence of American society and its political system 
through the least costly and dangerous way. 29 
2. Hamiltonian: the emphasis of this school is for the promotion of US 
economic interests. This is done as far as possible through expanding free 
trade, but sees a need to protect and maintain regimes that control key 
markets and resources. Thus maintenance of stability is a key factor. 30 
3. Jacksonian: here the focus is on the ability of the United States to act 
independently of other nations through the maintenance of a qualitative 
superiority in military terms. 31 
4. Wilsonian: this traditional school sees a moral obligation for the advancement 
of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, throughout the world. The 
28 Gerner, "The Evolution of the Study of Foreign Policy, " 18. 
29 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World 
(New York: Knopf, 2001) 174-217. 
30 Ibid. 99-131. 
31 Ibid. 218-63. 
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promotion of these "universal ideals" is viewed to be in the national interest 
of the United States. 32 
Although Mead's framework is not a methodology for foreign policy analysis, it is 
useful for giving general descriptive conceptualisations of US grand strategy and US 
foreign policy. Therefore, Mead's terminology will be incorporated into the proposed 
methodology to offer descriptive and contextual observations. 
Whilst there are clear problems with traditional analytical foreign policy analysis, the 
more contemporary scholarship on this subfield allows for a sophisticated approach 
that counters its methodological shortfalls. 33 A metatheoretical approach towards 
analytical foreign policy analysis proposes the development of a wider conceptual 
framework from which state action is interpreted, and the varying levels of analytical 
analysis are incorporated. This counters the problem of eclecticism as differential 
findings from competing levels of analysis are used against larger scale framework. 
34 
A benefit of using this approach is that differential levels of analysis can be 
identified as more important in particular circumstances whilst serving the overall 
purpose of providing grounding to the overarching interpretation of the study. 
Moreover, this does not confine the analysis to a sub-national level as the 
methodology can incorporate relevant activity on both national and international 
levels. 35 
Taken as a whole, this case study will apply, from a phenomenological ontology, a 
metatheoretical foreign policy analysis framework as its methodology, which will 
necessarily include a descriptive and analytical epistemology. This is commensurate 
with Ikenberry's prescription for conducting a foreign policy analysis of the United 
32 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the 
World 132-73. 
33 Ikenberry, "Introduction, " 9-12. 
34 G. John Ikenberry, et al., "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic 
Policy, " 42.1 (1988): 1-14; and G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to 
American Foreign Economic Policy, " 42.1 (1988): 219-42; and Ikenberry, "Introduction, " 9-11. 
35 Ikenberry, "Introduction, " 9-12; Ikenberry, et al., "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining 
American Foreign Economic Policy, " 1-14; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics 13-31. 
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States. The nature of the overarching metatheoretical framework is that of US grand 
strategy. The very concept of US grand strategy will be shown to rely to a great 
extent on the idiosyncrasies of the President and by the ideological influences on the 
elite decision makers within the administration. This will be explored in greater 
detail in chapter three of this study where a comparative foreign policy analysis of 
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush will be conducted with the purpose being to 
elucidate a conceptualisation of US grand strategy during the time frame of this 
study. 
This will also serve as a useful hypothesis from which the case study of US foreign 
policy towards the Middle East can be examined. Chapter 2 will provide a literature 
review to further demarcate the location of this study's grand strategic framework 
within the existing scholarship. The following sections will, however, provide further 
details on the parameters of research and the sources of data of this study's 
methodology. 
2.2 The Parameters of the Study 
As has already been highlighted, this study is not an evaluative study of US foreign 
policy and will be confined to an analytical and descriptive approach commensurate 
with the methodology and objectives that have been laid out. The means of achieving 
these objectives will be through a case study of US foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. 
The specific time frame of this study is 1993-2003. The justification is that this 
allows for an examination of US foreign policy during Clinton's two terms of office, 
and the first two years of George W. Bush's first term of office. This accounts for his 
policy before and immediately after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, until 
the end of 2003. The full period of Bush's first term of office is that the study's 
emphasis is on showing how US grand strategic policy changed in the wake of the 1-1 
trauma of the 9/11 terrorist attacks by using US policy towards the Middle East as a 
case study, and a premise of this study is that an adequate examination can be 
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concluded within this time frame. Therefore, it is outside the scope of this study to 
examine US policy after the end of 2003. 
In terms of the parameters of the case study, the complexity of US foreign policy 
towards the Middle East requires a broad examination in order to provide for an 
adequate contextualisation and understanding of US foreign policy. The scope of this 
research will, therefore, provide an examination of US foreign policy towards the 
three key interconnected areas of: Persian Gulf security; the Arab-Israeli dispute; and 
political Islam. The justification is that these three interconnected spheres are the 
main contextual areas that best encompass the issues that have had a bearing on US 
foreign policy during the time frame of this study, and therefore the scope will be 
limited to their rubric. 
The definition of Persian Gulf security is taken as being the geopolitical security of 
the states surrounding the Persian Gulf. 36 The scope of this examination is defined as 
US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq. The justification is that this was the primary 
focus of US foreign policy by which the United States sought to provide for Persian 
Gulf security. It is, therefore, outside the scope of this thesis to provide an 
examination of US bilateral foreign policy towards the individual Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states. 
In terms of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the focus will mainly be on US foreign policy 
towards the Israeli and Palestinian negotiations, but it will also provide an 
examination of US foreign policy involvement in Israeli negotiations with Jordan and 
Syria respectively. Israeli negotiations with Lebanon will also be encompassed, but 
this thesis will view it as linked with the Syrian negotiations on account of its 
particular circumstances. 
In approaching US foreign policy towards political Islam, the scope of research will 
encompass issues relating to US foreign policy towards moderate and extremist 
political Islam. This will be in addition to an examination of US foreign policy 
towards international Islamic terrorism as this is an important contextual issue that 
36 The definition of a geopolitical unit is essentially that of an individual state. Here the emphasis is on 
the security of the GCC states. Conversely, geostrategy is defined as a regional based strategic policy. 
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has key relevance to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, and nature of US 
grand strategy post-9/11. This will serve the purpose in chapter four of allowing for a 
cogent explanation of the key contextual factors that resulted in, and the character of, 
the emergence of the new grand strategic era of the War on Terror. 
In terms of the epistemology, this thesis will not encompass the bureaucratic debates 
on foreign policy decisions as such an examination in the time frame and scope of 
this study is too expansive to be included. And more importantly, this aspect of 
foreign policy analysis suffered from the practical limitation of such information not 
being available at the time of writing due to internal policy papers being classified. 
The areas which will be examined are those that form the traditional sphere for 
foreign policy analysis as has already been outlined. But given the metatheoretical 
methodology, this thesis will also encompass issues on national and international 
levels that are deemed relevant to analysing US policy formation towards the scope 
of this case study. 
2.3 The Sources of Data 
Given that this study will use a metatheoretical approach to foreign policy analysis, 
the sources that it will draw from are wide ranging. Fortunately, US foreign policy is 
an exceptionally well documented and researched area, so there is a wide body of 
primary and secondary material to draw from. Nevertheless, it is also highly 
controversial area and subject to competing interpretations and misconceptions. As 
the study is non evaluative, the issue of hermeneutics will predominantly concern 
scholarship whose empirical data is relied upon in the absence of primary material to 
cross check its accuracy. 
The focus is necessarily on primary materials as far as possible and draws on: 
speeches; Congressional testimony; governmental and non-governmental reports; 
foreign policy dispatches; and press briefings. Interviews were conducted in 
circumstances where there was a clear degree of ambiguity over US foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, a key limitation is that this thesis was not able to draw from classified 
governmental material which could provide for a more valid interpretation of foreign 
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policy formation. Whilst this leaves scope for future research on this area, the 
following section will outline the contribution this study makes to the existing 
scholarship. 
3.0 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study applies a metatheoretical foreign policy analysis methodology towards US 
foreign policy to the Middle East in the time frame 1993-2003. It is the first study of 
to conduct this form of analysis on US foreign policy towards the Middle East within 
the time frame and scope that has been outlined. It is also original in that it provides 
an initial comparative analysis of the idiosyncrasies of elite decision makers and 
foreign policies differences between Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. 
A further key area where this study provides an original contribution is through its 
interpretation of US policy towards Iraq. Through the foreign policy analysis 
conducted, this thesis has uncovered new evidence that allows for a revision of 
interpretations on US policy towards Iraq during the Clinton administration. This is 
highly significant since it allows previous interpretations on the strategic 
underpinnings and character of US policy towards Iraq during the Clintonian era to 
be revisited. 
The overall significance of this study, however, is that is contributes to the wider 
body of scholarship on US foreign policy formation, strategic and tactical direction 
and contextualisation towards the Middle East, whilst also providing a case study 
interpretation of US geostrategy and grand strategy which has wider currency in 
international relations scholarship. 
4.0 THE ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
The structure of this thesis is divided into four substantive sections, and ultimately 
consists of eight chapters. This, the first chapter, provides the introduction; the 
methodology; the scope; and the parameters of research. The second chapter 
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provides an examination of the existing literature in order to highlight the current 
scholarship in this field and to identify the justification and problem in which this 
study is directed. The third chapter provides comparative observations on the 
idiosyncrasies of the elite bureaucratic decision makers and foreign policies of Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush. This provides the methodological framework where 
this case study will be lodged. The fourth chapter is substantive in that it provides an 
analysis of the position of the United States towards political Islam and how 
countering the root causes of extremism (terrorism) underpins the very essence of the 
new grand strategic era of the War on Terror. The fifth chapter will provide an 
examination of US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq in the time period 1993- 
an 2001. This will aim to demonstrate the nature of Clinton's foreign policy and gr d 
strategy in the post-Cold War era. The sixth chapter will also provide an analysis of 
US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq but will be carried out in the time period 
2001-2003. This chapter will show that the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks had a defining impact on grand strategy which allows that this change allows 
for a proper explanation of US foreign policy in this time period. Moreover, it 
underscores that a change in grand strategy had occurred away from that of the post- 
Cod War era. The seventh chapter provides an analysis of US foreign policy towards 
the Arab-Israeli peace process. The final chapter will provide concluding comments 
and the scope for future study. 
5.0 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the objectives, methodology and structure of this study. 
The methodological approach is a metatheoretical foreign policy analysis which will 
draw upon a variety of epistemological factors in order to analyse and show the 
trajectory of US foreign policy towards the Middle East 1993-2003. The objectives 
of the study are essentially threefold: firstly, an interpretation will be provided of US 
foreign policy within a grand strategic framework. This will underline the conjecture 
that the Bush administrations response in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 resulted in the emergence of the grand strategic era of the War on 
Terror. This will be shown to be a radical departure in US foreign policy from the 
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post-Cold War era and is the most radical redesign of US grand strategy since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
The second objective will be to offer a comparative foreign policy analysis of the 
presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. This will not only provide an 
original contribution to the existing body of scholarship but will also be used to 
underline the radical departure following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
The final related objective is to conduct an analysis of US foreign policy towards the 
Middle East during the time period 1993-2003 as a case study to test the 
prescriptions made through examining the application of US strategic policy. This 
will be achieved through examining the three interconnected areas of Persian Gulf 
security; the Arab-Israeli peace process; and political Islam. By analysing the origins, 
trajectory and nature of US foreign policy towards these three interrelated case study 
areas, this thesis will also aim to offer an original conceptualisation of US policy 
towards these key areas and thus contribute to the wider field of scholarship of 
Middle Eastern international relations. 
The methodological approach will be firmly lodged with the contemporary 
scholarship in the subfield of foreign policy analysis. The model that will be used for 
the case study is metatheoretical foreign policy analysis and will attack the subject 
area through a descriptive and analytical epistemology. The scope of the foreign 
policy analysis will not encompass the qualitative aspect of bureaucratic bargaining 
over policy decisions for the reason that such documentary information was not 
available to this study and such an approach would be to expansive given the time 
frame and scope of this study. 
The following chapter will provide a literature review of the current scholarship in 
order to underscore the contribution this study makes and its location within the 
existing literature. It will then move to the substantive chapters of this thesis where 
the comparative foreign policy analysis and the case studies towards the Middle East 
will be approached. 
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Chapter II 
Literature Review 
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"The greater our knowledge increases the more our ignorance unfolds. " 
John F. Kennedy 
September 1962 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The following will provide a literature review of the competing interpretations of the 
United States' foreign policy towards the Middle East, with specific regard to the 
three areas under scrutiny in this thesis, namely Persian Gulf security; the Arab- 
Israeli peace process; and, finally, political Islam. The literature review will aim to 
locate gaps in the previous scholarship in the field of study that are commensurate 
with what this thesis proposes. 
The foreign policy of the United States towards the Middle East is an area which has 
received a great deal of attention; however, the majority of scholarship is evaluative 
based. In comparison, a relatively small number of studies, using a descriptive and 
analytical epistemology, have been conducted through a foreign policy analysis 
framework on the origins and context of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
As this study is not an evaluative foreign policy analysis, the following review of 
academic literature will not encompass this area of scholarship and will necessarily 
focus on the character, trajectory and context of US foreign policy. 
Whilst this thesis aims to provide an analytical understanding of US foreign policy 
towards these three key interrelated areas, it also offers an interpretation that can be 
satisfactorily located within wider strategic concepts. This literature review 
necessarily includes the competing interpretations of the geostrategy underpinning 
US foreign policy at global and regional levels. This allows for a wider contextual 
interpretation of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
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2.0 CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF GLOBAL GEOSTRATEGIC 
FRAMEWORKS IN US FOREIGN POLICY 1993-2003 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall there have been 
competing prescriptions and interpretations on the trajectory US foreign policy took 
in what is commonly described as the post-Cold War era. Charles Krauthammer 
described a `unipolar world' in which US hegemony in the international system had 
emerged. ' Indeed, the implosion of the Soviet Union is generally accepted as a 
landmark in US foreign policy which saw the emergence of a true hegemonic 
superpower. Others, such as Samuel Huntington, cautiously questioned how long this 
could endure. 2 Indeed, Francis Fukuyama famously declared the culmination of an 
ideological evolution that had reached its climax with the triumph of liberal 
democracy over what he saw as the last remaining competing ideology. 3 
The concept that liberal democracy had triumphed over competing ideologies, and 
thus had lost the overarching strategic guide, can be seen to have given rise to a 
revisionist version of global geostrategic conceptions of American foreign policy. G. 
John Ikenberry contended in 1996 that the overarching American grand strategy 
since the end of the Second World War had been to promote liberal democracy, and 
thus the Cold War needed to be seen under this rubric. Ikenberry went on to show 
that this liberal foreign policy guide did not alter following the end of the Cold War, 
and ultimately served as a grand strategic guide for American foreign policy during 
the Clintonian era. This conceptualisation is significant: it challenges the more 
traditional realist prescriptions of Cold War grand strategy as it virtually subordinates 
Cold War era politics to a geopolitical rather than a global geostrategic level. The 
significance of this is that US foreign policy during this study's time frame would 
1 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment, " Foreign Affairs 70.1 (1990): 23-33. 
`Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower, " American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. 
John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown University, 2005) 540-63. 
3 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History? " America and the World: Debating the New Shape of 
International Politics, ed. Gideon Rose (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989) 1-28. 
4 G. John Ikenberry, "America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the 
Post-War Era, " American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New 
York: Georgetown University, 2005) 268-86. 
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thus be interpreted as having been guided by a consistent global grand strategy dating 
back to the emergent post-Second World War era. But to what extent can this 
conceptualisation be applied to US foreign policy towards the Middle East? Indeed, 
if Ikenberry's thesis is taken to its logical conclusion and applied to the Middle East, 
the United States would have promoted liberal democracy as a strategic priority; 
however, there are good reasons to question whether this is the case as Clinton's 
Persian Gulf foreign policy was widely equated with the maintenance of the status 
quo. 
Although there are clear questions arising from Ikenberry's thesis, Walter Russell 
Mead lends support to the argument that liberal democracy has been a long term 
theme in US foreign policy. In Mead's influential historical study on US foreign 
policy, he highlights that the pursuit of liberal democracy has been a historical force 
in US foreign policy calculations with a vintage that can be traced back to the War of 
Independence. 5 Nevertheless, it is pertinent to question the extent to which such 
Wilsonian ideals actually had a bearing on US foreign policy since the end of the 
Cold War. 
In fairness to Ikenberry's thesis, his view has credibility when one examines the 
position of the Clinton administration: Anthony Lake outlined in 1993 the conception 
of a grand strategy based on the "enlargement of the world's free community of 
market democracies. "6 Warren Christopher reiterated this in 1995 by underlining that 
"support for democracy is not some starry-eyed crusade; it is a determination to help 
freedom take hold where it can. "7 In other words, Clinton's overarching grand 
strategy was premised on the dual objective of promoting democracy and bolstering 
economic development. This was clearly articulated as the Clinton administration's 
priority, and strategic point of reference, for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
5 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World 
(New York: Knopf, 2001) 132-217. 
6 Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement, " Remarks at Johns Hopkins University, School 
of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C.: Johns Hopkins University, 21 Sep. 1994.1 Ipp. 
17/06/02 <http: //www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/intret/lakedoc. html>. 
7 Warren Christopher, "America's Leadership, America's Opportunity, " Foreign Policy 98 (1995): 7. 
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era. Moreover, this was very much a consistent theme in both Clinton 
8 administrations' foreign policy statements. 
However, in terms of a specific interpretation of the Clintonian era, Douglas 
Brinkley echoes this theme by arguing that Clinton adopted an overarching foreign 
policy doctrine, which can be likened to a grand strategy that was premised on the 
pursuit of liberal democracy on a global scale. 9 Charles Maynes echoed a similar 
line, and characterised the administration's strategy as showing a level of consistency 
from the Cold War era. In 1993 Maynes commented: 
The new approach turns out to be much like the old one. Under the 
Clinton doctrine of enlargement, America's alliance commitments 
remain the same as they were under the Cold War doctrine of 
containment. American troops stay where they are... Under the new 
doctrine of enlargement, the United States will try to spread 
democracy and free markets. But that was the US objective during 
the Cold War. 10 
Although there is clear evidence that the Clinton Presidency did indeed premise itself 
on the grand strategy of pursuing democracy and promoting global capitalism, and 
arguably continued certain aspects of Cold War grand strategy, real questions remain 
as to whether this had a substantive impact on US foreign policy. Indeed, Thomas 
Carothers maintains that Clinton's record on democratic promotion had "not lived up 
to the expansive rhetoric. "11 More to the point: was the Clinton administration's 
foreign policy towards the Middle East guided by the grand strategy of pursuing 
democracy and promoting global capitalism? 
8 United States, President of the United States, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlareement, (Washington, D. C.: GPO, Feb. 1995) 41pp. 12/06/02 <http: //www. whitehouse. gov/>; 
United States, President of the United States, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, Oct. 1998) 35pp. 15/06/03 <http: //www. whitehouse. gov/>. 
9 Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine, " Foreign Policy 106 (1997): 
111-27; and Thomas Carothers, "The Clinton Record on Democracy Promotion, " Critical Mission: 
Essays on Democracy Promotion, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2000) 39-52. 
10 Charles W. Maynes, "A Workable Clinton Doctrine, " Foreign Policy 93 (1993): 3. 
"Carothers, "The Clinton Record on Democracy Promotion, " 39. 
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Other scholars, however, reject the notion that the Clinton administration had any 
grand strategy at all. Linda Miller succinctly showed in 1994 that the Clinton 
administration tried to "revise the conventional Cold War wisdom"12 and thus had 
failed to provide a coherent successor framework to Cold War grand strategy. 
Similarly, Richard Hass provided a distinction in 1997 that can be drawn between the 
Clinton administration's rhetoric and practice on this strategic framework. He 
highlights that despite the administration positioning itself on the premise of 
expanding democracy and free markets; its stated Wilsonian agenda has had "a 
negligible impact on day-to-day affairs. " 13 The importance behind this is that, despite 
such a grand strategic framework being articulated, the administration arguably did 
not conduct its foreign policy in accordance with such a rubric. But even then, the 
extent to which Clintonian grand strategy can be disregarded as rhetorical is 
questionable: it seems reasonable to assume that it was an important factor in foreign 
policy calculations given that it was promoted as an overarching foreign policy 
framework. 
Nevertheless, this scepticism is echoed by Henry Kissinger who interpreted US 
foreign policy during the Clintonian era as having recoiled from the Cold War 
pursuit of the national interest, favouring instead the use of geoeconomics as a 
strategic rubric. Kissinger writes that: 
Victory in the Cold War tempts smugness; satisfaction with the 
status quo causes policy to be viewed as a projection of the familiar 
into the future; astonishing economic performance lures 
policymakers to confuse strategy with economics and makes them 
less sensitive to the political, cultural and spiritual impact of the vast 
transformations brought about by American technology. '4 
From this perspective, the Clintonian foreign policy rubric would have been devoid 
of politically based strategic concepts, and thus would have reduced US foreign 
12 Linda B. Miller, "The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign Policy, " International Affairs 70.4 
(1994): 646. 
13 Richard N. Hass, "Fatal Distraction: Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy, " Foreign Policy 108 (1997): 112. 
14 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 
Rev. ed. (London: Free Press, 2002) 19. 
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policy to a series of ad hoc decisions cemented by proposals for expanding the global 
economy. The significance for this thesis is that in the absence of a coherent global 
political grand strategy, geoeconomic frameworks would have given way to regional 
geostrategic frameworks. 
In sum, the indications are that the Clinton administration premised itself on a grand 
strategic framework which sought the global promotion of democracy and global 
capitalism as a means for guiding its foreign policy. Indeed, some scholars have 
suggested that this was consistent with a long standing grand strategy which predated 
the Cold War era. Nevertheless, there seems reason to doubt whether this grand 
strategy was adopted in practice, thus allowing the charge that it is more rhetorical 
than substantive. Therefore, the significance for this thesis is whether US foreign 
policy towards the Middle East can be satisfactorily equated as falling under the 
rubric of the Clinton administration's global strategic framework; or rather was 
merely premised on a regional geostrategy in the time frame 1993-2001. The 
significance here is that by determining whether US foreign policy towards the 
Middle East under the Clinton era originated under the articulated grand strategy 
tests these competing interpretations. 
2.1 The Context of the Global War on Terror 
Although a clearer interpretation of the Clintonian era is important, a further issue 
arises when examining the time frame following the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Indeed, there have been 
competing interpretations made on the Bush administration's foreign policy after 
these events. Some scholars have argued that there has been consistency in US grand 
strategy, whilst others have argued that the attacks resulted in a fundamentally new 
era underpinning US foreign policy that is akin to Cold War grand strategy. 
Some of the more conservative responses have equated the Bush administration's 
policy response post-9/11 as simply an affirmation of a liberal grand strategy that can 
be traced back to the Second Would War. Robert Kagan views the Bush 
administration's new strategy as essentially a restatement of loner standing American 
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policies. In many respects this echoes Ikenberry's thesis of a liberal grand strategy 
dating back to the post-Second World War order. Kagan comments that: 
[T]he striking thing about [Bush's strategy] is that aside from a few 
references to the idea of pre-emption, which itself was hardly a 
novel concept, the Bush administration's `new' strategy was little 
more than a restatement of American policies, many going back half 
a century. 15 
In a similar vein, Walter Russell Mead sees Bush's strategy as not necessarily a 
radical transformation, but rather a restatement of traditional forces within US 
foreign policy. However, Mead offers an original conception by suggesting that the 
security environment was a product of the new economic disparity the global 
economy had created. 16 Nevertheless, Mead sees a reaffirmation of longstanding 
Wilsonianism as having become more pronounced given the newfound willingness 
for the application of power which he describes as a Jacksonian current in US foreign 
policy. '7 The significance of this approach is that the Bush administration's response 
cannot necessarily be equated as a new grand strategic approach; but then the clear 
question arises of how US foreign policy towards the Middle East post-9/11 can be 
interpreted. Indeed, this conception indicates that any changes in US foreign policy 
towards the Middle East falls squarely under the rubric of regional geostrategy. 
However, given the March 2003 invasion of Iraq as an example, it seems doubtful 
that it can realistically be explained without reference to the wider contextual issues 
arising from the War on Terror; especially when the invasion was articulated as 
falling under such a rubric by the Bush administration. 
Others have argued that a new global grand strategy within US foreign policy has 
emerged which is akin to that of the Cold War era. For example, Hass notably 
equates the post-9/11 international system as the "post-post-Cold War era" which he 
sees as a new grand strategic era which would be characterised by US engagement 
15 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: 
Knopf, 2004) 93. 
16 Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk 
(New York: Knopf, 2004) 109-25. 
17 Ibid. 59-82. 
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under a coherent framework reminiscent of the Cold War. 18 Also, he highlights that it 
is distinguishable from the post-Cold War era. But, on a more specific level, John 
Lewis Gaddis indicated in 2002, that the Bush administration adopted a new grand 
strategy that is in complete contrast to that articulated by the Clinton administration. 
Gaddis describes the Bush administration's strategy as "the most sweeping redesign 
of US grand strategy since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. "19 In terms its 
nature, Gaddis says that "[i]t rejects the Clinton administration's assumption that 
since the movement toward democracy and market economics had become 
irreversible in the post-Cold War era, all the United States had to do was `engage' 
with the rest of the world to `enlarge' those processes .,, 
20 Most importantly, Gaddis 
shows that there are two central features to the Bush administration's grand strategy. 
Firstly, it identifies a linkage between `rogue states' that seek the production of 
unconventional weapons, and the ultimate risk that such weapons could be used 
asymmetrically by terrorist groups: he argues this has necessitated the adoption of 
the preventative use of force doctrine. Secondly, Gaddis identifies that the long term 
objective of this grand strategy is directed towards combating the perceived root 
causes of terrorism through promoting democracy on a global basis. 21 In essence, the 
long term aspect to the Bush administration's strategy can be equated with 
counterterrorism. The key question for post-9/11 US foreign policy towards the 
Middle East is the extent to which US geostrategy and foreign policy can be viewed 
as falling under such a rubric as Gaddis describes. 
In contrast to Gaddis, G. John Ikenberry suggests that the Bush administration's 
response can be equated to a neo-imperial grand strategy. Ikenberry builds on his 
thesis that a liberal grand strategy is identifiable from the end of the Second World 
War which remained consistent throughout the commonly referred to post-Cold War 
18 Richard N. Hass, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East, " Remarks to the 
Foreign Policy Association, New York: GPO, 22 Apr. 2002.7pp. 30/10/03 
<http: //www. state. gOv/s/p/renV9632. htm>. 
19 John L. Gaddis, "Bush's Security Strategy, " Foreign Policy 133 (2002): 53.; and John L. Gaddis, 
"Grand Strategy in the Second Term, " Foreign Affairs 84.1 (2005): 2. 
20 Gaddis, "Bush's Security Strategy, " 53. 
21 John L. Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2004) 80-113. 
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era. He ultimately contends that the foreign policy response to the 9/11 attacks has 
resulted in this longstanding current being supplemented with imperial designs. 22 He 
did not, however, believe that a new grand strategy in US foreign policy had 
occurred. 23 Ikenberry argues that the Bush administration's strategic concepts equate 
to a vision which derogates the notion of sovereignty as it has placed itself in a 
position where it alone dictates acceptable behaviour on a national and sub-national 
level, whilst also seeking the promotion of liberal democracy on a global level in 
order to safeguard US interests. He views this departure away from multilateralism 
as a radical reorientation in US foreign policy whilst remaining premised on the 
pursuit of a liberal democratic order. 24 Nevertheless, Ikenberry suggests that this 
departure from multilateralism is a temporary phase which was caused by the manner 
in which neoconservatives dominated the Bush administration's calculations shortly 
after the 9/11 attacks. 25 
On a more qualitative level, Ikenberry also highlights that the means of achieving 
these objectives have resulted in the adoption of the preventative use of force; virtual 
rejection of international law; and the belief that US hegemony is required for liberal 
democracy to be secured. 26 Overall, Ikenberry's thesis is important as it argues that 
the Bush administration's grand strategy is imperial and based on ensuring US 
hegemony, in contrast to Gaddis's equation that it is more about combating the actual 
causes and threats of terrorism. Nevertheless, Ikenberry's prescription that this 
encapsulates a new grand strategy post-9/11 seems questionable: many of the factors 
which he highlights have a historical vintage. Indeed, Niall Ferguson's excellent 
study on the historical development of US supremacy highlights that such forces are 
far from new. 27 
22 Ikenberry, "America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War 
Era, " 564-72. 
23 G. John Ikenberry, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror, " Survival 43.4 (2001): 19-3 1. 
24 G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Neoconservative Moment, " Survival 46.1 (2004): 7-10. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ikenberry, "America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War 
Era, " 564-72. 
27 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2004). 
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Ikenberry's conception of a resurgent unilateralism is also interesting, but to what 
extent can it be seen as something new when the United States has engaged in 
foreign policy endeavours, such as the Kosovo campaign under Clinton, without 
reference to international law that arguably subjugated the Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty? Indeed, this allows us to question whether Ikenberry's prescription of 
its emergence post-9/11 is really as valid as he makes it out to be. 
The willingness of the Bush administration to pursue unilateralism is contended by 
David Skidmore as being less different to the Clintonian years than Ikenberry would 
have us believe. Skidmore's comparative foreign policy analysis in 2005 of Clinton 
and George W. Bush's propensity for a unilateral foreign policy suggests that 
"[u]nder both presidents, US behaviour was strongly unilateralist. "'8 He goes on to 
say: 
Under Clinton, US unilateralism was less a preference in itself than 
the outcome of a policy process driven by domestic constraints. 
Without the authority bestowed upon the presidency by Cold War 
imperatives, Clinton was unable, and perhaps unwilling, to 
overcome domestic resistance to multilateralism. 29 
In terms of how the foreign policy of George W. Bush compares, Skidmore writes: 
Under Bush, unilateralism was the product of a combination of 
unchecked power abroad, the sway of particularistic interests at 
home, and the ideological inclination of Bush and his top advisers. 
Even the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, proved 
insufficient to deflect the Bush administration's unilateralist 
tendencies. 30 
The importance of Skidmore's comparative foreign policy analysis is that it 
questions Ikenberry's contention that a radical shift towards unilateralism occurred 
28 David Skidmore, "Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy, " Foreign Policy 
Analysis 2 (2005): 223. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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under George W. Bush. Indeed, Skidmore suggests that "[t]he appropriate contrast is 
not between a multilateralist Clinton and a unilateralist Bush, but between two 
unilateralisms that differ not in kind but more in tone, emphasis and degree. "31 
Overall, there are significant disparities in the competing interpretations of how US 
foreign policy can be interpreted through a global geostrategic lens during the time 
frame of this study. Although there is a general acceptance that the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks had a significant impact on US foreign policy, it does not seem clear as to 
how the overall time frame of this study can be interpreted. The significance for this 
thesis is thus that it does not allow for a clear indication of how US foreign policy 
towards the Middle East can be interpreted or conceptualised within US global 
geostrategy. Therefore, justification arises for conducting a foreign policy 
metatheoretical analysis of US foreign policy, in order to clearly provide an 
interpretation which contextualises these issues by using US foreign policy towards 
the Middle East 1993-2003 as a case study. The significance will be that it will test, 
and ideally clarify, the trajectory and conceptualisation of the global geostrategic 
framework of US foreign policy during what is debated as a transitional period. 
Therefore, a clear account of US grand strategy will be provided in chapter 3. But, in 
order to properly account for the competing interpretations of US foreign policy 
towards the Middle East: the following section will provide a conceptualisation of 
US geostrategy on a regional level towards Persian Gulf security; the Arab-Israeli 
peace process; and political Islam. 
3.0 CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF US GEOSTRATEGY TOWARDS 
THE MIDDLE EAST 1993-2003 
Interpretations of US geostrategy towards the Middle East are equally contentious. In 
terms of the US regional strategy towards the Middle East, it was with the 
announcement of the "dual containment strategy" by Martin Indyk in May 1993, 
Special Assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the 
National Security Council, that US foreign policy became officially lodged on the 
31 Skidmore, "Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy, " 224. 
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premise of containing and deterring both Iran and Iraq from challenging the security 
of the key oil producing Gulf States, in addition to undermining the peace process 
and threatening Israel. 32 Indyk portrayed the Clinton administration's approach to the 
Middle East as a non-compartmentalised strategy which was premised on dual 
containment. The definitive outline of dual containment was made, however, by 
national security adviser Anthony Lake in a 1994 article in the journal Foreign 
Affairs. 33 Lake clarified the conception of the strategy as entailing a multilateral 
containment of Iraq as a means of forcing compliance with UN resolutions; and a 
unilateral containment with Iran until it altered its internal and external policies. The 
fact that these policies provided for Persian Gulf security was merely seen as a by- 
product as they were premised on other criteria. 34 Indeed, Lake's argument afforded 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein the prospect of having sanctions lifted over a period of 
time, once compliance had been recognised by the UN Security Council and 
confidence had been restored within the international community. 35 Iran received a 
similar prescription in that the United States sought a moderation of Iran's policies in 
order for a rapprochement to occur, but would maintain sanctions as a means of 
controlling Iran until it moderated its policies deemed provocative by the United 
States. There was thus a degree of analytical conflict between these objectives and 
the conception of it as a containment strategy which one can equate with 
maintenance of the status quo. 36 
Although Lake presented the dual containment strategy as a prudent policy 
undertaking, debate exists on its origins and nature which contrasts with the official 
position. In 1994, F. Gregory Gause III interpreted it as a strategy geared towards 
achieving the wider regional strategic objective of Persian Gulf security. 37 Gause 
32 Martin Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East, " Address to the Soref 
Symposium, Washington, D. C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 18 May 1993.4pp. 
12/07/03 <http: //www. washingtoninstitute. org/pubs/soref/indyk. htm >. 
33 Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States, " Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994). 
34 Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East. " 
35 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States, " 45-50. 
36 F. Gregory Gause 111, US Policy toward Iraq, Emirates Lecture Series, vol. 39 (Abu Dhabi: The 
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2002) 12. 
37 F. Gregory Gause III, "The Illogic of Dual Containment, " Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994): 56-58. 
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recognised that Iran and, to a lesser extent, Iraq were seen to pose a threat towards 
Israel and the peace process, but interpreted the overall dual containment strategy as 
being ultimately geared towards securing US geostrategic interests in the Persian 
Gulf. Whilst Gause maintained that the Clinton administration's dual containment 
policy was premised on geostrategic concerns towards the Persian Gulf, he argued 
that this was subservient to the long term objective of making neighbouring states a 
"sufficient counterweight to both Iran and Iraq. "38 Therefore, Gause effectively 
argues that containment was designed to weaken both countries to a sufficient degree 
in order to usher in a balance of power: through the application of containment, the 
status quo would be enforced and would thus cater for Persian Gulf security. 
Anthony Cordesman also argued in 1994 that the adoption of dual containment was a 
necessity given the inability of the Gulf countries to offer a credible defence against 
their aggressive neighbours. Cordesman comments that "[it] is not solely a function 
of what Iran can do or Iraq can do, it is a function of what the nations in the region 
can do, and it is basically a function of American ability to contain Iranian and Iraqi 
military power. "39 He recognised that such an approach was required in order to 
safeguard vital US political and economic interests. Nevertheless, he conceded that, 
in the case of Iraq, containment would ultimately not be able to prevent an Iraqi 
production of unconventional weapons as it merely slows their development 
40 
Gause, however, went even further by arguing in 1999 that sanctions neither 
weakened Saddam's hold on power, nor stopped his development of unconventional 
weapons . 
41 Nevertheless, both shared the premise that dual containment was 
premised on geostrategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Kissinger lends weight to this 
prescription by echoing Gause's argument that dual containment was a thoroughly 
geostrategic response to the threat both countries posed to US interests in the Persian 
Gulf. 42 
38 Gause III, US Policy toward Iraq 12. 
39 Martin Indyk, et al., "Symposium on Dual Containment: US Policy toward Iran and Iraq, " Middle 
East Policy 3.1 (1994): 13. 
40 Ibid. 
41 F. Gregory Gause III, "Getting It Back on Iraq, " Foreign Affairs 78.3 (1999): 62. 
42 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? 191. 
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In contrast, Gary Sick contended in 1996, that the adoption of a containment policy 
towards Iran was primarily based on serving the strategic priority of the Arab-Israeli 
peace process. 43 He highlighted how it was a policy undertaking which virtually 
mirrored a policy paper authored by Martin Indyk in 1993, prior to him taking office 
in the National Security Council, which called for a containment of the threats Iran 
and Iraq posed to Israel and the peace process itself. Therefore, US bilateral foreign 
policy towards Iran was arguably subordinate to US interests towards the peace 
process. Sick conversely saw US policy towards Iraq under the dual containment 
rubric as being premised on a compliance with UN resolutions: increased Persian 
Gulf security was thus seen by him as a by-product rather than an objective. ' 
Indeed, Sick suggests that this resulted in the United States emerging as a regional 
player rather than an external actor, and was thus able to ensure these objectives 
were achieved. 45 
In what several scholars recognise as a seminal article on this subject, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy refined these interpretations in 
1997. They suggested that the Clinton administration's bilateral policies towards Iran 
and Iraq were part of the mutually reinforcing strategic objectives of supporting the 
peace process, and providing for Persian Gulf security. 46 Thus a mutually compatible 
dual track US geostrategic policy towards the Middle East was applied, and the "dual 
containment strategy" was a mere slogan with little conceptual worth. 
However, in terms of how US policy towards political Islam gels with this equation, 
Fawaz Gerges's important study has demonstrated that Clinton's goal of combating 
the structural causes of radical Islamism has been subservient to wider geostrategic 
concerns premised on maintaining the status quo. Geres writes: "[t]he United States 
has not only supported its traditional friends - in their fight against Islamists - but 
43 Gary Sick, "The United States and Iran: Truth and Consequences, " Contention 5.2 (1996): 59-78. 
44 Gary Sick, "Rethinking Dual Containment, " Survival 40.1 (1998): 5-32. 
as Gary Sick, "US Policy in the Gulf: Objectives and Purpose, " Managing New Developments in the 
Gulf, ed. Rosemary Hollis (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2000) 14. 
46 Zbigniew Brzezinski, et al., "Differentiated Containment, " Foreign Affairs 76.3 (1997): 20-30. 
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has done little to persuade them to open up the political field to existing, legitimate 
opposition forces. "47 The significance here is that unwillingness to promote 
democracy in the face of regional geostrategic interests demonstrates that the grand 
strategic premise of the Clintonian era was not applied in practice. Indeed, this theme 
was also articulated by Maria do Ceu Pinto in 1999: 
In the case of America's friends in the Middle East, the US 
government's overriding interest is to maintain the existing regimes 
in power; their stabilising role, their position regarding the peace 
process and their pro-Western orientation make them important 
regional allies. In order to safeguard the integrity of these regimes, 
the Clinton administration has toned down its promotion of the 
`democratisation agenda' for fear that the opening up of their 
political systems would give the Islamists an opportunity to gain 
power. 48 
Even with the onset of the administration of George W. Bush, there is little dispute 
that foreign policy towards the Middle East actually retained consistency from the 
Clinton administration up until the watershed of the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks. Indeed, Robert Kagan and William Kristol critically remarked that prior to 
the 9/11 attacks, Bush's policy seemed "content to continue walking down dangerous 
paths in foreign and defence policy laid out over the past eight years by Bill 
Clinton. "49 The views of other scholars, such as Kenneth Pollack, were more 
moderate but still identified US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq as showing 
so 
continuity from the preceding Clinton administration. 
47 Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 231. 
48 Maria do Cdu Pinto, Political Islam and the United States: A Study of U. S. Policy Towards Islamist 
Movements in the Middle East (New York: Ithaca Press, 1999) 281-82. 
39 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "Clinton's Foreign Policy Cont., " Weekly Standard 12 Mar. 
2001: 11. 
50 Kenneth Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad? " Foreign Affairs Editors' Choice: The Middle East Crisis, 
ed. Gideon Rose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) 116-32. 
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Moreover, following the attacks of 11 September 2001, whilst there is general 
agreement that significant changes occurred in US foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, there is debate as to how these can be conceptualised and interpreted on a 
regional geostrategic level. The key problem of assessing such issues so close to the 
time in which they have occurred allows for little historical reflection, and thus they 
are uncertain at best. 
From a non-academic perspective, George Friedman argued in 2004 that US regional 
geostrategy towards the Persian Gulf had altered in that it now saw the threat 
emanating from al-Qa'ida as the primary threat to regional and US national 
security. 51 Freedman says that this shifted the focus towards Saudi Arabia's 
counterterrorism efforts as this was believed by the administration to be the key to 
defeating al-Qa'ida. He maintains that this resulted in the United States seeing an 
invasion of Iraq as resulting in a US military presence surrounding Saudi Arabia 
which would have allowed for pressure to be used against the Saudis for them to 
undertake comprehensive counterterrorism initiatives through repression rather than 
political reform based initiative. 52 Although Friedman's interpretation is original, 
there is reason to question whether this satisfactorily explains the origins of US 
foreign policy towards Iraq given that it virtually disregards any concept of a 
political reform based on counterterrorism that scholars widely believe is at the heart 
of combating extremism. 
In contrast, No Daadler and James Lindsay suggest that the 9/11 attacks did not 
result in a change in Bush's outlook on foreign affairs, it merely confirmed them. 
More specifically, they suggest that the March 2003 invasion of Iraq was carried out 
in order to remove the threat Iraq was seen to pose on a geostrategic level to Persian 
Gulf security, in addition to countering the potential threat of Iraqi unconventional 
weapons being transferred to terrorists for use on a wider level. 53 Therefore, they 
51 George Friedman, America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between America 
and Its Enemies (London: Little Brown, 2004) 253-80. 
52 [bid. 
s' No H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Bush's Foreign Policy Revolution, " The George W. Bush 
Presidency: An Early Assessment, ed. Fred I. Greenstein (Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 2003) 125- 
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equate a level of consistency on a geostrategic level in terms of the threat Iraq was 
seen to pose, but nevertheless identify it as having been supplemented by an 
overarching strategy designed to counter the proliferation of unconventional weapons 
by hostile states for fear they could be provided to terrorists. 
Rosemary Hollis offered a more sweeping assessment in 2003, by suggesting that US 
foreign policy towards the Middle East in the post-9/11 international system was 
viewed by the Bush administration as having failed on a geostrategic level, and thus 
security threats, rogue states and stagnant reform had to be tackled directly. 
54 She 
argues that the new approach is to rework the regional order. But importantly, Hollis 
agues that they have been compartmentalised by the Bush administration so they are 
dealt with as individual issues which in essence equates to derogation away from 
geostrategy towards geopolitics. 
55 Therefore, the key issue arising from this 
framework is the extent to which geopolitics, if at all, became guided by the post- 
9/11 global geostrategic outlook which other scholars have identified. 
In terms of whether the US foreign policy has a geostrategic objective towards the 
Middle East, Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, Amy Hawthorne, and Daniel 
Brumberg suggested in 2002 that the Bush administration has adopted a new 
geostrategic agenda that called for the adoption of democracy as part of a Greater 
Middle East Initiative. They suggest that the Bush administration had redefined its 
geostrategy towards the Middle East as resting on the premise of democratisation; 
this was seen as a means of providing regional security and combating the root 
causes of terrorism. 56 Indeed, they maintain that the Bush administration adopted the 
belief that terrorism and political extremism is a product of the undemocratic 
54 Rosemary Hollis, "Getting out of the Iraq Trap, " International Affairs 79.1 (2003): 32-35. 
55 Ibid. 32-33. 
56 Marina Ottway, et al., "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East, " Critical Mission: Essays on 
Democracy Promotion, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002) 
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political structure of Middle Eastern countries. 57 The remedy to this was seen as an 
overall rejection of the Clintonian geostrategy which called for the maintenance of 
the status quo. From this basis, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was undertaken to 
"unleash a democratic tsunami across the Islamic world. "58 
The interpretation of US geostrategy towards the Middle East being premised on the 
adoption of democracy is highly significant. Indeed, it is commensurate with John 
Lewis Gaddis's notion of US grand strategy being geared towards counterterrorism 
and takes account of Ikenberry's thesis that the promotion of liberal democracy is a 
long standing guide for US foreign policy. But in terms of how this gels with the role 
of the Arab-Israeli peace process is unclear and underscores the room for analysis. It 
is possible to infer, however, that Ottaway and Carothers interpret the Bush 
administration as believing the democratisation of the Middle East will make Israel 
more secure and aid the peace process. Nevertheless, questions remain as to how US 
foreign policy calculations towards the peace process fit in with this geostrategy. 
According to Michael Scott Doran in 2003, the US invasion of Iraq can be viewed as 
a key factor in a wider strategy towards achieving a resolution in the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, by way of combating the root causes of terrorism. 59 Indeed, Bill 
Quandt notably echoed and expanded on this line of argument in 2005, by taking the 
position that the Bush administration had come to view its geostrategic priority as 
resting on combating the root causes of terrorism through achieving a resolution in 
the Arab-Israeli dispute. 60 He argues that the adoption of the preventative use of 
force doctrine against rogue states, that were manufacturing or possessing 
57 Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror, " Critical Mission: Essays on 
Democracy Promotion, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003) 
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Democracy Promotion, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003) 
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unconventional weapons, was used as the justification for invading Iraq. 61 However, 
he views this as part of a wider strategic objective of countering the root causes of 
terrorism and ultimately achieving a resolution to the peace process. 62 Specifically, 
Quandt draws a parallel with US engagement following the liberation of Kuwait in 
1991: by removing Iraq as a strategic threat to Israel, a resolution in the peace 
process was more likely to occur. Therefore, on a geostrategic level, the peace 
process had become more important in US foreign policy calculations than before as 
it was now was viewed in terms of combating one of the key root causes of 
extremism. The importance of Quandt's geostrategic interpretation is that it places 
the peace process as the key contextual factor which unpinned US strategy for 
combating the root cause of terrorism. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the 
invasion of Iraq can be equated as having been undertaken to enable a resolution to 
the peace process through removing Israel's geopolitical threats. Indeed, it is possible 
that the peace process was actually subservient to US grand strategy which sought 
the promotion of democracy and freedom as a means for combating the wider root 
causes of terrorism in addition to seeing a Palestinian Authority's adoption of such 
principles as a means to actually achieving a resolution through meaningful 
diplomacy. 
In sum, there is a level of ambiguity as to how US regional strategy towards the 
Middle East in the time frame of this study can be conceptualised. The problem this 
raises is that it does not allow for a clear determination of how US foreign policy can 
be interpreted with specific reference to the wider global geostrategic interpretations 
that have already been discussed. This provides justification for a closer inspection of 
the interpretations of the trajectory taken by US foreign policy towards the three key 
areas of this case study. The purpose behind this is that a clear understanding of US 
foreign policy trajectory, which should allow for a distinction between tactics and 
strategy, will allow for a clear conceptualisation within a geostrategic framework. 
The following will, therefore, review the competing interpretations of the trajectory 
US foreign policy took towards the Persian Gulf; the Arab-Israeli peace process; and 
Political Islam during 1993-2003. 
61 Quandt, Peace Process 3rd ed. 396-402. 
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-37- 
4.0 INTERPRETATIONS OF US GEOPOLITICAL FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARDS THE NODDLE EAST 1993-2003 
As already highlighted, there are competing conceptions on US geostrategy but, 
predictably, there is also disagreement on the trajectory US foreign policy took in 
order to achieve such objectives. The focus of this section will, therefore, be based 
on the trajectory of US foreign policy. 
In terms of Persian Gulf security it is necessary at this stage to demarcate US foreign 
policy on a bilateral basis towards Iran and Iraq. US foreign policy towards the 
individual Gulf States will not be included as the scope of this thesis is limited to a 
discussion of Iran and Iraq under the rubric of Persian Gulf security. 
In terms of the trajectory of US foreign policy towards Iraq, Gause maintains that 
although Clinton continued George H. W. Bush's tactical policy of indefinitely 
containing Iraq through UN sanctions as a means of achieving US strategic 
objectives towards Persian Gulf security, this tactical policy altered towards a regime 
change policy in 1998.3 Indeed, Gause quite rightly highlights that on account of 
Congressional legislation, US policy officially changed towards that of regime 
change in October 1998. Gause cites domestic political factors within the United 
States as being the cause. Although Gause recognises that Clinton also provided 
limited support for opposition groups in varying degrees since 1993, he suggests that 
this was merely part of a means of keeping pressure on Iraq to comply with UN 
resolutions. 
In contrast to this, however, Gary Sick contends that US tactical policy towards Iraq 
altered towards a regime based approach in 1997. Importantly, Sick highlights that 
this was an executive led change, and thus brings into question what caused a change 
in US tactical policy. But, of equal significance, this challenges the view that tactical 
policy only changed following the Congressional legislation in October 1998. 
63 Gause III, US Policy toward Iraq 11-14. 
-38- 
David Wurmser took a similar position in 1999, but argued that the change in US 
tactical policy towards regime change occurred in 1995.64 He suggests that a 
distinction needs to be made between overt and covert policy: overtly, US foreign 
policy was officially premised on containment based on the need for a compliance 
with UN resolutions; covertly, Clinton had changed tactics in 1995 towards regime 
change on account of the international context where US policy was unravelling. The 
significance is that US policy during the Clinton administration arguably went 
through three stages to achieve its wider strategic objectives: containment through 
sanctions; covert regime change policy; and official regime change policy. 
Although Wurmser's account is convincing, there appears to be justification for 
questioning why the Clinton administration only adopted a tactical policy of regime 
change in 1995, when interpretations of the administration of George H. W. Bush 
clearly suggest this tactical policy of seeking regime change was applied during his 
administration from 1991-1993.65 In other words, why does the academic scholarship 
suggest a gap in US tactical policy towards regime change in the time period 1993- 
1995? Officially the Clinton administration held a different policy from its 
predecessor up until 1998, but the adoption of a covert policy towards regime change 
as early as 1995 suggests a possibility that a policy continuation towards achieving 
regime change may have occurred since 1991, thus justifying further in-depth 
examination. 
However, with the onset of the Bush administration in January 2001, it was officially 
premised on regime change as a result of Congressional legislation that was signed 
into law in October 1998. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that it continued 
the Clinton administration's approach of containing Iraq through sanctions as a 
means of controlling the geostrategic threat it posed until an internal regime change 
had been achieved. 66 Nevertheless, the key divide is generally accepted as being the 
64 David Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein (Washington, D. C.: 
AEI Press, 1999) 7-29. 
65 Madeleine Albright and William Woodward, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: 
Macmillan, 
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attacks of 11 September 2001. With the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, US policy 
had clearly changed tactics. The issue is, therefore, what were the origins of this 
change in foreign policy and was it carried out for the objective of regime change in 
that had been official policy since 1998, or was it carried out for alternative reasons? 
Indeed, as the above discussion on geostrategy indicates, there is reason to believe 
that the strategic objectives had changed which brought about a change in tactical 
foreign policy. 
Given these trajectories in US bilateral policy towards Iraq, there is a clear ambiguity 
on what the nature of US tactical foreign policy was in order to achieve its wider 
objectives. Therefore, a qualitative foreign policy analysis is justified in order to 
clarify the trajectory of US foreign policy towards Iraq through a descriptive and 
analytical epistemology. 
In terms of US policy toward Iran there are fewer disputes about its trajectory. It is 
generally accepted wisdom that US containment policy towards Iran steadily 
hardened since the adoption of the dual containment strategy. Indeed, it is 
commonly accepted by scholars that the impetus for this trajectory was the domestic 
political environment within the United States. 67 Congressional legislation is seen as 
having subjugated the foreign policy prerogative of the executive, and forced a 
tightening and expansion of unilateral sanctions in order to achieve the objectives of 
dual containment. However, Hossein Alikhani reminds us through a bureaucratic 
foreign policy analysis that although US policy was primarily motivated by 
domestic Congressional considerations, Iran's behaviour towards terrorism; its 
opposition towards the peace process; and the issue of weapons of mass destruction, 
were ultimately provocative policies which perpetuated such a trajectory. 68 
But the election of President Mohammed Khatami is understood as the key 
contextual factor which promoted a change in tact. Stephen Fairbanks comments 
that "Iran's 1997 election process was a stake in an evolution toward greater 
67 For an excellent discussion see Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran 
and America (New York: Random House, 2004) 265-349. 
68 Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000) 402- 
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pluralism and democracy. "69 He stresses that the opportunities presented by this 
election needed to be immediately realised. He maintains that although Khatami's 
reformist agenda faced real problems, its success was ultimately dependent on 
reciprocity from the United States. Ruhi Ramazani highlights that Khatami's 
reforms were moving towards a "faqih-guided democratic peace. "70 Ramazani 
concludes that Khatami's reforms are directed towards greater democratisation. He 
stresses that such reformist moves were a product of complex internal reforms, and 
most importantly, are in the interests of the United States . 
71 He also argues that 
although Washington initially failed to recognise Khatami's reformist movement, it 
ultimately ushered in a policy shift to support Khatami's position base. 72 
Although Ramazani is correct to highlight that Khatami's election was a watershed 
in Clintonian foreign policy towards Iran as Washington did indeed move towards 
fostering closer relations with Khatami, Kenneth Katzman cautions that 
Washington's policy remained consistent. He explains that it maintained its 
containment strategy, and only made subtle moves towards engagement. 73 Moreover, 
Katzman goes onto conclude that following the re-election of Khatami in 2000, the 
Clinton administration reaffirmed this subtle dual track policy of engagement and 
containment. 
But with onset of the Bush administration, it is generally accepted that a policy 
change did not occur until after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks as the Bush 
administration was involved in a policy review which was not concluded in the 
preceding time frame. 74 But in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Kenneth Pollack argues 
that up until January 2002, there were signs of cooperation and engagement based on 
69 Stephen C. Fairbanks, "A New Era for Iran, " Middle East Policy 5.3 (1997): 55. 
70 Ruhi K. Ramazani, The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement: Towards an Integrated US Policy 
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72 Ibid. 
73 Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: Current Developments and US Policy, " CRS Report for Congress, 
(1B93033), Washington, D. C.: CRS, Congress, 9 May. 2002,10-17. 
74 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle 324. 
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mutual interests. 75 However, he argues that following Iran's implication in the 
smuggling of illicit arms to groups aligned with the Palestinian authority, Iran was 
viewed as a sponsor of terrorism and was thus included as part of an `axis of evil'. 
This set the tone for US relations with Iran for the remainder of the time frame of this 
study. 76 Nevertheless, it is worth questioning whether the substantive engagement 
and cooperation in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks was tactical or strategic. 
Indeed, if we accept some of the wider geostrategic conceptualisations that indicate 
the Bush administration had premised itself on the objective of pursuing 
democratisation for the purpose of counterterrorism, the actual overriding objective 
could be defined as seeking a change in regime in Iran and thus a rapprochement 
would be seen by some as running counter to this. The importance of determining 
whether US policy towards Iran post-9/11 was tactical or strategic would allow for a 
conceptualisation of whether the promotion of democracy had indeed became a 
geostrategic priority. 
In terms of the interpretations of the trajectory of US involvement in the peace 
process, the Clinton administration's first term of office has been described by Avi 
Shlaim as being one in which "Clinton refused to put pressure on Israel and adopted 
a hands-off attitude to the peace process. "77 In order to demonstrate this approach, 
Shlaim argues that Washington refrained from applying pressure on Syria, and 
simply confined US diplomatic efforts to "carrying messages back and forth". 
78 Bill 
Quandt supports this view by highlighting Washington's policy towards the peace 
process which can be categorised as "letting Israel set the pace for negotiations. "79 
Moreover, he argues that Washington preferred to have a laissez-faire attitude to the 
peace process by not applying pressure. Nevertheless, Quandt argues that the first 
Clinton administration did maintain a policy of facilitating the negotiating between 
75 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle 349-58. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin, 2000) 511. 
78 Ibid. 531. 
79 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 
2nd ed. (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 339. 
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the parties when required, but saw the onus being on the parties themselves. 
80 
Interestingly, Quandt seems to hint that the reason the Clinton administration took 
such an approach was simply because of a pro-Israeli stance. Therefore, by 
Washington allowing Israel to control the pace of negotiations and by refraining 
from the application of US pressure on the parties in the dispute, Clinton was 
ultimately acting in a pro-Israeli manner towards the peace process. 
Whilst Quandt equates Clinton's involvement in the peace process as that of a 
facilitator by virtue of his sensitivity to his political position in Congress, he does 
highlight that a change occurred following the election of Ehud Barak. Quandt 
argues that Clinton saw an opportunity for the achievement of a historic agreement 
and was ultimately driven by personal ambition. 
81 Nevertheless, following the 
election of George W. Bush, Quandt contends that US foreign policy initially 
reverted to disengagement as a result of the context of a high profile diplomatic 
failure by Clinton. But following the attacks on 11 September, Quandt interprets US 
policy as having moved to a policy of engagement as a resolution was viewed as 
being commensurate with the overarching objective of combating the root cause of 
terrorism. 82 
A similar view was advocated by Robert Freedman. He saw the initial months of the 
Bush Presidency as premised on disengagement resulting from the failure of 
Clinton's high profile effort at Camp David. Nevertheless, he suggests that 
"Palestinian terrorism" was also a key factor which thwarted Bush's efforts prior to 
11 September 2001.83 But following 9/11, Freedman maintains that this had a 
defining impact on the manner in which Arafat was viewed by Washington. He 
characterises Bush's approach post-9/11 as remaining reasonably consistent with the 
main exception that Arafat had become persona non grata as a result of his alleged 
80 Quandt, Peace Process 2nd ed. 321-40. 
81 Ibid. 355-76. 
82 Quandt, Peace Process 3rd ed. 385-412. 
83 Robert 0. Freedman, "The Bush Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Record of Its 
First Four Years, " The Middle East Review of International Affairs 9.1 (2005), 27/03/05 
<www. meria. ida. ac. il/journal/2005/issue 1 /j v9no 1 a4. html>. 
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links with terrorism. Therefore, the emphasis had shifted towards promoting 
democratic leadership within Palestinian Authority. 
In sum, the available literature indicates that there are clear disagreements within the 
academic scholarship on the trajectory of US foreign policy towards Middle East. In 
particular, US policy towards Iraq shows a clear degree of ambiguity as to when 
Clinton's strategic policy became centred on regime change. But overall, given these 
ambiguities there is justification for conducting an empirical examination, using an 
analytical and descriptive epistemology, in order to clarify the character and 
contextual origins of US foreign policy towards these three interlinked areas. Whilst 
this has merit in its own right, its importance for this thesis is that it will serve as a 
case study to assess the grand strategic conceptualisation of US foreign policy 1993- 
2003 that will be established in the subsequent chapter. 
5.0 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
From the above survey of the literature on US foreign policy, it is clear that there is a 
degree of ambiguity as to its strategic rubric, nature and implementation. 
Specifically, the existing scholarship offers competing interpretations on US grand 
strategy during the Clintonian era and in the post-9/11 international system. Some 
scholars have contended that the Bush administration's response to the attacks 
marked a reaffirmation of a long standing foreign policy strategy, whilst others view 
a fundamental redesign of US grand strategy having taken place. As has already been 
outlined, the premise of this thesis is that a fundamental departure from post-Cold 
War US grand strategy occurred in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But in order 
to provide a more valid interpretation, a grounded qualitative examination of US 
foreign policy is justified. 
By using US foreign policy towards the Middle East as a case study, it will be 
possible to identify the dynamics of US grand strategy 1993-2003. However, the 
above review has also underscored that US geostrategy towards the Middle East is 
also subject to competing prescriptions. This is also the case with US foreign policy 
towards the three key areas of: Persian Gulf security; the Arab Israeli peace process; 
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and political Islam. Therefore, by using a foreign policy analysis towards these areas, 
this thesis provides a contribution to the current body of scholarship on the three 
levels of. US grand strategy; US geostrategy towards the Middle East; and US 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. By the nature of the methodology proposed, 
it will provide for a clear interpretation of these interlinked areas. 
Given this, the subsequent chapter will provide comparative observations on Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush. This will be attacked through a traditional foreign 
policy analysis. This will establish the idiosyncratic and bureaucratic differences that 
have contributed towards their differential foreign policies. But most importantly, it 
will also establish the grand strategy of the post-Cold War era and the nature of 
departure from this in the wake of the trauma of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This will 
then be used as the methodological framework for the case study analysis. 
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Chapter III 
Comparative Observations on 
William J. Clinton and George W. Bush 
-46- 
"No foreign policy - no matter how ingenious - has any chance of success if it is 
born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none. " 
Henry Kissinger 
August 1973 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The most distinguishing feature of US foreign policy is the level to which varying 
degrees of continuity and change stem from each successive administration. Each 
President brinks a new outlook, interpretation and agenda for US policy. The 
President's choice of staff disseminates change on a bureaucratic level which in turn 
has an impact on policy. The importance of recognising such factors is necessary in 
order for a comprehensive foreign policy analysis and interpretation to be achieved. 
Within the context of this case study, there is a need to provide for comparative 
observations on Bill Clinton's and George W. Bush's administrations as such 
analysis allows for a clearer understanding of the factors which contributed towards 
foreign policy formation and trajectory. This will be achieved through a comparative 
foreign policy analysis. ' But significantly, it will outline a clear hypothesis which 
suggests that a radical change in US grand strategy occurred in the wake of the 
trauma of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Specifically, the nature of the Bush Doctrine and 
the manner in which the international environment was interpreted allows for an 
interpretation that the response to the attacks marked a departure from the post-Cold 
War towards the War on Terror era. This will serve as an overarching framework 
from which a metatheoretical foreign policy analysis case study towards the Middle 
East can be conducted in order to test and offer an understanding of the origins of US 
foreign policy during the time period 1993-2003. 
Deborah J. Gerner, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Exhilarating Eclecticism, Intriguing Enigmas, " 
International Studies Notes 16.3 (1991): 4-19.; Deborah J. Gerner, "The Evolution of the Study of 
Foreign Policy, " Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, eds. 
Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick Jude Haney (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995) 17- 
32.; and Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and 
Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) 342-64. 
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The following analysis will provide an examination of the idiosyncratic differences 
between Clinton and Bush in order to highlight how their background, outlook, and 
character would have had an impact on foreign policy. A second area which will be 
examined is that of the bureaucratic level. This will highlight the idiosyncratic 
differences of key staff members from both presidencies whose background and 
beliefs are important factors that allow for a deeper understanding of the origins of 
foreign policy trajectories. The final section will examine how this foreign policy 
manifested and contrasted under each presidency. 
2.0 IDIOSYNCRATIC ATTRIBUTES 
One of the key elements in foreign policy formation is that of the individual level 
which can lend itself to more psychological prescriptions. How political decision 
makers construct a view of the world in their minds is an essential component in 
understanding foreign policy. 3 Such ontological factors would have an impact on 
how foreign policy issues are perceived, interpreted and acted upon. 4 
The idiosyncratic differences between Bill Clinton and George W. Bush are 
significant in that their style of leadership, political ethos, and vision differ markedly. 
In terms of their background, the differences are stark. Whilst Bush followed in the 
path of John Quincy Adams who also succeeded his father as President in 1825, 
Clinton grew up in a modest household at the hands of a drunken and physically 
abusive stepfather. 
2 Philip E. Tetlock and Charles B. McGuire, "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy, " American 
Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown 
University, 2005) 484-500. 
3 Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in 
Foreien Policy Decisionmaking 111-91. 
4 Robert Snyder, et al., "Decision Making Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy, " International 
Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969) 199-206.; 
Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception, " International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. 
Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969) 239-54.; John Vogler, "Perspectives on the Foreign Policy 
System: Psychological Approaches, " Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems 
Approach, eds. Michael Clarke and Brian White (Aldershot: Elgar, 1989) 135-58.; and Graham T. 
Allison, Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 1971) 128-42. 
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Clinton enrolled for his bachelor's degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown 
University. He subsequently attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar for two 
years. Bush went to Yale where he graduated with a bachelor's degree in History. 
Whilst Clinton subsequently went to Yale Law School, Bush opted for Harvard 
Business School. This academic and professional background had an impact on 
decision making style: whilst Clinton approached issues in a lawyerly systematic 
manner, Bush's style was more characteristic of demonstrating leadership through 
decisive action. Although Bush's academic performance at Yale and Harvard could 
not compete with the excellent academic credentials of Carter or Clinton, his SAT 
scores were, nonetheless, very impressive. 
The most important difference about their activities at university level, however, was 
that they took different positions during the anti-Vietnam war movement. Clinton 
was active and vocally supportive of the movement during his undergraduate studies 
at Georgetown, and his subsequent move as a Rhodes Scholar to University College, 
Oxford, was something that his political opponents would later seize on as evidence 
of his avoidance of the draft. Comparatively, Bush's reputation at university was 
more apolitical and hedonistic. In contrast to Clinton, Bush enrolled with the Texas 
Air National Guard. But the importance of their differing political outlooks at the 
time of the anti-Vietnam War movement is significant: the Clintonian administration 
was, according to Henry Kissinger, "the first staffed by many individuals who came 
out of the Vietnam protest. "5 Bush's senior staff by comparison, was comprised of 
more politically seasoned individuals: many had served in previous Republican 
administrations dating back to Richard Nixon. 6 Indeed, Kissinger is correct to 
highlight that generational forces are significant factors in how policy issues are 
perceived and acted upon. 
Their route to the White House was also different. Clinton's first attempt at a 
political career began in the wake of Nixon's resignation in 1974, when he ran 
unsuccessfully for a Congressional seat in Arkansas. Clinton subsequently ran for the 
5 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 
Rev. ed. (London: Free Press, 2002) 29. 
6 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004) 14- 
19. 
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State Attorney General which he then used as a platform for the Governorship in 
1978. Elected as the youngest Governor in the United States, he held the position 
until 1982, but was then re-elected again in 1984 and ultimately used this as a 
platform for the presidency. Bush also unsuccessfully contested a Congressional seat, 
but his political career really began in 1994 when he won the Texas governorship by 
capitalising on the political dissatisfaction with Clinton's "political ineptitude by 
pressing for and failing to achieve major health care reform. "7 Bush also capitalised 
on the breaking Lewinski scandal in 1998 to discredit his Democrat opponent and 
achieve re-election. 
Whilst Clinton clearly had more political experience in office before winning the 
presidency, Bush still had a wealth of experience from an inside exposure to his 
father's and the Reagan presidency. But even more importantly, their differential 
political backgrounds had an impact on their political ethos in general: Clinton's 
political ability was fostered through domestic politics, whilst Bush had a more 
rounded exposure but clearly still lacked the level of experience in office Clinton had 
accumulated. Either way, neither could be described as foreign policy orientated 
before taking office in the same manner of Geore H. W. Bush. 
In terms of their religious outlook, Clinton was a Baptist whilst Bush was a born- 
again evangelical Christian. 8 Whilst there is no question that Clinton was a devout 
Baptist, there is little indication that this had a bearing on his policy during office. 
Indeed, Clinton frequently spoke of the need to maintain a clear separation between 
the church and state. 9 But for George W. Bush religion is much more significant in 
that he regards it as having shaped his worldview outlook and purpose in life. 10 The 
origins of Bush's religious outlook is significant in that, although several Presidents 
have been noted Christians - Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter and Richard Nixon - the 
7 Stephen Graubard, The Presidents: The Transformation of the American Presidency from Theodore 
Roosevelt to George W. Bush (London: Penguin, 2005) 669. 
8 David Aikman and George W. Bush, A Man of Faith: The Spiritual Journey of George W. Bush 
(Nashville: W Publishing, 2004) 111-34. 
9 William J. Clinton, "Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, " 
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1993), vol., lpp. vols. 
10 Kevin P. Phillips, American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House 
of Bush (New York: Viking Penguin, 2004) 49-51. 
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Bush presidency appeared to be the most `faith-based' to hold the White House. 
" 
But crucially, Bush appeared more than any of his predecessors to draw a policy 
guide from his spiritualism, 12 and it seems reasonable to conclude that his beliefs 
have complemented the outlook of key members of his administration on the basis of 
their similarity. 
The differences were significant even with their election to the presidency. Clinton's 
November 1992 election victory saw him inaugurated on 20 January 1993, as the 
forty-second President of the United States and also as the first Democrat President 
since Jimmy Carter. Clinton won by a comfortable majority over the incumbent 
George H. W. Bush by wisely recognising that the key issue for the electorate was 
the economy. An often quoted phase, "it's the economy stupid, " typified Clinton's 
highly successful 1992 Presidential electoral campaign. He also entered office with 
the 103`d Congress (1992-1994) being Democrat controlled. Although the US 0 ID 
economy was experiencing recession and required immediate attention, Clinton 
undoubtedly took office in a secure domestic political position. Nevertheless, the 
Democrat's control of Congress was short-lived as control was lost in 1994, and was 
not regained during his two terms of office. 13 
In comparison, Bush became the first President since Benjamin Harrison in 1888, 
and only the fourth since independence, to win the Electoral College vote but lose the 
popular vote. The controversy surrounding the vote count in Florida, where the 
Supreme Court had to rule on the outcome, tainted Bush's first term on the grounds 
of legitimacy. Nevertheless, Bush entered office with a firm Republican majority in 
Congress and a strong economic environment which was only beginning to show 
signs of slowdown. 
11 Howard Fineman, "Bush and God, " Newsweek Mar. 10 2003: 3-5. 
12 Fred Barnes, "God and Man in the Oval Office, " Weekly Standard (2003), vol. 008,3pp. vols., 2.; 
Stephen Mansfield, The Faith of George W. Bush (Lake Mary, Fla.: Charisma House, 2003) 149-76.; 
and Paul Ken-or, God and George W. Bush: A Spiritual Life (New York: Regan Books, 2004) 89- 
290. 
" David Brady and D. Sunshine Hillygus, "Assessing the Clinton Presidency: The Political 
Constraints of Legislative Policy, " The Clinton Riddle: Perspectives on the Forty-Second President, 
eds. Todd G. Shields, Jeannie M. Whayne and Donald R. Kelley (Arkansas: University of Arkansas 
Press, 2004) 47-78. 
- 51 - 
Although both had differential electoral victories, the most important factor was in 
their contrasting styles of leadership. It is generally accepted that Clinton treated 
issues in a highly systematic and unstructured manner in order to explore them to 
their full potential. 14 The propensity for lengthy meetings may have been a good 
means of fully exploring policy issues, but it also highlights Clinton's lack of focus 
and decisiveness as a leader. The importance being that Clinton's approach favoured 
decision making on an ad hoc level, whilst trying to accommodate as many different 
positions as possible. In other words, Clinton sought wide ranging consent and 
approval rather than being driven by an objective or ideology. Whilst such a style has 
merits of allowing for informed decisions which are more utilitarian, it is also an 
inherently weak style in that clarity of purpose and direction would be lacking. Either 
way, it appears reasonable to conclude from the available evidence that Clinton had 
an aversion to foreign policy risk taking. Stephen Graubard appropriately asks: 
Why, then, was [Clinton] unable to address the problems that 
surfaced abroad, that recommended a major reconsideration of 
policies pursued by his two Republican predecessors? The short 
answer is that Clinton, like Bush and Reagan, feared any 
engagement that carried substantial risk, defined as the return of 
American body bags. '5 
By comparison, Bush saw his position as the Commander in Chief who did not get 
immersed in finer details in the way that Clinton had so typically done. 16 The focus 
was, therefore, on taking decisions once recommendations had been formulated, 
whilst giving general direction for policy. 
17 The limitation of such an approach was 
that the President became more dependent on the advice of senior staff, but it does 
have its own merit in that there is clarity of purpose through decisiveness. Indeed, 
14 Betty Glad, "Bill Clinton: The Character Issue Revisited, " The Clinton Riddle: Perspectives on the 
Forty-Second President, eds. Todd G. Shields, Jeannie M. Whayne and Donald R. Kelley (Arkansas: 
University of Arkansas Press, 2004) 1-22. 
15 Graubard, The Presidents: The Transformation of the American Presidency from Theodore 
Roosevelt to George W. Bush 648. 
16 Fred I. Greenstein, "The Leadership Style of George W. Bush, " The George W. Bush Presidency: 
An Early Assessment, ed. Fred I. Greenstein (Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 2003) 1-16. 
"David Frum, The Right Man: An inside Account of the Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush 
(New York: Random House, 2003) 12-74. 
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this allows for a style of leadership epitomised by Ronald Reagan. But in comparison 
to Reagan and Clinton, George W. Bush appears to have been more comfortable in 
using American power in general. This was especially the case following the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001. 
In terms of a worldview, both candidates did premise themselves on a platform that 
the United States should play an active role in world affairs: this is hardly surprising 
as this is a common trait that every major Presidential candidate has positioned 
themselves on since the end of the Second World War. 
18 For Bush, the promotion of 
American values was clearly commensurate with US interests. Indeed, he notably 
held in high esteem Natan Sharansky's arguments that democracy and freedom were 
the universal remedies to tyranny and extremism. 
19 But as early as 1999, Bush 
commented that: 
[T]he basic principles of human freedom and dignity are 
universal... Some have tried to pose a choice between American 
ideals and American interests - between who we are and how we 
act. But the choice is false. America, by decision and destiny, 
promotes political freedom - and gains the most when democracy 
advances. America believes in free markets and free trade - and 
benefits most when markets are opened. America is a peaceful 
power - and gains the greatest dividend from democratic stability. 
20 
Bush saw his position as being in direct comparison to Clinton, whose foreign policy 
he alluded to as being "action without vision, activity without priority, and missions 
without end. "21 But in terms of Bush's vision, Robert Kagan characterised it as 
having "no hint of a pseudo-realist notion that American principles have to be set 
' No H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy 
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 2003) 36. 
19 Anonymous, "The Odd Couple, " Economist Online (2005), vol., 3pp. vols.; and Natan Sharansky 
and Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004) 18-38. 
20 George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism, " Remarks at the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library (Simi Valley, California: FAS, 1999), vol., 8pp. vols. 
21 Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism. 
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aside in favor of exclusive concentration on America's vital national interests. "22 
Interestingly this is a worldview which is notably similar to Ronald Reagan's 
outlook. 23 Nevertheless, Bush's perception of American values being universal and 
their promotion being in US national interests, underscores the point that he had a 
neo-Reaganite vision of international affairs. 24 
When compared with Clinton, there are surprising similarities in that he also saw the 
promotion of democracy and freedom as being in US national interests. According to 
Clinton, "[t]he defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world 
aren't merely a reflection of our deepest values; they are vital to our national 
interests. Global democracy means nations at peace with one another, open to one 
another's ideas and one another's commerce. "25 This vision articulated by Clinton 
prior to taking office was maintained throughout his two terms of office; however, he 
also saw geoeconomics as a key addition component. Clinton remarked, "[o]ur 
economic strength must become a central defining element of our national security 
policy. "26 Indeed, this was commensurate with his domestic platform of defining the 
economy as his primary policy concern. Clinton's vision was, therefore, premised on 
dual strategic objectives. The importance of this for foreign policy analysis is, 
however, that in certain circumstances such objectives could be contradictory: the 
promotion of democratic reform could unbalance the status quo and thus be to the 
detriment of geoeconomics. Therefore, the key issue is the extent to which such 
strategies were applied in practice and served as a strategic guide for foreign policy. 
Overall, there are noticeable differences in the background, outlook, and leadership 
style of Bush and Clinton. But more importantly, such factors highlight a differential 
approach to how America's role in the world was perceived, and leadership styles 
22 Robert Kagan, "Distinctly American Internationalism, " Weekly Standard 29 Nov. 1999: 6-9. 
23 Graubard, The Presidents: The Transformation of the American Presidency from Theodore 
Roosevelt to George W. Bush 547-87. 
24 Hugh Heclo, "The Political Ethos of George W. Bush, " The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early 
Assessment, ed. Fred I. Greenstein (Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 2003) 37-39. 
25 William J. Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, " Speech at Georgetown University 
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1991), vol., 3pp. vols. 
26 William J. Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security. 
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that would have had a bearing on policy formation. Nonetheless, it is also important 
to recognise the general bureaucratic differences which played a key role. Whilst it is 
outside the scope of this thesis to explore how individual decisions were bartered on 
a bureaucratic level, the following section will draw attention to the idiosyncratic 
differences of senior staff. 
3.0 IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON ELITE DECISION MAKERS 
Whilst Clinton and Bush do have clear idiosyncratic differences, it is also of 
significance that this extended to the very character of their administrations. 
Clinton's choice of staff is telling as they closely mirrored his own style and outlook. 
The importance of Clinton's choice of staff for foreign policy was that they shared 
his general lack of vision and caution in American foreign policy. This contributed to 
the administration's lack of strategic clarity and purpose in foreign policy matters. 
In the first Clinton administration, the appointment of Warren Christopher as 
Secretary of State, a distinguished lawyer who had been the Deputy Secretary of 
State in the Carter administration, was viewed by many as a safe bet. However, 
although Christopher was widely regarded as an efficient and capable bureaucrat, he 
was also seen as "lacking originality and beliefs of his own. "27 Given Clinton's 
lawyerly and at times indecisive character, the weakness of Christopher in pressing 
for his own beliefs would have resulted in a relatively low key input from the State 
department in foreign policy formation. Moreover, this contributed towards a 
reactive based foreign policy rather than one that was striving for clearly defined 
objectives. 
A similar appointment was made in the form of Anthony Lake as National Security 
Advisor. Unlike Christopher, Lake was far from not having his own opinions: he was 
notably critical of the Vietnam policy whilst he was on the Kissinger's national 
security staff during the Nixon administration and resigned over the covert bombing 
Z' David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 
2001)174. 
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of Cambodia. But in Lake, Clinton had an individual who shared his sentiments over 
Vietnam and took an equally cautious approach to the application of US military 
power. "Lake was a Wilsonian figure in an era that was less and less Wilsonian"28 
David Halberstam writes. In many respects, Kissinger is correct that key members of 
Clinton's staff were opposed to Vietnam and thus had a particular generational 
outlook on the international environment. 29 But although Lake was influential in 
devising strategy, his relationship with Clinton has been described as formal, and 
thus it is unlikely that he was able to exert a level of influence that some of his more 
notable predecessors had done. 30 
However across the board, it is striking that the first Clinton administration was 
devoid of individuals who had an inclination towards making, use of US power 
projection capability. This was underscored by Les Aspin at Defence, and James 
Woolsey at the CIA, who found that they did not enjoy open access to Clinton. 31 
With Aspin, Clinton's choice was poor as he was ill qualified to run a bureaucracy as 
large and complex as the Pentagon, even though he had an excellent command of 
defence issues. 32 When compared to Robert McNamara, Aspin was a relatively weak 
Secretary of Defence. Given Clinton's unstructured style of leadership and focus on 
domestic and, in particular, economic affairs, foreign policy was given less attention 
when compared to previous administrations and this was compounded by the 
idiosyncrasies of the key people he appointed. 33 
Few changes occurred, however, with the onset of the second Clinton administration 
in 1996. The appointment of Madeline Albright as Secretary of State was a notably 
change which gave the State Department a higher profile. Albright was a highly 
28Ibid. 286. 
29 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? 29. 
30 John F. Harris, "New Security Adviser Berger Is Known as Consensus Builder, " Washington Post 6 
Dec. 1996: A27. 
31 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals 244. 
3- Graubard, The Presidents: The Transformation of the American Presidency from Theodore 
Roosevelt to George W. Bush 635. 
33 Ibid. 629-30. 
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N 
talented and articulate diplomat, who was more charismatic than Christopher, but she 
was not noted for having a particular ideology: "no one associated her with any 
particular view or wing of the party. "34 Therefore, as with Clinton's previous senior 
level appointments, Albright was a highly capable individual but did not articulate a 
sense of purpose in foreign policy which would have filled the void left by Clinton's 
lack of decisiveness, and weak vision in US foreign relations. 
At the National Security Council, Sandy Berger replaced Tony Lake. Berger was a 
long-time friend of Clinton and had been Lake's deputy since 1993. Berger 
immediately confined himself to pursuing what had become the defining strategy of 
the Clintonian presidency: geoeconomics. According to Berger, he saw his purpose 
as promoting "a new international economic architecture for expanding trade and 
creating American jobs in the global economy. "35 Whilst this underscored the 
strategic outlook of the administration, it also was more indicative of lack of clarity 
in which foreign policy was treated as geoeconomics is not a substitute for 
geostrategy. 36 
Overall, on a bureaucratic level the Clintonian presidency was marked by a cautious 
approach towards international affairs that generally seems to have resonated 
throughout both administrations. Indeed, Clinton's choice of candidates appears to 
have mirrored his own idiosyncrasies. 
In direct comparison, George W. Bush's administration was notably comprised of 
strong-willed characters that had a clear worldview before taking office. Bush's 
foreign policy team was "mostly drawn from people who had served in the third and 
fourth tiers of his father's administration. "37 Most importantly, several held a 
common outlook on international affairs that can be likened to the neoconservativism 
34 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals 386. 
35 Harris, "New Security Adviser Berger Is Known as Consensus Builder, " A27. 
36 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? 19. 
37 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy 22. 
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originally spawned by Leo Strauss. 39 Indeed, Condoleezza Rice famously coined the 
term "Vulcans" to describe Bush's foreign policy team. 39 It is, therefore, pertinent to 
provide a discussion of neoconservatism in the following section with specific regard 
to how this characterised the Bush administration. 
3.1 The Neoconservative School 
As a school of thought neoconservatism grew from the left wing radicalisation of the 
1960s which was primarily a product of the anti-Vietnam War movement. A number 
of left wing liberal intellectuals became disillusioned with the anti-Americanism of 
the period and began to reassert against this counterculture. Norman Podhoretz 
writes: 
Neoconservatism came into the world to combat the dangerous lies 
that were being spread by the radicalism of the 1960s and that were 
being accepted as truth by the established liberal institutions of the 
day. More passionately and more effectively than any other group, 
the neoconservatives exposed those lies for what they were: an 
expression of hatred, rooted in utopian greed, for the life lived in this 
country, and the major weapon in a campaign to deprive it of the will 
to defend itself against its enemies in the world outside. 40 
Although neoconservative intellectuals were of left wind origin themselves, their 
critique of the `radicalised' left of the 1960s proved to be the key divide which saw a 
new intellectual school emerge. This became more pronounced as a neoconservative 
perspective of the Welfare state developed into a critique of the expansionist policy 
epitomised by the New Deal. Through this reaction to left wing ideology, 
neoconservatism gradually became more identifiable with traditional right wing 
conservatism. 
38 Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004) 141-43. 
39 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans 1-9. 
40 Norman Podhoretz, Neoconservatism: A Eulogy, 1996, AEI Press, Available: 
http: //www. aei. org/publications/pub1D. 18103/pub_detail. asp, 10/08/05 2005. 
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A further key pillar of neoconservatism is anticommunism. This can be broadened 
out into the desire for the promotion of Wilsonian ideals. Although traditional 
conservatives were also noted for their anticommunist zeal, their focus was primarily 
on the risks from internal subversion. Senator Joe McCarthy's zealous 
anticommunism within American society epitomised this approach. Neoconservative 
elites approached the issue on a much wider perspective, focusing primarily on the 
external risk of communist aggression against liberal democracies. President 
Reajan's ardent anticommunism meshed well with the views being articulated by 
neoconservative intellectuals and his view that a clear pursuit of freedom, liberty, 
justice and equality as universal ideals was wholly commensurate with this agenda. 
Indeed, such values are also seen as fostering peaceful relations as this is viewed as 
the norm amongst like-minded democratic countries. With this overriding belief in 
the moral supremacy in liberal democratic values, neoconservatives see other 
competing ideological or religious beliefs as a direct threat. Therefore foreign policy 
is seen as a means of both safeguarding and promoting their morally based values for 
the national interest. This is an interesting combination of Wilsonianism/Idealism 
premised on realist calculations. 
Although it is clear why neoconservatives desire the spread of liberal democratic 
values, there is not, however, a uniform acceptance of the feasibility and role the 
United States should play in achieving the goal of democratisation within 
neoconservatism itself. In the seminal article "Dictatorships and Double Standards" 
(1979), Jeane Kirkpatrick, a leading neoconservative, argued that while the United 
States should uniformly promote the spread of democracy on moral grounds, it 
should recognise that country specific factors may preclude the transformation to 
democracy occurring in a stable manner. 41 She argued that although the United States 
should promote democracy, it must recognise premature reforms may result in a 
backlash which could allow communists to gain power: the support of non- 
communist dictatorships was therefore justified. Indeed, Kirkpatrick recognised that 
in many instances in the third world, a successful and stable democratisation process 
would likely be a long term process, and went as far as advising against policies 
which would lead to a premature democratisation. The essence, therefore, of what 
41 Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards, " Commentary 68. Nov. (1979): 34-45. 
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has been widely described as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, is the use of selective 
measurers to promote democracy in order to combat the spread of communism. 
Kirkpatrick's argument, however, posed the key challenge to neoconservatives in 
terms of defining the strategic objective: democratisation versus challenging the 
Soviet Union in terms of refraining from policies which could destabilise friendly 
regimes on a geopolitical level. 42 
Importantly it was with this mainstream promotion of neoconservative values by 
President Reagan that its ideological division with traditional conservatism began to 
break down. But with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the `defeat' of communism as 
an ideology, the neoconservative school of thought had lost its raison d'etre. 
Intellectually its scholars generally became engrained in with mainstream 
conservatism and some of its more high profile advocates, such as Irving Kristol, 
indicated that the fall of the Soviet Union marked the culminating success of 
neoconservatism's key objective over tyranny. 43 
But with the fall of the Soviet Union, George H. W. Bush reverted, in line with his 
own beliefs, to a more realist foreign policy strategy reminiscent of the Nixon- 
Kissinger era. 44 Consequently, the most notable neoconservatives such as Paul 
Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and Max Boot, were 
critical of Bush's realist policy which they generally equated with appeasement. 
Therefore, the end of the Reagan administration and the implosion of the Soviet 
Union may have signalled the neoconservatives' loss of direct influence over the 
foreign policy reigns of power, but it was period which reinforced their optimism 
that democratic values have universal applicability. 45 Nevertheless, this also marked 
the evolution of the neoconservatives' `Cold War ideology' into new post-Cold War 
strategy. It is this revision which later had a direct bearing on the presidency of 
George W. Bush. 
42 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans 97-98. 
43 Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (New York: Free Press, 1995) 
44 Mann, Rise of theVulcans 164-78. 
45 Joshua Muravchik, "The Bush Manifesto, " Commentary 1 14. Dec. (2002): 28-29. 
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A key event which galvanised neoconservative intellectuals in this new post-Cold 
War environment was the failure of George H. W. Bush's administration to take 
decisive action and topple Saddam Hussain after the liberation of Kuwait. Following 
on from the mantra of the fall of the Soviet Union, neoconservatives saw every 
reason for the overthrow of Hussain and also saw the United States' new undisputed 
hegemonic primacy as every reason to believe it could be carried out. With Hussain's 
longevity and failure of the Clinton administration to formulate an effective and 
coherent policy towards Iraq, neoconservative political groups such as the Project for 
the New American Century (PNAC) were founded. The PNAC was founded by 
William Kristol and its membership included many high profile members of the 
Reagan administration. Its core principle is listed as: 
As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the 
world's pre-eminent power. Having led the West to victory in the 
Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the 
United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past 
decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new 
century favorable to American principles and interests? 
46 
A further area of interest for neoconservatives was the issue of a rising China that 
could threaten the pre-eminence of the United States. It was, however, with the 
election of George W. Bush as President that many considered to be neoconservative 
intellectuals were able to return to positions of power after an `exile' during the 
Clinton era. This included Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defence, Paul 
Wolfowitz as his deputy and also Dick Cheney as the Vice President. Given this, it 
therefore seems appropriate to examine the specific role of neoconservatism in the 
Bush administration and how this post-Cold War ideology evolved into a new one 
which characterised the outlook of the War on Terror. 
46 Elliott Abrams, et al., Statement of Principles, 3 Jun. 1997, Project for a New American Century, 
Available: http: //newamericancentury. org/statementofprinciples. htm. 
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3.2 Neoconservatism and the Bush Administration 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the character of George W. Bush's 
senior staff was inherently ideologically conservative: Condoleezza Rice's outlook 
on international affairs was more of a traditional realist and thus shared the outlook 
of Brent Scowcroft and Kissinger. 47 Indeed, it would also be a mistake to assume the 
ideological conservatives in the Bush administration held the same view as the 
founding fathers of neoconservative school of thought. 48 
Nevertheless, Rice did hold some neoconservative views on the need for the 
promotion of freedom and democracy which became more apparent after 11 
September 2001.9 In terms of her background, she gained her doctorate on a 
comparison of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian militaries, under the tutelage of Josef 
Korbel who was Madeline Albright's father. She was thus more of a European 
specialist. But her relationship with George W. Bush was particularly strong as they 
both shared a love of sports, exercise and, as a devout Presbyterian, they shared a 
similar outlook on life. Although Bush did not appoint her to Cabinet level as Clinton 
had done with Lake and Berger, it is generally accepted that she enjoyed excellent 
access to Bush and was instrumental in foreign policy formation. 
Other senior level staff, however, held more ideological beliefs. Unlike Rice, 
Wolfowitz upheld many of the ideals espoused by Leo Strauss. James Mann 
describes Wolfowitz's outlook as being premised on "stopping tyranny and 
condemning evil; the notion that dictatorships operate in fundamentally different 
ways from democracies; the belief that liberal democracies and their intelligence 
agencies can be fooled by a dictator's elaborate deceptions. "50 Wolfowitz undertook 
his doctorate on the risks of proliferation from nuclear desalination plants at the 
47 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans 148. 
48 Stefan A. Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 40-200.; and Norton, Leo Strauss and the 
Politics of American Empire 141-80. 
49 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans 316. 
50 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans 29. 
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University of Chicago under Albert Wohlstetter who was a noted opponent of 
proliferation. Wolfowitz initially gained experience in the Nixon administration in 
the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and later under the Carter 
administration as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for the Middle East and 
Persian Gulf. It was in this capacity that Wolfowitz's views on the strategic 
importance of the Persian Gulf were developed. 
In the final year of the George H. W. Bush administration, Wolfowitz, as Under 
Secretary of Defence, was charged with the task of formulating the Pentagon's first 
post-Cold War Defence Planning Guidance for 1992.51 The purpose of the document 
was to develop an overall military strategy, and develop future defence budgets from 
it. The person who actually wrote this classified document was Zalmay Khalilzad, 
the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Planning. Khalilzad built 
on Wolfowitz's ideas to develop a coherent post-Cold War neoconservative military 
strategy. However, Khalilzad's 1992 draft was leaked to the press, and was subject to 
a wave of criticism, both domestically and overseas. Although the draft was rewritten 
in a more diplomatic tone to alleviate the concerns of allies overseas, 
52 its 
overarching themes remained reasonably consistent in the revision. The primary 
themes within the reports were: 
1. The United States should work actively to retain its pre-eminence in the 
world by preventing a rival power from emerging. 
2. Future military coalitions would be ad hoc, and specific to the cause. 
3. The United States would act unilaterally if it defines such action as being in 
its national interests. 
4. The United States should aim to actively promote its values and interests on a 
global basis. 53 
Unlike neoconservative vision during the Cold War, this revision had to alter 
according to, as Leo Strauss argues, the definition of threat facing liberal 
51 Patrick E. Tyler, "Us Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop, " New York Times 8 Mar. 
1992: A 12.; and Patrick E. Tyler, "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics, " New York Times 
10 Mar. 1992: A 10. 
52 Tyler, "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics, " A10. 
53 Tyler, "Us Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop, " A12. 
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democracies. 54 Although during the Cold War the threat was clearly seen as 
Communism, the post-Cold War revision saw the new threat being: potential 
challengers to American hegemony. Nevertheless, it was with the onset of the 
Clinton administration that the neoconservatives were essentially confined to an 
opposition role as they lost their positions in government. According to James Mann, 
however, despite using a different rhetorical vision, the Clinton administration did 
not substantively depart from this post-Cold War neoconservative strategy: 
Overall, the Democrats failed to come up with any clear alternative 
vision of American strategy that would forswear the 1992 vision of 
the United States as a sole superpower. When the Clinton 
administration sought to articulate its own view of America's role in 
the world, it stressed the importance of globalisation, open markets 
and democracy. Those themes did not contradict the 1992 strategy, 
but rather described the economic and political basis of the new 
ss international system the United States intended to dominate. 
Although the Clinton administration was indirectly pursuing this aspect of the post- 
Cold War neoconservative vision, those neoconservatives who had lost their 
positions of power when Clinton took office developed their opposition to the 
Democrats through organisations such as the PNAC and also through influential 
publications such as the Weekly Standard, National Interest and the Daily Star. 
Indeed, during the Clinton years, Wolfowitz was particularly critical of the 
administration's policy towards Iraq; he, and many others, saw this as an incoherent 
and unworkable policy. The issue of Iraq was, along with China and Taiwan, the 
main moral and security issues they saw the United States facing. Accordingly, these 
issues, in particular Iraq, served as the key mobilising agents for the 
neoconservatives when they were not in office throughout the Clinton era. 
By 1997 Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives had openly began to call for regime 
change against Saddam Hussain, and were actively lobbying Congress, through the 
Project for a New American Century, for an official change in Clinton's policy 
54 Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire 181-94. 
55 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans 248-93. 
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towards Iraq. 56 Moreover, this effective opposition against Clinton's policy toward 
Iraq played a key role in prompting Congress to legislate, and subsequently Clinton 
signing into law, the Iraq liberation Act of 1998. This ultimately saw the 
neoconservative policy towards Iraq being overtly adopted as a foreign policy 
objective. 
It was only following the 2000 Presidential election that the neoconservatives were 
able to return to a variety of positions of power within government. 57 From an 
opposition movement in exile during the Clinton years, the election of George W. 
Bush marked their return to power. Although Bush's foreign policy team retained its 
hawkish views towards Iraq and its neoconservative outlook on international affairs 
in the months prior to 11 September 2001, its Straussian external threat remained 
premised on countries which could challenge the pre-eminent position of the United 
States. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, changed this perception of external threat. 
With the attacks, terrorism had become a readily identifiable threat by the American 
public which was capable of striking against them within the United States. 
Others such as Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld, Vice-President Cheney, and his Chief 
of Staff "Scooter" Libby, were more concerned with maintenance of the qualitative 
edge the United States had over any strategic competitors rather than the more 
idealistic doctrine advocated by Wolfowitz. As has been highlighted earlier, the 
Pentagon's Defence Policy Guidance 1992, which was officially authored by 
Cheney, was later rewritten by Libby in diplomatic language without changing the 
underlying theme of maintenance of US hegemony. Rumsfeld's political views also 
echoed this position as he established himself as a leading hawk opposed to a 
reduction of the military capability of the United States whilst he was Defence 
Secretary during the Ford administration. 58 The findings of the 1997 Congressional 
commission to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States, which he 
56 Elliott Abrams, et at., Letter to President Clinton, 26 Jan. 1998, Project for a New American 
Century, Available: http: //www. newamericancentury. org/iraqclintonletter. htm.; and Elliot Abrams, et 
al., Letter to Trent Lott and Newt Gingrich, 29 May 1998, Available: 
http: //www. newamericancentury. org/iraqletterl998. htm. 
57 Mann, Rise of the Vulcans 29. 
58 United States, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report, " ed. Department of Defence (GPO, 2001), vol. 
Washington, D. C., 79pp vols. 
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chaired, further cemented this reputation. 59 In essence, some members of the Bush 
administration held strong views prior to taking office for the need to maintain 
hegemony by preventing the rise of a strategic competitor to American military 
superiority. 
In a similar fashion, Colin Powell and Richard Armitage both had strong views on 
the need for maintenance of the qualitative military edge of the United States. They 
slightly differed from Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Libby by generally being more 
pragmatic and more willing to see value in multilateralism. In many respects, they 
were ideally suited for top two positions in the Department of State. Nevertheless, 
they were not as political as the other members of Bush's senior staff and both had a 
disdain for idealism or ideology in foreign policy, which placed them in conflict with 
Wolfowitz and Condoleezza Rice. 
Nevertheless, the Bush administration did have a more religious character in 
comparison to the Clinton administration which cannot be ignored: it has been 
widely reported that religious practices such as bible readings and group prayers 
before official meetings have been held in the Bush White House. But these were not 
just symbolic gestures as such beliefs were translated into policy. Indeed, one of 
Bush's first domestic policies was the Faith-Based Initiative which sought to "unite 
conservative evangelicals, urban Catholics, minority pastors, and traditional noblesse 
oblige Republicans in a grand religious inspired approach to social problems. "60 But 
in terms of US foreign policy, the attacks of 11 September 2001 played a more 
telling role. The attacks served to reinforce Bush's existing convictions of the 
universality of the values that have grounding in his own Christian faith: freedom, 
liberty and democracy. Indeed, as with many other fellow Americans, Bush 
categorised those who perpetuated the terrorist attacks as the embodiment of evil 
and, consequently, a direct challenge towards the good values seen to be epitomising 
the United States. Indeed, some commentators such as Martin E. Marty have gone as 
59 United States, "Rumsfeld Commission Report, " Executive Summary of the Commission to Assess 
the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, ed. Congress (Brookings, 1998), vol. Washington, 
D. C., 24pp vols. 
60 Frum, The Right Man: An inside Account of the Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush 100-01. 
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far as describing Bush as feeling that he has been called upon by God in the form of 
a religiously justified cause against evil. 61 
In his 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush illustrated his belief that such values 
are universal and enshrined in the Christian faith by saying that: "the liberty we prize 
is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity. 42 The importance of 
this is clear: Bush's own religious values and beliefs, which are shared by many 
within his administration, were a factor that shaped his outlook and, specifically the 
desire to spread freedom, liberty and democracy as part of his foreign policy. 
All things considered, it seems possible to recognise several important characteristics 
on a bureaucratic level during the first Bush administration. There were two key 
complimentary idiosyncrasies that resonated in the administration: a desire for 
maintenance of US hegemony, and a firm belief in the desirability of spreading 
Wilsonian ideals. Indeed, prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the general foreign policy 
focus of the administration was more geared towards the issue of China which was 
seen as a possible strategic competitor. In the post-9/11 environment, however, these 
idiosyncrasies were reflected in US foreign policy which saw a need to both maintain 
US hegemony in addition to combating the root causes of terrorism through the 
promotion of Wilsonian ideals. When compared with the Clinton presidency, it is 
noticeable that there are clear differences on a bureaucratic level which had a bearing 
on the perception, interpretation and decisions in US foreign policy during the time 
frame of this study. Therefore, on an idiosyncratic level the differences form a near 
dichotomy. 
4.0 FOREIGN POLICY 
From the preceding observations, it is possible to draw some initial comparisons on 
the foreign policies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The following examination 
is, however, only an initial survey as its validity is understandably dependent on the 
61 Martin E. Marty, "Bush and God, " Newsweek Mar. 10 2003: 5-7. 
62 George W. Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address, " The President's State of the 
Union Address (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 2002), vol., 20pp. vols. 
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data available at the time of writing; nevertheless, there is good reason to conclude 
that a fundamental change in US grand strategy occurred in the wake of the trauma 
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks which ultimately permeated throughout the US foreign 
policy agenda. 
With the onset of the Clinton administration, the overarching strategy unpinning US 
foreign relations was articulated as being premised on the dual objectives of a global 
promotion of democracy and a furtherance of global economic capitalism. The 
Clinton administration saw these two strategic objectives as mutually reinforcing. 
Whilst the promotion of liberal democracy and market capitalism has a strong 
vintage in US foreign policy history, the key issue for scholars has been whether the 
end of the Cold War truly marked the demise of a grand strategic era in US foreign 
policy. Whilst some scholars such as John Ikenberry equate US grand strategy since 
the end of the Second World War as premised on the Jeffersonian pursuit of 
democracy, one cannot deny that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the 
Soviet Union marked the end of an era where a clearly identifiable external threat 
was perceived by Washington which served as a strategic guide for US foreign 
policy during the Cold War era. Therefore, despite the Clinton administration 
maintaining what can be described as the quintessential American goal of promoting 
liberty, freedom and democracy; there is justification for taking the position that the 
Clinton presidency occurred within a different grand strategic era to that of the Cold 
War. 
Despite the Clinton presidency articulating a grand strategy based on the promotion 
of democracy and global capitalism; there is good reason to conclude that 
geoeconomics alone served as the strategic point of reference for Clintonian foreign 
policy. The problem with this approach, according to Kissinger, is that 
geoeconomics "is not a substitute for global order, though it can be an important part 
of lt. "63 
In the case of US foreign policy towards Persian Gulf security and political Islam, 
the promotion of democracy was subjugated at the expense of regional geostrategic 
63 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? 30. 
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interests. Indeed, the very nature of Clinton's geostrategy was premised on 
maintenance of the status quo through containment and deterrence. Despite the 
administration's position towards political Islam being premised on widening 
democracy and civil liberties throughout the Middle East, this conflicted with 
Clinton's policy on a regional level. Therefore, at least in the case of the Middle 
East, it seems justified to conclude that Clinton's objective of pursuing democracy 
was more rhetorical than substantive. 
But on a more general level, the Clinton administration failed to provide a coherent 
strategic guide for foreign policy: this was reinforced by the idiosyncrasies of 
Clinton and the senior personnel that he appointed. In terms of the Middle East, and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular, it is fair td characterise Clinton's foreign policy 
as reactive and applied on an ad hoc level. 
Nevertheless, Clinton's use of geoeconomics as a strategic guide for foreign policy 
and his ad hoc response to political developments was conducive to garnering 
multilateral support. Although Iraq proved to be a key point of contention with US 
allies in Europe in particular, Clinton's foreign policy did allow for a greater degree 
of multilateralism within the international system. Through his emphasis on 
geoeconomics, Clinton was better able to conduct his foreign policy and the 
cooperation it delivered would have fostered the spectacular global economic 
performance of the late 1990s. From this, one can interpret Clintonian foreign policy 
as being Jeffersonian on a rhetorical level, but overall distinctly Hamiltonian in 
character. 
Although Clinton's foreign policy was inherently weak through its general reactive 
nature stemming from its geoeconomic basis, George W. Bush's foreign policy 
marked a clear departure from this trajectory. As has already been discussed, the 
idiosyncratic outlook, perception, and vision of the Bush administration was wholly 
based on differential criteria. On a bureaucratic level, the primary concern for many 
of Bush's senior foreign policy staff was for the maintenance of a qualitative 
superiority of the United States relative to potential strategic competitors. A second 
underlying tenant was the neoconservatism which sought the promotion of 
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democracy and freedom on a moral basis, in addition to seeing it providing for the 
national security of the United States. 
When the Bush administration's policy prior to the 9/11 attacks is examined towards 
the Middle East, there appears to have been a general level of continuity from the 
Clinton administration. The discernible difference towards the Arab-Israeli dispute 
appears to have been a product of the geopolitical environment and, importantly, this 
case study will indicate that a change in regional geostrategy did not occur at that 
time. Therefore, despite the administration having differential idiosyncratic attributes 
to the Clinton presidency, foreign policy trajectory remained fairly constant. But it 
should not be forgotten that a policy review was still being conducted during this 
period of time and thus it is not possible to say whether these differential attributes 
would, by themselves, have translated into a radical departure from Clinton's 
geostrategy. On the other hand, the Bush administration's initial policy towards 
China in particular, indicates a change commensurate with the idiosyncrasies 
discussed. 64 
The attacks of 11 September 2001, however, do appear to have resulted in the onset 
of a new grand strategic era that one can equate in certain respects with the Cold 
War. 65 Given the importance of the Bush administration's foreign policy strategy 
post-9/11, the following section will analyse the nature of the Bush Doctrine in order 
to underscore that a new grand strategic approach was adopted in the wake of the 
trauma of the 9/11 attacks. 
4.1 The Bush Doctrine 
The Bush administration's response to the attacks was wholly commensurate with 
the idiosyncratic characteristics that have been defined above, and has been likened 
64 John Chipman, Strategic Survey 2001/2002 (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 264-68. 
65 John L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: OUP, 1998) 281-95.; and 
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995) 423-45. 
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by Bob Woodward to a fundamentally new foreign policy doctrine. 
66 The Bush 
Doctrine has three identifiable pillars which were originally outlined in the National 
Security Strategy of 2002.67 These three pillars can be summarised as: 
1. Prevent hostile states from acquiring unconventional weapons 
2. Promote democracy and freedom on a global basis 
3. Maintain the pre-eminence of the United States in the international system. 
The nature of the Bush Doctrine is ambitious, optimistic and longsighted. Clear 
comparisons can be drawn with Woodrow Wilson's vision in the aftermath of the 
First World War but, for the Bush administration, it is seen not only in moral terms, 
but also through a clear definition of what the national security threats to the United 
States are. 68 The nature of its pillars reflect this as it includes both immediate security 
concerns from states intent on producing unconventional weapons, to the more long 
term goal of combating the root causes of extremist political Islam and politically 
motivated extremism with global reach in general. Given this, the following section 
will provide an analysis of the more immediate concerns of the doctrine, whilst the 
subsequent section will look at its more long term aspects. 
4.1.1 The Preventative Use of Force 
The first pillar of the Bush Doctrine emerged as a direct response to the realisation 
that if terrorists armed with box cutters could use aeroplanes as a weapon to cause 
mass casualties, what would the scenario be if an unconventional weapon was used? 
The response to this possible scenario saw the Bush Doctrine draw a linkage between 
terrorism and hostile states with the intent to produce unconventional weapons. It 
also rejected in no uncertain terms Kenneth Waltz's argument that proliferation can 
Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002) 30. 
67 United States, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, " ed. President of 
the United States (GPO, 2002), vol. Washington, D. C., 35pp vols. 
68 For an excellent study on Wilsonianism and foreign policy see: Robert S. McNamara and James G. 
Blight, Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2003) 17-58,217-26. 
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be equated with international stability. 69 This aspect of the Bush Doctrine was 
controversial as it called on such threats to be dealt with preventatively. This linkage 
went beyond the separate issues of states harbouring and supporting terrorist groups 
which the Afghanistan campaign underscored. 7° 
Vice President Cheney argued that the casualties posed by terrorist groups actually 
using unconventional weapons would have, if used to their greatest potential, 
dwarfed those of 11 September 200171 Given the difficulties in manufacturing and 
deploying such weapons, Cheney is correct that the most logical means for terrorists 
acquiring such weapons would ultimately stem from `rogue state' producers. 
72 
Indeed, this point was underlined by Bush: 
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of 
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that 
they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence 
indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United 
States will not allow these efforts to succeed.... [H]istory will judge 
harshly those who saw this coming dander but failed to act. In the 
new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is 
the path of action. 73 
The significance of this pillar in the overall strategy is that it vastly broadened the 
target list from "terrorist organizations of global reach" to include "any terrorist or 
state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction 
69 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers, No. 171 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981) 1-32.; United States, "National Security 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, " ed. President of the United States (GPO, 2002), 
vol. Washington, D. C., 9pp vols.; and also see United States, "National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, " ed. President of the United States (GPO, 2003), vol. Washington, D. C., 32pp vols. 
70 Woodward, Bush at War 43. 
71 Ibid. 137. 
72 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and Us Foreign Policy (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2001) 164.; David A. Kay, "Wmd Terrorism: Hype or Reality, " The Terrorism Treat and Us 
Governmental Response: Operational and Organisational Factors, eds. James M. Smith and William 
C. Thomas (Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001) 69-78. 
73 Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address, " vol. 
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(WMD) or their precursors. "74 The scope was thus widened to include countries 
defined by the United States as hostile which were viewed as procuring, or 
attempting to procure, unconventional weapons. This was in spite of whether they 
were legally entitled to produce such weapons under international law. The reason 
why this potential form of terrorism was placed onto the national security agenda is 
not only attributable to the logical projection in the nature of terrorist attacks, but 
also to the anthrax attacks which took place in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. Although it is unclear what impact the anthrax attacks had on the 
national security agenda, it seems justifiable to infer that they were a factor which 
installed a level of fear within the domestic electorate of a mass casualty terrorist 
attack using such weapons. 
The specifics of this strategy mean that in cases where hostile states are viewed as 
intention or actually producing unconventional weapons, the United States would 
prevent their acquisition by resorting to anticipatory self defence if a 
diplomatic/peaceful resolution in accordance with US zero sum demands had proved 
elusive. In other words, the United States would ultimately resort to the use of force 
if a state does not comply with US non-negotiable demands. This is based on the 
belief that such weapons could be used directly or asymmetrically against the United 
States, and the scale of the threat justifies the subjugation of state sovereignty. Bush 
unveiled this change in military strategy at the West Point Military Academy in June 
2002 where he stated that "our security will require all Americans to be forward- 
looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our 
"75 liberty and to defend our lives. 
In terms of the historical use of pre-emptive action, the National Security Strategy 
maintained that: 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive 
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The 
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more 
74 United States, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, " vol. 6. 
75 George W. Bush, "West Point Commencement Speech, " America and the World: Debating the New 
Shape of International Politics, ed. Gideon Rose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) 
367. 
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compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of 
the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. 6 
Bush's proposal, however, went beyond the traditional definition of pre-emptive war 
and encompassed the doctrine of preventative war. 77 It is important to recognise that 
pre-emptive warfare is a response in the face of an imminent attack whilst a 
preventative war is carried out long before a potential threat materialises. 78 
The use of pre-emptive force was not a new concept by any means in the history of 
US foreign policy. Indeed, the Kennedy administration had acted pre-emptively in its 
establishment of a naval quarantine around Cuba during the missile crisis. However, 
Robert Kennedy reminds us that the naval quarantine of Cuba was premised on the 
call to action from the Organisation of American States, and the administration 
purposely refrained from referring to it as pre-emptive self defence. 79 Nevertheless, a 
policy of pre-emptive action had never been a formally declared policy of the United 
States, despite its actual usage. The adoption of the preventative war doctrine was, 
however, very much a new concept in US foreign policy. 
The Bush administration maintained that there was a clearly established legal basis 
for the pre-emptive use of force: 
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not 
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend 
themselves against forces that present an imminent dander of attack. 
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the 
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat- 
76 United States, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, " vol. 15. 
77 Walter B. Slocombe, "Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy, " Survival 45.1 (2003): 123-28. 
78 Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War, " World Politics 40. Oct. 
(1987): 82-105. 
79 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Norwalk, Connecticut: 
Easton Press, 1991) 61-103.; and John L. Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004) 38-56. 
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most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces 
preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat 
to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. 80 
This legal justification for the pre-emptive use of force, which should more 
accurately be referred to as anticipatory self-defence, stems from a narrow 
interpretation of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) provides for a 
clear prohibition towards the use of force in the international system. The exception 
to this, carried in Article 51, allows for the "inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs... until the Security Council has taken 
measurers to maintain international peace and security. "81 Apart from the Cuban 
missile crisis, there have been only two other relevant cases since the adoption of the 
UN Charter to potentially support its basis under customary international law: 
Israel's attack on the Egyptian army in 1967, and Israel's air strike on Iraq's nuclear 
reactor in Osirak in 1981. Even so, the legality of the preventative use of force rubric 
in the Bush Doctrine remains unproved at best under customary international law, 
but may well prove to be an evolving principle of customary international law. 82 
In response to criticism, the Bush administration's position was clarified by William 
H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser to the State Department: 
The President's National Security Strategy relies upon the same 
legal framework applied to the British in Caroline and to Israel in 
1981. The United States reserves the right to use force preemptively 
in self-defense when faced with an imminent threat. While the 
definition of imminent must recognize the threat posed by weapons 
of mass destruction and the intentions of those who possess them, 
the decision to undertake any action must meet the test of necessity. 
After the exhaustion of peaceful remedies and a careful, deliberate 
consideration of the consequences, in the face of overwhelming 
So United States, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, " vol. 15. 
81 Malcolm D. Evans, Blackstone's International Law Documents, Blackstone's Statutes, 4th ed. 
(London: Blackstone, 1999) 16. Emphasis Added. 
8, Al-Hussain Al-Thani, "The Legality of Use of Force against Iraq in March 2003, " (University of 
Durham, 2004), vol., 32-36. 
-75- 
evidence of an imminent threat, a nation may take preemptive 
83 action to defend its nationals from unimaginable harm. 
Whilst Taft's definition goes some way to address the concerns of the definitions 
arbitrary use, the legality of invoking Article 51 as a justification for the use of 
force, prior to an actual attack having occurred, is not generally accepted by legal 
scholars. 84 
The case of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 underscored this doctrine of the 
preventative use of force: Iraq was viewed as having such weapons in its possession, 
and also intent on further production whilst being unwilling to comply with the 
demands of the international community in a peaceful manner. The key issue to 
understand about this pillar is, however, that the preventative use of force is not seen 
as applicable is every circumstance. The Bush Doctrine only saw this as applicable in 
cases where hostile states remain committed to acquiring unconventional weapons 
once diplomacy to reverse this situation had been tried and failed. But the 
significance of this pillar is that it reduces US diplomacy to a zero-suns game where 
compromise is not possible on this issue. Therefore, under its rubric, the preventative 
use of force would occur once diplomacy, leading to a fill compliance with US 
demands, is seen as tried and failed, which indicates that the notion of diplomacy in 
such circumstances is reduced to an anachronism. 
Nonetheless, the Bush administration's adoption of the concept of the preventative 
use of force, premised on unilateralism if necessary, sets a precedent for states 
defining their security interests and applying unilateral measures to achieve them. 
But the willingness of the Bush administration to resort to unilateralism has some 
vintage in US foreign policy, particularly in Republican circles. 85 Nevertheless, it is a 
course of action that holds the risk of setting a precedent in the international system. 
Henry Kissinger succinctly comments that: 
83 William H. Taft, "The Legal Basis for Preemption, " Roundtable on Old Rules. New Threats 
(Washington, D. C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), vol., 3pp. vols. 
R' Miriam Sapiro, "Iraq: Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, " The American Journal of 
International Law 97.3 (2003): 602. 
85 Jesse Helms, "American Sovereignty and the Un, " National Interest 62. Winter (2000): 31-34. 
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As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States has a 
special unilateral capacity to implement its convictions. But it also 
has a special obligation to justify its actions by principals that 
transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It cannot be in 
either the American national interest or the world's interest to 
develop principals that grant every nation an unfettered right of 
preemption against its own definitions of threats to its security. 86 
Although the administration did caution other nations from using pre-emption as a 
pretext for aggressive military action, the ambiguity of what exactly warranted such 
state practice, if it is taken as a precedent for international action, underscores that 
the Westphalian order is truly in systemic crisis. 87 
The nature of the threat that became so apparent after the 9/11 attacks also ushered in 
other pillars which allow for it to be defined as a grand strategy. Indeed, it is the 
manner in which the threat was defined that has prompted a departure from the 
Clintonian era. The nature of this difference lies firstly in the manner in which the 
Bush administration defines terrorism as being countered in the long term, and 
secondly in the recognition that the ultimate threat posed by terrorism is through the 
use of unconventional weapons, as has already been discussed. Therefore, this pillar 
saw the need to counter the threat posed by unconventional weapons and terrorists 
before they could possibly emerge as the risks were deemed too great. 
4.1.2 Democratic Promotion 
The second key pillar is the adoption of the neoconservative position on the 
promotion of democracy and freedom. Gaddis remarks that this is at the centre of the 
Bush Doctrine. 88 The desire to defend and spread such values draws from a historical 
96 Henry Kissinger, "Consult and Control: Bywords for Battling the New Enemy, " Washington Post 
Sept. 16 2002: A19. 
87 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? 234-82. 
88 John L. Gaddis, "Bush's Security Strategy, " Foreign Policy 133 (2002): 50-57. 
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vintage in US foreign policy which was most clearly articulated by Woodrow Wilson 
and Thomas Jefferson. 89 In contrast to previous administrations which saw its 
promotion as desirable, the Bush Doctrine saw the promotion of liberal democracy as 
a national security requirement. 
The key reason why the Bush Doctrine equates democratic promotion with national 
security is on account of the interpretation that the absence of democracy and 
freedom actually spawns extremism under the guise of terrorism. Therefore, in the 
post-9/11 context, the root cause of the terrorist attacks was viewed as the lack of 
legitimate representative institutions within the Middle East and elsewhere as this 
resulted in the only outlet for dissent being religious fanaticism. 90 The Bush 
administration thus embraced the intellectual position on radical political Islam that it 
is the very lack of democracy and freedom in given countries that results in the rise 
of political extremism and terrorist action. 91 
In addition to democratisation actually combating the root causes of terrorism with 
global reach, the Bush administration also saw it as desirable on the grounds that 
representative democracies are more likely to engage in peaceful relations and thus 
democratisation would provide stability and security for the international system. 
Indeed, this is a thoroughly Wilsonian ideal that believed like-minded democracies 
would opt to resolve difference through legal means and diplomacy. Therefore, when 
this is translated to the Middle East, a complete reordering of the political 
environment was desired in order to provide for regional stability in the long term. 
This is despite the transformation requiring a geopolitical overhaul which would 
create insecurity through socio-political changes. Indeed, this is in direct contrast to 
the Clinton administration's approach. 
89 Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine, " American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, 
ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown University, 2005) 584-85. 
90 Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey, Ist ed. (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1998) 133-58.; and Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? (London: Phoenix, 2002) 
168-78.; see also United Nations Development Programme, The Arab Human Development Report 
2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 
Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2004). 
91 Phillip H. Gordon, "Bush's Middle East Vision, " Survival 45.1 (2003): 155-63. 
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The nature of this pillar allows the charge that it is exceptionally optimistic and 
ambitious. Indeed, it goes well beyond the revolutionary vision Wilson articulated in 
the aftermath of the First World War. But for Bush, the 9/11 attacks marked an 
opportunity to restructure the world order. Bush remarked that "history has called us 
into action, and we are not going to miss that opportunity to make the world more 
peaceful and more free. "92 
With regard to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, it was viewed by Bush as serving 
dual purposes commensurate with this pillar: firstly, it allowed the removal of 
Saddam Hussain's dictatorship and the installation of democratic polity; and 
secondly, a democratising Iraq was viewed as fostering pressures for democratic 
reform within neighbouring authoritarian states within the region. 3 In some respects 
this is akin to the Cold War Domino Theory. Bush remarked in the aftermath of the 
Iraq invasion that "I believe that a free Iraq can be an example of reform and 
progress to all the Middle East. "94 Indeed, with Iraq serving as a beacon for 
democracy, the Bush administration believed that it would foster pressure within the 
civil society of neighbouring states for democratic reforms to be implemented 95 This 
highlights that this pillar fostered a wider geostrategic agenda for the Middle East 
which is in direct contrast to the Clinton era. 
Therefore, the belief was that only through a complete reordering of the international 
system in the long term can the root causes of terrorism be countered. In addition to 
this, the Bush administration also saw democratic promotion as serving the goal of 
92 George W. Bush, "President, Vice President Discuss the Middle East, " Remarks by the President 
and the Vice President Upon Conclusion of Breakfast (Washington D. C.: GPO, 2002), vol., 3pp. vols. 
93 Gordon, "Bush's Middle East Vision, " 155-63. 
94 George W. Bush, "President Discusses the Economy with Small Business Owners, " Remarks by the 
President in the Rose Garden (Washington D. C.: GPO, 2003), vol., Opp. vols.; See also Colin Powell, 
"The Us-Middle East Partnership Initiative: Building Hope for the Years Ahead, " Remarks at the 
Heritage Foundation 
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 2002), vol., 6pp. vols. 
95 Stephen Cook, "The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform, " Foreign Affairs 84.2 (2005): 92-96.; and 
Marina Ottaway, et al., "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East, " Critical Mission: Essays on 
Democracy Promotion, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002) 
229-36. 
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providing for international stability in the long term as it upholds the principle that 
democratic nations will resolve their differences through Wilsonian means. 
4.1.3 American Hegemony 
The final level of the Bush Doctrine called for the maintenance of US hegemony. It 
is noticeable that this was in fitting with the spirit of the Pentagon's Defence Policy 
Guidance of 1992.96 As already highlighted, this called for maintenance of US 
primacy through ensuring a qualitative superiority in military capability. 97 This can 
be translated as having an imperial connotation but will depend on the definition of 
hegemony and empire. 98 Either way, it was premised on the belief that the United 
States actually upholds universal values and thus maintenance of US primacy was 
required in order to promote and defend them in addition to the United States itself. 
99 
Indeed, Edward Rhodes highlights that the maintenance of the US hegemonic 
position "provides the aegis under which peace and freedom can be built. "10° 
In an address to the West Point Military Academy in 2002, Bush remarked that 
"America has, and intends to keep, military strength beyond challenge - thereby 
making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to 
trade and other pursuits of peace. "101 But in the National Security Strategy of 2002, 
Bush announced that "[ilt is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military 
96 Tyler, "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics, " A12 
9' Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine, " 584-85. 
93 G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition, " American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essaus, 
ed. G. John Ikenberry, 5th ed. (New York: Georgetown University, 2005) 564-75.; Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2005) 
131-49.; Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge. 2005) 89-90.; 
and Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2004) 
169-99. 
9' Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition, " 564-75.; Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The 
Realities and Consequences of Us Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) 225-44.; 
and Bush, "West Point Commencement Speech, " 369. 
10° Edward Rhodes, "The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda, " Survival 45.1 (2003): 134 
101 Bush, "West Point Commencement Speech, " 369. 
-so- 
strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's 
highest priority is to defend the United States. " 102 The strategy goes on to say that: 
The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat 
any attempt by an enemy-whether a state or non-state actor-to 
impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. We 
will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and 
to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade 
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of 
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. 103 
This has been interpreted by Robert Jervis as seeking the dual objectives of ensuring 
that no nation could even contemplate matching US military supremacy through 
heightened levels of funding, in addition to actually preventing a rival from 
emerging. 104 Although Jervis believes that the United States would act militarily to 
ensure it maintains its primacy, it is difficult to envisage that military force would be 
used in the hypothetical situation of a liberal democratic rival emerging. 
Nevertheless, this aspect of the Bush Doctrine is aimed primarily at preventing a 
non-democratic state from gaining primacy over the United States. 
All things considered, the Bush Doctrine, which can be equated with a grand 
strategic approach, has three key aspects. Importantly, these global strategic goals 
resulted in a fundamental reassessment of US geostrategy towards the Middle East. 
This indicates that the Bush Doctrine is a truly a global geostrategy which can be 
likened to the approach of the United States during the Cold War era. Therefore, the 
Bush administration's foreign policy response has resulted in the new grand strategic 
era of the War on Terror, which has succeeded the era of the Post-Cold War in which 
Clinton's foreign policy operated. 
102 United States, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, " vol. 29. 
103 Ibid., vol., 29.30. 
104 Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era 89-90. 
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5.0 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The conclusions that can be drawn from these comparative observations are that the 
character, worldview and vision for US foreign policy are markedly different in the 
Clinton and Bush administrations. The idiosyncratic differences of Bush and Clinton 
appear to correlate with the character of key senior individuals in their given 
bureaucracies, and are ultimately commensurate with the nature their foreign policies 
have taken. On a bureaucratic level, Clinton's administration was staffed by 
individuals who shared his geoeconomic vision for foreign policy, but were not noted 
for holding particular views which would place them in conflict with this. In any 
case, the Clinton presidency can be characterised as risk averse in foreign policy 
concerns. Whilst its geoeconomic orientation and reluctance to take risk in the use of 
military power made it a more compatible policy for multilateral cooperation, its ad 
hoc approach to international affairs was weak and did result in contradictory 
positions being adopted. Bush's idiosyncrasies, however, lend themselves towards a 
clear and decisive foreign policy that is geared towards long range and ambitious 
projections. It has also resulted in a propensity for unilateralism which is in direct 
contrast to the Clinton presidency. 
In direct comparison, the Bush presidency has been shown to have departed from 
Clinton's geoeconomic strategy in a radical fashion. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush 
administration adopted a new strategic approach towards international affairs that 
resulted in a complete overhaul of US geostrategy towards the Middle East. As has 
already been highlighted, depending on the interpretation of grand strategy, it is 
possible to argue that a new grand strategic era occurred following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. 
Taken as a whole, it is clear that a radical departure in US foreign policy has taken 
place. Whilst Bush's policy is more sophisticated than Clinton's geoeconomic 
foreign policy strategy, the key issue is whether the radical transformation it requires 
for the international system will actually provide the United States with the 
objectives it has set out to achieve. Given the long term nature of Bush's policy, an 
adequate evaluation at this stage is not viable, but the key observation that can be 
made is that it is inherently optimistic. This will lead to new challenges for the 
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United States in terms of whether it can successfully accomplish its objectives in the 
face of instability and insecurity that will likely follow as transitions to democracy 
occur. 
Given these observations, and the conjecture that a new grand strategic era for US 
foreign policy has emerged in the wake of the trauma of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
rest of the thesis will analyse US foreign policy towards the Middle East as a case 
study to illustrate this conceptual framework and the radical change that has 
occurred. The next chapter will, therefore, provide an analysis of US foreign policy 
towards Persian Gulf security as a means of illustrating both the origins of US 
foreign policy in the time period 1993-2003, in addition to conceptualising it with the 
grand strategic frameworks identified. 
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Radical Political Islam and Grand Strategy 
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"Which is more important in world history: The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet 
Empire? A few over-exited Islamists or the liberation of Central Europe and the end 
of the Cold War? " 
Zbigniew Brzezinski 
January 1998 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The epigraph by Zbigniew Brzezinski is telling: prior to the attacks of 11 September 
2001 it was difficult to equate the rise of radical political Islam with the ideological 
and military threat posed by the Soviet Union. But the scale and severity of the 9/11 
attacks resulted in a foreign policy response which can be viewed as a new grand 
strategic era for US foreign policy. Whilst Brzezinski's assessment was correct prior 
to the 9/11 attacks, it is important to recognise that the overall product of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan was the beginning of the development of a radical version of 
international political Islam that ultimately spawned al-Qa'ida. As the response of 
the United States to the 9/11 attacks marked the onset of a new grand strategic era, 
the product of these events are equally important for world history. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the position of the United States towards 
political Islam during the time period 1993-2003. Specifically it will demonstrate 
how the linkage between neoconservatism and the advent of US grand strategy in the 
era of the War on Terror was premised in the main on countering the root causes of 
religious political extremism through promoting the key neoconservative ideals of 
political representation; freedom; human rights and equality on a global level. 
Indeed, their absence is ultimately viewed as having created the conditions which 
bred international terrorism. So whilst promoting these values fulfils the moral edge 
of neoconservatism it also serves a more realist function of safeguarding US national 
security. 
In examining US foreign policy towards radical political Islam, it will be shown that 
the position of the United States towards political movements which are guided by 
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Islam, does not equate to a policy towards the Islamic religion. But in terms of these 
movements, a demarcation can generally be made between those that are moderate, 
which legitimately participate in the given political system, and extremists' 
movements which have a propensity towards violence in order to fulfil their political 
objectives. The United States will be shown to view extremist movements as 
illegitimate, which fall under its counterterrorism policy rubric. The focus of US 
policy towards political Islam is therefore on moderate Islamic groups. 
The issues facing US policy towards moderate Islamist groups revolve around 
whether both their participation in a democratic process, in addition to whether the 
establishment of a government based on the Islamic Shari'a they commonly seek as 
legitimate. This chapter will show that the steadily evolving policy towards political 
Islam in the time period 1993-2003, was typically inconsistent in that it commonly 
saw such groups' participation as legitimate, but a majority electoral victory as 
illegitimate. 
Of more importance, however, is the manner in which the United States aimed to 
combat the root causes of extremism and terrorism in general. Although the 
academic literature quite rightly indicates a diverse and rich account of the causes of 
extremism, the position of the United States in this time period can be characterised 
as viewing a democratic and freedom deficit in Islamic countries as being at the root 
of Islamic inspired extremism. Nevertheless, this thesis will argue that the stated US 
policy towards reform as a means of countering the root causes of Islamic extremism 
was actually a secondary foreign policy concern to US policy strategy towards the 
Persian Gulf arena. However, this thesis will contend that the adoption of a grand 
strategic rubric of the War on Terror resulted in a fundamental departure in this lonb 
standing policy. 
2.0 OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
In order to provide an appropriate analysis of US foreign policy towards political 
Islam, it is necessary to firstly provide an adequate contextualisation by providing a 
general overview of the intellectual framework. The significance of the intellectual 
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context is that it underlines that a foreign policy response towards political Islam 
would probably depend on the intellectual context that is adopted. 
Academic interpretations towards political Islam appear to demonstrate a clear 
dichotomy. These differential interpretations concern the origins, characteristics and 
perceived threats posed by political Islam. But most importantly, this dichotomy 
reflects whether political Islam is viewed as compatible with democracy. The 
significance of these competing classifications is that they advocate diverse and 
incompatible policy responses towards political Islam. In many respects, the debate 
over political Islam is one of the few remaining intellectual debates within US 
foreign policy: the legacy of the Iranian Revolution shows that differential 
interpretations as to why the United States `lost Iran' has a direct bearing on policy 
prescriptions towards Islamism. ' 
In terms of the classification and origin of Islamist movements, it has been argued 
that political Islam can be characterised as a complex socio-cultural response, which 
has evolved historically, rather than a simple product of the political structure. 
Bernard Lewis approaches the issue in terms of asking why the once vibrant and 
successful Islamic civilization has declined and fallen in relation to the West. 
Lewis's lucid historical explanation argues that various inherent internal 
constrictions have resulted in the relative decline of the Islamic civilization. But 
more importantly, he sees political Islamic movements using politicised 
interpretations of history which explain this decline as a means of garnering their 
support bases. Other scholars, such as Francois Burgat, echo Lewis's thesis by 
arguing that Islamism is a response to Westemisation and therefore should simply be 
considered a cultural response. 3 Bugat argues that "the process of re-Islamisation is a 
mere process of re-traditionalisation, developing in relative autonomy and exclusion 
1 Robert Satloff, US Policy Towards Islamism: A Theoretical and Operational Overview (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2000) 3-5. 
2 Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004) 22-166. 
3 Francois Burgat, "Ballot Boxes, Militaries and Islamic Movements, " The Islamism Debate, ed. 
Martin Kramer (The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, 1997) 41. 
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to the dynamic of political liberalisation and social modernisation. "4 Bassam Tibi 
maintains this theme by highlighting that a Muslim identity has emerged as a cultural 
response from Muslim encounters with Western modernity. 5 These sociologically 
grounded cultural responses draw from globalisation and regionalisation approaches 
which identify the reaffirming of a localised culture, or normative values, as being a 
product of an increased level of international interaction and interconnectedness. 
Whilst increased interaction and awareness of foreign cultures, economies, political 
frameworks and religions results in a reaffirming of a cultural identity, 6 Hrair 
Dekmejian takes the position that this has occurred within the context of a failure of 
modernisation and development in the region 7 The significance behind this is that it 
is the failure of competing ideologies in terms of delivering modernisation and 
development that has led to the adoption of Islamism as a new ideological paradigm. 
Again, this affirms Lewis's argument that an affirmation of Islamic values in 
political life is viewed as the most apt reason of restoring the Islamic world's 
position in relation to the West. Nazih Ayubi supports this approach but stresses that 
the lack of economic development in the Middle East can be attributed to it being 
`artificial' development which was mainly geared towards catering for Western 
actors. 8 Moreover, this `artificial' form of development is categorised as not only 
unsustainable, but also one which undermines socio-economic and political relations. 
In other words, Ayubi argues that modernisation in Muslim societies arose from the 
pressures of colonialism and its overall development has been inhibited. 
4 Francois Burgat, "Ballot Boxes, Militaries and Islamic Movements, " 41. 
5 Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Order 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002) 64-113. 
6 John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, 2nd ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1994) 289-392. 
7 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 2nd ed. (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1995) 3-72; R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, 
and Consequences, " The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity, ed. Shireen Hunter 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988) 103-15. 
$ Nazih N. M. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 
1991) 120-77. 
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Although the cultural response argument provides a credible reason for the existence 
of Islamist movements, Daniel Pipes considers Islamism ultimately stemming from 
Western radicalism. 9 He highlights that many Islamists are those who have been 
exposed to the West and are highly educated. They seek the modernisation of their 
own countries but blame the West for inhibiting their countries' indigenous 
development. Hence, not only does Pipes recognise that Islamism is fostered by a 
radical cultural response to modernity, but he also sees it as a product of the 
frustration at the lack of economic development within the Middle East. Therefore, 
in contrast to Dekmejian, Pipes highlights that Islamists view the lack of 
modernisation and development in the Middle East as a result of Western capitalism. 
Whilst both cultural and economic factors have been advanced as contributors 
towards the growth of Islamic movements, it should not be forgotten that Islamic 
political movements are first and foremost a political response. It has been widely 
argued that it is a natural successor to the ideological void left in the wake of Arab 
nationalism. John Esposito sees the emergence of political Islam as a result of the 
failure of alternative paradigms such as "Arab nationalism/socialism, Iranian 
(Pahlevi) nationalism, and Muslim nationalism in Pakistan. '" With the apparent 
failures of these ideologies, political Islam became revitalised as a viable alternative. 
Esposito and Voll both approach this so-called Islamic revivalism from a historical 
perspective that identifies political Islam as the only credible alternative to 
authoritarianism. They convincingly argue that: 
As the recent histories of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate, 
Islamist groups are more likely to emerge as the major opposition 
party when they are `the only game in town' that is, when they 
function in political environments in which they become the sole 
credible voice of opposition and thus attract the votes of those who 
9 Daniel Pipes, "The Western Mind of Radical Islam, " The Islamism Debate, ed. Martin Kramer (The 
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1997) 51-67. 
10 John L. Esposito, "The Persian Gulf War, Islamic Movements and the New World Order, " The 
Iranian Journal of International Affairs Spring (1991): 346. 
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simply wish to vote against the government or system, as well as 
the votes of their supporters. 11 
In many respects, Esposito and Voll's analysis correctly identifies that the key 
underlying cause of political Islam's success is the absence of any other credible 
political mobilising force. The key question is, therefore, why is there an absence of 
competing political mobilising agents? Esposito's analysis would have us believe 
that it is simply a product of the failure of competing political ideologies; but surely 
this overlooks why even limited democratic pluralism has failed to develop within 
Middle Eastern countries in general. Nevertheless, Maria do Ceu Pinto reminds us 
that: 
[Political Islam is] mainly a protest movement against the current Arab 
regimes which suffer intrinsic weaknesses relative to the emerging Islamist 
challenge. The Muslim activists gain popular appeal by endeavouring to 
implement the very programme nationalist regimes devised but were unable 
to carry out. 12 
In other words, the growth in support for Islamism rather than other political 
movements is a result of the failure of indigenous Arab regimes to implement 
successful development programmes. Thus, Pinto implies that Islamism is a 
political response to the socio-economic context. 
Whilst there are several origins of political Islam, for policy prescriptions the most 
important consideration is the political structure itself within countries where 
political Islam finds currency. Bernard Lewis rightly highlights that: 
Religious movements enjoy... practical advantage[s] in societies like 
those of the Middle East and north Africa that are under more or less 
autocratic rule: dictatorships can forbid parties, they can forbid 
meetings - they cannot forbid public worship, and, they can to only a 
limited extent control sermons. As a result the religious opposition 
11 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 1996) 196. 
12 Maria do Ceu Pinto, Political Islam and the United States: A Study of U. S. Policy Towards Islamist 
Movements in the Middle East (New York: Ithaca Press, 1999). 
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groups are the only ones that have regular meetings places where they 1-1 
can assemble and have at their disposal a network outside the control 
of the state or at least not fully subject to it. The more oppressive the 
regime the more it helps the fundamentalists by giving them a virtual 
monopoly of opposition. 13 
Whilst this explains why political Islam has grown within the context of 
authoritarianism, it does not by itself explain why political Islam potentially leads to 
Islamic terrorism. The most likely explanation is that on account of the failure to 
achieve reform within authoritarian countries, the use of violence is seen by some as 
a legitimate means of achieving their political objectives. Therefore, the very 
essence of the absence of freedom in authoritarian systems serves to foster the 
radicalisation of some Islamists into using terrorism as a political tool. 
This line of argument is incorporated to a certain extent in Martin Indyk's analysis 
into why Islamist movements have seen a resurgence coupled with the use of 
violence as a tool of achieving political objectives. 
14 Indyk argues that on account of 
the frustration of the Islamists in dealing with their own government, opposition 
towards the United States and other Western powers has been fuelled, as they are 
seen as the reason why authoritarian regimes have been unwilling to reform. When 
viewed within the context of US policy towards Persian Gulf security, which 
specially sought the maintenance of the status quo, there is credibility in the 
argument which sees the US national interest as having been the barrier to political 
reform in the first instance. Islamic terrorism against the United States is thus a 
direct by-product of US policy efforts to promote its national interest in the Middle 
East. 
13 Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (London: Phoenix, 2003) 114. 
1 Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar, " Foreign Affairs 82.1 (2002). 
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2.1 Accommodation and Confrontation 
Islamic political movements use highly diverse methods in their attempt to gain 
political power. Islamists are generally classified in terms of their political 
behaviour being either moderate or radical, based mainly on whether they use 
violence as a political tool. However, there are some commonalities which 
transcend political Islamic movements that should not be overlooked. Esposito 
highlights the following commonalities: 
1. Islam is viewed as being a total way of life; 
2. Westernisation is equated with secularism and other values contrary to Islam; 
3. Islam is the divine route to success and therefore is superior to capitalism and 
socialism; 
4. The introduction of the Shari'a will produce a more moral and just society; 
5. It is the duty of all Muslims to embrace the concept of Jihad - to make effort 
against the odds. '5 
Despite these communalities, Esposito and Voll quite rightly emphasise the 
distinction between Islamic movements that pursue power in moderate or radical 
fashions: 
Radical groups which go beyond these principles such as 
Hezbollah, al-Jihad, Takfir wal Hijra and the Army of God believe 
in an overthrow of Muslim governments who they see as un- 
Islamic; that a historical battle exists against the West; Muslims 
and non-Muslims who do not accept this are infidels. 16 
They highlight that although such radical groups exist, they operate on the fringe of 
society and are not representative of the majority norms and values of mainstream 
15 Esposito, "The Persian Gulf War, Islamic Movements and the New World Order, " 342-43. 
16 Ibid. 344. 
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Muslim societies. 17 The mainstream Islamic groups are highlighted as being non- 
violent: 
[They are] vibrant, multi-faceted movements that will embody the 
major impact of Islamic revivalism for the foreseeable future... its 
goal is the transformation of society through the formation of 
individuals at the grass roots level. Islamic societies work in 
education (schools, child care centres, youth camps), in religious 
publishing and broadcasting, in economic projects (Islamic banks, 
investment houses, insurance companies, local agrarian 
development) and in social services (hospitals, clinics, legal aid 
societies). '8 
Following the view that moderate Islamists exist, Esposito affirms the 
accommodationist view that Islam is compatible with democracy and should 
therefore be accommodated into the political spectrum as part of a wider drive 
towards political pluralism. 19 In any case, Esposito and James Piscatori quite rightly 
remind us that Islam does indeed have an intrinsic representative element through 
the consultative mechanism of the Shura. 20 Moreover, the involvement in 
democratic polity is believed to be a moderating mechanism as participation within 
it forces the moderation of policy for simple political expediency. This is seen as 
further marginalising radical Islamists. 2' 
Graham Fuller takes a comparable position by highlighting that Islamists 
involvements in democratic political processes would have to be suitably moderated 
for them to effectively co-operate with other movements and to enable them to fulfil 
t' John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, "Islam's Democratic Essence, " Middle East Quarterly 1.4 
(1994): 5-10; John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, "Islam and Democracy: Rejoinder, " Middle East 
uarterl 1.4 (1994): 74. 
18 Esposito, "The Persian Gulf War, Islamic Movements and the New World Order, " 344. 
19 Esposito and Volt, "Islam and Democracy: Rejoinder, " 73-75. 
20 John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam, " Middle East Journal 45.3 
(1991): 427-40. 
21 Ibid. 
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their objective of gaining political support for election to power. 22 Ahmad and 
Zartman comment that: 
Even if we consider the profession of democracy by the present 
leadership of Islamist countries as tactical or opportunistic, there is 
reason to believe that the very process of working within a democratic 
framework will transform this opportunistic commitment to a more 
substantive and effective commitment among the next generation of 
leaders and supporters. 23 
Piscatori goes even further by arguing that it is far from certain that even if political 
Islamic parties gained power, we would see it "degenerate into the obscurantist 
beliefs, priestly tyrannies, and sacred violence that secular ideologues anticipate. "24 
Therefore, this highlights the prospect that political Islam is indeed compatible with 
democratic polity. 
Overall, the Accommodation ist School not only stresses the distinction between 
radical and moderate Islamists, but also highlights the advantages of incorporating 
moderates into the democratic political process in order to moderate political 
behaviour. Whilst political Islam is viewed as compatible with democracy and the 
inclusion of Islamists in a free and pluralistic system as desirable, the 
Confrontationlist School sees an inherent tension existing between democracy and 
Islam. Bernard Lewis argues that Islamist participation in the democratic process is 
tactical as elections would effectively result in "one man, one vote, once. , 25 He 
argues it is basically illegitimate for a democracy to effectively vote itself away and, 
with the democratic election of an Islamic theocracy, that is precisely what would 
happen. But the reason why Islam is seen as unable to function within a democratic 
22 Graham Fuller, "Islamism(S) in the Next Century, " The Islamism Debate, ed. Martin Kramer (The 
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1997) 141-60. 
23 Mumtaz Ahmed and I. William Zartman, "Political Islam: Can It Become a Loyal Opposition, " 
Middle East Policy 5.1 (1997): 72. 
24 James P. Piscatori, "The Turmoil Within: The Struggle for the Future of the Islamic World, " 
Foreign Affairs Editors' Choice: The Middle East Crisis, ed. Gideon Rose (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2002) 178. 
25 Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy, " Atlantic Monthly 271.2 (1993): 91. 
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system is taken up by Samuel Huntington as being a direct result of its incompatible 
culture. 26 Huntington argues that an Islamic theocracy is incompatible with the very 
notion of fundamental freedoms that underpin liberal democracy. 27 He suggests that 
this inherent tension may well result in some form of civilization confrontation 
rather than the traditional state based conflict. 
Lewis picks up on the theme of the desirability of an Islamic theocracy by arguing 
that Islamic governance not only results in the abrogation of fundamental human 
rights, it also serves to stifle economic and social development. 28 Lewis writes, "[i]n 
the course of the twentieth century it became abundantly clear in the Middle East 
and indeed all over the lands of Islam that things had indeed gone badly wrong. 
Compared with its millennial rival, Christendom, the world of Islam had become 
poor, weak, and ignorant. ". 19 But Lewis does not limit his analysis to nation specific 
Islamist groups, he see international ones, epitomized by al-Qa'ida, as equally 
undesirable: "For Usama bin Laden, his declaration of war against the United States 
marks the resumption of the struggle for religious dominance of the world that 
began in the seventh century. , 30 Lewis goes on to conclude that "[i]f the 
fundamentalists are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a 
dark future awaits the world, especially the part of it that embraces Islam. ' 31 
Overall, Lewis suggests that the equation of Islam with peaceful rule is a fallacy, 
and thus political Islam cannot be allowed to reach its logical conclusion of the 
establishment of an Islamic theocracy governed by the Shari'a. 
Given this incompatibility and potential threat, Daniel Pipes argues that despite the 
degree of diversity of all Islamic political movements, they are inherently hostile 
226 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations? " Foreign Affairs 72.3 (1993): 22-32. 
27 Samuel Huntington, "Religion and the Third Wave, " National Interest 24. Summer (1991): 40-41. 
Zs Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? (London: Phoenix, 2002) 168-78. 
29 Ibid. 168. 
30 Lewis, The Crisis of Islam 139. 
31 Ibid. 140. 
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and pose a threat to Western civilisation. 32 He identifies Islamism as analogous to 
other ideological movements such as communism and fascism which are widely 
considered inimical to Western norms and values. 33 Amos Perlmutter echoes his 
theme by arguing that Islamism is an "aggressive revolutionary movement as 
militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and Nazi movements of the past. " 34 
This view is grounded in the argument that underlying commonalties exist amongst 
all political Islamic movements and that incompatibility can be equated with other 
competing ideologies. 
Martin Kramer continues by drawing our attention to inherent common 
characteristics which allows us to question if any real distinction exists between 
radical and moderate Islamic movements. 35 He goes as far to argue that this 
commonality indicates a unified political ideology, equitable with communism, 
which threatens the West. 36 He specifically highlights Iran as being at the centre of 
this monolithic Islamist civilization. 
The accommodationist approach, which sees the Shari'a as compatible with 
democratic polity and Islamists involvement in the democratic process resulting in a 
moderation of behaviour, is firmly rejected by Daniel Brumberg. He echoes Lewis's 
premise that moderate Islamists are essentially only engaging in the democratic 
political process for tactical reasons in that they believe it to be the most legitimate 
and likely way they will achieve power. Such behaviour is seen as tactical as 
democracy could be subverted once power is gained as the adoption of the Shari'a 
32 Robert H. Pelletreau, et al., "Symposium: Resurgent Islam in the Middle East, " Middle East Policy 
2.2 (1994). 
33 Daniel Pipes, "There Are No Moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist Islam, " National Interest 
41. Fall (1995): 48. 
3' Amos Perlmutter, "Wishful Thinking About Islamic Fundamentalism, " Washington Post 19 Jan. 
1992, A5. 
35 Martin Kramer, "The Mismeasure of Political Islam, " The Islamism Debate, ed. Martin Kramer 
(The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1997) 167- 
72. 
36 Martin Kramer, "Islam Vs. Democracy, " Commentary 95. Jan. (1993): 38-39. 
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will usher in an authoritarian theocracy. 37 Kramer continues with this theme by 
highlighting that although democracy was promised by Islamists in Iran, candidates 
are vetted by the Guardian Council in order to see if they meet the requirements set 
out in the Iranian constitution: "the regime in Tehran thus fails the key test of 
democracy, for it cannot be voted out of power. "38 He argues that by their very 
essence Islamic theocracies are expansionist, aggressive and inherently anti-Western. 
The reason for this stems from the belief that Western culture is perceived as the 
anti-thesis to Islamic values. 39 Indeed, Kramer argues that by fundamentalist regimes 
positioning themselves as the bastion against Western culture, they indirectly serve 
to self-legitimise their presence. 
Oliver Roy approaches this issue from a unique perspective by arguing that Islamic 
polity cannot be an effective and lasting form of governance. He comments that: 
Even if Islamist regimes are authoritarian and coercive, why is there 
no Islamic totalitarianism? My answer is that there is a 
contradiction in Islamist ideology. If it does respect the basic idea of 
the Shari'a, it cannot control the family and has to admit the 
existence of a private sphere beyond the reach of the state. If it does 
not respect the Shari'a, then this ideology might be opposed in the 
very name of Islam... true Shari'a would mean devolution of law 
from the state to a religious court. 40 
Therefore, Roy argues the position that governance under Shari'a law not only has 
inherent contradictions which make it unworkable along its own ideals, but also that 
it is incompatible with `Nestern models of liberal democratic polity. 
37 Daniel Brumberg. "Rhetoric and Strategy: Islamic Movements and Democracy in the Middle 
East, " The Islamism Debate, ed. Martin Kramer (The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and 
African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1997) 11-18. 
38 Kramer, "The Mismeasure of Political Islam, " 49. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Oliver Roy, "Islamists in Power, " The Islamism Debate, ed. Martin Kramer (The Moshe Dayan 
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1997) 82. 
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Overall, the characteristics of political Islam are a clear matter of contention. It is 
accepted by scholars and commentators that Islamic political movements do share 
common characteristics in terms of their goals and values, as well as having diversity 
in the methods to which they attempt to gain political power. Notable academics 
such as Esposito, Piscatori and Voll take the position that radical and violent 
movements are unrepresentative; the majority of Islamic movements are moderate 
and en-age in peaceful participation in the political process. They highlight that such 
moderate movements should be accommodated in the democratic process as they 
would necessarily moderate their objectives further for expediency, and would 
consequently not pose a threat to the democratic framework. Although this view has 
a great deal of credibility, other commentators such as Kramer and Pipes affirm that 
no real distinction can be drawn between moderate and radical Islamist movements. 
They highlight that the difference between moderate/peaceful and violent/radical 
Islamists is inconsequential as both seek the establishment of a regime based on the 
principles of the Shari'a. They highlight that the Shari'a is incompatible with liberal 
democratic rule, human rights and Western culture. Although an Islamic theocracy 
would not necessarily equate with extremism, the belief that it would not allow itself 
to be voted out of power on account of it conflicting with its religious principals 
makes it inherently incompatible with democratic rule. The net effect of such 
incompatibility is an overriding tension with the West. 
2.2 The Historical Context 
The position of the US government towards political Islam began to germinate 
during the Carter presidency. The Carter administration saw the Islamic Mujaheddin 
in Afghanistan as a geostrategic means of drawing the Soviet Union into a `Vietnam 
style' conflict in order to counter the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, 
Brzezinski regarded the actual cause of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as being 
a direct result of a successful covert US operation to draw them into an invasion. 
Brzezinski stated: 
According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the 
Mujaheddin bean during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet 
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army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly 
guarded until now, is completely otherwise. Indeed, it was July 3, 
1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid 
to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very 
day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him 
that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military 
intervention 41 
Brzezinski's analysis of the situation was correct. The US induced invasion marked 
the onset of a strategic relationship which involved the supply of armaments to 
Islamists. The significance of this covert US policy was that Afghanistan became the 
locus of an Islamic guerrilla style insurgency against the Soviet Union, which 
attracted numerous recruits from across the world. In many respects, it can be 
described as the beginning of an international jihad which is in contrast to the nation 
specific Islamists who merely oppose their own government. But significantly, the 
use of the Afghan Mujaheddin was a tactical means by which the United States 
secured wider interests in accordance with the Cold War strategic environment. 
Although this episode marked the beginnings of US involvement with political 
Islamic movements, it was a covert strategy and thus not representative of an 
overarching US policy framework. 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was, however, the key issue which brought political 
Islam into the spotlight. Unlike the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan which was seen as a 
tactical asset, the Iranian Revolution was seen as a clear strategic threat to US 
interests. The revolution was highly significant in that it not only marked a 
fundamental change in US policy towards Persian Gulf security, it also marked the 
emergence of political Islam as a credible political force. On a wider level, the Shi'a 
uprisings in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia in 1979, in addition to the seizure 
of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamists; underscored that the ramifications of 
Iran's Islamic Revolution had a wider significance. 
41 Bill Blum, "The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan: Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, " Le 
Nouvel Observateur 15-21 Jan. 1998,12/06/03 
<http: //www. globalresearch. ca/articies/BRZI 10A. html>. 
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Although the United States did have several other encounters with radical Islamists 
during the 1980s, a comprehensive policy framework does not appear to have been 
established. It would be more accurate to describe a perception of political Islam as 
having developed at this time: political Islam was almost consistently seen as posing 
varying degrees of risk y2 The terrorist bombing of the US marine barracks in 
Lebanon in 1983 underscored the recognition that radical Islamists posed a threat, 
but the focus of the Reagan administration generally remained centred on the Cold 
War strategic environment. Political Islam remained a secondary concern. 
It was not until the Algerian Revolution in 1991 that political Islam was seen as 
holding a potential threat through democratic polity. Unlike the manner in which 
Khomeini came to power in Iran, Algeria showed that Islamists could gain power 
through democratic means and thus underscored Bernard Lewis's point that 
democracy could be used illegitimately: many saw an Islamic theocracy as resulting 
in the abolition of future elections. The victory by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
in Algeria's parliamentary elections resulted in a bloody civil when the military 
intervened to nullify the elections. In many respects, a parallel can be drawn with the 
1964 democratic election of the socialist Salvador Allende in Chile: both were 
legitimate electoral victories but were deemed by the United States as a usurpation of 
democracy. Nevertheless, the Islamist's democratic victory demonstrated that an 
Islamic theocracy could occur through democratic means. 
But the realisation of the threat posed by political Islam through the ballot box 
coincided neatly with the end of the Cold War era. To many writers, Islamism 
became the ideological successor to communism. But in terms of US foreign policy, 
the Algerian scenario represented a clear threat to US interests within the Middle 
East. Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Edward Djerejian, 
stated that "a coherent policy framework towards Islam has become a compelling 
need as foreign policy challenges erupt involving an `arc of crisis' extending from 
42 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2001) 41-72; Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: 
Free Press, 2004) 35-72. 
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the Balkans, the Caucasus, North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South 
Africa. "43 Given the end of the Cold War and the realisation from the causes of 
Algerian civil war that US interests on a wider level were potentially at risk from 
political Islam, a coherent policy position was thus seen as warranted. 
The formation of a policy framework was unveiled by Djerejian in June 1992. In his 
`Meridian House Declaration, ' Djerejian made clear that despite the end of the Cold 
War, Islam was not seen as a monolithic threat to the United States. Djerejian 
remarked that "the US Government does not view Islam as the next `ism' 
confronting the West or threatening world peace. That is an overly simplistic 
response to a complex reality. "44 But whilst the diversity amongst political Islamic 
movements was recognised and accepted as part of the political process, Djerejian 
outlined that certain Islamist groups were not supported by the United States: "we are 
suspect of those who would use the democratic process to come to power, only to 
destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance. While we 
believe in the principle of `one person, one vote, ' we do not support `one person, one 
vote, one time. ,, 45 
Therefore, the policy formulation saw a clear distinction between moderate and 
radical Islamist groups. Radical Islamist groups were demarcated as having the 
following characteristics: 
1. Practice terrorism, oppress minorities, preach intolerance, or 
violate internationally accepted standards of conduct regarding 
human rights; 
2. Insensitive to the need for political pluralism; 
3. Cloak their message in another brand of authoritarianism; 
4. Substitute religious and political confrontation for constructive 
engagement with the rest of the world; 
43 Qtd. In: Pinto, Political Islam and the United States 206. 
°'i Edward Djerejian, "The US and the Middle East in a Changing World, " Address at Meridian House 
International, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 2 Jun. 1992.8pp. 04/05/02 
<http: //dosfan. l ib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/ 1992/htral/Dispatchv3no23. htmi>. 
45 Ibid. 
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5. Do not share our commitment to peaceful resolution of 
conflict, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict; and 
6. With those who would pursue their goals through repression 
or violence. 46 
In contrast, moderate Islamist groups were seen as seeking a gradual reform and 
affirmation of Islamic ideals on their given country. Importantly, these Islamic ideals 
were viewed as compatible with democratic rule. Djerejian commented that: 
In countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, we thus 
see [moderate] groups or movements seeking to reform their 
societies in keeping with Islamic ideals. There is considerable 
diversity in how these ideals are expressed. We detect no monolithic 
or coordinated international effort behind these movements. What 
we do see are believers living in different countries placing renewed 
emphasis on Islamic principles and governments accommodating 
Islamist political activity to varying degrees and in different ways 47 
The key point about this policy formulation was that it demonstrates a synthesis of 
both the accommodationist and confrontationlist schools of thought: both were 
applied respectively to whether the Islamist group was defined by the United States 
as moderate or radical. Nevertheless, this definition was fluid and applied on a case- 
by-case approach. Therefore, whilst it was clear that the United States opposed 
extremism which manifested itself through violence, ambiguity remained as to 
whether the United States "was genuinely committed to the principle of free 
elections in a case in which political Islamists could win power. ', 
48 Although the 
Meridian House address had its limitations, it was also politically helpful. Maria do 
Ceu Pinto comments that: 
On the one hand [Djerejian's formulation] enabled Washington to 
oppose any Islamic group that espoused violence and challenged 
46 Edward Djerejian, "The US and the Middle East in a Changing World, " 
47 Ibid. 
48 Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 83. 
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moderate pro-Western regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. On 
the other it made it possible to resist groups opposed to the peace 
process and anti-American Islamic regimes in power - such as 
Sudan and Iran - which met his criteria of being violent, intolerant 
49 and coercive. 
In essence, Djerejian's formulation rested on three distinct tiers: moderate Islamists 
which were compatible with US foreign policy interests and were a non-issue; and 
extremist Islamists, which could both be compatible and incompatible with US 
foreign policy interests. That is to say, analytically speaking, US policy towards 
extremists Islamists was dependent not on whether violence was used, but who it was 
being used against. On the other hand, a rejection of violence as a political means 
was clearly present, thus ruling out a condoning of extremism. From this, it appears 
that there was a degree of ambiguity and lack of coherence in US policy statements 
which encompassed political Islamic movements. 
Overall, Fawaz Gerges is correct to argue that the real importance of the Meridian 
House Declaration was that it left a contextual framework for the Clinton 
administration S0 It interpreted political Islam very broadly and thus was far from a 
comprehensive policy framework. But it did stress two important themes: firstly, that 
a clear dichotomy exists, separating both moderate from extremist Islamism; and 
secondly, extremist Islamism can be identified not only by its willingness to use 
violence as a political tool, but also from its wider political agenda which is seen as 
incompatible with democracy. Thus the point of contention for this framework was 
whether moderate Islamists can be viewed as compatible with democratic rule 
despite the differentiation from extremist groups. 
Although it was an important framework, Gerges argues that the George H. W. Bush 
administration did not translate this position into policy as it conflicted with Persian 
Gulf security: the strategic objective of maintaining security through supporting the 
status quo did not correspond with the competing objective of political reform and 
49 Pinto, Political Islam and the United States 207. 
50 Gerges, America and Political Islam 85. 
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accommodation. Therefore, when US policy towards political Islam under the Bush 
administration is put into context, it amounted to very little operationally. Indeed, its 
flexibility and lack of clarity underscored it as a secondary foreign policy issue to 
wider US policy interests in the Middle East. 
3.0 UNITED STATES POLICY POSITION TOWARDS POLITICAL 
ISLAM 1993-2001 
With the onset of the Clinton administration in 1993, a key issue which appeared to 
be facing US foreign policy towards political Islam was how to maintain the fine 
balance between accommodation and confrontation, whilst not allowing US policy to 
be charged with being anti-Islam per se. The Bush administration had been vocal in 
the Meridian House Declaration that it neither saw Islam as a threat nor extremist 
Islamists as representative of the Islamic faith. By maintaining the Bush 
administration's position of stressing that the United States did not equate extremist 
political Islam with the Islamic faith, it underscored the dichotomy and legitimised a 
confrontationist approach against extremism. In other words, by stressing that radical 
Islamism was nothing to do with the Islamic religion, the United States could reject 
accusations that it was adopting a confrontationist strategy towards political Islam. 
While moderate political Islam was essentially a non issue, extremist Islamism was 
seen to demand a policy response as it was equated with terrorism. 
Throughout Clinton's two terms of office, it is striking that it was consistent in the 
manner in which extremist Islamism was portrayed: policy pronouncements carefully 
and consistently dispelled any linkage between the Islamic faith and terrorism, in 
addition to rejecting the notion that political Islam was a successor to communism. 
Clinton personally affirmed these points during his visit to Indonesia in November 
1994. He commented, "[I] say to the American people and the West generally that 
even though we have had problems with terrorism coming out of the Middle East, it 
is not inherently related to Islam - not to the religion, not to the culture. "51 On a 
similar note, Clinton remarked in an address to the Jordanian parliament in October 
51 Thomas W. Lippman, "To Islam, an Olive Branch, " Washington Post 28 Dec. 1994, A3. 
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1994, "[that] America refuses to accept that our civilizations must collide... [w]e 
respect Islam. "52 
Robert Pelletreau succeeded Djerejian as Assistant Secretary of State, and 
maintained what appeared analytically to be the three-tier approach towards political 
Islam: 
In the foreign affairs community, we often use the term "political 
Islam" to refer to the movements and groups within the broader 
fundamentalist revival with a specific political agenda. "Islamists" 
are Muslims with political goals. We view these terms as analytical, 
not normative. They do not refer to phenomena that are necessarily 
sinister: there are many legitimate, socially responsible Muslim 
groups with political goals. However, there are also Islamists who 
operate outside the law. Groups or individuals who operate outside 
the law-who espouse violence to achieve their aims-are properly 
called extremists. 53 
Martin Kramer sees this as a three-tiered approach as it demonstrates a clear 
analytical inconsistency in US foreign policy: it arguably allowed the United States 
to condone extremism, which can manifest itself in the form of terrorism, as 
legitimate, providing the United States agrees with its objectives. 
54 Nevertheless, this 
is an academic point of contention and is in direct contrast to the longstanding 
official position of the US government that it does not condone or support terrorism. 
In September 1995, Pelletreau underscored this point by stating that "I have trouble 
defining exactly where one category starts and another stops... [we] ought not color 
every party or group or government the same way, nor should we simplistically 
52 William J. Clinton, "Speech by President to the Jordianian Parliament, " Remarks by the President to 
the Jordianian Parliament, Amman: GPO, 26 Aug. 1993.2pp. 11/10/04 
<http: //www. clintonfoundation. org[legacy/ 102694-speech-by-president-to-jordanian-parl iament. htm>. 
53 Robert H. Pelletreau, "Symposium: Resurgent Islam in the Middle East, " Middle East Policy Fall 
(1994): 2. 
5' Martin Kramer, "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists? " Middle East Quarterly 10.2 
(2003): 7. 
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condemn them all as anti-Western. "55 He also stated that "[w]e must deal with 
fundamentalist Islam in a variety of contexts - how it impacts on issues of 
importance to the United States, such as the peace process, or combating terrorism, 
or encouraging open markets or political pluralism or respect for human rights. The 
starting point is our own objectives, not political Islam as such. "56 As a result of a 
lack of clarity and coherence in distinguishing moderate from extremist groups, even 
amongst those that use violence, US policy pronouncements regarding political Islam 
can be interpreted as being both contradictory and ambiguous. 
Therefore, the Unites States' position on extremist political Islam was clearly 
confrontational providing it was commensurate with US policy objectives. Indeed, 
although we know the Clinton administration's position towards both moderate and 
extremist political Islam, it is not part of a specific stated policy towards Islam, or 
indeed politicised Islam. Therefore, political Islam mainly became an issue for the 
United States when it used terrorism as a means of achieving its political objectives, 
and thus falls under the rubric of US counterterrorism policy. Strictly speaking, it is 
inaccurate to view the Clinton administration as having had a policy towards Islam. 
This point was underlined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Robert 
Neumann: "[l]et me be clear and emphatic: the United States of America does not 
and should not have a political policy towards Islam. "57 
This point underscores the argument that if the United States did not have a specific 
policy towards political Islam, and extremist Islamism was not seen as representative 
of the Islamic faith, the central issues are: firstly, the position of the United States 
towards moderate political Islam vis-ä-vis democracy; and secondly, the nature of 
US counterterrorism policy towards extremist political Islam. The importance of the 
compatibility of moderate political Islam with democracy is that it demonstrates 
whether the United States supports moderate political Islamic movements in a 
democratic polity. With regard to counterterrorism, this highlights the more 
operational sphere of US policy towards extremist political Islamic movements. 
55 Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, "Robert H. Pelletreau Jr.: Not Every Fundamentalist Is a 
Terrorist, " Middle East Quarterly 2.3 (1995): 7. 
56 Pipes and Clawson, "Robert H. Pelletreau Jr.: Not Every Fundamentalist Is a Terrorist, " 7. 
5' Qtd. in: Satloff, US Policy Towards Islamism: A Theoretical and Operational Overview 8. 
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3.1 Islam and Democracy 
The position of the United States towards political Islam's compatibility with 
democracy was chequered by the events in Algeria. As has already been stated, the 
George H. W. Bush administration did not view the election of the Algerian 
Salvation Front (FIS) as legitimate as it believed democracy could not vote itself out 
of existence. This was a view which was upheld throughout the Clinton presidency. 
Pelletreau's ambiguous distinction of moderate from extremist Islamists is not 
helpful. The case-by-case approach which recognises overlapping criterion of the 
two definitions does not allow for a clear analytical interpretation of whether US 
foreign policy saw Islam as inherently compatible with democratic ntle. Clinton's 
national security advisor, Anthony Lake, saw Islamic extremism as separate from the 
Islamic faith, but also as posing a threat to freedom itself. Lake commented in May 
1994 that "[w]hat distinguishes Islamic extremism from other forms of extremism is 
not terrorism, but the naked pursuit of political power. "58 Lake's statement is 
important in that it expanded on the Meridian House Declaration by showing that 
extremism had a dual dimension of its propensity for the use of violence, in addition 
to its underlying, political objectives. Previous declarations had basically confined 
extremism to the sole definition of whether it resorted to violence. 
Lake's formulation raises more questions than it answers. It is questionable to what 
extent moderate or extremist Islamists can be separated if they both desire the 
establishment of an Islamic theocracy as their strategic objective. In terms of whether 
there are differential forms of an Islamic theocracy, which would more or less 
acceptable to the United States, would simply not a viable means of analytically 
assessing US policy towards political Islam. 
In contrast, Pelletreau confined the definition of extremist Islamists as being centred 
on acts rather than objectives. 59 Pelletreau stated in May 1994 that Islamists "who 
58 Anthony Lake, "Conceptualizing US Strategy in the Middle East, " Address to the Soref 
Symposium, Washington, D. C.: Wasington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 May 1994.4pp. 
19/04/02 <http: //www. washingtoninstitute. org/pubs/soref/lake. htm>. 
59 Satloff, US Policy Towards Islamism 10. 
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operate outside the law"60 could be classified as extremists. This legalistic 
formulation, made within days of Lake's objective based definition, indicates a lack 
of clarity in US policy towards defining extremism. Of course, the US designation of 
Hezbollah in 1997 as an extremist group demonstrated that this was a flawed 
approach . 
61 Nonetheless, it does underscore the point that analytically, there was 
inconsistency in whether the United States interpreted political Islam as a threat 
based on its actions or its strategic objectives. 
By 1996, Pelletreau's definition of Islamism had incorporated the issue of 
extremist's objectives in addition to their actions. Pelletreau commented that: 
Extremists around the world use whatever resources they have to 
achieve their goals. In the Middle East, religious rhetoric can be 
made into one of those resources. A fatwa or incitement to violence 
can be just as dangerous as bombs and bullets. The impulse that 
motivates the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades of Hamas, the Algerian 
Armed Islamic Group (or GIA) and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards is not Islamic piety, but a mixture of revenge, fanaticism and 
pursuit of political power. 62 
The classification of extremists as using whatever means available to them in order 
to achieve their objectives, suggests that the goal of an Islamic theocracy is viewed 
as synonymous with extremism and contrary to US interests. Indeed, this indicates 
the distinction between moderate and extremist Islamists was not as clear as 
Pelletreau's previous comments would have us believe. From this, one could argue 
that, at the very least, the United States viewed even moderate political Islam with a 
degree of scepticism because of its potential to usurp democracy in the event of the 
establishment of an Islamic theocracy. However, when viewed within the context of 
previous policy statements, there was a clear lack of clarity as to whether the United 
States viewed moderate Islamists objectives as being in favour of US interests. 
60 Satloff, US Policy Towards Islamism 10. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Robert H. Pelletreau, "Dealing with the Muslim Politics of the Middle East, " Address to the Council 
on Foreign Relations, New York: GPO, 8 May 1996.7pp. 15/09/02 
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Compounding this uncertainty, in June 1998 Robert Neumann seemingly reverted to 
the distinction of actions signifying the classification of an Islamist group. But 
Neumann went further than previous administration statements as he rejected the 
school of thought which advocated the United States should have a policy towards 
Islamist groups that use democracy as a tactical means of achieving their 
incompatible strategic objective of an Islamic theocracy. He rejected the 
confrontation of moderate Islamists groups as it was seen as incompatible with the 
underlying Jeffersonian tenants of US foreign policy. 
63 Therefore, he indicated that 
their strategic objective was flawed but the United States would did not view their 
activities as illegitimate. 
When US policy statements towards the objectives of Islamists and its compatibility 
with democratic rule is examined since the onset of the Clinton presidency, there 
appears to be a lack of consistency or clarity, and it has at times been contradictory. 
There have, however, been some consistencies that can be highlighted during the 
time period 1993-2001. The most noteworthy consistency has been US opposition to 
the use of violence as a political tool. Although the flexible nature of US policy has 
allowed for an analytical criticism of whether this is true, at an operational level, 
there is good reason to believe that this has been applied in practice. The key issue is, 
however, whether the United States views an Islamic theocracy as commensurate 
with democracy, and therefore raises the issue of the extent to which moderate and 
extremist Islamists can be equated given that they seemingly seek the shared goal of 
an Islamic theocracy. At a base level, US policy was inherently contradictory as it 
saw moderate Islamists' participation in the democratic process as legitimate, but 
their end game objective as illegitimate. The indication is that Islamists' political 
participation is fine, providing they only remain on the fringes of democratic polity 
and thus do not usurp democracy in favour of an Islamic theocracy. 
As the general indication is that the United States favoured a widening of the 
political system in Middle Eastern authoritarian countries and the inclusion of 
moderate Islamists, the key issue is how this equated within the wider context of US 
63 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World 
(New York: Knopf, 2001) 100-73. 
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policy. On a regional level within the Persian Gulf, the security of the region to 
safeguard US interests rested on the containment of Iran and Iraq as a means of 
ensuring the status quo. The key interest was thus to ensure that the security of the oil 
producing GCC countries was ensured in order to safeguard US economic interests. 
Political reform and the inclusion of Islamists in the political process posed risks for 
the stability and security of these countries. Therefore, US interests within the 
Persian Gulf was widely viewed as being potentially jeopardised by the US position 
towards moderate Islamist groups. 
On an international level, the key pillar of the Clinton administration was for the 
expansion of free markets and democracy. Although this was in fitting with US 
policy towards political Islam, it contrasted with US policy towards the Persian Gulf. 
Whilst there was a clear policy quagmire, the Clinton administration cannot be 
regarded as having pressed Middle Eastern countries to implement substantive 
reform. Although there were clear rhetorical statements calling for this, it amounted 
to very little. This indicates that Clinton's policy was contradictory in that it called 
for a widening of political participation, but US interests towards Persian Gulf 
security were its primary concern. Political Islam and furthering its inclusion in 
democratic polity can thus be interpreted as a secondary concern. 
3.2 International Terrorism 
With the onset of the Clinton administration in 1993, terrorism was, according to 
Richard Clarke, "far down on the new team's priority list. "64 The Clinton 
administration had come to power with its global foreign policy objectives premised 
on the expansion of democracy and free markets: counterterrorism was undoubtedly 
a key issue but, as with the previous Bush White House, it was not viewed as an 
immanent threat. The significance of terrorism with regard to political Islam is 
simply that extremist Islamism can manifest itself in what the United States defines 
as terrorism: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non- 
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
64 Clarke, Against All Enemies 73. 
- 110 - 
influence an audience. "65 International Islamic terrorism is therefore an important 
contextual issue in allowing for an understanding of US foreign policy towards 
extremist political Islamic movements and is of direct relevance to the grand 
strategic era of the War on Terror. 
The January 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York was the first 
high profile Islamic terrorist attack within the United States. The arrest of Omar 
Abdel Rahman, a blind Egyptian cleric, uncovered what was to turn out to be an al- 
Qa'ida terrorist cell with direct links to Khalid Sheikh Mohamad and Ramzi Yousef. 
Investigations in the cleric's apartment in New York uncovered references to the 
Afghan Services Bureau (Mahktab al Kiddimah). The Afghan Services Bureau, 
better known as al-Qa'ida, was a form of international political Islam that had 
developed in the wake of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, and was headed by 
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
Unlike indigenous extremist political Islamic movements operating within Middle 
Eastern countries, al-Qa'ida's modus operandi stems directly from the circumstances 
surrounding the Cold War guerrilla style insurgency within Afghanistan. The 
decision by the United States to instigate a Soviet invasion coupled with its support 
for the Afghan Mujaheddin, served both the strategic purpose of embroiling the 
Soviet Union in a Vietnam style conflict, and as a locus point attracting numerous 
recruits from across the Muslim world. The CIA purchased armaments from China 
and Egypt using Saudi and US funds in order to back the insurgency. 66 It was in 
essence the Vietnam conflict but with role reversal. 
Unlike other indigenous nation specific political Islamic groups, the Afghan 
Mujaheddin was directed against a foreign power. Significantly, the total number of 
Mujaheddin fighters has been estimated to range from 175,000 to 250,000 from over 
40 countries. 67 But with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, it was seen as a 
65 United States, CIA, The War on Terrorism: Frequently Asked Questions, (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 
2005) 2pp. 20/11/02 <http: //www. cia. gov/terrorism/faqs. html>. 
66 Steve Coll, "CIA in Afghanistan: In CIA's Covert War, Where to Draw the Line Was Ivey, " 
Washington Post 20 Jul. 1992, A3. 
67 Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (London: Macmillan, 1988) 244-45. 
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religious victory by the Mujaheddin. That is to say, the withdrawal of the Soviet 
Union reinforced the conviction that their insurgency had defeated a superpower: but 
crucially, it created a strategic vacuum. Peter Bergen quite rightly comments that: 
The victory against communism in Afghanistan was an intoxicating 
moral victory: a superpower had been defeated in the name of Allah. 
It was an important lesson for the Afghan Arabs and for bin Laden 
himself, who applied it to the next holy war - against the United 
States 68 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 prompted the deployment of US forces onto the 
Arabian Peninsula to defend Saudi Arabia from potential Iraqi invasion, and 
ultimately as a launch-pad for a counter-invasion of Kuwait to liberate it from Iraq 
under a UN mandate. This was the key event which seemingly resulted in the United 
States being viewed by bin Laden and his affiliates as the immediate successor to the 
Soviet Union. Within the context of their extremist Wahabbi interpretation of Islam, 
the presence of a non-Islamic force on the Arabian Peninsula was a key trigger given 
the location of the two holy shrines in Mecca and Medina. Bernard Lewis reminds 
us, however, that bin Laden's reasoning was highly complex: "[t]he catalog of 
American offences they cite is long and detailed, beginning with the conquest, 
colonization, and settlement - emotive words - of the New World and continuing to 
the present day. , 69 Indeed, bin Laden saw the "New World Order", first outlined by 
George H. W. Bush to a joint session of Congress on 11 September 1990, as 
symbolic of the onset of a new phase in the United States' relations with the world, 
and the Islamic world in particular. 0 Indeed, the specific date of the 9/11 attacks 
some eleven years later was probably symbolic of this. In an interview with Peter 
Arnett in 1997, Bin Laden stated: 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in which the US has no 
mentionable role, but rather the credit goes to God, Praise and Glory 
68 Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (London: Phoenix. 
2002) 78. 
69 Lewis, The Crisis of Islam 134. 
70 George H. W. Bush, "Toward a New World Order, " Address before a joint session of Congress. 
Washington, D. C.: GPO, 11 Sept. 1990.27pp. 15/06/04 
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be to Him, and the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, this collapse made the 
US more haughty and arrogant and it has started to look at itself as a 
Master of this world and established what it calls the new world 
order. 71 
With bin Laden locating himself in Sudan and later in Afghanistan, the establishment 
of a loose network of former Mujaheddin fighters known as al-Qa'ida had emerged. 
Al-Qa'ida is by no means a monolithic organisation: it is a loosely organised 
international political Islamic organisation which is represented across the world. 
The informal nature of al-Qa'ida is what provided it with its operational 
effectiveness, as infiltration by governmental intelligence agencies was highly 
difficult. For US foreign policy, at the onset of the Clinton administration the sphere 
of political Islam was very much seen under the guise of indigenous Islamist groups, 
but al-Qa'ida was a different threat altogether as its objectives encompassed both 
localised nation specific issues, in addition to wider goals which saw a need for the 
United States to be directly attacked. 
Although al-Qa'ida was implicated in the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing and the 
subsequent debacle in Somalia, it was not initially clear to the Clinton administration 
what they were facing. 72 The focus of the Clinton administration towards 
international terrorism was arguably state centric. Iran, Sudan and Syria were the 
focus of the initial efforts by the Clinton administration towards international 
terrorism. 3 Indeed, Iranian backed Saudi Hezbollah was reported by the US 
government as being behind the attack at al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia, which killed 
nineteen US military personal in 1996. During the first Clinton administration, the 
threat from international terrorism was seen as squarely coming from state sponsored 
terrorism. Non-state international terrorist groups were still recognised as a real 
threat, but were viewed as less operationally effective in contrast to state sponsored 
terrorist groups. Although the trial of the World Trade Centre bomber, Omar Abdel 
71 Peter Arnett, "March 1997 Interview with Osama Bin Laden, " CNN Online March 2001,12107/04 
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Rahman, was showing the first signs that the United States faced a threat from 
international non-state political Islam, and that bin Laden was potentially involved in 
financing transnational terrorist operations, 74 the focus of US counterterrorism 
strategy was generally focused on state actors. Indeed, it appears that much of the 
intelligence the United States was receiving about al-Qa'ida was unsubstantiated at 
this point. 
The recognition by the CIA that the United States was facing a loosely organised 
international terrorist network, headed by bin Laden, occurred in the summer of 
1995 75 The steady flow of intelligence underlined that the United States was facing a 
threat from a previously unheard of organisation known as al-Qa'ida which was 
headed by bin Laden. But by 1998, al-Qa'ida became a more comprehensive 
organisation as it reportedly `merged' with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, headed by 
Ayman Zawahiri. Whilst bin Laden remained the public figurehead of al-Qa'ida, it 
has been widely speculated that Zawahiri acted in an equal capacity to bin Laden. 
Around the same time, bin Laden issued a fatwa which called upon Muslims to target 
the United States. Although al-Qa'ida had attacked the United States before, this was 
the rhetorical declaration of war. The true scale of the threat facing the United States 
from al-Qa'ida surfaced shortly afterwards. In August 1998, the US embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya were simultaneously attacked causing over two hundred and 
fifty fatalities and injuries to over five thousand. The Clinton administration 
responded with targeted air strikes in Afghanistan after receiving actionable 
intelligence about an al-Qa'ida leadership meeting. This, however, amounted to very 
little and did not succeed in its objective of killing al-Qa'ida's leadership. 
The bombings of the US embassies galvanised the administration's view that al- 
Qa'ida posed a clear and present dander to the United States. Al-Qaida had steadily 
evolved and the embassy bombing underscored its operational ability. Crucially, this 
was the juncture at which the Clinton administration actually sanctioned the use of 
lethal force against bin Laden and thus is the point when bin Laden was viewed as an 
immanent threat rather than a fugitive from the law requiring trial and imprisonment. 
74 Clarke, Against All Enemies 147. 
75 Ibid., 148. 
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But politically speaking, an unequivocal response by the Clinton White House was a 
necessity given the scale of the attack. The response of the Clinton administration 
was to implement several new counterterrorist policies and increase funding towards 
homeland security programmes; these issues ultimately fall outside the scope of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the key point is that, despite the Clinton administration having 
taken the al-Qa'ida threat very seriously and implemented several counterterrorist 
measurers, its policy response was reactive and thus not geared towards combating 
the perceived root causes of al-Qa'ida's support base. As has already been discussed, 
the root causes of the support base of political Islamic movements are several but, 
most importantly, it is the structural barriers to political reform in authoritarian 
countries which make political Islam an attractive and viable means of expressing 
discontent and striving for political objectives. The priority of the Clinton presidency 
towards the Persian Gulf remained throughout geared towards ensuring the security 
of the region through upholding the status quo. Therefore, although the Clinton 
administration implemented a variety of counterterrorism measurers, these were 
reactive based policies to al-Qa'ida's operational network and little attention was 
focused on combating the causes of its support base. 6 
This allows us to conclude that Clinton's policy towards international Islamic 
inspired terrorism was, although an issue of great importance, a secondary issue to 
Persian Gulf security. Of course, there is the argument that the Clinton 
administration may not have seen the structural barriers as the most effective means 
of combating the base support level of al-Qa'ida, but when US policy 
pronouncements toward political Islam are taken into account, it is seems that the 
administration did indeed see the political structure of authoritarian countries as 
being the main cause of political Islam's support base. Therefore, Clinton's policy 
towards international Islamic extremism was geared towards an operational response 
and, as with its policy towards indigenous nation-specific political Islam, pressing for 
substantive political reforms in authoritarian countries was not viewed as compatible 
with the key interest of preserving Persian Gulf security. 
76 For further details on US counterterrorism policy see: David Tucker, "Combating International 
Terrorism, " The Terrorism Treat and US Governmental Response: Operational and Ornanisational 
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With the onset of the George W. Bush administration, it appears that this policy 
trajectory was continued. In the initial months of the new administration, a 
comprehensive policy review was conducted. As a result, there was no substantive 
change in operational US foreign policy relating to political Islam. According to 
Clarke, this policy review was slow and continued up until the attacks of 11 
September 2001. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the findings of the 
Deputies' level policy review showed that a more comprehensive non-state centric 
solution was agreed for the National Security Presidential Directive on Terrorism. 
Indeed, it seems that this stemmed not only from the realisation that the Clinton 
administration had been overly state-centric and the nature of al-Qa' ida warranted a 
change of tactics, but also President Bush wanted to eliminate al-Qa' ida rather than 
merely "swatting flies. "77 Although the indication is that prior to the 9/11 attacks the 
Bush administration was planning a more vigorous counterterrorism policy, the 
available evidence does not indicate that this was anything more than an escalation of 
Clinton's reactive based policy. There is no indication that the Bush administration 
was going to alter its policy towards Persian Gulf security in order to usher in a 
reformist agenda in order to combat the root causes of extremist political Islam and 
international terrorism. 
There were some bureaucratic changes however, which are worthy of note. Most 
importantly, according to Richard Clarke, the former National Coordinator for 
Security and Counterterrorism, the newly incumbent Bush administration did not 
grasp the complexity of the terrorist threat. 78 Clarke argues that Condoleezza Rice 
saw the National Security Council as a "foreign policy coordination mechanism and 
not some place where issues such as terrorism in the US"79 should be addressed, and 
thus was arguably viewing terrorism as a secondary national security concern. 
Moreover, Clarke implies that Rice's decision to downgrade his position of National 
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism from Cabinet level as further 
evidence of the priority to which the Bush administration afforded the threat from 
77 Clarke, Against All Enemies 235. 
78 Ibid. 229-32. 
79 Ibid. 230. 
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terrorism. Nevertheless, although Clarke is right to highlight this bureaucratic 
restructuring, it does not analytically demonstrate that the Bush administration had 
adopted, or was indeed planning, a different foreign policy strategy towards 
terrorism, or saw terrorism in general as any less of a threat. 
3.3 Summary Assessment 
From the above assessment of US policy towards political Islam, although the United 
States did not have a policy towards the Islamic faith, it has held a position on 
political movements which were grounded in Islam. Whilst the United States has a 
long-held position that it opposes violent extremism as a means of achieving political 
objectives, the policy pronouncements of the Clinton administration has analytically 
brought this into question. Indeed, there were indications that the United States 
condoned the use of violence if it saw the objectives behind the attack as legitimate. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that although there is an analytical 
inconsistency in US policy during the time period 1993-2001, the United States was 
at an operational level opposed to the use of violence for achieving political 
objectives. 
The key issue with regard to political Islam was, however, whether the moderate 
Islamist parties should be viewed as compatible with democratic rule. The academic 
backdrop to this question has been shown to be highly contentious. Nevertheless, in 
terms of US foreign policy, the policy pronouncements on this subject during the 
Clinton era does seem to suggest inconsistency and a lack of clarity. Regardless of 
such, the key issue was that although the participation of Islamists in democratic 
polity was, more often than not, seen as legitimate; the notion of an Islamist party 
achieving its strategic objective of an Islamic theocracy was not. In many respects. 
US foreign policy in the time period 1993-2001 appears to have held the position, 
most notably advocated by Bernard Lewis, that the establishment of an Islamic 
theocracy would run contrary to the very basis of democratic rule. In effect, the risk 
of democracy voting itself out of existence was not only seen as an illegitimate 
response but also a potential outcome from an Islamist electoral victory. 
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Whilst this was an ongoing inconsistency, and a key long-standing debate in US 
foreign policy, the spectre of political Islam manifesting itself through international 
terrorism was not treated as seriously until Clinton's second term of office. With US 
policy towards political Islam being mainly state-centric, it appears that the shift 
away from this categorisation in dealing with al-Qa'ida only began to occur 
following the onset of the Bush administration and the comprehensive policy review 
which was conducted. Nonetheless, the key point was that in terms of US 
counterterrorism strategy towards al-Qa'ida, US policy was firmly reactive based. 
Therefore, the root causes of extremist political Islam, which were identified by the 
Clinton administration, were not countered. Specifically speaking, US policy towards 
Persian Gulf Security was the administration's primary concern and thus the need to 
forcefully press for substantive reform in order to counter the root causes of 
extremism were not implemented. 
4.0 UNITED STATES POLICY POSITION TOWARDS POLITICAL 
ISLAM POST-9/11 
Following the devastating attacks of 9/11 on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon, the foreign policy priorities of the Bush administration underwent a 
comprehensive revision. The shock and horror of the attacks on US society was 
overwhelming, and was akin to the reaction of the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour. But 9/11 was arguably more telling: it was an attack against the symbols of 
American military and economic power and resulted in a significant loss of civilian 
life, rather than military personnel as occurred in Pearl Harbour. A foreign policy 
response of one form or another was inevitable given the domestic political outcry. 
The unfolding of the Bush administration's neoconservative foreign policy response 
was that a new grand strategic era in US foreign policy occurred. As with the Cold 
War era, the White House defined an overarching external threat to the national 
security of the United States and its allies. Unlike the communist threat which was 
seen in purely state centric terms, international Islamic terrorism was seen as a by- 
product of the socio-political conditions present within particular countries, most 
notably the Islamic countries of the Middle East, which can be described as 
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undemocratic in character. As with the Clinton administration, Bush's interpretation 
accepted the formulation, advocated by Bernard Lewis, that the root cause of 
political Islam and radical international Islamic terrorism was the structural 
conditions present within authoritarian countries. As has already been discussed, it is 
the perpetuation of authoritarian rule in Middle Eastern countries that ultimately 
results a furthering of the support base of radical Islamists: both nation-specific and 
international. 
US policy towards combating the radical manifestation of political Islam in the time 
period 1993-2001 was subservient to US strategy towards the Persian Gulf arena. 
Specifically, although the Clinton administration recognised that democratisation and 
the spread of freedom were necessary remedies against radical political Islam, the US 
strategy of promoting a balance of power through maintaining the status quo was its 
primary foreign policy concern. The significance of the Bush administration's policy 
response to the attacks of 9/11 was that these priorities became reversed: combating 
the root causes of radical Islamism became a priority over immediate US interests in 
the Persian Gulf arena. Indeed, through combating the root causes of radical political 
Islam, US national security was seen to be enhanced. Nonetheless, as has already 
been discussed, the Bush administration saw the widespread adoption of democracy 
and freedom throughout the Middle East as actually catering for Persian Gulf 
security concerns, but it was recognised that this transition would result in a period of 
potential insecurity. 
The Bush administration's invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 reflected this 
grand strategic vision in addition to immediate operational concerns: the ousting of 
the Taliban was serving the purpose of denying sanctuary and a formal base of 
operations for al-Qa'ida. But within Bush's strategic framework, the implementation 
of democracy and freedom to Afghanistan served the overarching goal of 
safeguarding US national security through combating what it defined as the root 
causes of radical Islamism. The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 aain served the g 
same strategic objective. But with Iraq, it was a much more important policy as it 
was seen as the means by which democracy and freedom could be promoted 
throughout Middle East and the Persian Gulf countries in particular. Indeed, the Iraq 
invasion underscores the point that US policy towards political Islam had risen to 
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become a foreign policy priority, and the altered definition of Persian Gulf security 
was in fitting witlt this. Therefore, unlike the Clinton administration where there was 
a clear inconsistency in the two policy agendas. Bush's post-9/11 policies were 
strategically compatible. 
With the overall grand strategy dictating the supremacy of both Jeffersonian and 
Wilsonian guides to foreign policy, the key analytical question about Bush's policy 
was whether moderate political Islam was viewed as compatible with democracy. 
Anoush Ellteshanii is correct to ask whether the Bush administration "would fathom 
the emergence of Islamist-leaning governments across the Aral) world'? " According 
to I3ush, however, Islam and democracy are indeed compatible: 
lt should be clear to all that Islam - the faith of one-fifth of 
humanity - is consistent with democratic nile. Democratic progress 
is found in many predominantly Muslim countries - in Turkey and 
Indonesia, and Senegal and Albania. Niger and Sierra Leone. 
Muslim men and women are good citizens of India and South 
Africa. of the nations of Weston Europe, and of the United States of 
America. More than half of all the Muslims in the world live in 
freedom under democratically constituted government,. They 
succeed in democratic societies, not in spite of their faith. but 
because of it. A religion that demands individual immoral 
accountability, and encourages the encounter of the individual with 
God, is fully compatible with the rights and responsibilities of self- 
government. ' 
Rush's comments were Crlww(t by Condol«zza Rice who stated that "the Islamic 
faith and striving for democracy and t uman rights are not only fully compatible, they 
" Anuushiravan Iihteshami, 'File Delicate State of. 1u Iitn Democracy. " CjIýLh. il! \erni 2004: 216 
" George W. Bush, "Prc; ittcnt ! lush 1)iku;; ci Frccdom in Iraq and Middle Fait, " Kcntarks by the 
president at the 20th Anniscrsary of the Natiuna1 f: ndo s rncnt for Ikmocracy, Wa; hingtun. D. C.: 
GI'U, 6 Nov. 2(X)3. Epp. 15109/(1i <http //ýý««. «ttitchuuic, Gov/ncýý+/rclca; r: /'_(x)3/11121X)3I I(6- 
2. html>. 
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arc mutually rcii forcing. " 2 Richard Armitage reinforced this view by stating that "I 
think a democratic election held in the Muslim Nvorld will be a further Sign that 
there's nothing antithetical about democracy and the great religion of lsl: Ul1. ý, 
13 
Although from the above statements one can conclude that the Bush administration 
shared the Clintonian position that moderate Islamic parties' participation in a 
democratic process was legitimate, it is not altogether clear if an Islamic theocracy 
would be viewed within the same light. Indeed, given the possibility that such a 
government could, as Bernard Lewis highlights. result in the subjugation of 
democratic nile, it is reasonable to take the position that although Bush held 
Jeffersonian democratic values as universal, an Islamic theocracy would have been 
seen as an illegitimate outcome. More to the point, this indicates a policy 
continuation from the Clinton era: legitimate participation but with the recognition of 
it f)otentially leading to an illegitimate outcome. 
The key issue, therefore, is under what guise: would the outcome actually have been 
seen as legitimate for the Bush administration? Michael Iliraii writes that the 
combination of democracy and Islam does pose a potential contradiction, but there is 
also the possibility of a trite compatibility. According to Bernard Lewis, who acted as 
one: of a select group of academic consultants to the Bush White (louse, the solution 
is viewed as coming from the adoption of the Kenialist democratic model 
syniptoinatic of Turkey. 
xt Michael I lirsh comments that: 
The administration's vision of post-war Iraq was also fundamentally 
Lewisian, which is to say Kenialist. Paul \Volfow"itz repeatedly 
invoked secular, (dem ocratic Turkey as a "useful model for others in 
the %1uslilll world", as tilt deputy secretary of defense termed it in 
Cunitulcrtz; t Rice, Ric Sm V; iluc: ýý[ IaantýI? cmýk r, ý. ý, l luºn; ýn hiYht; \iutualý_ftrnfý? re 
(W: uitinl; ton D. C.: GPO, .1 Dec. 2O2) app. 15109, 'tll : http: lhuk}u. incitlbay. I; aV/c/p/th- 
soc2(N)2l2OK; 2. html>. 
" Richard Armitage, "Armitage: Afghan Votc to Show [kntocracy. I; LIm Compatible, " [kputy 
secretary of st: uc intcrvic%'cll by It. tlian 11CW'I)al>Cr, \Va; hingwn. D. C.: GPO, 6 Oct. 2(x)4. Opp. 
17/121(11 <http: III k}'u. u; cmba;; y. luvlC/l1/tlt"? Ql? IIUIý"ýE>. [1tntl>. 
" Michael liir'h. "Bernard Lewis Revisited: What If Islam lins an Obstacle to Democracy in the 
\(itl, llc East but the Secret to Achieving It? " «'; t0hingur, 1\týivjthl "t5. 
Nov. (2(X)4) Epp. 13/I2AO4 
<htth_//ýý ýý ýý . riillýcýiyrinterra, ticOwmell. veA ernanl 
Icýý i: ýý_'ýºcrýi: itrý1.3k1fý. 
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December 2002 on the eve of a trip to lay the groundwork for what he 
thought would be a friendly Turkey's role as a staking ground for the 
Iraq war. Another key Pentagon neocon and old friedd of Lewis's. 
Harold Rhode, told associates a year ago that we need an accelerated 
Turkish model' for Iraq. S5 
In support of I-tirsh's argument, Bush remarked in July 2004 on a visit to Turkey that, 
"I appreciate so very much the example [Turkey] has set on how to be a Muslim 
country and at the same time a country which embraces democracy and nile of law 
and freedom. "'G Here the significance is that the idead end product of what Bush 
viewed as a desirable and legitimate outcome frone democratic polity within an 
Islamic society was a separation of religion frone government. From this conception, 
moderate political Islamic parties can legitimately participate in a pluralistic 
democratic polity, but the adoption of an Islamic theocracy resulting in the potential 
scenario of one person, one vote, one time, would continue to he viewed by the 
United States as an illegitimate outcollle. 
In many respects, the Bush administration's position towards political Islam clarified 
and expanded on what was it,, ambiguous and at times contradictory position of US 
foreign policy prior to the attacks of 9/11. Although the Bush presidency saw the 
compatibility of democratic nºle in an Islamic society more clearly achievable and, 
most importantly, desirable, than any preceding administration, it still appears to 
have held the same position that an Islamic theocracy would have been an 
illegitimate political outcome. 
5.0 CIIAl''1'EK CONCLUSION 
«'hat can be deduced from US foreign policy with respect to political Islam and 
terrorism in the time period 1993-2003, is that there was consistency in sonic 
"M icharI IIirsh. "Ikrn. nand Lewis Ilcvisitcd: What If Islam I+nI an Ohst. wlk to Democracy in the 
Middle East but the Secret to Achieving lt? " 
"Cücorge W. Ilu; h, "Remark; Prior to Discus, iotri %ith Prime Minister. " Remarks prior to 
tfi'cussiun: with Prime Minister Rcccp'I-tyyip (irtlog to of Turkey. Ankara: GPO. 27 Jun. 2(X11.1pp. 
I7/02/05 <htth: //ýý«w. findarticlr.,. cun>/1ý/artic(c, /mi_m'_1ý9/i, ý7_"30/ai_nb1 3SGý_>. 
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respects and a reversal of policy in others. In terms of continuity, the United States 
maintained a consistent opposition towards violent political expression during this 
time period. Nonetheless, the lack of clarity and consistency in the Clinton era 
brought this supposition into question as one could analytically conclude from the 
Clinton administration's position that it condoned political extremism, providing its 
objective was commensurate with US policy interests. But, as has already been 
discussed, at an operational level, it is reasonable to conclude that the United States 
remained firmly opposed towards extremism as a means of achieving political 
objectives. 
With regard to the scope of US policy towards political Islam, it is important to 
recognise that there is no evidence to support the conjecture that the United States 
had a policy toward Islam per se. Indeed, it is noticeable that the United States has 
gone to great pains to underscore the point that it does not have a policy towards one 
of the world's great religions. But it would be accurate to describe a steadily 
evolving understanding of Islamic political movements and how this fits in with US 
policy. The key issues for US policy towards political Islam in this time period was 
essentially twofold: firstly, whether the establishment of an Islamic state premised on 
the Shari'a would be compatible with democratic principals; and secondly, how 
should Islamic inspired terrorism be countered. 
United States foreign policy during the Clinton era towards whether an Islamic state 
premised on the Shari'a was compatible with democracy was slow in developing. 
The gradual flow of statements on the issue by administration officials was often 
unclear and inconsistent. The Clinton administration saw the participation of Islamic 
political parties which desired the adoption of the Shari'a as legitimate in a 
democratic process. However, it saw a potential majority election as an illegitimate 
outcome due the belief that the adoption of the Shari'a would ultimately result in a 
subjugation of democracy. In many respects, a historical parallel can be drawn with 
US Cold War policy towards communist political parties' involvement in democratic 
politics. 
The onset of the War on Terror strategic environment for US foreign policy greatly 
clarified and expanded upon the importance of political Islam in policy calculations. 
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With the external threat being defined as terrorism with global reach, the issue of 
how to combat its root causes became a defining feature of US grand strategy for the 
Bush administration. Whilst there was recognition in the Clinton era that the 
authoritarian nature of Islamic states were the prime cause of terrorism, Clinton's 
policy remained firmly reactive based and, crucially, a secondary foreign policy 
concern to US interests in the Persian Gulf strategic arena. Indeed, it is widely 
accepted that the Clinton administration accepted the balance of power in the Persian 
Gulf by failing to substantively press for reform. Although Clinton articulated that 
the spread of democracy and global capitalism was a priority, Clintonian foreign 
policy appears to have been overly cautious and lacking in a clear strategic vision. 
Nevertheless, the combating of the root causes of political Islam as part of a 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy had been a secondary foreign policy 17 
concern to Persian Gulf security since the Cold War era. 
The advent of the War on Terror changed these priorities: The need to combat the 
root causes of terrorism with global reach became a primary foreign policy concern 
and thus supplanted the post-Cold War policy towards Persian Gulf security. 
Although the definition of Persian Gulf security will be shown in this thesis to also 
have changed, counterterrorism, directed at combating its root causes, had taken on a 
status of grand strategy. The key point here is that whilst Clinton's policy towards 
terrorism with global reach was reactive based, and Islamic terrorism was a 
secondary foreign policy concern to Persian Gulf security, Bush's policy priority was 
offensive based and had resulted in a new definition of Persian Gulf security. 
The central issue, with regard to the Bush administration's newfound priority of 
countering the root causes of terrorism was, however, whether Islamic governance 
based on the Shari'a was compatible with the democracy and freedom agenda. The 
Bush administration's statements greatly expanded upon those of the previous 
presidency as any notion that democracy could not work in an Islamic society were 
comprehensively dispelled by them. However, the newfound commitment towards 
democracy and freedom did not clarify whether all democratic outcomes would be 
viewed as acceptable. Indeed, there is good reason to conclude that the Bush 
administration saw democracy as compatible within an Islamic society, providing the 
Shari'a was not adopted. 
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Chapter V 
United States Foreign Policy Towards 
Persian Gulf Security: 
Iran and Iraq 1993-2001 
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"We recognise this area as vital to US interests and we will behave, with others, 
multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must. " 
Madeleine Albright 
October 1994 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary national interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf region 
have their historical origins rooted in the circumstances of the First World War. 
Although the United States had commercial interests in the Maghreb region dating 
back to 1784,1 it was the inherent requirement of the modern era of mechanised 
warfare in addition to the dynamics of Western industrialisation at the time, that oil 
firmly became a key economic and strategic interest of the United States. 2 It is 
important to recognise from the outset that the paramount national security interest of 
the United States in the region has historically been for "[an] unhindered flow of oil 
from the Persian Gulf to the world market at a stable price. ,3 The stability of the 
Persian Gulf is, therefore, very much a national security interest of the United States. 
During the Cold War, the containment of communism was the overarching, global 
strategic consideration that characterised US foreign policy and this was 
consequently reflected in its policy towards the Persian Gulf. The reasons why the 
Persian Gulf was a key strategic interest for the United States during the Cold War 
era, is usefully summarised by Michael Hudson: 
[T]he entrenchment of Soviet power in that strategic region would 
[have been] a decisive shift in the world balance, outflanking NATO; 
' Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975: A Survey 
(Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1977) 1-57. 
2 John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1963) 167-69. 
3 United States, Department of Defence, United States Security Strategy for the Middle East, 
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 3 May 1995) 48pp. 15/06/03 
<http: //www. defenselink. mil/policy/isa/nesa/mideast. html >. 
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Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil could disrupt the economy of the 
free world; and triumph throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe. 4 
With Britain having decided to withdraw its presence east of Suez in the 1960s, 
Richard Nixon was prompted into developing a `twin-pillar' security strategy of 
promoting Iran, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, as guardians of regional security 
and as bulwarks against Soviet expansionism .5 This twin-pillar strategy 
became 
defunct when Iran, the key pillar of the US policy, experienced an Islamic revolution 
in 1979 that resulted in Muhammad Shah Reza Pahlevi being overthrown. 
The dramatic overthrow of the Shah ushered in a new era for regional politics and 
US strategic policy towards the region. The subsequent seizure of the US embassy in 
Tehran in November 1979 and the ensuing hostage crisis was crucial in affirming the 
perception of the Islamic Republic as inimically hostile to US interests. It was as a 
result of the anti-American position of the successor Islamic regime in Tehran that 
the revolution necessarily ushered in a reassessment of Iran's role in US policy 
towards Persian Gulf security. A further key factor was that Iran became equated 
with an asymmetric threat to Israel -a key long term US interest - through its 
support for Hezbollah and its destabilising influence on the internal affairs of 
Lebanon. 
With the onset of the Reagan administration in 1981, US policy towards the Persian 
Gulf was essentially formulated within the context of the Iran-Iraq War and also 
through perceived Iranian links to international terrorist attacks against both the 
United States and Israel. Although the US professed neutrality towards the conflict, 
Reagan's policy was essentially characterised by a strategic balancing in which it 
provided intelligence assistance towards Iraq. 6 
4 Michael C. Hudson, "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy Towards the Middle East, " 
Middle East Journal 50.3 (1996): 334. 
5 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979) 1262-65. 
6 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-87: Strategic Implications 
and Policy Options (London: Jane's Publishing, 1987) 157-63. 
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With the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the emergence of a post-Cold War 
international environment, the dynamics of US foreign policy had entered into a new 
phase. The onset of the Clinton era saw geoeconomics7 become its strategic point of 
reference for US foreign policy. Although the Wilsonian and Jeffersonian pursuit for 
liberal democracy was articulated as a pillar of Clinton's grand strategy, this was a 
rhetorical prescription: US geostrategy in the Persian Gulf, which called for the 
maintenance of the balance of power, was in clear conflict. 
The following analysis will firstly separate US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq 
for reasons of clarity. The next section will outline the post-1991 Gulf War strategic 
environment before examining the regional geostrategy adopted throughout the 
Clinton years. 
2.0 POST-1991 GULF WAR STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
Following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, President George H. W. Bush used the 
unprecedented agreement within the international community towards Iraq to 
formulate a post-war sanctions and inspections mandate through the United Nations. 
Washington's post-liberation agenda was positioned on a multilateral effort towards 
ensuring Iraq did not possess unconventional weapons. But the key by-product of 
this was that it provided for Persian Gulf security. When the Bush administration 
adopted this policy, it was formulated in the context of uprisings within Iraq that 
followed the liberation of Kuwait. 8 Indeed, it is widely known that there was high 
confidence in the administration and in many policy circles that Hussain would be 
overthrown by a national revolutionary civil uprising or through an internal military 
coup d'etat. Therefore, a direct military invasion of Iraq was not seen as necessary 
given the widely held belief that Hussain's regime was likely to be overthrown by 
' Geoeconomics is defined as the pursuit of economic engagement as a political objective. Therefore 
international trade and foreign investment are key drivers of this strategic policy. Geoeconomics as a 
foreign policy strategy was fully commensurate with the domestic electoral platform of Bill Clinton. 
8 The uprisings in Iraq followed a speech given by President Bush in which he called on the people of 
Iraq overthrow Saddam Hussain. Although Bush's speech gave no indication that the US would 
provide direct support for any uprising, it was widely interpreted within Iraq that a subsequent 
invasion or provision of direct support was imminent. 
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internal forces. Resorting to the United Nations allowed Iraq to be multilaterally 
contained until regime change actually occurred. Therefore, whilst the strategic 
objective was to nullify the threat posed by Iraq, the tactics employed were geared 
towards regime change. 9 
The adoption of UNSCR 687, which was ultimately enforceable under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, placed obligations on Iraq to verifiably dismantle its chemical, 
biological and nuclear programmes, in addition to any ballistic missiles and related 
components with a range greater than 150 kilometres. Also, in accordance with the 
US regional security agenda, UNSCR 687 established an embargo on military 
procurement and laid the basis for sanctions on imports and exports in order to pay 
for damages incurred following the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. With the 
Iraqi threat to Persian Gulf security being curtailed through a multilateral 
containment strategy by the Bush administration, the key issue was how to prevent 
Iranian hegemony within this context. 
Within Congress, however, following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, 
dissatisfaction had been mounting at the inconsistency of Washington's policy 
towards the Islamic Republic: it categorised Iran as a `rogue state' whilst burgeoning 
bilateral trade was allowed to go unchecked. Indeed, the level of trade was 
significant as "US exports to Iran in 1987 amounted to US$54 million, growing to 
US$60 million by 1989. In 1990, exports shot up to US$168 million, reaching 
US$750 million by 1992, making the United States Iran's sixth-largest trading 
partner. "lo 
The response in Congress to these pressures, coupled with both the newly emerging 
post-Cold War strategic arena and the geopolitical context in the Persian Gulf, 
resulted in the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992. It was justified by its 
sponsor, Senator John McCain, and its co-sponsor, Senator Alfonse D'Amato, that 
"tighter curbs on shipments to Iran were necessary if a repetition of US export 
9 Don Oberdorfer, "US Had Covert Plan to Oust Iraq's Saddam, Bush Adviser Asserts; Effort to 
Remove Leader Came Pretty Close', " Washington Post 20 Jan. 1993, Al. 
10 Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000) 163. 
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control errors with Iraq prior to the Gulf War was to be avoided. "11 That is to say, on 
account of Congressional pressure, prompted by domestic political considerations 
and the regional context in the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the liberation of 
Kuwait in 1991, the Bush administration was forced by Congress to implement a 
restrictive unilateral sanctions policy towards Iran. The Clinton administration 
inherited this policy position in 1993. Therefore, the overarching nature of the Bush 
administration's policy towards Persian Gulf security, which Clinton inherited, had 
the dual characteristic of a multilateral containment of Iraq through the United 
Nations, and a unilateral sanction based policy towards Iran. 
3.0 GEOSTRATEGY: DUAL CONTAINMENT 
In the immediate post-war scenario 1991-93, Iraq obstructed the UNSCOM 
inspections by restricting access to various sites, and prevented the seizure of official 
Iraqi documents by the inspectors. The UN responded to Iraqi non-compliance by 
adopting UNSCR 707 and 715, which effectively reaffirmed the legitimacy of 
inspections and the necessity for a full and complete Iraqi compliance. It was, 
however, in the immediate period prior to Bill Clinton being inaugurated into office 
that Iraq prohibited the use of UNSCOM flights, 12 and also made incursions into the 
demilitarised zone with Kuwait. 13 This violation by Iraq resulted in it being found in 
material breech of prior resolutions on 8 January 1993.14 In this instance, it seems 
likely that Iraq was testing the willingness of Washington to enforce compliance in 
the run-up to the US administration handover. These factors resulted in the coalition 
responding with a series of air strikes against Iraq. 15 Therefore, with the onset of the 
Clinton Presidency, the new administration inherited the policy position of being 
11 Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy 164. 
12 Iraq informed the UN that it would no longer permit UNSCOM fixed wing aircraft to operate within 
Iraq on 7 Jan. 1993. 
13 Iraq began positioning anti-aircraft missiles in the demilitarised zone on 27 Dec. 1992. 
14 Yoshio Hatano, "Situation between Iraq and Kuwait, " Statement by UN Security Council President 
Hatano, New York: 8 Jan. 1993.12/08/02 
<http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4noO3. html >. 
15 Coalition air strikes commenced on 13 Jan. 1993. 
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committed to upholding UN resolutions designed to contain the threat Iraq posed to 
US interests in the Persian Gulf region. 
Although President-elect Clinton supported this policy position, he made it clear that 
when he entered office he was "ready for a fresh start with Saddam Hussain. " 16 After 
receiving political criticism for a seemingly `softer' approach towards Iraq, Clinton 
refined his position on Iraq as being the maintenance of the Bush administration's 
policy but with a new policy initiative. 17 Crucially, Clinton made it clear that he 
could not conceive "[the] United States ever having any kind of normal relationship 
with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussain [was] there. "18 It was, therefore, clear that 
George H. W. Bush's position on Iraq was widely favoured within Congress and any 
radical departure by Clinton would have been politically costly to the new Democrat 
administration. Indeed, given this accepted political wisdom in Washington, it would 
have been a difficult departure for the newly incoming Clinton Presidency. 
Martin Indyk, the Special Assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian 
affairs, outlined the Clinton administration's "new" initiative towards regional 
security, in an address to the pro-Israeli Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 
May 1993. The strategy outlined by Indyk was that of dual containment towards both 
Iran and Iraq. 19 Dual containment rested on the premise that both states had a history 
of aggressive action in a variety of spheres, and posed a threat to the Persian Gulf 
states and Israel. The emphasis was thus on a moderation of their policies. 
16 Thomas Friedman, "Clinton's Warning to Saddam: I'm Going to Judge You by Your Behaviour, " 
International Herald Tribune 15 Jan. 1993,2. 
17 George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human: A Political Education (London: Hutchinson, 1999) 157- 
59.; also see Leslie Gelb, "A Reformed Iraq to Offset Iran? Forget It, " International Herald Tribune 18 
Jan. 1993,2. 
is William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1993: William J. Clinton 
(Bk. 1), Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1993.05/11/04 <http: //frwebgate. access. gpo. gov/cgi- 
bin/getdoc. cgi? dbname=1993_publ ic_papers_vol l _misc&docid=f: pap_pre. 
htm# 1993 vI contents>. 
19 Martin Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East, " Address to the Soref 
Symposium, Washington, D. C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 18 May 1993.4pp. 
12/07/03 <http: //www. washingtoninstitute. org/pubs/soref/indyk. htm >. 
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Clinton's Persian Gulf strategy rested on the recognition that a singular containment 
of Iraq was insufficient to guarantee regional security on account of the geopolitical 
situation: 
1. The threat posed by potential Iranian hegemony in the context of Iraqi 
containment; 
2. The threat posed by Iranian attempts to procure unconventional weapons; 
3. The inability of the GCC countries to mobilise a credible defence 
cooperation arrangement. 20 
The clearest expose of the dual containment strategy occurred, however, in an 
academic article in 1994, by Anthony Lake, the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs: 
The Clinton administration's policy of `dual containment' of Iraq and 
Iran derives in the first instance from an assessment that the current 
Iraqi and Iranian regimes are both hostile to American interests in the 
region. Accordingly, we do not accept the argument that we should 
continue the old balance of power game, building up one to balance 
the other. We reject that approach not only because its bankruptcy 
was demonstrated in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We reject it because 
of a clear-headed assessment of the antagonism that both regimes 
harbor towards the United States and its allies in the region. And we 
reject it because we don't need to rely on one to balance the other. '' 
Lake outlined Clinton's dual containment policy as not entailing a duplication of 
policy towards both Iran and Iraq, as the administration saw both states posing 
differential threats and thus warranting unique responses. Whilst the policy towards 
Iraq was multilateral in scope and based on UN resolutions, the US containment 
policy towards Iran was clearly a unilateral policy undertaking. The Iranian policies 
that warranted these responses were highlighted by Lake as: 
20 David W. Lesch, The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment 
(Oxford: Westview, 1996) 356-58. 
21 Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States, " Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994): 48. 
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1. Clandestine efforts to procure unconventional weapons with long-rande 
missile technology; 
2. Provision of direct and asymmetric support for radical political Islamic 
movements who use violent terrorist style methods of political expression; 
3. Efforts to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process; 
4. Efforts to destabilise Gulf countries such as Bahrain, and also Islamic 
countries in Africa; 
5. High levels of conventional weapons production and procurement, which 
posed a potential threat to the security of GCC states. 22 
For the Clinton administration, these factors ultimately posed a significant threat to 
US interests in the Persian Gulf, and were seen to warrant the continuation of a 
unilateral containment policy. 23 The objective of the Clinton administration towards 
Iran was thus: the United States would unilaterally attempt to economically, 
politically and militarily contain the threat posed by Iran to the re-ion and would 
seek a change in Tehran's behaviour through meaningful dialogue, leading ultimately 
to reconciliation rather than a regime change strategy. This was very much a 
continuation of the unilateral policy of the previous Bush administration towards 
Iran. 
Lake was careful to distinguish the administration's policy towards Iraq as being 
separate from Iran, whilst still encompassed under the same strategic policy of dual 
containment: 
In post-Khomeini Iran, a revolutionary regime remains engaged in 
outlaw behaviour. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration does not 
oppose Islamic government, nor does it seek the regime's overthrow. 
Indeed we remain ready for an authoritative dialogue in which we will 
raise aspects of Iranian behaviour that cause us so much concern. 24 
22 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States, " Foreign Affairs 48. 
23 Ellen Laipson, et al., "Symposium: US Policy Towards Iran: From Containment to Relentless 
Persuit, " Middle East Policy 4. Sep (1995): 2. 
24 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States, " 50. 
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Clinton's dual containment strategy towards regional security was therefore, in 
essence, a policy continuation towards both Iran and Iraq from the previous Bush 
administration. However, it was original on the grounds that no previous declared 
US policy rested on the premise of simultaneously containing both Iran and Iraq as a 
means of ensuring Persian Gulf and wider regional security. 
However, the accepted historical diplomatic wisdom of the application of 
containment theory is a conceivable explanation as to why the Clinton administration 
was willing to pursue this strategy towards Iran and Iraq. Throughout the Cold War, 
the United States pursued a strategy of containment towards the Soviet Union as its 
primary means of strategically combating the ideological and military threat it posed. 
It is also a strategy that the United States has employed against other states such as 
Cuba and North Korea. The origins of strategic containment are found in George 
Kennan's long telegram in 1946 on how to combat the Soviet threat. Expanded upon 
and clarified in Kennan's famous article in Foreign Affairs, containment emerged as 
the cornerstone of US grand strategic policy throughout the Cold War period. 25 
The credibility of containment, as a strategy for dealing with nations that pursue 
policies contrary to US interests, was greatly enhanced with the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Containment has credibility in US political discourse as it is seen to control 
the short and medium threats posed by `rogue states' and arguably forces change to 
occur at a socio-political level. It is important, however, to recognise that the 
containment strategy also emerged as a result of its perceived suitability for the 
geopolitical environment and the recognition within Congress that the United States 
should apply its power given its hegemonic position. 
Henry Kissinger eloquently captures the essence of the US application containment 
theory: 
Containment was an extraordinary theory... [t]horoughly American in 
its utopianism, it assumed that the collapse of a totalitarian adversary 
could be achieved in an essentially benign way. Although this 
u Anonymous [George Kennan] Anonymous, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct, " Foreign Affairs 25.4 
(1947). 852-68. 
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doctrine was formulated at the height of America's absolute power, it 
preached America's relative weakness. Postulating a grand diplomatic 
encounter at the moment of its culmination, containment allowed no 
role for diplomacy until the climatic final scene in which the men in 
white hats accepted the conversion of the men in black hats. 26 
Even during containment, Kissinger has argued that the prospect of a meaningful 
dialogue taking place between the United States and a perceived rogue country will 
very much hinge on whether Washington views the regime as having diplomatic 
credibility. 7 Kissinger highlights that US `exceptionalism'28 in its foreign policy 
requires the negotiating partner to act in a legalistic, honest and moral manner in its 
diplomacy. The prospect of meaningful dialogue thus ceases when Washington 
views the given regime as lacking in this. 
4.0 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ 1993-2001 
For the US, the imposition of sanctions brought about the by-product of a contained 
and controlled Iraq. A multilaterally contained Iraq thus catered for the US objective 
of ensuring the security and a balance of power within the vital area of the Persian 
Gulf., Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the reason why sanctions were 
supported by the international community was to compel Iraq to comply with its 
obligations: this is in contrast with the underlying US objective of ensuring Persian 
Gulf security through a contained and controlled Iraq. 
The official policy of the Clinton administration towards Iraq was, up until 1998, for 
a continuation of sanctions until a complete compliance with UN resolutions had 
been achieved. Following Iraq's full compliance with UN resolutions, a 
normalisation of relations was possible. Comparatively, in the previous Bush 
26 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Touchstone, 1995) 471. 
27 Ibid. 471-75. 
23 Exceptionalism in US foreign policy refers to the widely held belief that the values, which underpin 
American society, are universal values. This interpretation has a direct bearing on US diplomacy in 
that in the pursuit of US national interests, other nations will benefit from such values being imparted 
upon them. 
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administration, the US position towards Iraq differed slightly in that the emphasis 
was on the continuation of sanctions until Saddam was replaced from power, rather 
than a simple compliance with UN resolutions. 29 For the Clinton administration, 
Lake commented that "we will want to be satisfied that any successor [Iraqi] 
government complies fully with all UN resolutions". 3° This placed the official 
objective clearly on Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions, rather than regime change 
per se. However, from the outset of his term of office in 1993, Clinton made it clear 
that he could not "conceive of the United States ever having any kind of normal 
relationship with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussain is there. "31 This makes the strategic 
priority in his foreign policy very much open to question: was Clinton's overall 
strategic objective regime change or reconciliation following Iraq's full compliance 
with UN resolutions? The two strategic objectives are not compatible. With this in 
mind, the following section will provide analysis on US foreign policy towards Iraq 
and aims to separate the tactical from the strategic in order to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of US foreign policy towards Iraq. It will begin with a 
discussion of the tactical multilateral containment before moving on to the strategic 
element of regime change. The tactical policy will necessarily focus on the 
international context and the UN inspections mandate which US policy rested upon. 
4.1 Tactical Policy: Multilateral Containment 
Following the liberation of Kuwait by coalition forces, 32 Iraq was subject to stringent 
post-war obligations under UNSCR 687.33 Specifically speaking, UNSCR 687 called 
on Iraq to verifiably render harmless all of it's, "chemical and biological weapons 
29 Madeleine Albright and William Woodward, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan, 
2003)275. 
30 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States, " 48. 
31 Dan Rather, "President Interviewed by Dan Rather, " CBS 24 Mar. 1993,12/07/04 
<http: //www. cl intonfoundation. org/legacy/032493-president-interviewed-by-dan-rather. htm>. 
32 The coalition's military action to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces was authorised by UNSCR 678 
of 29 Nov. 1990 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
33 Iraq was obligated under UNSCR 687, Sect. C, to fulfil its obligations to the Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, which was signed by Iraq on 17 Jun. 1925 in Geneva. 
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and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, 
development, support and manufacturing facilities. "34 Iraq was viewed as having a 
well established offensive surface-to-surface missile programme: the test flight of the 
upgraded `Scud B' missile, with a range of more than 600km, posed a clear threat to 
the security of the states in the Persian Gulf. 35 UNSCR 687 stated that its "ballistic 
missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres and related major 
parts, and repair and production facilities" were to be rendered harmless. 36 
UNSCR 687 laid the basis for on-site inspections within Iraq by a United Nations 
Special Commission to verify compliance on these issues. Also, UNSCR 687 placed 
obligations on Iraq to comply with its commitments under the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and laid the basis for Iraq to verifiably render 
harmless its nuclear weapons programme under the supervision of the IAEA in 
conjunction with UNSCOM. 37 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush declared a national 
emergency with respect to Iraq, through Executive Order No. 12722 on 2 August 
1990: this blocked all Iraqi assets within the United States and placed restrictions on 
the importation and exportation of good and services between the two countries. 
Subsequent Executive Order Nos. 12724 and 12817 were implemented by the Bush 
administration to align US policy with UN Security Council Resolutions 661 and 778 
respectively. With the Bush administration having based its policies on the prediction 
that Hussain would be internally ousted from power following the intifadah in 1991, 
Washington was left with little choice but to adopt a containment policy through 
supporting UN resolutions until it had been achieved. 38 As already highlighted, this 
was adopted on the premise that it would ensure both Persian Gulf security, and 
34 UNSCR 687 of 3 Apr. 1991, Sect. C, Par. 8 (a). 
35 W. Seth Carus and Joseph Bermudez, "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme: Part 1, " Jane's 
Intelligence Review 2.5 (1990): 204-09; and W. Seth Carus and Joseph Bermudez, "Iraq's Al-Husayn 
Missile Programme: Part 2, " Jane's Intelligence Review 2.6 (1990): 242-48. 
36 UNSCR 687 of 3 Apr. 1991, Sect. C, Par. 8 (b). 
37 UNSCR 687 of 3 Apr. 1991, Sect. C, Par. 11. 
38 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, (New York: Random 
House, 2002) 53. 
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weaken Saddam Hussain's regime, with the ultimate objective of bringing about the 
conditions for an internal regime change. 39 In essence, the Bush administration saw 
its support of sanctions as a tactical means of ensuring Persian Gulf security until its 
strategic objective had been achieved. 
UNSCR 699 and 715 provided the confirmation for UNSCOM and the IAEA to 
conduct continual on-site inspections within Iraq in order to search and render 
harmless any prohibited materials. 40 Despite it being mandated by the United 
Nations, Iraq demonstrated little intention of allowing its unconventional weapons to 
be destroyed by the IAEA and the UN Special Commission. Hussain created a covert 
Concealment Operations Committee, which was headed by his son Qusayy, in order 
to hide his WMD programmes and stockpiles from the inspectors. Despite Iraqi 
attempts to inhibit the inspections process and conceal its prohibited nuclear 
programmes, in 1991 the IAEA inspection team successfully uncovered three 
uranium enrichment programmes: one using electromagnetic isotope separation 
technology; a second programme using centrifuge technology; and a third 
programme using chemical methods 41 In addition to this, Iraq was found to be 
experimenting with a laboratory-scale plutonium separation technique. Following 
these discoveries, in July 1991 the sixth IAEA inspection uncovered further proof of 
a nuclear programme that included several kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 
approximately 400 tons of natural uranium 42 
The findings of the IAEA inspectors alarmed the international community as Iraq's 
nuclear programme was more advanced than commonly thought. The discoveries 
made by the inspectors on Iraq's biological and chemical weapons programmes 
39 Pollack, The Threatening Storm 53. 
40 LNSCR 699 of 17 Jun. 1991 and UNSCR 715 of 11 Oct. 1991. 
41 United Nations, International Atomic Agency, First Semi-Annual Report on the Implementation of 
UNSCR 687, (S/23295), (Vienna: IAEA, 5 Dec. 1991) 6pp. 18/07/02 
<http: //www. iragwatch. org/un/IAEA/s-23295. htm>. 
42 United Nations, UNSCOM, First Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission 
Pursuant to the Implementation Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), (S/23165), (New York: 
United Nations, 25 Oct. 1991) 29pp. 18/07/02 
<http: //www. iraqwatch. org/un/UNSCOiM/687/s23165. htm>. 
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compounded this concern. 43 Following UNSCOM and the IAEA uncovering details 
of Iraq's nuclear and biological weapons programme in 1992, Iraq began to co- 
operate and disclosed to the inspectors details on their chemical and nuclear 
stockpiles, as well as admitting that they had a defensive biological programme. 
Although Iraq did make these declarations on its weapons stockpiles, their co- 
operation was consistently brought into question on numerous levels, especially 
given that the inspectors would make discoveries that were not listed in Iraq's 
declaration to the Security Council. 
With the onset of the Clinton administration and the confirmation of the containment 
policy in May 1993, US policy towards Iraq continued to rest clearly on the 
effectiveness of the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions. The 
weapons inspections process continued to be highly problematic with specific regard 
to Iraq's obligation to give a full, final and complete declaration on its weapons 
programmes, as prohibited by UNSCR 687 and required by UNSCR 707.44 Iraq's 
declarations were consistently found to be insufficiently detailed and incomplete by 
UNSCOM 45 In addition to failing to provide a full, final and complete declaration of 
its prohibited weapons, UNSCOM and the IAEA found Iraq to be carrying out "a 
continuing pattern of obstruction and intimidation" towards its mandate. 46 According 
to UN reports, up until 1995, there were numerous instances of Iraqi obstruction 
towards inspectors and it has been suggested that the obstruction was "directed at the 
43 United Nations, UNSCOM, Fourth Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission 
Pursuant to the Implementation Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), (S/24984), (New York: 
United Nations, 17 Dec. 1992) 22pp. 18/07/04 <http: //www. iragwatch. org/unfUNSCOM/687/s- 
24984. htm>. 
44 United Nations, Secretariat, Third Report under UNSCR 715 by the Secretary-General on the 
Activities of the Special Commission, (S/25620), (New York: United Nations, 19 Apr. 1993) 8pp. 
12/05/03 <http: //www. iragwatch. org/un[UNSCOMJ715/s25620. pdf>. 
45 United Nations, UNSCOM, Ninth Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission 
Pursuant to the Implementation Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), (S/1995/494), (New York: 
United Nations, 20 Jun. 1995) 1 Opp. 18/07/03 <http: //www. iragwatch. org/unJUNSCOM/687/s-1995- 
0494. htm>. 
46 United Nations, Fourth Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Pursuant to 
the Implementation Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). 
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highest levels of the Iraqi government and by the Office of the Presidential Palace 
(OPP) and personnel in Saddam's private Diwan (office). "47 
Hussain's defiance also extended to provoking a potential military engagement with 
the United States in October 1994 after his deployment of ground forces near the 
Kuwaiti border. Saddam apparently wanted to provoke a crisis with the United States 
to have the UN sanctions lifted. Clinton's response, however, was to deploy 170 
aircraft and 6,500 personnel to Riyadh under the rubric of Operation Vigilant 
Warrior. It is of significance that Clinton retained 120 aircraft and 5,000 personnel as 
a permanent military deployment in order to deter future transgressions by Iraq, thus 
placing a greater degree of pressure on Baghdad to comply. 
However, despite Iraq's persistent obstruction and provocations, by 1995 the UN 
inspection process had yielded positive results. UNSCOM and the IAEA had 
severely degraded Iraq's WMD programmes, which involved the destruction of 
"over 480,000 litres of chemical warfare agents, over 28,000 chemical munitions and 
nearly 1,800,000 litres, over 1,040,000 kilograms and 648 barrels, of some 45 
different precursor chemicals for the production of chemical warfare agents. , 48 
The official view of the United States was that the IAEA had "effectively disbanded 
the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme at least for the near term . "49 However, 
questions remained as Iraq was unable to account for its stockpiles of precursor 
ingredients for the production of chemical weapons. Most notably, Iraq was unable 
to account for precursor chemicals required for the production of 200-250 tons of the 
advanced nerve agent VX. 50 Therefore, although Iraq was failing to fully comply 
with the inspectors, the UN and the IAEA had achieved a great deal by destroying 
47 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (Westport: Praeger, 1999) 127-28. 
48 United Nations, Ninth Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Pursuant to 
the Implementation Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). 
49 William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1994: William J. Clinton 
B( k. 1), Wasington D. C.: GPO, 1995.07/01/04 <http: //frwebgate. access. gpo. gov/cgi- 
bin/getpage. cgi? dbname=1994_public_papers_vol1_misc&page=1046&position=all >. 
50 United Nations, Ninth Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Pursuant to 
the Implementation Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). 
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sizeable amounts of Iraq's chemical arsenal, dismantling its nuclear programme and 
destroying its declared defensive biological weapons programme. 
4.1.1 Post-1995 Inspection Process 
Although by 1995 UNSCOM and the IAEA were reasonably satisfied that they had 
rendered harmless the majority of Iraq's prohibited weapons and were ready to 
implement the long term monitoring phase, 51 it was with the defection to Jordan of 
Lt. General Hussain Kamal Hassan al-Majeed and Lt. Colonel Saddam Kamal 
Hassan al-Majeed that a new phase in the weapons inspections process was ushered 
in. 52 Hussain Kamal al-Majeed was the former Minister of Industry and Military 
Industrialisation in Iraq and was one of Saddam Hussain's inner circle. The defection 
was prompted by Saddam's son Udayy issuing threats against Hussain Kamal and his 
family. 53 As Hussain Kamal was intimately involved in a deception of UNSCOM 
and the IAEA by way of a covert illicit weapons programme, it was clear to the Iraqi 
regime that information on this would be provided to UNSCOM and the IAEA. The 
Iraqi government thus opted to pre-empt any possible information Hussain Kamal 
would give the Special Commission by providing documentation pertaining to its 
covert illicit weapons programme to the IAEA. Baghdad provided "documentary 
material, which included technical records, drawings, suppliers catalogues and 
extracts from scientific and technical publications [that] amounted to some 680,000 
pales, of which some 80% related to Iraq's past nuclear programme. "sa 
These new declarations showed that Baghdad's prohibited weapons programmes 
were more advanced than previously thought, especially with regard to the 
51 United Nations, Secretariat, Seventh Report under UNSCR 715 by the Secretary-General on the 
Activities of the Special Commission, (S/1995/284), (New York: United Nations, 10 Apr. 1995) 36pp. 
12/08/03 <http: //www. iragwatch. org/un[UNSCOii1/715/s-1995-284. htm>. 
52 They defected to Jordan along with several members of their family and their wives who were 
Saddam Hussain's daughters. 
53 Amatzia Baram, Building toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn's Secret Strategy for Survival 
(Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998) 8-17. 
54 United Nations, First Semi-Annual Report on the Implementation of UNSCR 687. 
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development of the advanced VX nerve agent. 55 Also, by October 1995, the Special 
Commission had concluded that Iraq had significantly misled UNSCOM and the 
IAEA over the issue of prohibited missile technology: 
Iraq has been misleading the Commission by withholding information 
that, before the Gulf war, it had secretly produced Scud-type missile 
engines and carried out research and development on a variety of 
projects on missiles of prohibited ranges. Furthermore, Iraq's efforts 
to conceal its biological weapons programme, its chemical missile 
warhead flight tests and work on the development of a missile for the 
delivery of a nuclear device led it to provide incorrect information 
concerning certain of its missile activities. 56 
In terms of Iraq's weapons programme, the most alarming aspect of the new 
revelations was that Iraq had a secret, offensive biological warfare programme and a 
covert chemical weapons programme that included the production of the advanced 
VX nerve agent on an industrial scale. 57 According to UNSCOM, Iraq declared it had 
produced sizeable quantities of the chemical precursors exclusive to the development 
of VX and that it possessed sufficient amounts to produce 90 tons of VX. 58 It was 
noted at the United Nations that: 
In the chemical weapons area, the Special Commission's 
investigations have led to disclosure of activities [aimed] at the 
acquisition of a considerable capability for the production of the 
advanced nerve agent VX. Whether Iraq still keeps precursors in 
59 storage for immediate VX use has not been fully clarified. 
55 United Nations, Ninth Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Pursuant to 
the Implementation Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). 
56 United Nations, Seventh Report under UNSCR 715 by the Secretary-General on the Activities of 
the Special Commission. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 United Nations, Seventh Report under UNSCR 715 by the Secretary-General on the Activities of 
the Special Commission. 
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These damming revelations about Iraq's undisclosed illicit weapon programmes in 
addition to a continuation of the policy of non-cooperation with the UN inspectors 
demonstrated that Iraq was failing to comply with its obligations which gave it little 
diplomatic credibility in the face of its previous false declarations. 
The response at the UN was predictable and Iraq's failure to comply with its 
obligations was greeted with condemnation. This mood in the UN was further 
exacerbated by the seizure of advanced missile components destined for Iraq via 
Jordan in 1995.60 This showed that the provisions of UNSCR 687 paragraph 20, 
which placed control on Iraqi imports, was insufficient in the face of a defiant Iraq. 
The response at the United Nations was the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1051,61 
which strengthened the import and export controls on Iraq by requiring all imports to 
Iraq to be declared and ultimately accounted for by Iraq. Despite the efforts at the 
United Nations to further strengthen the sanctions mandate, Iraq was found by 
UNSCOM to be continuing in a persistent and deliberate obstruction of the 
inspections process. 62 This pattern of obstructing the mandate of UNSCOM and the 
IAEA continued throughout 1996-98 and ultimately saw Iraq being found in breech 
of its obligations by a series of UN Security Council resolutions. 63 
4.1.1.1 The Dilemma of Verifiability 
The defection of Lt. General Hussain Kamal Hassan al-Majeed was a turning point in 
Iraq's situation vis-a-vis the UN, which also demonstrated to the United States that 
Iraq had little intention in complying with UN resolutions. UNSCOM recognised in a 
60 United Nations, Ninth Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Pursuant to 
the Implementation Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 
61 Approved on 27 Mar. 1996, the Resolution was adopted unanimously and was sponsored by France, 
Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and the United States. 
62 United Nations, UNSCOM, Forth Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission 
Pursuant to the Implementation Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996), (S/1997/774), (New York: 
United Nations, 6 Oct. 1997) 41 pp. 25/09/03 <http: //www. iragwatch. org/un/UNSCOM/1051/sres97- 
774. htm>. 
63 Iraq's failure to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA 1996-98, saw the international community 
condemn Iraq through UNSCR 1060 of 12 Jun. 1996, UNSCR 1115 of 21 Jun. 1997, UNSCR 1134 23 
Oct. 1997, UNSCR 1137 of 12 Nov. 1997 and UNSCR 1205 of 5 Nov. 1998. 
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report to the Security Council in January 1999 that: "the overall period of the 
Commission's disarmament work must be divided into two parts, separated by the 
events following the departure from Iraq, in August 1995, of Lt. General Hussain 
Kamal. "64 
In Hussain Kamal's testimony to the IAEA, he was categorical that Iraq did indeed 
have nuclear, chemical and biological weapon programmes that dated back to the 
Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, he stated that previous declarations given by Iraq were 
flawed as its biological and chemical weapons programmes, particularly with regard 
to the VX nerve agent, were more advanced than previously known by the UN. His 
statement, however, is enlightening in that by August 1995 he said he personally 
ordered the unilateral destruction of all of the prohibited weapons, pre-cursor 
chemicals and missile components, in order to have the sanctions on Iraq lifted. In 
his testimony to the IAEA, Hussain Kamal states, "I ordered the destruction of all 
weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed. "65 He 
comments that: "I made the decision to disclose everything so that Iraq could return 
to normal. "66 He goes on to confirm that the destruction of the prohibited weapons 
took place, "after visits of inspection teams, " who were "very effective in Iraq. "67 
The significance of Hussain Kamal's testimony cannot be underestimated as any 
assessment of its truthfulness determines the justification underpinning US 
containment policy through multilateral sanctions: without the possession of 
unconventional weapons, the official justification for multilateral sanctions would 
have been nullified. Given the scope of the new information he provided the IAEA, 
the detrimental impact it had on Iraq's diplomatic credibility, and the fact Hussain 
Kamal was executed upon his return to Iraq after falsely being, promised a pardon by 
6" United Nations, Secretariat, Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the United 
Nations and the Government of Iraq on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 986 
(1995), (S/19961356), (New York: United Nations, 20 May 1996) 1Opp. 04/11/04 
<http: //www. meij. or. jp/text/Gulf, 7o20War/mouunirql996. htm>. 
65 United Nations, UNSCOM and IAEA, Interview Transcript with Hussain Kamel in Amman, 
Sensitive classification note for file, (New York: United Nations, 22 Aug. 1995) l5pp. 12/07/03 
<http: //www. casi. or,,. uk/info/unscom950822. pdf>. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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Saddam, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is an element of truth in his 
testimony. However, if Iraq had indeed destroyed all of its weapons and any trace of 
them, why was it continuing to persist in an obstruction of the UN Special 
Commission if it had nothing to hide? The significance, however, in accepting 
Hussain Kamal's testimony that Iraq had unilaterally destroyed all its prohibited 
weapons, presented the key problem of verifiability for a complete compliance with 
UN resolutions. The paradox was thus how could Iraq prove to the UN Special 
Commission and the international community that it had destroyed its stockpiles, 
listed in official Iraqi documents, when it had concealed the destruction process and 
any evidence of it having taken place? 
\ 
Consequently, there is a possibility that Iraq possessed fewer, or indeed none, of the 
prohibited weapons and technologies post-1995 than it had failed to account for. In 
addition to this issue, there is the matter of whether Iraq's unaccounted for weapons 
actually still posed a threat. The majority of chemical and biological weapons were a 
relic of the Iran-Iraq war: many of those that had been weaponised would have been 
defunct anyway as the chemical weapons Iraq was known to possess, such as the 
nerve agents sarin and tabun, have a limited shelf life of five years if stored in ideal 
conditions. The advanced nerve agent VX has only a slightly longer shelf life. 
Biological weapons also suffer from the same problem, even if stored in ideal 
conditions: Botulinum and Liquid Anthrax have a shelf life of 3-4 years. 
A further factor, which warrants consideration, is that during the 1991 conflict a 
number of the weapons would have conceivably been destroyed in the bombing 
campaign. Indeed, Iraq's chemical weapon site at al-Muthanna was completely 
destroyed, along with weapons stored there. It is also likely that other weapon stores 
were destroyed in the intensive bombing campaign across Iraq in 1991. 
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that even if the prohibited weapons had not 
been unilaterally destroyed as indicated by Hussain Kamal, it is unrealistic to take 
the position that Iraq would have been able to verify the destruction of all its 
weapons and related components following the 1991 bombing campaign. Moreover, 
by 1995, virtually all-remaining weapons would likely have been past their shelf life 
thus rendering them defunct anyway. The threat Iraq potentially posed was therefore 
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more to do with its capacity to produce new weapons from unaccounted-for 
precursor ingredients. But even when considering potential production from 
precursor ingredients, it is open to question how effectively an estimate could take 
into account wastage during production. Therefore, it is reasonable to take the 
position that the majority of Iraq's illicit weapons had indeed been destroyed or 
destroyed by 1995, and that Iraq was not in the position of being able to filly verify 
their destruction to the United Nations. 
4.2 Air Exclusion Zones 
Following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, President Bush called upon the Iraqi 
people to "take matters into their own hands, " and oust Saddam's regime from 
power. 68 Various civilian areas in Iraq, and in particular the Kurdish areas, openly 
rebelled against the Iraqi regime. It was following the Iraqi military repression of 
these rebellions that the international community condemned these actions and 
adopted UNSCR 688 of 5 April 1991. UNSCR 688 condemned the oppression of the 
Iraqi civilians and demanded that Iraq immediately halt the repression. Of 
significance however, was the appeal by the Security Council that "all Member 
States and all humanitarian organizations... contribute to these humanitarian relief 
efforts. "69 Following the adoption of UNSCR 688, the United States, United 
Kingdom and France, adopted a northern air exclusion zone in April 1991. This had 
the express objective of creating a safe haven for the Kurdish civilians by making the 
area north of the 36`h parallel in Iraq a fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft free 
zone. 0 This northern no-fly zone was justified by the United States as being 
consistent with UNSCR 688 in terms of it providing the adequate security needed for 
the humanitarian relief effort. The United States, United Kingdom and France 
68 George H. W. Bush, "Statement from Baghdad: A Cruel Hoax, " Comments to the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 15 Feb. 1991.20pp. 13/07/03 
<httpd/dosfan. lib. uic. edu/erc/briefing/dispatch/1991/html/Dispatchv2no07. html >. 
69 UNSCR 688 of 5 Apr. 1991. Par. 6. 
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established a second air exclusion zone in southern Iraq in the area below the 32nd 
parallel on 26 August 1991 in order to provide protection for the Shi'ite population. 
This southern air exclusion zone was subsequently expanded to the 33 `d parallel in 
September 1996. 
At issue, however, was whether UNSCR 688 actually provided the legal justification 
for the US, UK and French enforcement of the no-fly zones. UNSCR 688 was not 
enacted under Chapter VII, and thus did not provide any explicit provisions for the 
use of force. 71 Although Congress called upon Bush to press the Security Council to 
agree on the enforcement of UNSCR 688 in accordance with Chapter VII, no such 
measures were introduced to the Security Council. 72 It is thus on account of the 
absence of the specific authorisation for the use of force in UNSCR 688 that the legal 
foundation of the air exclusion zones was questionable under the guise of 
international law. 
The legality of the air exclusion zones enforcement was also questionable on the 
grounds of whether it was concurrent with the authorisation for the use of force 
under UNSCR 678.3 But even when the legality of action under the legal position of 
humanitarian intervention is considered, it seems clear this basis for intervention, 
"would have limited the operation to air drops and other non-forcible assistance of a 
humanitarian character. , 74 In addition to these issues, any potential justification of 
self-defence as a means of legitimising enforcement in the air exclusion zones was 
also questionable "since the argument depends on coalition aircraft having the right 
to fly over Iraq in the first place. "75 Therefore, under international law the legal 
foundation for the US position on air exclusion zones was absent and simply 
71 Christine Gray, "From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq, " 
European Journal of International Law 13.1 (2002): 9. 
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73 Ibid. 203. 
74 Ibid. 205. 
71 Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? 200. 
-147- 
highlights the willingness of the United States to nullify the provisions in the Treaty 
of Westphalia on the ground of humanitarian concerns 
The Clinton administration's support for the air exclusion zones, which were clearly 
inherited from the previous Bush administration, proved to be a contentious issue and 
a dividing factor within the Security Council. The decision by Clinton in September 
1996 to extend the southern air exclusion zone to the 33rd parallel was in response to 
Hussain's attack on Irbil on 31 August 1996.76 France did not support this change in 
policy and did not commit its forces to patrolling the extended area of the no-fly 
zone. 7 But on 27 December 1996, France withdrew its involvement from Operation 
Northern Watch, as it no longer found there to be a humanitarian requirement to 
justify its continued participation. The US took a contrary position and continued to 
enforce the air exclusion zone, which undoubtedly served to further aggravate the 
emerging divisions on the Security Council up until late 1997. France's participation 
in Operation Southern Watch was suspended on 16 December 1998, due to the 
commencement of Operation Desert Fox by the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
It is therefore clear that the Clinton administration's participation in the Iraqi air 
exclusion zones was a factor that ultimately served to further tensions within the 
multilateral coalition. The Clinton administration's commitment of its forces towards 
enforcing the southern and northern air exclusion zones within Iraq was a policy 
which, although grounded on humanitarian considerations, failed to possess legal 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and under international law. 
The significance of US support and enforcement of the Iraqi air exclusion zones is 
that whilst they demonstrated a US commitment towards the humanitarian 
predicament of the oppressed Kurdish and Shi'ite population areas, it was a policy 
that served to undermine the integrity of multilateral international coalition. With 
76 Robert H. Pelletreau, "Developments in the Middle East, " US Department of State Dispatch, 5.41, 
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heightened divisions in the Security Council, most notably from 1996-98, the French 
withdrawal from the northern air exclusion zone and disagreement over the US 
decision to extend the southern air exclusion zone would have undoubtedly served to 
further challenge the integrity of the multilateral coalition. 
4.3 Strategic Policy: Regime Change 
The safe-haven in northern Iraq not only served the function of providing 
humanitarian relief, but it also was intended to stem the flow of Kurdish refugees 
into Iran and Turkey, 78 in addition to providing a secure base of operation for 
opposition movements as a part of the overall insurgency strategy. 79 It was following 
the establishment of the northern safe-haven in 1991 that the opposition movements 
were able to unite under the umbrella organization of the Iraqi National Congress 
(INC). The CIA then began supporting the INC covertly as part of the regime change 
strategy. 8° The CIA sent small quantities of armaments, money and supplies to the 
constituent parts of the INC, as part of US covert efforts to promote an insurgency 
which would have weakened Saddam's regime and thus made it more susceptible to 
8 an internal coup d'etat. 1 
Although the official position of the Clinton administration was geared towards the 
upholding of UN resolutions through multilateral sanctions, the overall strategic has 
been suggested by David Wurmser as having covertly altered towards the objective 
of regime change from 1995.82 The truth of the matter is actually quite different as 
there is evidence to suggest that a policy continuation from the preceding Bush 
administration actually occurred, which means that US policy was officially geared 
78 Bush, "US Expands Kurdish Relief Efforts, " 
79 David Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussain (Washington, D. C.: 
AEI Press, 1999) 13. 
80 Ibid. 14. 
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towards the objective of regime change since 1991. In an interview by the author 
with Anthony Lake, he clarified the situation as being: 
The problem was that we could not, at that time, state explicitly that 
the purpose of our policy was the overthrow of the regime... because 
if that became explicitly stated at that time it would blow apart the 
coalition, as such a goal did not fall explicitly within the terms of the 
UN resolutions. Although when we argued that there needed to be full 
compliance with all the resolutions passed in the wake of the first 
Gulf War, in effect, that was calling for [Saddam Hussain's] 
overthrow because, if he observed the provisions calling for an end to 
repression, then his regime would fall. 83 
Therefore, Lake's remarks underline that containment was viewed by the 
administration as a tactical means of achieving its overarching strategic objective of 
reime change. But in terms of how this strategic policy of regime change was 
implemented, it is necessary to provide an examination of CIA operations, and those 
involving opposition groups, undertaken by the Clinton administration towards Iraq. 
In terms of opposition groups, the Clinton administration continued to support the 
INC as a means of bringing about a "democratic and pluralist government in Iraq 
that can live in peace with its neighbors and its own people. "84 Washington saw the 
INC as useful tool in fostering a degree of domestic opposition to the Iraqi regime, 
but not as a direct threat. 85 Indeed, Lake commented in an interview with the author 
that "the institution that could actually overthrow Saddam was the Iraqi military. ' 86 
Thus, the administration did not believe groups such as the INC were going to 
actually unseat Saddam Hussain. 
83 Anthony Lake, Telephone Interview with Author, 27 Sep. 2004. 
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In March 1995 however, the INC launched a military offensive against Iraqi 
military forces and admittedly made advances against them. With a sizeable number 
of defections having occurred to the INC, it seemed that a real threat was being 
posed to the regime of Saddam Hussain. 87 For Washington, however, the advances 
posed the problem that a victory by the INC forces would have potentially 
threatened the territorial integrity of Iraq due to the major role of Kurdish separatist 
movements in mounting the insurgency. But given that it would have likely had a 
bearing on the stability of neighbouring states, its success would have been contrary 
to the US strategic interests of an unhindered flow of hydrocarbon resources from 
83 the region. 
In light of the threat posed to the territorial integrity of Iraq by a potential INC 
victory during March 1995, the US withdrew its support for the insurrection. 89 The 
decision to withdraw all support for the insurrection is reported as having come 
directly from the White House. 9) The unwillingness to support the INC in this effort 
was a departure of official policy by the Clinton administration as US policy towards 
the INC was stipulated as: 
We are also providing stronger backing for the Iraqi National 
Congress (INC) as a democratic alternative to the Saddam Hussain 
regime. The INC has succeeded in broadening its base to encompass 
representatives of all three major communities in Iraq: Sunni, Shi'ite 
and Kurd. It is committed, as are we, to maintaining the territorial 
integrity of Iraq and to adhering to Iraq's international 
responsibilities. We are now urging others in the region to accord the 
INC the recognition and support it deserves. 91 
87 Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally 14-15. 
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Although Washington clearly supported the insurgency activities of the INC as a 
means of promoting domestic opposition within Iraq, the Clinton administration 
reneged on its policy position by not supporting the INC as a replacement to 
Saddam's regime. It has been speculated that the Clinton administration's reversal in 
policy is on account of their unwillingness to het embroiled in an INC orchestrated 
military engagement, 91 which could have placed unwanted pressure on the territorial 
integrity of Iraq that was contrary to US interests. 
The withdrawal of US support for the March 1995 insurgency resulted in the 
fragmentation of the Kurdish coalition and also in the failure of the INC offensive, 93 
and the I: \'C's ability to mount any effective opposition to Baghdad cease. 94 More 
importantly though, it marked the failure of CIA covert operations in northern Iraq, 
and damaged US credibility with the Kurdish factions and those remaining in the 
INC. 95 
Washington subsequently opted to focus its insurgency efforts on the newly 
emerging Iraqi National Accord (INA), as this was seen as the most viable means 
from which a coup d'etat could occur from within the regime. 96 The INA, headed by 
Iyad Allawi, who was a former Iraqi intelligence official, was comprised mainly of 
military officers from the Sunni core of the Iraqi regime. Unlike the INC, which 
offered regime change through military confrontation, the INA had the potential to 
bring about an internal coup d'etat. Importantly, an internal coup d'etat was seen as 
unlikely to pose the same threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq as a military 
insurgency by the INC. Washington saw an internal coup as the most feasible and 
also the most politically expedient way of achieving reime change. Assistant 
Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau aptly commented, "the only way you were going 
9' Hoagland. "How CIA's Secret War on Saddam Collapsed, " A21 
13 Ibid. A"" 1. 
94 John Burgess and David Ottway. "Iraqi Opposition Unable to Mount Viable Challenge, " 
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to succeed in unseating the existing regime was through an internal military coup 
aainst it. "9' The defection of Hussain Kamal al-Majid and General Nizar al- l 
Khazraji, 93 undoubtedly demonstrated to Washington that Saddam's inner circle was 
disloyal, fragmenting and thus conducive to undertaking an internal coup. 
The key problem with the INA as an opposition movement, however, was that it had 
been "heavily penetrated by Iraqi security. "99 With the vast majority of the defections 
to the INA having come from the Iraqi military and Saddam's own inner circle, it is 
likely that many bogus defections would have occurred to provide disinformation 
and carry out counter-intelligence operations. This would have served to not only 
hamper the operations of the INA, but also to undermine and prevent any coup 
attempts from occurring a`_ainst Saddam. 
The infiltration of the INA by Iraqi intelligence proved to be the root cause of the 
failure of the INA as an insurgency movement. In 1996 an INA coup operation was 
thwarted by Iraqi intelligence and resulted in the execution of several hundred CIA 
backed conspirators within Iraq. 1°° The lack of success in the INA's operation 
understandably placed Saddam in a more secure position and underlined the inability 
of the INA to initiate a coup. Although Washington continued to support the INA 
after 1996, it is only reasonable to conclude that the significant infiltration of the 
INA by Iraqi intelligence made its effectiveness and future likelihood of successfully 
carrying out a coup very unlikely. 
The Clinton administration's strategic insurgency and covert regime change policy 
had, therefore, ultimately failed in fulfilling its objectives, and by 1996, was a policy 
option rendered ineffectual. Although the United States overtly premised its policy 
on an Iraqi full and complete compliance with UN resolutions, it covertly continued 
the Bush administration's official strategy of supporting insurgency movements 
within Iraq towards the ultimate objective of initiating regime change. Indeed, the 
97 Wurmser, T%-rznnv\ Ally 21. 
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pursuit of this strategy demonstrates the duplicitous nature of Clinton's policy as it 
was officially premised on a destruction of Iraq's prohibited weapons leading to 
reconciliation, whilst the true objective was regime change. 
The support for the INC by Clinton was initially effective in serving the purpose of 
uniting the Kurdish factions and in fostering general opposition towards Saddam's 
regime. However, by 1995, the administration's unwillingness to militarily support 
the INC had resulted in the failure of the offensive and the collapse of the CIA 
sponsored insurgency in northern Iraq. The reime change strategy of the 
administration can therefore be split into two parts: firstly, using the INC as a means 
of weakening Saddam's regime and thus making it more susceptible to a coup; and 
secondly, it switched its focus in 1995 towards the INA as a means of instigating a 
coup. In sum, this demonstrates the pursuit of regime change as a strategic objective 
since 1991 through internal means. 
4.4 The Failure of Tactical Containment 
In the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the Iraqi domestic economic 
infrastructure virtually collapsed. As a consequence, the Iraqi people faced a 
detrimental humanitarian predicament and the government was not in a position to 
alleviate it. UNSCR 687 incorporated provisions that exempted food and medicine 
from the embargo, as well as easing the restrictions on Iraqi assets for use in 
purchasing such supplies. Security Council Resolution 706, passed on 15 August, 
was a direct response to meet these needs. It gave Iraq the ability to sell up to US$1.6 
billion in oil over a six month period using an escrow account, which could be used 
to purchase food and medicine, and to compensate Kuwait. 101 For Saddam, this UN 
initiative posed a threat to his rule as the control of revenue and provision of supplies 
would fall to the UN which Would consequently be seen as an alternative authority 
within Iraq. 1°2 As compliance with the humanitarian relief provisions of UNSCR 687 
and 706 challenged the rule of Saddam, Baghdad's response was to adopt a self- 
101 UNSCR 706 of IS Aug. 1991, Para. 1. 
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sufficiency programme rather than co-operating and utilising the provisions the UN 
had provided it. 103 
During the first Clinton administration, the humanitarian situation within Iraq 
weakened support amongst the international community, most notably among Arab 
states, for the multilateral sanctions mandate. In response to these concerns, the 
United States proposed UNSCR 968 on 14 April 1995, dubbed the `oil-for-food' 
programme, which greatly expanded the oil sales Iraq could use for purchasing 
humanitarian provisions. 10' 
Despite the introduction of this programme, `sanctions fatigue' amongst UN member 
states was clearly growing and being fostered by Iraq. 105 Iraq realised that the most 
effective method of having the sanctions lifted was to divide the will of the Security 
Council on the sanctions and inspections processes. Apart from highlighting the 
humanitarian impact of the sanctions, Baghdad proactively engaged in discussions 
with Russia and France on lucrative oil and trade agreements. Although the State 
Department attempted to refute Iraq's claims on the effect of sanctions, it had little 
impact. 106 In addition to this, it is reasonable to believe that both France and Russia 
had a vested interest in seeing the sanctions lifted, as Iraq owed them US$4 billion 
and USSS billion respectively. 107 Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov commented that "[w]ithout sanctions, the Iraqis would sell oil and pay us; 
with sanctions, they sell oil and use the sanctions as an excuse not to pay us. "108 This 
was used by Iraq to make these countries support the lifting of sanctions, due to their 
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own national economic interests. Therefore Washington's emphasis, and reliance on 
a concerted multilateral response to Iraq, was unravelling due to the humanitarian 
effects of the sanctions policy and the resolute efforts by Iraq to further divisions 
within the international community. 
The oil-for-food programme was subsequently further expanded109 in order to reduce 
the opposition to sanctions, which was occurring mainly through humanitarian 
concerns. For Washington however, the policy of maintaining multilateral 
international support for sanctions, by providing backing for increased Iraqi oil sales 
for humanitarian supplies, was in essence a double-edged sword. In order to maintain 
multilateral support for the sanctions policy, the US supported the oil-for-food 
programme, but this strategy resulted in weakening the strict nature of sanctions on 
Iraq. Mary O'Connell comments: 
The agreement contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1153 
more than doubled the cash Iraq would receive every six months. In 
fact, it potentially allowed Iraq to sell US$10.5 billion a year of oil, 
which compares to average Iraqi annual oil exports of US$11.5 billion 
(in 1998 dollars) during 1981-1989... This compares with US$1.32 
billion every six months under the prior agreement, or US$2.64 
billion a year. 110 
Therefore, the Clinton administration's multilateral policy of containment through 
sanctions on Iraq was showing sins of deficiency and potential failure, in the light 
of a weakening of international support for the indefinite continuation of sanctions. 
Whilst Washington's support for easing the humanitarian crisis served the diplomatic 
purpose of revitalising its multilateral support base, thus strengthening the integrity 
of the multilateral coalition, at the same time it undermined the strict nature of the 
sanctions and provided a diplomatic success for Iraq through the increased revenue it 
had at its disposal. 
109 Its provisions tirre expanded by UNSCR 1143 of 4 Dec. 1997 and UNSCR 1158 of 28 Mar. 1998. 
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Despite Iraq being, found in breech of its obligations by the UN, Washington found 
that the international community's willingness to support UN sanctions indefinitely 
was increasingly wavering. Many saw the sanctions as having created a significant 
humanitarian predicament for the Iraqi people. " It appears, however, that the main 
cause of the humanitarian crisis was the deliberate withholding of humanitarian 
supplies by the Iraqi regime. t '' Saddam's regime withheld supplies in order to create 
a humanitarian crisis aniongst the Iraqi population, which served the purpose of 
fostering divisions within the international community towards enforcing 
sanctions. 113 Indeed, the Iraqi regime purposely failed to utilise the available 
resources provided for it under the oil-for-food programme in a deliberate effort to 
perpetuate the humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people for its own purely political 
objectives. 114 
Iraq's strategy was undoubtedly effective in creating divisions in the Security 
Council. The increased debate as to the actual legality of UN sanctions towards Iraq 
further undermined the US position due to the issue over whether they were in line 
with both the legal principal of proportionality and with customary international 
humanitarian law standards. 15 
The regional political ramifications of the sanctions were viewed in terms of the 
humanitarian predicament of the Iraqi people. The humanitarian situation inflamed 
regional public opinion towards the US, and Secretary of State Albright found that 
the rulers of Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait %%"ere deeply concerned with the plight of the 
Iraqi people. This impacted on their support for the US position towards Iraq. 116 
Further compounding the loss of regional support was the slow pace of negotiations 
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in the Arab-Israeli peace process following the election of Binyamin Netanyahu. 
These factors made the US policy of containment towards Iraq loose vital support 
from Arab states and the wider international community, which further served to 
encourage Saddam to defy the UN sanctions policy. 
In light of the split in the international community, Iraq focused its energies on 
attempting to divide the Security Council, whilst continuing active non-cooperation 
during 1997-9S. With Russia and France both showing an unwillingness to resort to 
force in order to compel 117 it was clear to Baghdad that it was succeeding in 
dividing the will of the international community and that the determination to 
enforce UN resolutions was lacking. The concerted Iraqi effort to defy UN 
resolutions saw Iraq have four further UN Security Council Resolutions passed 
against it, as it was found to be in breech of its obligations. 118 
4.4.1 Domestic Political Factors 
The continued Iraqi defiance of UN resolutions and the emerging divisions within 
the international coalition towards the sanctions were clear evidence of a failing US 
position. Members of the US Congress were openly critical of the situation vis-ä-vis 
Iraq and the general mood felt in Congress was usefully summed up by the Chairman 
of the Congressional Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: 
[A]ctions by the administration and the UN particularly have rendered 
the effectiveness of the sanctions less than meaningful, and without 
effective sanctions the UN inspectors in my opinion will never be able 
to force Saddam to destroy his weapons of mass destruction. 119 
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The immediate response given by Congress to Iraq's defiance was a ruling that Iraq 
was in material breach of its international obligations. 120 The Congressional 
dissatisfaction with the administration, and realisation that US policy towards Iraq 
had virtually failed, was heightened by the testimony of the former Chief of 
UNSCOM's Concealment and Investigation Unit, Scott Ritter. Ritter accused the 
Clinton administration of deliberately interfering in the operations of UNSCOM, 
with the express intention of preventing a confrontation from occurring. t'1 The 
implication from Ritter's testimony was that the Clinton administration actively and 
deliberately impeded the weapons inspection processes in order prevent a 
confrontation from occurring, which would have further divided the international 
coalition. Ritter specifically suggested that Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
intervened in the independent inspection process by delaying the no-notice 
inspections on 6-9 August 1998. From Ritter's testimony, it was widely reported this 
was a deliberate action by Albright to prevent a confrontation. 122 Ritter also alleged 
that the CIA was using UNSCOM as a means of gathering intelligence. Former 
UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler, however, convincingly rebutted Ritter's 
allegations that the US had interfered with the operations of UNSCOM. '23 Although 
Butler also denied that the CIA gathered intelligence through UNSCOM, '24 it 
subsequently transpired that this aspect of Ritter's allegation was accurate. '25 Indeed, 
not only did the CIA covertly participate in the inspection process and receive full 
briefings from UN weapon inspectors, they also were highly involved in providing 
intelligence to further the inspection mandate. '26 
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Ritter's testimony had a damning effect in Congress on perceptions towards the 
Clinton administration. Speaker of the House, Newt Ginaa ich, was scathing in his 
criticism by suggesting that the effect of the administration was to appease Iraq, and 
that its "tough rhetoric on Iraq has been a deception masking a real policy of 
weakness and concession. "127 In addition to this, Ritter gained international notoriety 
as vocal critic of the Clinton administration's policy strategy128 and, given his 
credentials as a former Chief Weapons Inspector, it was likely he had some influence 
on public opinions towards Clinton's foreign policy. 
The stagnation of the US position towards Iraq during 1997-98 led to a growing 
number of calls within Congress for increased efforts to overthrow Saddam 
Hussain's regime. Congress recognised that it was the regime of Saddam that posed 
the continuing threat to international peace and security and, through legislation in 
January 1998, urged the President "to work with Congress in furthering a long term 
policy aimed at definitively ending the threat to international peace and security 
posed by the government of Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programme". 
'29 
The growing calls for direct action against the Iraqi regime ultimately resulted in 
Congress adopting the Iraq Liberation Act on 31 October 1998.130 Proposed by 
Majority Leader Trent Lott and House International Relations Committee Chairman 
Benjamin Gillman, the Iraq Liberation Act specified that "[i]t should be the policy of 
the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussain 
from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to 
replace that regime. "131 The bill, which received bipartisan support and passed by a 
margin of 360-38, gave President Clinton the authority to allocate US$97 million in 
defence equipment to Iraqi opposition groups, and a further US$2 million for 
127 Gellman, "Gingrich Opens File on White House Iraq Policy. 
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opposition groups' radio and television broadcasts. The adoption of this legislation 
clearly originated from the failure of the multilateral approach towards Iraq, and 
marked a decisive shift in Congressional pressure on US policy from containment 
towards overtly perusing regime change. Moreover, it is important to recognise that 
although this legislation came clearly from Congress, the administration viewed the 
new policy with some degree of scepticism13` as it was seen to be hampering efforts 
to maintain the multilateral coalition towards the maintenance of sanctions. 
Nevertheless, the covert policy towards regime change since 1991 had now become 
an official policy. 
4.4.2 Continuing Iraqi Defiance 
Only two months after Richard Butler had taken over from Rolf Ekeus as the 
Chairman of the UNSCOM inspection team, Iraq provoked a major crisis in an effort 
to shake off the inspections and sanctions. On 13 September 1997, the Iraqi regime 
refused the UN inspectors direct access to the military barracks in Tikrik. In this 
instance, UNSCOM was informed that the site they were planning on visiting was 
classed as a "sensitive" site. Under an agreement in 1996 between Rolf Ekeus and 
the Iraqi government, only four UNSCOM personnel would conduct the inspection 
of such sites. The inspection team was initially denied access to the site, and despite 
an agreement that no vehicles may be used within the site or leave it, several did so. 
Moreover, the UNSCOM Chief Arial Inspector was prevented by Iraqi officials from 
photographing the site, which was in clear breech of Iraq's legal obligations. When 
the inspectors finally gained access to the site after three hours, they found evidence 
that documentation had been removed from the site. 133 
Two days after the incident at Tikrit military base a similar incident occurred at the 
Sarabadi Republican Guard base. 134 Later that month, however, there was a standoff 
132 Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: US Efforts to Change the Regime, " CRS Report for Congress, 
(RL31339), Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 22 Mar. 2002, 
16pp, 23/10/03 <http: //www. casi. org. uk/info/usdocs/crs/020322rl3l339. pdf>. 
133 Butler, Saddam Defiant 96-97. 
134 Ibid. 97. 
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over the inspection of the Iraqi Special Security Organisation (SSO) headquarters, 
and a major crisis unfolded. The inspectors were stopped in the vicinity of the SSO 
headquarters at gunpoint. Despite direct negotiations between Tariq Aziz and Butler, 
the UNSCOM inspectors were prevented from gaining access on the justification that 
the SSO headquarters were part of a presidential site. With the inspectors being held 
at gunpoint, they were withdrawn on account of fears for their safety. 
UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler formed the opinion that the arbitrary prevention 
of inspectors from accessing certain sites, and the lack of substantive co-operation, 
made it clear that the priority of Iraq was to maintain WMD stockpiles rather than to 
get a clean bill of health from the UN. Butler commented that: 
The claim that Saddam Hussain's regime wanted, above all, to rid Iraq 
of economic sanctions was false. Iraq's priority... had always been to 
retain weapons of mass destruction - and, perhaps in particular, a 
biological weapons capability. Because disarmament and relief of 
sanctions are tied together under international law, this means that 
Saddam's ability to hold on to such weapons is far more important to 
him than the welfare of 22 million ordinary Iraqis. 135 
Indeed, at face value, it is logical to conclude that given Iraq's failure to 
substantively comply with its obligations, its priority was to maintain an 
unconventional weapons programme. However, it also seems clear that Iraq had a 
real desire to rid itself of UN sanctions: therefore it seemed apparent that Iraq's 
priority was to covertly maintain some form of WMD capabilities whilst also 
attempting to rid itself of the UN sanctions and the inspections mandate. 
The response at the UN Security Council to Iraq's defiance was UNSCR 1134 of 23 
October 1997. Whilst the resolution did not find Iraq in `material breech' of its 
obligations, it did note with `grave concern' Iraq's recent obstruction of the UN 
mandate. Unlike previous Security Council Resolutions, UNSCR 1134 was not 
adopted unanimously. Three permanent members of the Security Council - China, 
135 Butler, Saddam Defiant 100. 
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France and Russia abstained in the vote. It would have therefore been clear to Iraq 
that sanctions fatigue was taking effect at the Security Council. 
With the tide of international opinion moving in its favour, Baghdad decided to up 
the stakes by barring US nationals from partaking in UNSCOM inspections. 
136 In 
addition to this, Tariq Aziz also specified that American provided U-2 flights must 
cease. Whilst the UN condemned Iraq's position, a stalemate developed. 
137 The 
UNSCOM inspection teams that comprised US nationals were prevented from 
partaking in the inspections, and from this, the inspections process ground to a halt. 
Although the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, attempted to 
reach a political solution by sending UN Special Envoys to Baghdad, a solution was 
not forthcoming. 138 
A breakthrough in the stalemate came via Russian diplomatic offices on 20 
November 1997. Tariq Aziz held talks with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov and 
reached an agreement that Iraq would allow a resumption of the UNSCOM 
inspections with the provision that the inspection process would be conducted 
effectively in order to usher in a speedy lifting of the sanctions. 
139 Following this 
announcement, the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council met in Geneva to conclude a joint statement on the Iraq-Russia Agreement. 
The Geneva Agreement saw the representatives of the permanent members of the 
Security Council endorse the unconditional return of the inspectors, however, it was 
136 Judy Aita, "UNSCOM Suspends Operations in Iraq, " United States Information Agency 29 Oct. 
1997,12/03/03 <http: //www. fas. org/news/iraq/1997/10/97102902_npo. html>. 
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conceded that there would be an effort to make UNSCOM more `effective' in its 
operations as a means of seeing the sanctions speedily lifted. 
140 
Despite the positive outlook the Geneva Agreement provided, within a few months 
Iraq resorted to its former policy of disrupting the inspections process, which again 
indicated that it was trying to conceal a covert WMD programme. In the backdrop of 
this defiance, the United States and the United Kingdom continued to build up their 
military forces in the Persian Gulf, which had begun before the Geneva Agreement. 
Given the continued military deployment and Iraq's failure to comply with its 
obligations, by February 1998, there was notable concern within the United Nations 
that the crisis was spiralling out of control. Kofi Annan took it upon himself to reach 
a political solution to the crisis and travelled to Baghdad to meet with Saddam 
Hussain. '4' The UN-brokered agreement provided Iraq a further opportunity to 
comply with its obligations with the provision that UN diplomats when travelling to 
Iraqi presidential sites would accompany the inspection teams. Whilst the United 
States held some scepticism that the UN-brokered agreement would actually work, 
they nonetheless welcomed it as it provided a resumption of the inspections. 
l4' The 
United States responded by sponsoring Security Council Resolution 1154, which 
provided, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the "severest consequences" for Iraq 
in the event of it violating its obligations under UNSCR 687.143 
4.4.2.1 Operation Desert Fox and Stalemate 
With Congressional, in particular the Republican members of Congress, applying 
pressure on the administration to adopt a more aggressive strategy towards Baghdad, 
140 Wendy Lubetkin, "Secretary of State: Perm Five Unity Brings Apparent Reversal in Iraq, " United 
States Information Agency 20 Nov. 1997,26/09/03 
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143 UNSCR 1154 of 2 Mar. 1998, Par. 3. 
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Washington was forced to take a more proactive approach towards the enforcement 
of UN resolutions. Despite the UN-brokered agreement that had been concluded in 
February 1998, by August Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba'ath 
Party Command halted their cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA on the basis 
that the oil embargo needed to be lifted and the composition of the UNSCOM and 
IAEA inspection teams should be reorganised. Iraq did, however, allow the 
monitoring as required by UNSCR 715 to continue. As a result of Iraq's defiance of 
its obligations under international law and its failure to honour the UN-brokered 
agreement of February 1998, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1194 which 
ultimately condemned Iraq for its non-compliance. 
However, when Clinton signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act on 31 October 1998, 
Iraq responded on the same day by terminating its co-operation with the inspectors. 
Clinton had been under pressure from the Republican controlled Congress to take 
more forceful steps, and Iraq understandably viewed this policy adoption as highly 
provocative and illegal action. Iraq's cessation of co-operation with the inspectors 
resulted in the adoption of UNSCR 1205 of 5 November 1998. This resolution 
condemned Iraq for having halted its cooperation indefinitely with UNSCOM and 
the IAEA. 1`4 
In the face of a divided international community, Iraqi's cessation of the weapons 
inspection process proved to be the most significant test to the determination of the 
United States to enforce UN resolutions. On 14 November 1998 Clinton, along with 
British Prime Minister Blair, ordered air strikes on Iraq, but ultimately postponed 
them for 24 hours due to Iraqi concessions. With Iraq declaring it would fully and 
unconditionally comply with UN resolutions on 15 November, the air strikes were 
called off. It was made clear by Tony Blair that the United States and the United 
Kingdom would act militarily if Iraq withdrew its cooperation again. '45 
1°4 Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba'ath Party Command halted their cooperation 
with UNSCOM and the IAEA on 5 Aug. 1998, and the government of Iraq terminated its cooperation 
on 31 Oct. 1998. 
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Despite the threat of force hanging over Iraq, Richard Butler informed the Security 
Council on 8 December that Iraq was continuing to hamper the inspections process. 
In his sobering report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 15 
December 1998 Butler stated: "Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised 
on 14 November 1998". 146 With the very real likelihood of military action as a result 
of Butler's report, the UN removed its staff from the UNSCOM mission in Baghdad 
on 15 December. On the following day, whilst the UN Security Council was in 
session and debating Butler's report, the United States and the United Kingdom 
carried out Operation Desert Fox, which involved concentrated air strikes on a 
variety of targets within Iraq. 147 The military strikes lasted for 72 hours, after which 
Clinton announced that the military objectives had been achieved. 148 Although the 
military air strikes were successful in degrading the military apparatus of Saddam's 
regime, 149 they did not prove successful in re-establishing Iraq's co-operation and 
compliance with UN resolutions and further reinforced divisions in the Security 
Council. 150 
The United States and the United Kingdom justified the legality of the air strikes 
under the provisions of UNSCR 1154 and 1205 under Chapter VII. The former 
stressed that Iraq must "accord immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to 
the Special Commission and the IAEA in conformity with the relevant resolutions, " 
and, "that any violation would have [the] severest consequences for Iraq. "t51 
Resolution 1205 provided condemnation for an Iraqi violation through its suspension 
of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Although the resolutions did not 
explicitly authorise the use of force, it was argued that they provided implied 
146 United Nations, UNSCOM, UNSCOM Chairman's Letter to the Security Council, United Nations, 
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authorisation. 152 In addition to the reliance on implied authorisation, the US and UK 
argued that UNSCR 678 provided the authorisation 
153 for the use of force, due to its 
provision that "Iraq comply fully with Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions. " 54 However, this argument is open to question under international 
law. 155 Therefore, the position taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in 
justifying Operation Desert Fox clearly demonstrates their departure from the 
multilateral doctrine as they carried out military action without the express 
authorisation from a Security Council Resolution. 
Therefore, the shift in official US policy towards regime change occurred in 1998 as 
a result of the Republican Congressional pressure on the basis that the multilateral 
effort had failed due to the unwillingness of the international community to enforce 
resolutions in the face of clear Iraqi defiance. Indeed, Clinton commented in 1998 
that Saddam posed a threat to the whole world and that "[the] best way to end that 
threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government. , 
156 Martin Indyk notably 
commented that: 
We have come to the conclusion, after more than seven years of effort 
at seeking Saddam's compliance with UN Security Council 
resolutions, that his regime will never be able to be rehabilitated 
or reintegrated into the community of nations. This conclusion is 
based on what Saddam's record makes manifest - that he will never 
relinquish what remains of his WMD arsenal, and that he will never 
cease being a threat to the region, US interests, and his own people. It 
is based on Saddam's policies, not on any predetermined policy of our 
own. Thus, in November of last year, President Clinton announced a 
152 Gray, "From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq, " 12. 
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new policy with regard to Iraq: henceforth, we would contain Saddam 
Hussain until a new regime can govern in Baghdad. 
'57 
Clearly by 1998, Clinton's official policy strategy towards Iraq had completely 
changed. Importantly, he had ultimately come to officially accept the very same 
strategic understanding that his predecessor, President George H. W. Bush, had 
adopted towards Iraq: a normalisation of relations and the security of the Persian 
Gulf could not be ensured while Saddam was in power. 
4.4.3 US Policy Post-Operation Desert Fox 
In the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox, which lasted for only 72 hours, it seems 
that the war objectives were geared towards not only debilitating Iraq's capability for 
threatening neighbouring states and its production of weapons of mass destruction, 
but also to destabilise Saddam's regime. US Defence Secretary Cohen and General 
Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that 
"American forces attacked not just the headquarters of Iraqi military intelligence, 
Special Republican Guard and Special Security Organization, but also barracks 
housing Republican Guard troops, while regular Army units were left alone. "tss It 
was reported that "[t]his aspect of the war plan served what military officials 
acknowledged was the larger, if undeclared, purpose of the air strikes: to weaken 
Saddam Hussain's hold on power by damaging his personal support structure and 
sowing unrest within the Iraqi military. "159 This was in addition to the stated 
objective of degrading Iraq's WMD capability, despite `dual use' facilities not 
targeted in order to avoid civilian casualties. Indeed, Sandy Berger recognised that in 
the aftermath of the bombing campaign, the only choices left for US policy was for: 
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"total Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council demands, which is unlikely, or the 
downfall of Saddam Hussain, which is inevitable. " 160 
Whilst the official position of the United States changed towards the promotion of 
regime change as a result of Congressional legislation, the multilateral containment 
approach came under strong criticism from France, Russia and China in the wake of 
the air strikes. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who was under pressure from the 
Russian Duma and was potentially facing impeachment, used the air strikes as a 
means to deflect attention away from his domestic problems and ultimately withdrew 
the Russian Ambassadors temporarily from both Britain and the United States as a 
political gesture. Spurred by his domestic political concerns, Yeltsin highlighted the 
US and British air strikes as an illegal action and pressed for the lifting of UN 
sanctions towards Iraq. 161 Clearly, the US position of multilaterally containing Iraq 
through the United Nations had become virtually untenable in the aftermath of 
Operation Desert Fox. 
With the unravelling of the sanctions policy in the United Nations, Saddam Hussain 
raised the stakes by declaring that he no longer recognised the northern and southern 
no-fly zones on the basis on their illegality under international law. Hussain's 
calculation resulted in a sustained war of attrition, which ultimately further degraded 
his air defence capability. 162 
The French Ambassador to the United Nations, Alain Dejammet, recommended 
altering the current system of requiring Iraq to account for its stockpiles towards one 
which prevented Iraq from acquiring new stockpiles of weapons of mass 
destruction. 163 The problem for the United States in accepting this position, 
according to State Department spokesman James P. Rubin, was that "Iraq should not 
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be liberated from the sanctions until it rids itself of all weapons of mass 
destruction. "' 64 With the United States proving unwilling to lift sanctions until Iraq 
had verified the destruction of its weapons, the French proposal was not adopted. 
Similarly, Russia issued its own proposal on 15 January, which stated that "the 
embargo could be lifted once the council receives a report from an assessment team 
on the status of Iraqi cooperation on disarmament and decides to start the monitoring 
system. "165 Clinton's counter-proposal, which proved equally unsatisfactory, was to 
"allow Baghdad to borrow against a UN escrow fund to buy food and medicine, 
encourage humanitarian contributions to Iraq, and strengthen UNICEF and other UN 
programs already on the ground. " 166 The US proposal was in essence an extension of 
the oil-for-food programme. Iraq however rejected this proposal as Iraq's Trade 
Minister, Medhi Saleh, stated that "Iraq will not accept anything short of a 
comprehensive lifting of the unfair embargo. "167 
Given the conjecture already discussed regarding the unlikelihood that Iraq could 
actually account for its prohibited weapons, it seems that the French and Russian 
proposals were a more realistic means of containing Iraq's potential long term threat 
whilst maintaining the international consensus towards Iraq. Therefore, whilst 
Clinton's decision to insist on Iraq fully accounting for its stockpiles before the 
sanctions could be lifted was, strictly speaking, a legitimate course of action in the 
light of Iraq's legal obligations, it was not a realistic policy position. However, given 
that the United States was committed to regime change, the permission of Iraq to 
have sanctions lifted would have increased the regimes economic position, thus 
making it more secure. Therefore, in keeping with the US strategy of regime change 
towards Iraq, Washington demonstrated an unwillingness to lift sanctions regardless 
of whether Iraq could actually account for its prohibited weapons. 
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With the impasse in the Security Council, coupled with Baghdad's unwillingness to 
co-operate, UN inspections within Iraq remained suspended for the remainder of 
Clinton's second term of office. The strategic priority, however, rested clearly on the 
promotion of regime change. Under the terms of the Iraq Liberation Act, USS97 
million was allocated to insurgent groups operating within Iraq, with the objective 
being to effect regime change. This policy was notably criticised by General 
Anthony Zinni, Commander of US Forces in the Persian Gulf, as not being a realistic 
policy option. 169 Zinni commented "I will be honest. I don't see an opposition group 
that has the viability to overthrow Saddam at this point. i169 Given the high number of 
competing opposition groups, it seems likely that Zinni's assessment was indeed 
correct. Martin Indyk's comments that "[i]t will take time and hard work, " and that 
"a lot more will be done behind the scenes than will be noticeable publicly, at least at 
first, " thus seem an accurate assessment of the situation. 170 
The Clinton administration refrained from providing the opposition groups with 
military help as, according to James Rubin, the United States was "not prepared to 
take action that is premature or that puts people's lives needlessly at risk... [t]here are 
a number of steps that have to be taken before we're in a position to provide lethal 
assistance. "171 By the end of the second Clinton administration, just under US$2 
million of the allocated amount had been spent by the Pentagon. It was only in the 
final week of the Clinton administration that a plan for distributing a US$25 million 
Congressional aid package to further the efforts of opposition movements was 
formulated. This was an aid package in addition to the US$97 million provided for 
under the Iraq Liberation Act, of which only US$5 million had been allocated. But 
the Clinton administration was obligated into formulating a distribution plan for the 
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US$25 million aid package as Congress had incorporated it into the federal aid 
budget: 172 
As a reflection of continued congressional support for the overthrow 
effort, a provision of the FY2001 foreign aid appropriation (H. R. 
4811, P. L. 106-429, signed November 6,2000) earmarked US$25 
million in ESF for "programs benefiting the Iraqi people, " of which at 
least: USS12 million was for the INC to distribute humanitarian aid 
inside Iraq; US$6 million was for INC broadcasting; and US$2 
million was for war crimes issues. According to the appropriation the 
remaining US$5 million could be used to aid the seven groups eligible 17 
to receive assistance under the ILA. 173 
The Republican Congress was thus clearly pressing for Iraqi opposition groups to be 
assisted in order to effect regime change within Baghdad. Therefore, on a domestic 
political level, the Bush administration came to power with strong political support 
within Congress for the terms of the Iraq Liberation Act to be fulfilled. 
Overall, given the impasse at the United Nations, Clinton's tactical policy of 
intrusive inspections and sanctions, whilst pursuing a regime change strategy, lay in 
tatters. Multilateral support for the sanctions had virtually disappeared in the 
aftermath of Operation Desert Fox. The continued application of sanctions, which 
were a highly watered down version of their original inception, only remained active 
through the safeguard of a potential US veto. Although Clinton's policy had officially 
reverted towards regime change, given the fractured state of the opposition 
movements (which was to a certain extent a product of Clinton's unsuccessful covert 
efforts at inducing regime change), the prospect of a credible armed insurgency was 
remote indeed. 
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4.5 Summary Assessment 
Clinton's official policy towards Iraq up until 1998 was for the application of 
sanctions until a full compliance with UN resolutions was achieved: this allowed for 
potential reconciliation once the sanctions had been lifted. This policy, however, 
served the US national interest as it allowed for a multilateral containment of Iraq 
which catered for Persian Gulf security. Comparatively, the strategy of George H. W. 
Bush's administration towards Iraq differed by way of it being centred on 
containment as a means of controlling potential threats until regime change had 
occurred, ruling out any prospect of reconciliation. Whilst the pursuit of regime 
change was a policy option, it is strategically incompatible with the reconciliation 
through containment approach. 
It was not until October 1998, with the signing into law of the Iraq Liberation Act, 
that US policy officially reverted to the strategy of the previous Bush administration: 
containment until regime change occurred. Given the covert pursuit of regime 
change prior to this and its incompatibility with the containment leading to 
reconciliation path, the question of what exactly was Clinton's strategy towards Iraq 
prior to October 1998 is clearly justified. 
Clinton's policy towards Iraq has almost uniformly been described as pursuing 
inconsistent and incompatible objectives. Indeed, Henry Kissinger accuses Clinton's 
policy towards Iraq of having lacked strategic clarity. This study has shown this 
perspective to be wanting as Clinton's duplicitous strategy of striving for 
incompatible objectives was more politically and strategically sophisticated than the 
current body of scholarship would have us believe. As already discussed, Clinton did 
not conceive a normalization of relations with Iraq as being possible while Saddam 
Hussain was in power but, nevertheless, had to balance the logic of pursuing an 
official regime change strategy against the long term need for the maintenance of 
international support for the multilateral sanctions based policy. The problem facing 
Clinton was that the adoption of an official regime change policy would have most 
likely fractured the support base of the multilateral sanctions based policy, rendering 
it wholly ineffective. Indeed, Robert Kagan comments that the "rehabilitation and 
reintegration of Saddam Hussain's Iraq" was precisely what most of Washington's 
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allies in Europe sought. 174 Clinton's strategy was, therefore, sophisticated in that it 
catered for this disparity by being officially committed to reconciliation, 175 after a 
full Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions had occurred, whilst covertly pursuing 
regime change. Clinton's duplicitous strategy thus received the benefit of 
international legitimacy through multilateralism whilst covertly a classic realpolitik 
strategy, reflecting the US national interest, was pursued. Indeed, it has been shown 
that Clinton refrained from supporting an armed military insurgency to unseat 
Saddam Hussain, preferring an internal coup d'etat, as a result of the potential risks it 
may have had on the territorial integrity of Iraq and the geopolitical stability of the 
Persian Gulf. Therefore, Clinton's strategy was for regime change, but not at the 
expense of an armed insurgency or military invasion, which could have impacted 
upon US strategic interests in the wider Persian Gulf. 
The uprisings in 1991 and the continual stream of defections that followed made an 
internal coup seem likely. Clinton continued the application of multilateral 
containment in order to control the threat Iraq posed to regional security. With Iraq 
facing the key issue of verifying the destruction of its prohibited weapons, the 
prospect of a long term necessity for sanctions was realistic. However, the sanctions 
also served the tactical role of weakening the regime of Saddam Hussain, both 
economically and militarily, making it more susceptible to a coup d'etat. 
The strategic objective of the Clinton administration towards Iraq was therefore 
premised on regime change from the offset, and its duplicitous commitment towards 
Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions was very much a tactical policy geared 
towards the continual multilateral containment of Iraq. The significance of this is that 
the US strategy towards Iraq during the Clinton administrations did not alter from its 
original inception in the previous Bush administration in 1991. Kissinger and others 
are therefore mistaken to assume that Clinton's strategy towards Iraq lacked clarity: 
it was in fact a policy which maintained a consistent strategic objective and was 
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r 
sophisticated in that it used tactical measures as a means of achieving a greater 
degree of international legitimacy. Moreover, it used containment as a means of 
controlling the threat posed by Saddam until a coup d'etat, which was favourable to 
Washington, had occurred. 176 
Therefore, it was with the adoption of the Iraq Liberation Act and the collapse of the 
multilateral containment after Operation Desert Fox, that Clinton's tactical and 
covert strategic policies had ultimately failed by December 1998, resulting in the 
forced reversion by Congress to the Bush administrations official policy of reime 
change. By January 2001, Clinton's policy towards Iraq throughout his two terms of 
office had thus been consistent in its overall strategic objective of pursuing regime 
change through the only politically viable method of achieving this result: a coup 
d'etat. What can be interpreted from Clinton's policy is that his tactical policy of 
multilateral containment had ultimately failed. For Gulf security, there was also the 
strategic failure of achieving regime change, not as a result of a policy mistake by 
Clinton, rather a product of the effectiveness of Iraq's security forces and the 
inability of the western intelligence agencies to effectively operate within Iraq. 
5.0 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN 1993-2001 
By 1993, bilateral relations with Iran remained chequered by both historical and 
contemporary differences. For the United States, one of the main issues hampering a 
rapprochement concerned Iran's continual opposition towards the Arab-Israeli peace 
process both rhetorically and substantively. In addition, its conventional military 
capability and alleged efforts to acquire a nuclear arsenal served as active barriers 
towards the goal of reconciliation. On a geostrategic level, Iran was seen by the 
United States as posing a potential threat to US allies in the Persian Gulf and also 
towards the freedom of the seas through its potential ability to disrupt shipping 
access through the Strait of Hormuz. 
176 Not withstanding an armed invasion of Iraq to enact regime change, containment was seen as a 
requirement by Washington as a means of controlling the threats Iraq potentially posed the region 
until either regime change or its full compliance with UN resolutions was achieved. 
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The mutual hostility between Iran and the United States does not, however, 
correspond with their overlapping interests. '77 On a geostrategic level, politically and 
strategically important areas flag Iran's borders. Its large oil reserves coupled with its 
large deposits of natural gas clearly indicates Iran has great importance for the global 
economy. Moreover, its role as the most populous Shi'a country gives it a special 
role in Islamic jurisprudence. For Iran, trade relations with the United States have the 
potential for rapid economic development and regional ascendancy. Although co- 
operative relations potentially possessed the prospect of fulfilling such mutual 
interests and benefits, relations since 1979 were very much void of being built on 
such grounds. 
The foreign relations of the United States and Iran in the time period 1993-01 is 
remarkable in that their respective foreign policies appeared to have mutually 
reinforced the others and thus lessened the prospects of substantive diplomacy. 
Whilst it is outside the context of this thesis to examine what factors actually 
determined Iran's foreign policy, this thesis does show that the impact of Iran's 
foreign policies on its bilateral relationship with the United States has served to 
prevent a rapprochement from occurring. Indeed, from the United States point of 
view, Iran's unwillingness to moderate its sponsorship of terrorist organizations, in 
addition to its vocal opposition to the peace process, has fuelled Congressional 
legislation against Iran. This is important because it created a domestic political 
environment within the United States which makes any `softening' of US policy a 
politically charged option for the executive. 
Overall, this analysis will show that the Clinton administration sought a moderation 
in Iran's policies in order to achieve a degree of reconciliation. Without this, Iran 
was seen as posing a direct threat to Persian Gulf security. For reasons outside the 
scope of this thesis, Iran did not moderate its policies to a level which could have 
made reciprocal measures by the executive a credible political option. Indeed, Iran's 
policies served as a means by which interest groups were able to mobilize support for 
a punitive containment of Iran through unilateral sanctions. This will be shown to 
177 Zbigniew Brzezinski, et al., Iran: Time for a New Approach (Washington D. C.: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2004), 9. 
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have restricted the options available to the executive and, in essence, usurped the 
foreign policy prerogative of the President. Nevertheless, the thesis will contend that 
Iran's failure or inability to moderate its provocative foreign policies resulted in a 
deepening of the bilateral hostility. It is conceded, however, that it is reasonable to 
assume that some aspects of Iranian foreign policy were, to a certain extent, a 
reaction to the unilateral measures enacted by Congress. 
5.1 Domestic Political Context 
Whilst it is outside the scope of this study to give a detailed analytical account of 
Iranian domestic and structural factors that have affected its own foreign policy 
towards the United States, the general end product will be highlighted as it is 
germane to understanding the constraints US foreign policy towards Iran faced in the 
time period of this study. 
The CIA's involvement in overthrowing Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, coupled 
with the support of Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, were very significant historical 
grievances for Iran. However, the Revolution itself did not immediately mark the 
onset of bilateral hostility, but rather it was the decision to allow the Shah into the 
United States for medical treatment which triggered a domestic backlash against 
America. The resulting seizure of the United States Embassy and the popular support 
it received, allowed for what Said Amir Arjomand has classified as a "clerical coup 
d'etat. " 78 This saw the radical clerics ultimately extend their power over the 
moderates and any remaining areas of the Iranian government and military. The 
resulting effect was that the Islamic Revolution became self-legitimising through it 
being defined as diametrically opposed to the United States and the West. Even with 
the accession of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to the Presidency following the death 
of Ayatollah Khomeini, these constraints arguably thwarted his efforts at detente. 
Therefore, there were significant domestic and institutional contextual factors within 
178 Qtd in Robert Snyder, The United States and Iran: Analysing the Structural Impediments to .1 
Rapprochement (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2001) 11. 
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Iran which made a rapprochement with the United States an arduous policy 
quagmire. 
Similarly, in the United Staues, historical relations have had an institutional bearing 
on its foreign policy toward, Iran. As has already been discussed, the embassy 
hostage crisis and Iran's implication in terrorist attacks against the United States and 
Israel have been highly significant issues that have had a bearing on US foreign 
policy. 
Domestically, Iran was generally portrayed in the \Vestern media as a pariah nation 
inherently linked with terrorism. With images of Iranians chanting 'Death to 
America! ' after a religious sermon and occasional bunnngs of the US and Israeli 
flags, generally speaking, little distinction was usually made in the media between 
the ruling theocracy's supporters as compared with the wider diversity in Iranian 
civil society and even within the government itself. Nevertheless, the Mullahs' 
attempts to gain legitimacy amongst their supporters both rhetorically and 
substantively through their opposition towards the United States, clear pressures 
were forced onto the US foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, although American 
domestic perception of Iranian policies are important in evaluating domestic support 
for US foreign policy, in the case of the construction of US foreign policy towards 
Iran, the actions of Congress has shown itself to be particularly instrumental in 
determining this. 
A central issue to understanding the driving force of Congressional impingement on 
US relations with Iran has been the role of special interest groups. With Iran's hostile 
position towards Israel. Jewish group; have played a key role in lobbying for the 
adoption of a pro-Israeli policy. Given Iran's hostile rhetoric and its alleged support 
for terrorist attacks against Israel, meant that pro-Israeli interest groups generally 
categorised Iran as a clear and present 
danger. 
The umbrella organisation for the Jewish lobbies is the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (All'AC). Although US legislation prevents Israel from directly 
X77 Snyder. The United State-; ind bait 10.25. 
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providing funding or acting as a client of AIPAC, "Israel is the deg facto client of 
several Jewish lobbies: it is with its interests alone that they are concerned. "180 
Although there are several diverse pro-Jewish lobbies, they act in a fairly coordinated 
manner: 
Many AIPAC groups (anmong them the American Jewish Congress 
and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith) have their own 
representatives in Washington. AIPAC has close working relations 
with other Jewish organisations, some of which are represented on 
its board. It also advises numerous Jewish PAC's across the United 
States. 181 
The Jewish lobby is, along with the National Rifle Association, one of the ['lost 
influential and successful special interest groups in the United States. 
They yield a 
great deal of influence within Congress and their ability to have some 
bearing on 
Congressional voting is an important consideration in any evaluation of US policy 
that either directly or indirectly concerns Israel. 
In addition to lobbyist groups, domestic voting blocks are also an 
important 
consideration. The so called 'Jewish vote' is significant in some areas such as 
New 
York and sonn: North Eastern areas of the United States, but with there being 
in the 
region of 6 million Jewish individuals in the United States, they are a clear voting 
tninority. 142 However, it is worthwhile distinguishing the 'Jewish vote' from the 
'pro-Jewish vote, ' which stems mainly from diverse conservative Christian 
communities. Indeed, Clinton's election campaign pronouncements on the Middle 
East were noted for being very supportive of the Israeli state. Whilst this can likely 
be accounted for by his genuine affinity towards the Israeli state and the Jewish 
people, 
183 it also indirectly served the political purpose of catering for the significant 
American Christian and Jewish voting blocks. 
Nigel Bowles, The Government and Politics of the United titan:, Comparative Government and 
Politics. (Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1993) 227. 
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Although these factors are significant in varying degrees, it is important to recognise 
that the Contextual issues external to the United States are germane to understanding 
their own objectives towards US relations with Iran in the time period of this study. 
Raymond "Panter has argued that Israeli national politics are linked with direction of 
A1PAC's lobbying on the US Congress following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. 
Tanter maintains that AIPAC shifted its focus towards Iran following the defeat of 
the Likud party in Israeli national elections in 1992. "; 1k suggests that as a result of 
AIPAC being in effect linked with the Likud, its defeat at the Israeli elections 
lessened AIPAC's influence within the Congressional Balls of power. He goes on to 
say that by AIPAC immediately shifting its focus onto Iran, it was able to use this as 
a means of maintaining its influence within Washington following the defeat of the 
Likud. "5 
tviclitionally, many critics saw the Clinton administration as having all inherent pro- 
Israeli character of its own on account of the sizeable number of Jewish individuals 
that were present within it. Flossein Alikhani argues that within Clinton's, National 
Security Council; seven out of eleven of its most senior Directors were Jewish, along 
with a large number of senior individuals within the White I louse and State 
Department. This indicates that there was all inherent pro-Israeli bias from the offset 
in Clinton's adill ill istrat ion. Whilst Alikhani's argument has some merit, it should be 
viewed with caution as it is not methodologically feasible to measure its effect on US 
policy. However, it is reasonable to conclude that it was a factor that potentially 
fostered a degree of bias within the administration towards Israel. 
x. 1.1 Iran-Iraq Arm, Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 
During tile course of tiic: Iran-Iraqi War, the military presence of the United States had 
progressively increased in the region as a means. of securing its allies and to ensure 
the unrestricted supply of oil. Given the state of relations since the Islamic 
haymond Tantcr, flcýguc kc imr. _I_rrnrijm ; rout f'mlifcr. uioll (Ba. imgstoke: \lacmillan. 1999) 
55-57. 
t'S Tanter, flair K viimr. 56. 
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Revolution, the increased US military presence in the Persian Gulf was 
understandably seen by Tehran as a real threat to its national security. Coupled with 
this were its aggressive neighbour Iraq and its historical suspicion of Russia through 
its borders stretching from Afghanistan to the states on the Caspian 
basin. Given the 
threats Iran perceived, coupled with its conventional military 
forces being 
significantly degraded following its war with Iraq, it understandably saw a strategic 
need to rebuild its armed forces. 
As Iran was not self-sufficient in domestic weaponry production, it undertook a 
concerted effort to rebuild its angled forces from overseas sources. Iran's decision to 
increase the size of its armed forces in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War was 
strategically provocative to Washington oll account of the risk this potentially posed 
to US interests in the Persian Gulf and towards Israel. However, the availability of 
armaments had been curtailed as a result of the actions of successive US 
administrations since 1979. The view held by the majority 
in Congress and in US 
Policy circles ill general, was that post-revolutionary 
Iran posed a threat to US 
interests in the Middle East, and thus its armaments and military procurement should 
be restricted. As a result of the conditions oll the supply of conventional weapons, 
there was little choice frohe whom Tehran could actually enter into supply 
relationships with. The most notable military arms and technological suppliers 
in the 
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, proved to be Russia, China and North Korea. 
t ' 
Iran's relations with Russia had historically been characterised by hostility and 
stttipicion. t*47 I lowever, a thaw in relations occurred in February 1989 following a 
meeting between Ayatollah Khomeini and the Soviet Foreign Minister Edouard 
Shevanlººadze. This ultimately developed into a military and nuclear technology 
trade agreement following the visit to Moscow by the Speaker of the Iranian 
Parliament, Ali Akbar I lashemi-Rafsanjani, in June 1989. 
"" The Czech Republic and Poland %kcrc also countrics that tr. tdcti arms with Iran. 
111 Krnncth Katzman, "Iran: Arms anti Technology AClluicitioni. CRS Report for Co reis, (97- 
47.31F). Washington. D. C.: CRS, Congress, 22 Jun. 1995. Gpp.. 01/43/03 
<http: llwwýý, gtobal+rcurity. urg/ýýmd1lit tart'/rePt lt/C1S197 -lld. htnu. 
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The US led liberation of Kuwait in 1991 had important ramifications on Russia's 
influence in the Persian Gulf. The United States forged close political and military 
relations with the GCC countries, which effectively closed off the market to Russian 
arms manufacturers. It seems clear that, despite their poor historical relations, 
Russia's need for capital and Iran's need for armaments thus allowed both countries 
to develop their bilateral relations based on mutual interests. Geo-politics also 
accounts for the Russian-Iranian anus co-operation following the break-up of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. It has also been speculated that the supply of armaments to 
Iran has allowed Russia to control the spread of revolutionary Islam on its borders. Iss 
During the Clinton Presidency, Russia's arms trade with Iran did have ramification 
oll Moscow's bilateral relations with the United States. Such was the degree to which 
the Clinton administration viewed Iran's procurement of Russian armaments and 
technology, Clinton raised it as a serious concern with President Yeltsin at their 
Summit n1Cetings. 
t. 4t) Clinton made Russia's acceptance into the multilateral export 
trading control relationship, the Waasenaar Agreen1Cnt. 
t dependent upon Russia not 
to concluding any new arms agreements with Tehran. following the 1995 Clinton- 
Yeltsin summit meeting, Russia bowed to American pressure and agreed not to 
conclude any new arn1S agreements with Iran. t" 
China was also willing to provide armaments and technology to Iran in spite of US 
pressures to the contrary. 192 Following a visit to Bejing in 1985 by Ali Akbar 
f lashcmi-Rafsanjani, Iran entered into an armament trading relationship with the 
People's Republic. ' 93 A range of advanced conventional weapons were purchased by 
Katzman. "Iran: Amts anrt't'celmology Acquisitions. " 
'Iia Clinton-Ycltsin Summits wcrc held in: Vancouver. 1993; \Va+hini tun R. C. 199.1; and Moscow 
1995. 
1A) The \\'a: ncnaar Aýgre ntcnt is the succcs, or to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls. 
t't Clinton. My Life 65.1-56. 
John Calabrese, "China and the Persian Gulf: [: ncrg; y and Sccutit ", " %liddle Fail Journal 52.2 
(199x): 265. 
t') For a further details on Iran's procurement of comcntional %%capons from China, sec: Kenneth 
Katzman. "Iran: Military Relations with China, " CRS Kcix)rtfor Cotjvrrc: c, (96-572). \\'a: hin^ton. 
D. C.: CRS, Congress, 26 Jun. 1996, l3pp. 
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Iran, including alleged assistance for Iran's Sid/rob missile programme. I lowever, the 
main focus of Sino-Iranian conventional arms trade concentrated on advanced anti- 
ship missiles. Iran entered into an agreement to purchase the sophisticated Chinese 
manufactured Silkworm surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles. This represented a 
strategic escalation in Iran's military capability. This was ultimately realised in the 
final stages of the Iran-Iraq War when Iran used Silkworm missiles at US escorted 
oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and also at Kuwait oil installations. 
The trade in armaments between China and Iran does seem to have been motivated 
by commercial interests on the part of China: specifically revenue from the arms 
trade and also the regular supply of oil from Iran. China's willingness to supply Iran 
with arms and technology did prove to be a point of contention in US-Sino bilateral 
relations. It has been suggested that this is a 'tit for tat' strategy by Beijing in 
response to US military support for Taiwan. 194 
Similarly, Iran has engaged in a range of military and technological procurement 
from North Korea. 195 The focus of the relationship is, however, concentrated on 
ballistic missile technology. North Korea has allegedly sold Iran Scud and North 
Korean manufactured Nodonng and Tapeo-Doug surface-to-surface missiles, in 
addition to technology for Iran's own Shihab surface-to-surface missile project. 
1w' 
North Korea's sale of military technology did have an impact on its own bilateral 
relationship with the United States, but in terms of US-Iranian relations, its 
proliferating ballistic missile stockpile, together with the development of longer 
range Shihab rockets, 197 served to further aggravate bilateral relations. Indeed. Iran's 
19' Katzman, "Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions. " 
195 For a further details on Iran's procurement of conventional weapons from North Korea see 
Kenneth Katzman and Rinn-Sup Shinn, "North Korea: Military Relations with the Middle, " CRS 
Report for Congress, (95-75-F), Washington, D. C.: CRS, Congress, 23 Jun. 1994, l9pp., 
t'6 For a detailed study on Iran's ballistic missile programme sec Andrew Feickert, "Iran's Ballistic 
Missile Program, " CRS Report for Congress, (RS2154S). Washington, D. C.: CRS, Congress, 23 Aug. 
2004,6pp., 12/02/05 <http: //fpc. state. gov/documents/organizationt39332. pdf>. 
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missile proliferation compounded fears within Israel for its own national security, 198 
which in turn had an impact on the US foreign policy agenda. 
In the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the level of Congressional 
dissatisfaction towards Iran was being aggravated by Iran's procurement of such 
weaponry and also that the United States was one of Iran's major trading partners. 
By early 1992, with the dissatisfaction of the Department of Commerce's export 
licensing towards a proliferating Iran: Congress was prompted into adopting the Iran- 
Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992.199 Proposed by Senator John McCain and 
Senator Alfonse D'Amato, the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 suspended 
the ability of the United States government to, engage in trade with Iran; issue 
trading licences; and provide economic and technical assistance. It specifically 
placed restrictions on entities trading in advanced conventional weapons of a type or 
size that would have a destabilising impact on the region. Moreover, it prohibited the 
trade in technology that could assist Iran's unconventional weapons programmes. 
This legislation was also extra territorial in that it extended these provisions to 
foreign states and companies. An important factor of this Act, which subsequently 
had a bearing on the Clinton administration, was that it did not quantify what 
constituted, "destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons. "20° 
This later provided the Clinton administration with some degree of latitude in 
implementing the Act. However, the legislation had no bearing on Russian transfers 
of armaments to Iran as it was not enacted retrospectively over previously signed 
arms agreements. 
It is important at this point to recognise that the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation 
Act of 1992 was very much a Congressional response towards the problems posed by 
Iran and was the, "most restrictive legislation passed against Iran since 1980. ' 201 
This legislation, sponsored by the Republican Senators McCain and D'Amato, was 
198 Thomas W. Lippman, "Israel Presses U. S. To Sanction Russian Missile Firms Aiding Iran, " 
Washington Post 25 Sept. 1997, A31. 
'99 Alikhani, Sanctioniniz Iran 63. 
200 The Iran-Iraq Non Proliferation Act of 1992. 
201 Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran 164. 
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not welcomed by the Bush administration as it was seen as subjugating the 
Constitutional authority of the President to construct US foreign policy. President 
Bush notably commented that: 
I am particularly concerned about provisions that purport to derogate 
the President's authority under the Constitution to conduct US foreign 
policy, including negotiation with other countries... Consistent with 
my responsibilities under the Constitution for the conduct of 
diplomatic negotiations, and with established practice, I will construe 
these provisions to be precatory rather than mandatory. 
202 
Nevertheless, the signing into law of this Act did have a direct bearing on US policy 
as Washington began to further their efforts to enlist the co-operation of allied 
nations to restrict their exports to Iran, 
203 and marked the onset of a clear unilateral 
containment strategy towards Iran. 
5.2 Clinton's Foreign Policy Objectives Towards Iran 
With the onset of the Clinton Presidency, Robert Pelletreau, the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near East Affairs, outlined the objective of the administration towards 
Iran as being geared towards altering Iran's behaviour with respect to five key areas: 
1. Its quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and the 
means for their delivery. 
2. The continued involvement of the Iranian government in terrorism 
and assassination worldwide. 
3. Its support for violent opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
4. Iran's threats and subversive activities against its neighbours. 
5. Its dismal human rights record at home. 04 
202 Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran 164. 
203 Ibid 165. 
204 United States, House. Foreign Affairs Committee. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 
Developments in the Middle East, 105th Cong., Sess. 2nd, (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 01 Mar. 1994). 
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Importantly however, Pelletreau made it clear that a resumption of relations was an 
objective, but would very much depend on such activities being curtailed. Pelletreau 
commented: 
Our policy is not aimed at changing the Iranian government, but at 
inducing Iran to change its behaviour in these areas. We are prepared to 
enter into dialogue with authorised representatives of the Iranian 
, government to 
discuss the differences between us. We seek to persuade 
Iran that it cannot expect to enjoy normal state-to-state relations so long 
as it violates basic standards of international behaviour. This means 
working with other countries to deny Iran access to technology, new 
credits, and other means by which it can facilitate the pursuit of policies 
of destabilization, terrorism and acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction. 205 
5.3 Congressional Usurpation of Foreign Policy 
Although the Clinton administration was fortunate to come to power with a 
Democrat controlled Congress, following the 1994-midterm elections the Republican 
Party gained control of both Houses of Congress. The loss of Democrat control over 
congress is highly significant for two distinct reasons: 
1. The end of the Cold War signalled the end of the overarching global grand 
strategy geared towards the containment against the Soviet Union. With the 
loss of a clear strategy, Congress inevitably lost its general bipartisan 
approach towards foreign policy. When this is considered along with the 
administration's loss of partisan control over Congress, Clinton was facing a 
clear obstacle in the conduct of his foreign policy. 
2. As a result of the end of a general bipartisan approach towards foreign policy 
and the context of a Democrat Presidency, the Republicans within Congress 
inevitably adopted the strategy of being reactive to domestic political 
concerns on foreign issues as a means of garnering wider political support. 
205 United States, House. Foreign Affairs Committee. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 
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This translated into interest groups receiving a much wider political voice 
within Congress. 
The interplay of the political forces from interest groups and Congressional politics 
had been a constant source of pressure on the Clinton administration since the 
conception of the dual containment strategy. By March 1994, AIPAC released its 
highly influential policy document: Comprehensive US Sanctions against Iran: A 
Plan for Action. '206 The 76-page document outlined a strategy to combat Iran through 
a variety of means. AIPAC also lobbied "strenuously for a total trade embargo and 
for a secondary boycott of foreign companies trading with Iran. , 
207 But it was as a 
result of Senator D'Amato adopting this strategy that ultimately saw Congress force 
it onto the US foreign policy agenda. 
D'Amato, a fiercely pro-Israeli Republican Senator from New York, had a large 
Jewish constituency and was seen by many as a champion of AIPAC. Indeed, 
Senator D'Amato and AIPAC had a longstanding relationship as the organisation 
allegedly deterred potential Democrat candidates from running against him in his 
1986 re-election bid. 208 At the end of January 1995, D'Amato tabled in the Senate: 
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act of 1995209 Indeed, D'Amato's proposed bill 
was inherently linked with AIPAC as, according to Keith Weissman, AIPAC's Chief 
Middle East Analyst, it was AIPAC who actually wrote the proposed legislation. 
Drawing from AIPAC's 1994 strategy paper on comprehensive sanctions against 
Iran, 210 D'Amato's proposed legislation called for a prohibition on: 
I. Any transfer in the currency exchange of Iran. 
206 American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, Comprehensive US Sanctions against Iran: A Plan for 
Action (Washington D. C.: AIPAC, 1994) 1-72. 
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2. The transfer of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any 
banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments 
involve interest of Iran or thereof. 
3. The importing from, or exporting to, Iran of currencies or securities. 
4. Any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, 
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or 
exercising any right, power or privilege with respect to, or any 112 
transaction involving, any property in which Iran or any national 
thereof has any interest; by any person, or with respect to any 
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
5. The licensing for export to Iran, or for export to any other country 
for re-export to Iran, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States of any item or technology controlled in the Export 
administration Act of 1954. 
6. The importation into the United States of any good or service which 
is, in whole or in part, grown, produced, manufactured, extracted, or 
processed in Iran. 211 
Clearly, D'Amato's proposed legislation was comprehensive and a large escalation 
in US unilateral sanctions towards Iran. Although it was very much based on the 
framework of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, it added additional provisions that 
made it potentially the most restrictive legislation against a foreign country by the 
United States. 
In the interim period before D'Amato's bill received a hearing in the Senate, pressure 
on the Clinton administration mounted as Republican Representative Peter King 
tabled a bill in the House that was identical to D'Amato's. With it being clear that 
sanctions would be implemented, the Iranian National Oil Company (INOC) 
concluded a US$1 billion contract with US oil giant Conoco, to develop the Sirri-A 
and Sirri-E oil fields. The conclusion of the agreement does indicate a political 
21 1 United States, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act. 
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opening from Iran, 212 but as a result of the political situation within Congress, it is 
doubtful that it would have been politically feasible for the administration to pursue 
such an avenue at that time. 
The conclusion of the INOC-Conoco oil agreement serves to highlight the 
inconsistency of the dual containment strategy: on the one hand, the US$1 billion 
agreement was lawful, but on the other, it ran contrary to the stated objectives and 
spirit of the containment strategy. Given this inconsistency, conflicting remarks 
emerged from the administration on the agreement. 213 Whilst the White House 
appeared to condone the agreement by stating that it was legal, Secretary of State 
Christopher unequivocally condemned the agreement as inconsistent with the 
interests and policies of the United States. 214 
The response of the Clinton administration to this politically damaging situation was 
in effect to implement many of the provisions of D'Amato's bill in order to regain 
lost political ground and to be seen as responsive to the INOC-Conoco Agreement. 
On 15 March 1995, Clinton issued Executive Order 12957, which basically 
precluded the Conoco deal: 
1. [T]he entry into or performance by a United State person of the 
entry into or performance by an entity owned or controlled by a 
United States person, of (i) a contract that includes overall 
supervision and management responsibility for the development of 
petroleum resources located in Iran, or (ii) a guaranty of another 
person's performance under such a contract. 
2. [T]he entry into or performance by a United States person of the 
entry into or performance by an entity owned or controlled by a 
United States person, of (i) a contract for financing of the 
212 Elaine Sciolino, "Iranian Leader Says US Move on Oil Deal Wrecked Chances to Improve Ties, " 
New York Times 16 May 1995, AS. 
213 Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran 182. 
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development of petroleum resources located in Iran, or (ii) a 
guaranty of another person's performance under such a contract. 
3. [A]ny transaction by any United States person or within the United 
States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or 
avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in 
the Order. 215 
The Clinton administration, however, opposed the D'Amato bill, which was heard at 
the Senate on 16 March 1994, as it felt that milder sanctions were more appropriate, 
especially given the difficulties in applying unilateral sanctions. 
216 Given this 
opposition, D'Amato introduced the Iran Foreign Sanctions Act of 1995, dubbed 
D'Amato II by AIPAC, it went even further than his previous bill. The bill was 
designed to be extra-territorial in jurisdiction, whereby any foreign firm that trades 
with Iran would be subject to sanctions. Compounding this, identical legislation was 
introduced in the House by Republican King, with the caveat that a sanctioned 
foreign entity that had traded with Iran would not be able to trade at all within the 
United States. In effect, the combined nature of the bills potentially called for a 
foreign entity to choose to trade either with the United States, or with Iran. 
The bills were subject to a great deal of criticism as a result of the impact they would 
have had on US multilateral relations. Gary Sick highlights that the legislation, if 
enacted, would result in: 
[A] blizzard of Presidential waivers will be required... making a travesty 
of the legislative process and clogging the courts with frivolous 
litigation... corporate lawyers and entrepreneurs with a taste for complex 
legal dodges will have a field day, creating a swamp of evasive corruption 
and thriving business for eager prosecutors. 
17 
Both bills received public backing from AIPAC, as well as from the influential 
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). It should have been clear to 
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Clinton that the wise words of Senator William Fulbright in 1973 on how the Israelis 
actually control the Senate were indeed the case. 218 
Clinton was therefore faced with a clear dilemma that if he opposed the bills it would 
have been very politically damaging to his administration and thus to the Democrats 
in Congress. Clinton was thus left with little political choice. The administration's 
response was to steal the initiative yet again and propose the policy as its own, before 
the Senate and House voted on the D'Amato-King bills. With Clinton aiming to 
regain his domestic position with the pro-Jewish electoral factions, he duly 
announced his new policy undertaking at none other than a World Jewish Congress 
dinner, whilst wearing a yarmulke. Clinton stated: 
I am formally announcing my intention to cut off all trade and 
investment with Iran and to suspend nearly all other economic activity 
between our nations. This is not a step I take lightly, but I am convinced 
that instituting a trade embargo with Iran is the most effective way our 
Nation can help to curb that nation's drive to acquire devastating 
weapons and its continued support for terrorism... In my discussions 
with President Yeltsin and with the G-7 leaders in Halifax in June, I 
will urge other countries to take similar or parallel actions. I do want 
you to know that I do oppose the suggestion some have made that we 
impose a secondary boycott and prohibit foreign firms doing business 
with Iran from doing business with the United States. I don't agree with 
that. I think that decision would cause unnecessary strain with our allies 
at a time when we need our friends' co-operations. 219 
Clinton therefore proposed implementing tighter sanctions on trade with Iran, but 
went short of the D'Amato-King bills that called for sanctioning foreign entities that 
traded with Iran. D'Amato described the policy as "a foreign corporation or person 
will have to choose between trade with the United States and trade with Iran. "22° His 
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proposals were, however, commensurate with the dual containment strategy doctrine, 
but Clinton made it clear that he did not support a secondary application of sanctions 
against foreign entities because of the detrimental impact this would have had on US 
multilateral relations. Given that Clinton's official policy towards Iraq relied on 
multilateral support, it was commensurate with US interests to refrain from 
provocative foreign policies. 
Adding to Executive Order 12957 of 15 March 1995, Clinton issued Executive Order 
12959 of 6 May 1995 which prohibited virtually all trade and investment with Iran. 
The Executive Order towards Iran: 
1. Prohibits exportation from the United States to Iran or to the 
Government of Iran of goods, technology or services, including 
trade financing by U. S. banks; 
2. Prohibits the re-exportation of certain U. S. goods and technology to 
Iran from third countries; 
3. Prohibits transactions such as brokering and other dealing by United 
States persons in Iranian goods and services; 
4. Prohibits new investments by United States persons in Iran or in 
property owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; 
5. Prohibits U. S. companies from approving or facilitating their 
subsidiaries' performance of transactions that they themselves are 
prohibited from performing; 
6. Continues the 1987 prohibition on the importation into the United 
States of goods and services of Iranian origin; and 
7. Allows U. S. companies a 30-day period in which to perform trade 
transactions pursuant to contracts predating this order that are now 
prohibited? ' 1 
Therefore, with Clinton having issued Executive Order 12959 of 6 May 1995, he had 
in effect been forced to implement policy that was designed by pro-Israeli lobbyist 
groups and tabled by Republican Congressmen. Although this was policy that was 
commensurate with Clinton's dual containment strategy, the domestic political 
221 Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1994: William J. Clinton (Bk. 1), 654. 
-192- 
conditions limited his options and prevented him from having explored further the 
political opening made by Iran under the guise of the INOC-Conoco oil agreement. 
Indeed, this serves to highlights the trend of an intrusion by Congress onto the 
foreign policy agenda of the United States towards Iran. This usurpation could 
ultimately be traced back to the factors leading to the adoption of the Iran-Iraq Non- 
Proliferation Act of 1992. 
5.3.1 The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 
Following Clinton's Executive Order 12959 of 6 May, an understanding was reached 
with Senator D'Amato whereby he and his counterparts in the House would postpone 
having their respective bills considered by Congress. For this postponement, Clinton 
ambitiously agreed to actively gain support from US allies to reduce, or even cease, 
their bilateral trading with Iran. 
Clinton had made it clear, in his speech at the World Jewish Congress on 20 April 
1995, that he would pursue this objective at the G-7 summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
in June 1995.222 Predictably, the G-7 countries were unwilling to adopt this policy 
proposal towards Iran. The failure of the Clinton administration to gain international 
backing for its policy towards Iran, prompted D'Amato to submit legislation to the 
Senate on 8 September 1995. D'Amato's introduction of the Iran Foreign Oil 
Sanctions Act of 1995, co-sponsored by Senators Inouye, Pressler, Faircloth and 
Kohl, drew from, but ultimately differed from the legislation he introduced on the 27 
March 1995. D'Amato had amended his previous bill so that it would specifically 
target foreign entities trading in petroleum or natural gas products with Iran. 223 This, 
however, was still directly opposed to the stated position of the Clinton 
administration that it would not impose any secondary sanctions on foreign entities 
trading with Iran. 224 
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Although the Clinton administration opposed the legislation, 22 the Chairman of the 
House International Relations Committee, Benjamin Gilman, introduced a similar 
bill in the House of Representatives. Gilman's legislation, co-sponsored by 
Representatives Berman, Forbes, King and Shaw, was as comprehensive as 
D'Amato's Senate bill. Although the White House maintained its adamant opposition 
to the bills, within Congress, they received bipartisan support. Compounding this, 
Representatives Gejdenson and Burton introduced a bill which supported Gilman's 
position. 226 As a result of the high level of support the bills were receiving within 
both Houses of Congress, the Clinton administration changed its policy from direct 
opposition to a stated willingness to compromise. 227 
Senator D'Amato duly altered his legislation as a compromise measure towards the 
administration so that sanctions on entities trading on Iran's oil and gas fields would 
only qualify on investments of more than US$40 million. With the White House 
lending its support to this modified bill, it had clearly undertaken a policy reversal 
towards secondary sanctions on foreign entities engaged in trade in Iran's oil and gas 
sectors as a direct result of domestic political factors. 
Whilst the Senate bill was being approved, Democrat Senator Edward Kennedy 
added an amendment requiring the same sanctions be applied to Libya. Kennedy was 
representing the families of the victims of the notorious bombing of Pan Am Flight 
103 over Lockerbie. With Libya providing sanctuary to Abdel Basset Ali 
Mohammed al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, the two suspects in the 
bombing, Kennedy argued that it would serve as a means to both deter future terrorist 
attacks by Libya and hopefully compel Gaddafi to hand over the suspects. 
Although the legislation was a `watered down' version of its original incarnation, it 
was subject to a barrage of heavy criticism by US allies, as well as oil and gas 
companies, for having no basis under international law on account of the extra- 
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territorial application of the jurisdiction of the United States. 228 Although the Senate 
bill was technically illegal under international law, it had not come into force within 
the United States. The requirement was for it to be reconciled with Gilman's bill in 
the House. However, Gilman's bill sat diplomatically uncomfortable for the White 
House as it was more comprehensive than the modified D'Amato bill. Specifically 
speaking, Gilman's legislation called for sanctions on any entity that engaged in 
trade with Iran, which would have understandably have had diplomatic repercussions 
for the United States internationally. 
The administration strongly opposed Gilman's bill in Congressional hearings, but 
ultimately reached a compromise that allowed the bill to proceed with the support of 
the White House. The main compromises entailed Libya being essentially treated 
different from Iran, as sanctions were to be mandatory for contraventions of UN 
resolutions and were only optional for investment in the oil and gas sectors. 
With the passage to the Senate of the bill on 26 June 1996 for final approval, Senator 
Kennedy reintroduced an amendment that required the lifting of the distinction 
within the bill in applying differential sanctions on the two countries. Whilst this was 
opposed by AIPAC, it was as a result of the pressure of the Pan Am Flight 103 
victims' families on the Senate that allowed the bill, now jointly proposed by 
D'Amato and Kennedy, to be passed on 16 July 1996. 
With the Kennedy amendment, there was a new need to reconcile the two bills. This 
unexpectedly occurred as a direct consequence of the crash of TWA Flight 800 over 
Long Island on 17 July 1996. The initial view that it may have been a result of a 
terrorist attack resulted in a loss of opposition to the bill within the House 229 The 
unanimous adoption of the House bill paved the way for it to be signed into law by 
Clinton. 
Therefore, with a Republican controlled Congress, Congressional pressure and 
domestic political forces on the executive and the wider Democrat party forced 
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Clinton to alter his policy position towards Iran. Although the application of 
prohibitive unilateral sanctions was entirely commensurate with the rubric of the dual 
containment strategy, the extraterritorial sanctioning of entities trading with Iran was 
not. Moreover, Congressional legislation, which strengthened sanctions against Iran, 
is arguably not commensurate under the rubric of the dual containment strategy. 
Specifically speaking, with Congress legislating foreign policy, Clinton's flexibility 
in conducting diplomacy with Iran to achieve the strategic objective of reconciliation 
was very much thwarted. Moreover, given the priority of the Clinton administration 
to maintain the multilateral sanctions based policy towards Iraq, the Congressional 
legislation was very much a usurpation of the foreign policy prerogative of the 
executive and ultimately served to hamper the implementation of the overall dual 
containment policy strategy. 
5.4 Dual Track Diplomacy: Beyond Containment 
US policy towards Iran during the first Clinton administration had been clearly 
dominated by Congressional legislation as previously discussed. This had restricted 
the scope of options available to the White House and had effectively set the foreign 
policy agenda. Moreover, structural impediments within Iran were further active 
barriers towards any efforts at a rapprochement. 230 However, in May 1997, the 
political context in Iran changed as Mohammad Khatami, a self-declared reformer 
whose record was not tainted with hostile rhetoric towards the United States, was 
elected President. Khatami's election came as a surprise to many international 
observers and was dubbed the Second Khordad Movement after the date of his 
election. 
In an interview with CNN in January 1998 Khatami presented a more conciliatory 
note towards the United States. He drew parallels between the United States and 
Iran's revolutionary movement towards independence and, most notably, he called 
230 Robert Snyder, The United States and Iran: Analysing the Structural Impediments to a 
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for a `dialogue of civilizations. i23 1 He expressed his "respect for the great American 
people"232 and his desire for relations being built on a cultural exchange involving 
scholars, tourists, journalists and artisans, etc. Although it was a notable change in 
rhetoric, the substance of Khatami's remarks received a cautious response as some of 
these exchanges had already been occurring: 
American tourists go to Iran, although the State Department warns 
them that it is unwise, and many Iranians visit the U. S. and even 
attend American universities. Academics from both sides fly back 
and forth to give lectures and take part in conferences. There is no 
sign such exchanges have warmed the icy political climate much. 233 
Nevertheless, Khatami highlighted that "[o]ne of the major flaws in the U. S. foreign 
policy... is that they continue to live with cold war mentality and try to create a 
perceived enemy. " He saw the D'Amato legislation as epitomising this framework of 
thinking. Although Khatami's remarks were effectively a departure in official Iranian 
rhetoric towards the United States, in terms of US foreign policy Iran's continued 
opposition towards the Arab-Israeli peace process, along with other contextual 
issues, prevented any substantive alteration in US foreign policy. 
According to former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the opportunity for a shift 
in US foreign policy towards Iran did indeed occur in January 1998. However this 
was not as a result of Khatami's conciliatory remarks in the CNN interview but 
rather as a result of a substantive change in Iran's policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
peace process. Yasser Arafat had received a letter from Khatami which "backed 
Palestinian participation in the Middle East peace process, acknowledged Israel's 
legitimacy, and discussed the possibility of a region wide peace if the Palestinians 
were allowed to establish a state on the West Bank and Gaza. , 234 Also, Khatami 
publicly denounced terrorism and the killing of Israeli citizens, which was a 
significant move towards accommodating the demands of the United States. The 
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overall situational context leading to a change in US foreign policy was not, 
however, just limited to Iran's conciliatory overtures towards the United States and 
policy change towards the peace process. Albright commented: 
Iran's record in the war against drugs has greatly improved - at least 
within its own borders - and it has received high marks from the 
UN for its treatment of more than two million Iraqi and Afghan 
refugees. Iran is also participating in diplomatic efforts to bring 
peace and stability to Afghanistan and is making a welcome effort 
to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and other neighbors in the 
Gulf. 235 
Albright concluded that given this alternation in policy, "Iran no longer belonged in 
the same category as Iraq, "236 and consequently "[t]he time was ripe to move beyond 
"237 dual containment. 
The US response to Iran's policy changes under Khatami were cautiously welcomed, 
but significant obstacles towards reconciliation remained. Albright commented that: 
We view these developments with interest, both with regard to the 
possibility of Iran assuming its rightful place in the world 
community, and the chance for better bilateral ties. However, these 
hopes must be balanced against the reality that Iran's support for 
terrorism has not yet ceased; serious violations of human rights 
persist; and its efforts to develop long range missiles and to acquire 
nuclear weapons continue. The United States opposes, and will 
continue to oppose, any country selling or transferring to Iran 
materials and technologies that could be used to develop long-range 
missiles or weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, we oppose 
Iranian efforts to sponsor terror. Accordingly, our economic 
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policies, including with respect to the export pipelines for Caspian 
oil and gas, remain unchanged. 238 
Whilst a positive move towards resolving substantive differences had occurred, the 
contextual divide was, nevertheless, unlikely to lead to a period of detente in any real 
sense. Indeed, a shift in US policy could not have realistically occurred without Iran 
ending its policies - most notably its alleged support for terrorist groups - which 
brought pressure onto the foreign policy agenda from special interest groups and 
from within Congress. Although it is outside the scope of this study, it appears that 
there were structural obstacles within Iran which prevented a more substantive 
alternation in its own foreign policies, 239 in addition to the issue of a moderation of 
US policies which provided legitimacy for Iran's provocative policies. Indeed, in late 
1998, Khatami's reformist Second Khordad Movement suffered a clampdown which 
further weakened their influence against the conservative clerics. 240 
The options available to US diplomacy were few: given the challenges Khatami was 
facing from his conservative opponents, any public backing for him from 
Washington would have probably caused the reformist movement more harm then 
good. Although a significant relaxation of US sanctions policy would potentially 
have bolstered Khatami's position, wider contextual issues relating to Iran's foreign 
policies made this an unrealistic foreign policy choice for the United States in spite 
of the Clinton administration being in its final years of its second term of office. 
These issues included: 
1. The unresolved issue of whether Iran was covertly pursuing a nuclear 
weapons program in contravention of its international obligations; 
2. Iran's implicated in an attack on US forces stationed in Khobar Towers, 
Saudi Arabia, in June 1996; 
3. Iran had arrested thirteen Jewish individuals and several Muslims on the 
charge of espionage. Despite EU and UN pressure on Tehran, twelve were 
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imprisoned. This resulted in domestic political pressures within Congress 
which rejected the engagement approach; 
4. Without a substantive change in Iran's policies that were provocative to the 
United States and Israel, a significant relaxation in US sanctions policies 
would have been politically unworkable for both the White House given the 
likely response within Congress. 
Despite these contextual obstacles on the options available to the Clinton 
administration, it was following the Iranian February 2000 elections, in which 
Khatami's supporters gained control of the parliament, that the Clinton 
administration made a second attempt at improving relations. Again, it was the 
political situation in Iran which prompted the administration to make political 
overtures at providing concessions towards the Islamic Republic to indirectly bolster 
the reformist movement. The United States lifted its import restrictions on "Iran's 
principal non-oil exports - carpets, pistachios, dried fruit, and caviar. Whilst these 
are considered luxury items in the United States, their production and marketing in 
"'4' Iran are associated with the middle class, much of which had voted for Khatami. 
According to Albright, the Iranian reaction to the relaxation of US sanctions was 
mixed despite it gaining a positive response from the EU and domestically within the 
United States. 242 However, the US concessions did not go far enough to overcome 
the structural impediments facing the reformers within Iran. The context which 
created the policy quagmire is usefully summarised by Albright: 
The Clinton administration policy towards Iran was calibrated 
appropriately. We could have achieved a breakthrough only by 
abandoning our principals and interests in non-proliferation, 
terrorism, and the Middle East, far too high a price. We could have 
avoided the charge that we were too soft on Iran by ignoring the 
reform movement entirely, but that would have left us isolated 
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internationally and provided no incentive for Iran to change 
further. 243 
Therefore, at the end of the Clinton administration, the prospects for achieving a 
normalisation of relations with Iran were remote. Conversely, the opposite was true 
for Iran. US policies in the Middle East such as its support for Israel, military 
presence and restrictive sanctions policy, presented clear political obstacles for any 
change in Iranian foreign policy towards meeting the benchmark required for 
meaningful dialogue to take place. 
But with the onset of the Bush administration in January 2001, one may have been 
tempted to assume that its connections with the oil industry would have resulted in a 
softening of policy towards Iran. 244 This was not to be the case. Condoleezza Rice 
argued in an article in Foreign Affairs during the 2000 election campaign that "[a]ll 
in all, changes in US policy toward Iran would require changes in Iranian 
behaviour. , 245 In essence she articulated a policy continuation as there was little 
scope for an alternative to the policy of containment. As had been found by the 
Clinton administration, the key obstacle to a change in relations rested with the 
Iranians. The structural impediments to Tehran taking advantage of overtures from 
the United States in addition to the unwillingness to moderate Iranian foreign policy 
made the prospect of a rapprochement a distant goal. 
During the initial months of the Bush Presidency up until the 9/11 attacks, US policy 
can be characterised as a continuation from the Clinton era while a policy review was 
undertaken. 246 But on a wider contextual level, little had altered to justify a 
substantive shift in foreign policy. 
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By August 2001, the ILSA was up for renewal and the Bush administration renewed 
it with the caveat recommendation that it should be reviewed on a more periodical 
basis. Specifically, Colin Powell was reported as seeking a two year extension rather 
than the normal five year period. This was ultimately rejected by Congress and was 
renewed for a full five years on a 96-2 vote in the Senate. 247 
Although the White House was clearly attempting to garner some flexibility in its 
diplomacy towards Iran through its recommendation, the sponsor of the bill, Senator 
Charles Schumer of New York, argued that even though President Khatami had been 
elected, a moderation in Iran's sponsorship for terrorist movements had not 
occurred. 248 It can be argued that the reason why Congress voted against this stems 
from the manner in which AIPAC effectively mobilised support within Congress 
against any potential policy review. Indeed, by March 2001, AIPAC had gathered 
upwards of 180 co-sponsors in the House for the renewal of ILSA before the White 
House had publicly issued its policy position. It was only by June 2001 that the 
White House took the official position of seeking only a two year extension and this 
position was subjected to a great deal of criticism: "[I]f ILSA was a good policy, 
then why extend it for only two years, and if it was a bad policy, why extend it at 
all? "249 
On a wider level, however, in June 2001 a United States federal court issued 
indictments for fourteen men, alleged to be members of Hezbollah, for the 1996 
bombing at Khobar Towers. Crucially, the indictment implicated the Iranian 
government as being behind the bombing 25° Although this did not have a clear effect 
on the executive branch, it is likely that this was served to underline the case being 
made by AIPAC within Congress for a renewal of ILSA. 
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5.5 Summary Assessment 
What can be discerned from the above analysis is that US policy towards Iran during 
the time period 1993-01 can be divided into two distinct phases, that is, the substance 
of the factors which determined the actual foreign policy. These two distinct phases 
are separated by the election of President Mohammad Khatami in 1997. 
The nature of the Clinton administration's containment policy towards Iran can be 
satisfactorily explained using Walter Russell Mead's theoretical framework. Mead's 
theoretical approach allows us to identify a combination of Hamiltonian, Wilsonian 
and Jefferson driving forces as explaining Clinton's foreign policy strategy towards 
Iran. 
Within the conceptual framework, a containment of Iran would have served the key 
Hamiltonian strategic interests of promoting free trade and safeguarding the 
international economy by protecting the countries which have control over key 
resources. The containment of Iran ensured it would not pose a threat to the US 
economic interest in an unhindered flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. This would 
have included the interest in deterring Iran's alleged involvement in sponsoring 
terrorist attacks as regional instability would potentially have detrimental 
consequences on free trade. Similarly, the Clinton administrations' opposition to 
Iran's record on human rights and alleged involvement in terrorism is explainable by 
the Wilsonian school of thought. Mead interprets Wilsonianism as pressing for the 
application of universal human rights, the rule of law, democracy and other 
`universal ideals. ' Terrorism is interpreted as threatening free societies and 
international order as a whole, and thus warrants a Wilsonian response. However, 
with the potential threat state sponsors of terrorism pose to the national security of 
the United States, Jeffersonians also regard terrorism as warranting a foreign policy 
initiative. 
Although Mead's conceptual framework can cater for the strategic interests in 
Clinton's containment policy towards Iran, it does not satisfactorily account for the 
actual development of US policy towards Iran during the Clinton Presidency. The 
above analysis indicates that US foreign policy towards Iran 1993-1997 was 
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primarily the product of domestic structures outside the traditional government 
bureaucracy. Although the executive and the government bureaucracy had a clear 
foreign policy agenda, the international context, as determined on a domestic level 
by Iran's foreign policy - most notably its provocative polices towards Israel 
25 1 
resulted in a sustained effort on behalf of special interest groups on Congress to 
direct the foreign policy agenda. Interestingly, traditional foreign policy analysis 
concentrates on the role of the government bureaucracy, or executive, as the 
principal determining force in foreign policy. Indeed, the construction of the foreign 
policy of the United States is constitutionally enshrined as being the prerogative of 
the executive. However, the special nature of the international context, coupled with 
the highly mobilised and privileged position the Jewish and pro-Israeli lobbies 
occupy, resulted in an exceptional application of influence onto the legislative branch 
in the American government. 
The significance of this situation is twofold: firstly, the prerogative of the President 
to conduct foreign policy is subjugated; secondly, special interest groups, whose 
interests cannot be explained under the rubric of Mead's theory, actually determines 
the course of US foreign policy. Although a strict application of sanctions on Iran 
was commensurate with the containment policy, the extra-territorial application of 
sanctions was not. Therefore, Mead's theory cannot satisfactorily account for US 
policy towards Iran 1993-97, and thus warrants this study's inclusion of a layer of 
analysis which accounts for forces on the domestic political legislature. 
The second phase of US policy towards Iran during the Clinton Presidency occurred 
after a change in the domestic political situation with Iran which, in turn, resulted in 
a change in Iran's foreign policy. Despite the election of Mohamed Khatami and the 
subsequent alteration in Iran's foreign policy, it did not alter to the level sufficient to 
for meaningful dialogue and a detente to occur. Whilst it is outside the scope of this 
study to discuss the reasons why Iran could not make more substantive changes to its 
own foreign policy in order to enable reconciliation, the evidence in this case study 
supports the view that the proponents of engagement overlook the structural 
impediments within the United States which prevent this policy undertaking before a 
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satisfactory change in Iran's foreign policy had occurred. Indeed, the above analysis 
of US policy towards Iran during the Clinton Presidency indicates that a complex 
range of structural factors and special interests prevented any scope for meaningful 
diplomacy in the absence of a substantive change in Iran's foreign policy. 
6.0 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The Clinton era was characterised by a policy continuation from the previous Bush 
administration, which sought to achieve security within the Persian Gulf area through 
the maintenance of a balance of power by containing the potential threat posed by 
Iran and Iraq. Indeed, the Clinton administration sought a modification in Iran's 
policies in order to allow for a reassessment to occur. Nevertheless, Iran's inability or 
failure to moderate its policies resulted in important domestic political factors; the 
ensuing highly assertive and constrictive policy towards Iran prevented the executive 
having flexibility in its diplomacy. Although it is outside the scope of this thesis, it is 
reasonable to conclude that this further contributed to Iran's failure to moderate its 
policies and thus was potentially a self-depreciating cycle. Indeed as outlined above, 
it seems clear that the domestic political forces were the primary driver of US foreign 
policy towards Iran and this simply reduced the traditional prerogative of the 
executive to effectively pursue its policy objectives. 
Iraq was a different picture in that since 1991 the regime of Saddam Hussain was not 
viewed is redeemable. This was crucial in that unlike Iran where constructive 
dialogue was the objective, US policy towards Iraq sought the strategic objective of 
regime change. The Clinton administration's formula was for the application of 
sanctions until regime change occurred. A by-product of this was that Iraq was 
`contained' multilaterally, and this ensured Persian Gulf security until the strategic 
objective of regime change had occurred. Indeed, the prospect of regime change held 
the potential for reconciliation and a reassessment of the nature of Persian Gulf 
security. The reason why this strategic objective was not officially acknowledged at 
the time was a result of the need to ensure the unity of the international coalition. 
This was because the coalition was held together on the premise of the application of 
sanctions until compliance had been achieved, which would allow for reconciliation 
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and reintegration of Iraq into the international community. Therefore, the official 
position of the Clinton administration was a tactical means of achieving its 
overarching strategic objective of regime change. Importantly, this finding is an 
original contribution to the current field of scholarship. 
Through a complex interplay of domestic, regional and international factors, the 
unity of the international coalition began to unwind. With Congress legislating in 
1998 that the official policy of the United States should be directed towards 
achieving regime change, Clinton's tactical policy of multilateralism had in effect 
failed and ushered in an era of stalemate following the withdrawal of the 
international inspectors in December 1998. 
Therefore, throughout the Clinton era and up until the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, US foreign policy towards Persian Gulf security remained premised 
on a balance of power, with the containment of Iran and Iraq being the primary means 
of achieving this. This underscores the interpretation offered in chapter three of 
Clintonian grand strategy being premised on geoeconomics as the Wilsonian and 
Jeffersonian pursuit of liberal democracy was subjugated at the expenses of regional 
geostrategic interests. Indeed, this shows that the officially articulated dual nature of 
Clintonian grand strategy did not apply in the case of Persian Gulf security as this 
was contrary to the balance of power approach adopted: the promotion of liberal 
democracy was simply contrary to regional interests in ensuring the status quo in 
order to safeguard a steady flow of oil. 
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Chapter VI 
United States Foreign Policy Towards 
Persian Gulf Security: 
Iran and Iraq 2001-2003 
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"The United States has adopted a new policy, afonvard strategy of freedom in the 
Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we 
have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in 
every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace. " 
George W. Bush 
November 2003 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were a defining moment that promoted a 
major reassessment of US strategic policy. ' The scale of the impact the attacks had 
on mainstream US society had not been witnessed since the Japanese attack on Peal 
Harbour in December 1941. But the effect of the attacks was arguably more telling: it 
was an attack that targeted civilians and the symbols of American military and 
economic power. With the high number of civilian casualties, many Americans no 
longer felt the security they had enjoyed since the War of Independence. 
The attacks also marked a shift in the traditional priority of the US electorate from 
the main focus on domestic economic concerns towards a wider spectrum which 
encompassed threats to US national security from international forces. The 
significance of this was twofold: firstly, American domestic society perceived a new 
external threat under the guise of international terrorism; and secondly, many within 
the government felt the need to address these homeland security concerns of the 
domestic electorate. This was ultimately realised in the 2004 Presidential election 
where George W. Bush was widely acknowledged as having campaigned heavily on 
the national security ticket. 
This thesis contends that the response of the George W. Bush administration in the 
wake of the trauma of the 9/11 attacks resulted in the adoption of a new grand 
strategic era for US foreign policy which departed from the Clintonian years. In 
1 United States, White House, "President Bush /Meets with Prime Minister Blair, " Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 31 Jan. 2003.4pp. 12/09/03 <http: //www. whitehouse. cov/news/releases/2003/01/20030131- 
23. html>. 
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order to demonstrate whether the hypothesis outlined in chapter 3 is robust, this 
chapter will demonstrate the origins, nature, trajectory and context in which US 
foreign policy towards achieving Persian Gulf security was applied. This will be 
achieved through analysing US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq as a case study 
in the post-9/11 context. As discussed earlier, this is justified on the premise that US 
policy towards these two key countries was the primary means in which the United 
States sought to achieve this objective. Therefore, it is outside the scope of this 
chapter to discuss the bilateral policy of the United States to the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states. 
The Bush administrations' foreign policy response to the terrorist attacks was 
ultimately the official adoption of a grand strategy which departed from the 
traditional concepts of deterrence and containment. At its most basic level, it 
ultimately sought to maintain the pre-eminence of the United States in the 
international system in addition to safeguarding national security from external 
threats. As has been outlined in chapter 3, the significance of the September 11 
attacks was that they altered the domestic socio-political context within the United 
States in terms of the perception of an external threat: international Islamic 
terrorism. Although terrorism is nothing new, the Bush Doctrine was ultimately the 
political response to the newly perceived external threat. 
Since 1991, successive administrations had been consistent in their strategic 
assessment that the security of the Persian Gulf could not be secured with Saddam 
Hussain in power, and therefore sought reime change as the overall policy 
objective. As has already been discussed in the previous chapter, the Clinton 
administration saw Saddam's compliance with UN resolutions as a tactical policy 
likely to result in the overthrow of his reime. The newly incumbent Bush 
administration did not depart from this strategic assessment. The manner in which 
the 9/11 attacks impacted upon US foreign policy towards Iraq was through the 
tactics used to achieve this strategic objective: prior to 11 September 2001 US policy 
had been premised on an internal coup d'etat and not from an armed invasion. 
However within the context of a foreign policy analysis framework, the key issue is 
concerns what the factors were that resulted in this policy change. 
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In terms of US foreign policy towards Iran, it will also be shown that the Bush 
Doctrine resulted in a clear departure from Clintonian foreign policy. Under its 
rubric Iran's nuclear programme was viewed as holding the potential for it to acquire 
nuclear weapons even though Iran was entitled to a domestic nuclear power 
capability under international law. Moreover, the Iranian regime was viewed by the 
administration as undemocratic and thus in conflict with the key Wilsonian pillar in 
the Bush Doctrine. Overall, it underscores that the strategic rubric of the War on 
Terror resulted in a departure away from the regional geostrategy of the Clintonian 
post-Cold War era. 
As has already been outlined in chapter 3, the premise of this thesis is that a new 
grand strategy was adopted by the Bush administration in the wake of the trauma of 
the 9/11 attacks. This will be shown in the subsequent section to have resulted in a 
complete redefinition of US foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf. 
2.0 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ 2001-2003 
At the very first meeting of the Principals of the National Security Council on 30 
January 2001 Secretary to the Treasury, Paul O'Neill, reported that the focus of the 
administration was clearly on effecting regime change within Iraq. ` Secretary of 
State Powell saw a clear need to revamp Clinton's failed sanctions regime to achieve 
regime change through a tactical policy of seeking Iraq's compliance with UN 
resolutions. Powell commented that the sanctions are "not endearing us to the Iraqi 
people, whose support we're hoping to elicit... to help overthrow this regime. "3 The 
summery of the State Department's strategy towards Iraq at the National Security 
Council meeting on I February 2001 stated: 
Our overall objective would be to prevent Iraq from threatening its 
neighbors or the national security more broadly on the basis of 
continued control of Iraqi revenue, [a] ban on military and WIVID 
2 Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House. and the Education of Paul 
ONeill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) 29. 
3 Ibid. 74. 
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related imports and weapons inspections. This approach has two tracks 
which are mutually reinforcing and which we would pursue 
concurrently; one track is to intensify sanctions enforcement and the 
other is to implement UN Security Council resolution 1284. 
As with the Clinton administration, the strategic objective of regime change 
continued, and the use of sanctions as a tactical policy of promoting the conditions 
required to effect regime change was applied. The use of military force - in terms of 
an invasion - was reportedly never specifically discussed at the NSC meeting, and 
was not seen as a prudent policy option at that time. However, the need to rekindle 
the military coalition of the 1991 Gulf War was seen as a suitable means of coercing 
Saddam to comply with Security Council Resolutions. The Bush administration's 
strategy was therefore premised on a policy continuation from the Clinton 
administration. 
It was, however, in the period between 31 May and 26 June 2001 that the Deputy 
National Security Advisor, Stephen J. Hadley, held discussions at the Deputies' 
subcommittee level to formulate the Principals' strategic framework into an official 
policy strategy. 5 The official policy strategy towards Iraq was eventually presented to 
the Principals at the National Security Council on August 1,2001. Entitled "A 
Liberation Strategy, "6 the Top Secret document "proposed a phased strategy of 
pressuring Saddam and developing the tools and opportunities for enhancing that 
pressure, and how to take advantage of the opportunities. It relied heavily on the 
Iraqi opposition. "7 The strategy did not call for a military invasion but was a 
revitalised version of the policy that was undertaken during the Clinton era. Bob 
Woodward writes that: 
The paper had classified attachments that went into detail about what 
might be done diplomatically - economic sanctions and U. N. 
weapons inspectors; military with the no-fly zones and the 
° Suskind, The Price of Loyalty 84. 
s Woodward, Plan of Attack 21. 
6 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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contingencies if a pilot were shot down; and what the CIA or others 
might do to support, strengthen and empower the Iraqi opposition. 8 
Although this was a policy continuation, the willingness of the administration to use 
military force to achieve a foreign policy objective was seen as being in marked 
contrast to the general reluctance present within the Clinton Presidency. Indeed, Paul 
O'Neill found that "[t]hose present who had attended NSC meetings of the previous 
administration - and there were several - noticed a material shift [in the willingness 
to use military force]" and that the "prohibition [for using military force] was clearly 
gone... that opened options, options that hadn't been opened before. "9 Indeed, the 
most notable advocate for the use of military force against Iraq was Paul Wolfowitz, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defence. 10 His views were exceptionally hawkish - he had 
notably been calling for a military solution towards Iraq even before he had taken 
office in the Bush administration. 
Although the willingness to use military force was present and being touted by 
Wolfowitz; contextually, little had changed since the Clinton administration. The 
general willingness to use military force can most realistically be explained by the 
different intellectual beliefs held by those in Bush's foreign policy circle, 
specifically, its neoconservative character and outlook on international affairs. 
Nevertheless, the actual policy towards Iraq in the Bush administration prior to 11 
September 2001 should be characterised as a policy continuation from the Clinton 
era, but with the caveat that there was a substantive change in the administration's 
willingness to use of military force, even though a military invasion was not part of 
the administration's policy towards Iraq at that time. 
In accordance with Bush's election pledges and the administrations policy 
framework, efforts were made at attempting to rebuild the multilateral coalition 
towards Iraq from the onset. Secretary of State Powell sought regional support from 
within the Middle East for `smart sanctions' that would case the flow of 
a Woodward, Plan of Attack 21. 
9 Suskind, The Price of Loyalty 75. 
10 Woodward, Plan of Attack 21. 
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humanitarian and civilian goods to Iraq, whilst tightening restrictions on Iraqi illicit 
imports and exports. " Katzman explains Powell's stance: 
The smart sanctions plan represented an effort, articulated primarily 
by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the beginning of the Bush 
administration, to rebuild a consensus to contain Iraq. The US plan 
centred on a trade-off in which restrictions on the flow of civilian 
goods to Iraq would be greatly eased and, in return, Iraq's illicit trade 
with its neighbors would be brought under the oil-for-food program 
and its monitoring and control mechanisms. 12 
At the United Nations, Washington was successful in having UN Security Council 
Resolution 1409 adopted. This resolution eased the restrictions on Iraqi civilian and 
humanitarian imports. But within the Middle East, the smart sanctions proposal did 
not receive the crucial backing from Middle Eastern countries. In spite of this, 
Powell claimed that the policy was a success as "[w]e have kept him contained, kept 
him in his box. " 13 Thus whilst Washington's smart sanctions strategy did cater for 
the demands being levied by France, China and Russia for a broad easing of 
sanctions, it was generally unsuccessful in tightening the restrictions on Iraq's illicit 
imports and exports. 
In terms of Bush's pledge to uphold the terms of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the 
level of contact between Washington and Iraqi opposition groups was increased. 
However, the administration should not be seen as having made substantive progress 
towards the implementation of the Iraqi Liberation Act. Although the administration 
did carry out the distribution of economic support funds in accordance with the plan 
devised by Clinton in his final week of office, no funds were distributed as part of the 
Iraq Liberation Act itself. The reason for this was that the State Department 
suspended the distribution of funds by the Pentagon until a financial audit of the INC 
11 Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade, " CRS 
Report for Congress, (RL30472), Washington, D. C.: CRS, Congress. 19 May 2003,24pp., 17/06/04 
<http: //fpc. state. gov/documents/organization/21122. pdf>. 
12 Ibid. 
13 United States, Department of State, Briefing En Route to Cairo. E; ypt, 23 Feb. 2001) 3pp. 23/08/04 
<www. state. gov/secretary/rnV2001/931. html>. 
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was carried out. 14 The suspension was based on the suspected financial 
mismanagement of funds by the INC. This suspension on the allocation of funds 
continued until shortly after Bush's January 2002 State of the Union speech 
Since 1991, successive administrations had categorised Iraq as a hostile state which 
posed a threat to the United States through unconventional weapons. Iraq was 
presumed to be in possession of such weapons through its inability or unwillingness 
to verify the destruction of all of its prohibited weapon stockpiles. But it is important 
to recognise, however, that even if Iraq was in a position to verify the destruction of 
its entire prohibited weapons stockpile, it would have continued to have been seen as 
a threat to the United States. Specifically, since 1991, an Iraq under the regime of 
Saddam Hussain was viewed as being intent on rekindling its unconventional 
weapon programmes if the sanctions and inspection mandates were ever lifted 
because of the presumed intent of Saddam Hussain to acquire such weaponry. 
Given this contextual situation, the options available to the newly incumbent Bush 
administration can be summarised as: 
1. A continual application of UN sanctions until Iraq had both verified the 
destruction of its prohibited weapon stockpiles and Saddam Hussain's regime 
had been internally deposed from power. I5 
2. A military invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussain's regime from power. 
3. An abandonment of the containment strategy, opting instead for engagement 
and reintegration. 
Although the third option was a theoretical possibility, it would not have been a 
realistic policy option until the United Nations was able to vile that Iraq had fully 
complied with its obligations. 16 But, as has already been discussed in this thesis, Iraq 
" Elizabeth J. Lake, "State Department Audit to Delay Aid for INC, " Washineton Times 11 Jun. 
2001,11. 
15 It is reasonable to conclude that a succession to one of his sons upon his death would have been 
equally unacceptable to the United States as they would have likely been seen as having the same 
intent that Saddam had in terms of rekindling Iraq WMMD programmes. 
16 Given that the Bush administration allowed a resumption of relations with Libya following its 
renunciation of its intent to procure weapons of mass destruction, coupled with an inspections 
regime which has been able to verify the destruction of its stockpiles, it is theoretically possible that if 
Iraq was able to verify the destruction of such weapons, it may have been a policy option. 
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cannot be regarded as having been able to verify the destruction of all of the 
prohibited weapons the UN inspectors had calculated were outstanding, and thus 
would have technically remained in contravention of UN resolutions. Therefore, at 
the most basic level, the policy decision facing the Bush administration was either 
for the application of UN sanctions until an internal regime change had occurred, or 
for a military invasion to achieve regime change. In either case the endgame strategic 
objective had remained consistent since 1991: regime change. 
In the following analysis, the Bush administration will be shown to have been 
consistent in its application of US foreign policy towards Iraq that it inherited from 
the Clinton administration up until the 9/11 attacks. The analysis will demonstrate 
that the 9/11 attacks resulted in a fundamental break from the consistent US policy 
approach that had been applied since 1991. The manner in which the 9/11 attacks 
altered the contextual situation vis-ä-vis Iraq was through the definition of threat 
facing the United States in the newly emerged grand strategic era of the War on 
Terror. 
Specifically, the attacks prompted the definition of threat to not only include state 
sponsors of terrorism such as Afghanistan, but to also include countries hostile to the 
United States that were producing, or intent on producing, unconventional 
weapons. 17 In other words, Iraq was seen to pose a future threat as Saddam's reime 
was ultimately seen as intent on manufacturing unconventional weapons which could 
be used against the United States. By categorising Iraq in this manner, the preventive 
use of force was deemed as applicable. 
On a wider level however, the new grand strategic era also had a direct bearing on 
the definition of Persian Gulf Security: the balance of power doctrine, coupled with 
the tactical use of containment and deterrence as means of safeguarding the security 
of the GCC, was wholly rejected. The strategy was seen by the Bush administration 
as preventing the widespread adoption of liberal democracy, but crucially, in the 
advent of the War on Terror era this was interpreted by Bush's neoconservative 
" Vice President Cheney was instrumental in the extension of the definition of the terrorist threat to 
encompass 'rogue states' that were proliferating in weapons of mass destruction. See: Woodward, 
Plan of Attack 29. 
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foreign policy team as being the root cause of politically inspired Islamic terrorism 
epitomised by al-Qa'ida. In addition, the spread of liberal democracy was seen by 
neoconservatives as providing stability to the region as peaceful relations are, 
admittedly, the norm amongst likeminded liberal democracies. With the acceptance 
of these neoconservative pillars, both the road map towards ensuring Persian Gulf 
Security and countering the root causes of international Islamic terrorism were seen 
as achievable through the successful spread of liberal democracy throughout the 
Middle East. 
With Persian Gulf security resting on the need to reengineer the political landscape 
of the Middle East, a change in US policy towards Iraq occurred. The following 
analysis will show that the Bush administration saw the most effective means of 
achieving its objectives in the Middle East, and on a wider level towards its global 
counterterrorism campaign, was through implementing regime change in Iraq via a 
military invasion. Specifically speaking, an invasion of Iraq was seen as allowing for 
nation building, on a par with post-Second World War West Germany, which would 
ultimately serve as a beacon for democracy throughout the region thereby creating 
unassailable pressures on its neighbouring states to democratise. Through doing so, 
the logic was that overall dual strategic objectives of countering the root causes of 
international terrorism and safeguarding Persian Gulf security were attainable. 
The following analysis will show that the Bush administration saw Iraq's failure to 
comply with its international obligations as providing a cascts belli for war. It will be 
argued that this was used as a tactical means to provide public justification for the 
war, as the strategic goals of spreading democracy as a counter-terrorism initiative 
and preventing Iraq from potentially manufacturing unconventional weapons was not 
widely seen as a legitimate legal and political justification for invading Iraq. 
Therefore, the United States used Iraq's failure/inability to fulfil its international 
obligations as a cases belli for war, and as a tactical means of fulfilling its 
overarching political objectives. 
The tactical policy road map to launching an invasion of Iraq is characterised as: 
1. Arguing that Iraq possessed unconventional weapons, and was actively 
producing them in violation of international law; 
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2. Arguing that although Iraq had the capability to peacefully resolve the 
situation, it had no intention of doing so; 
3. Showing that Saddam Hussain's regime had ties with al-Qa'ida linked 
terrorist groups, and could potentially supply them covertly with 
unconventional weapons. 
4. To demonstrate that if the United States provided Iraq with an ultimatum to 
comply with its international obligations which it failed to heed, the United 
States would be justified to enforce UN resolutions to prevent the national 
security of the United States being potentially threatened by terrorists armed 
with the `smoking gun' of an unconventional weapon. 
These tactical justifications will be shown to insufficiently warrant the use of force 
against Iraq, and consequently it is possible to infer that the Bush administration 
knowingly overstated the risk as a means of garnering legitimacy for this policy. 
Nevertheless, this will serve to underline that the official policy towards Iraq was 
tactical, and masked the true strategic reasoning behind the invasion of Iraq in March 
2003 
The structure of the following analysis of US foreign policy will be twofold: firstly, 
an analysis of the official policy in the prelude of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 
will show that it does not adequately explain the foreign policy decision to depart 
from the post-Cold War containment policy towards Iraq. Secondly, a foreign policy 
analysis of alternative factors will be provided in order to demonstrate that following 
the 9/11 attacks, the official policy in the prelude to the invasion of Iraq was a 
tactical means of achieving a strategic objective that ultimately resulted from the 
context of the War on Terror. 
2.1 Tactical Foreign Policy Towards Iraq 
According to Bob Woodward, it was within days of the 9/11 attacks that Donald 
Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz began advocating military action against Iraq. 18 This 
13 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002) 49,83-85. 
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is corroborated by the former Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, who recalled that 
Wolfowitz raised the prospect of military action against Iraq at the National Security 
Council meeting on 13 September 2001 as part of the administration's response to 
the 9/11 attacks. 19 Whilst this is evidence of the internal debate on the appropriate 
response to the terrorist attacks, the actual manifestation of this aspect of the Bush 
Doctrine that saw Iraq encompassed as part of the War on Terror was unveiled in the 
2002 State of the Union Address. 
Following the 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush administration officials 
continued making the case for the inclusion of rogue states as part of the War on 
Terror on account of the risk from unconventional weapons. Although such a threat 
is conceivable, it arguably overstates the risk in that the modus operandi of terrorist 
groups should more accurately be associated with conventional weapons. 20 But, 
within the context of the post 9/11, attacks terrorists armed with unconventional 
weapons was generally accepted as the sum of all fears. By highlighting this 
potential threat, a domestic political will to extend the War on Terror to encompass 
Iraq was being fostered. 
To actually encompass Iraq into the rubric of the War on Terror, the White House 
began a twofold strategy which aimed to establish that Iraq was in possession of 
unconventional weapons and that it had links with al-Qa'ida. Members of Bush's 
foreign policy team made several references to the risk of Iraq's smoking gun being a 
"nuclear cloud" appearing over an American city that would effectively dwarf the 
scale of the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, such reports played on the already present 
perception of a linkage: according to a poll by Newsweek late July 2002,72% of 
people in the United States believed that Iraq was involved with aiding al-Qa'ida 
acquire unconventional weapons. 21 This is significant in that, by fostering this link, 
19 Suskind, The Price of Loyalty 188. 
20 John Gearson, "Terrorism in Historical Perspective, " The Goodenough-Chevening Conference on 
Terrorism (London: Unpublished, 2003) 
21 Spenser Ackerman, "The Weakest Link: Why the Bush Administration Insists against All Evidence 
on an Iraq-Al Qaeda Connection, " Washington Monthly Nov. 2003,23/08/04 
<http: //www. findarticles. conVp/articles/m i_m 1316/is_ 11 _35/a 
i_ 11 1027164>. 
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the ultimate risk of terrorists using an unconventional weapon against the United 
States became ever more real. 
By the Bush administration referring to Iraq's potential smoking gun as a "nuclear 
cloud" over an American city if UN resolutions were not enforced, the fears of the 
average American were being unjustly played upon as the IAEA inspectors had 
effectively rendered harmless Iraq's nuclear programme during the Clinton 
administration. Importantly, the Bush administration would have known this to have 
been the case. As Iraq simply did not have a nuclear capability or an active nuclear 
programme at the time, the use of such phraseology was effectively scaremongering. 
In terms of establishing a connection between the two, the Bush administration 
highlighted the presence in Iraq of the al-Qa' ida linked group Ansar al-Islam. 
22 The 
implication was that Ansar al-Islam's presence in Iraq was evidence of some form of 
substantive cooperative agreement with al-Qa'ida. But again, it was misleading of 
the Bush administration to have highlighted this. Ansar al-Islam was operating in the 
Kurdish area which was not under the control of Saddam Hussain. Although Saddam 
would have indirectly benefited from Ansar al-Islam's attacks on the Kurds, 
23 it is 
important to recognise that it was also hostile to Saddam's regime. Indeed, the 
prospect of a cooperative agreement was rejected by the leader of Ansar al-Islam as 
he saw Saddam's regime as operating "outside the Islamist zone. "24 Therefore, the 
implication of the Bush administration that Saddam's regime was connected to al- 
Qa'ida through Ansar al-Islam is a misrepresentation of the facts. But more 
importantly, it is not conceivable that this would not have been known by the US 
intelligence community. In some respects however, this was reflected in the 
administration's comments as a linkage which was only implied, and not 
categorically stated. Therefore, there appears to be a degree of justification to 
22 Johnathan Schanzer, Ansar Al-Islam: Iraq's Al-Qa'ida Connection, 2003, The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, 2pp. 10 Aug. 2004 
http: //www. ftontpagemag. com/Articles/Printable. asp? ID=5571. 
23 Schanzer, Ansar Al-Islam. 
24 Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War, Dir. Robert Greenwald, DVD, The 
Disinformation Company Ltd., 2004. 
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conclude that it was done deliberately to allow for Iraq's inclusion into the rubric of 
the War on Terror. 
In addition to this, it was reported that the lead hijacker of the 9/11 attacks, 
Mohamed Atta, met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in June 2000 and April 2001.25 
Although these reports were subsequently rejected by the Czech police'26 it is 
important to recognise that by the Bush administration citing such information, the 
public perception of a linkage between Iraq and al-Qa'ida would have been fostered. 
But in terms of whether there is substance to the overall view that Saddam's regime 
had links with al-Qa'ida, both the 9/11 Commission and the Duelfer reports have 
given little currency to these allegations. 27 Although the 9/11 Commission did find 
evidence that al-Qa' ida had repeatedly approached Iraq, they found no evidence to 
support the conjecture that any real cooperation had existed. 
28 Therefore, there is a 
clear question of why did the administration infer from its intelligence data that Iraq 
had substantial linkages to al-Qa'ida when a post-invasion reassessment suggests the 
contrary? 
In terms of translating this perception to Congress, the White House's alarming 
pronouncements saw Iraq steadily evolve as a key political issue as part of the War 
on Terror. Congress had clearly favoured regime change since 1998, but the issue of 
unconventional weapons falling into the hands of al-Qa'ida had altered the definition 
of threat that Iraq posed. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations met at the end 
of July 2002 to discuss the threats posed by Iraq; it was clear from the testimony of 
u Fred Barnes, "Mohamed Atta Was Here and Met with Saddam Hussain's Man in Prague, " Weekly 
Standard 8 Dec. 2002,12/06/03 
<http: //www. weeklystandard. com/content/public/articles/000/000/001/539dozfr. asp>. 
26 Peter Green, "Iraq Link to Sept 11 Attack and Anthrax Is Ruled Out, " Telegraph Online 18 Dec. 
2001,12/01/02 <http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/news/main. jhtml? xml=/news/2001/12/18/wirq 18. xml>. 
2' National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report: The Full Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 2004) 567pp. 12/01/05 <http: //www. 9- 
11 commission. gov/report/index. htm>; and Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special 
Advisor on Iraq's WMD: Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Washington, D. C.: CIA, 2004) 350pp. 
02/03/05 <http: //www. cia. goy/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/>. 
28 National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report: The Full Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States. 
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several of witnesses that the administration's fears were warranted. 29 With much of 
the substance of the Senate committee having confirmed the administration's 
position, this newly defined threat was given political credibility on a bipartisan 
level. 
Of equal importance, however, was the nature of the intelligence released by the CIA 
to members of Congress. With the CIA confirming that Iraq possessed such weapons 
and had links with al-Qa'ida, there appeared to be a clear political case which 
justified the executive's position. Indeed, in advance of the Congressional debate on 
the authorisation for the use of force against Iraq, the CIA released excerpts of a 
closed Congressional hearing held on 2 October 2002. The excerpts left little doubt 
that Iraq had longstanding ties to al-Qa'ida and posed a threat through its undeclared 
stockpiles of unconventional weapons. 30 With the executive and the intelligence 
community confirming that Iraq posed a threat to the United States through such 
linkages, the political climate within Congress shifted towards an acceptance of the 
position of the executive. Crucially, this allowed the executive to implement a 
substantive foreign policy change towards Iraq. 
With regard to Iraq's unconventional weapons programmes, the intelligence 
community was correct to highlight that Iraq had the theoretical capability to be in 
possession of weapons to the sum total that the UN special commission saw as 
outstanding. However, as has already been argued in this thesis, the intelligence 
community should have analytically known that this was highly unlikely and any 
suggestion to the contrary was misleading. According to the 2005 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, "[t]he intelligence community was dead wrong in 
almost all of its prewar judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This 
29 United States, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Threats. Responses and Regional 
Considerations Surrounding Iraq, 107th Cong. 2nd Sess., (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 31 Jul. 2002) 
279pp. 16/06/03 <http: //frwebgate. access. gpo. gov/cgi- 
bin/getdoc. cgi? dbname=107_senate_hearings &docid=f: 81697. pdf>. 
30 George J. Tenet, "CIA Letter to Senate on Baghdad's Intentions, " New York Times Online 9 Oct. 
2002,10/10/02 <www. nytimes. com/2002/10/09/international/09TTEX. htm1>. 
-221- 
was a major intelligence failure. "31 Although there was a clear failure of intelligence, 
there is also the possibility that the intelligence data was `politicised' by way of it 
being selectively used as a tactical means of providing the cases belli for war against 
Iraq. 
The clear case was thus made that Iraq had failed to comply with its obligations and 
that it continued to possess a prohibited unconventional weapons stockpile. By 
adding the terrorist linkage, US foreign policy was able to provide a level of 
justification, on the grounds of safeguarding US national security, to issue an 
ultimatum to Iraq. But, as already discussed, the policy response to this potential 
threat was the adoption of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence. So, if Iraq failed 
to adhere to its obligations, the Bush administration maintained that it reserved the 
right to use `pre-emptive' action against Iraq as per its rules of engagement. 
A key issue was whether the Bush administration should revert to the United Nations 
as part of its tactical strategy. Bush acknowledged that "[t]here were certain people 
in the administration that were hopeful we could solve this diplomatically. And there 
were some that basically said we can't solve it diplomatically. "32 Colin Powell has 
been portrayed as a notable advocate within the administration for resorting to the 
United Nations as a means of providing a wider diplomatic footing; but, then again, 
as Secretary of State it is only reasonable to expect that someone in such a position 
would advocate this. Although this was accepted by the administration, Cheney's 
views on the United Nations route leading to a "never-ending process of debate, 
compromise and delay"33 seems to capture the essence of the view held by the White 
House. It was recognised, however, that the active participation of the United 
Kingdom was required in order for political legitimacy if it could not be provided 
through the United Nations. Whilst the administration would not have conceivably 
felt a domestic political need for the specific authorisation of the Security Council in 
31 United States, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President, GPO, 2005) 618pp. 04/04/05 
<http: //www. wmd. gov/report/>. 
32 Woodward, Plan of Attack 153. 
33 Ibid. 157. 
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the same manner as the United Kingdom, some form of international legitimacy was 
still required. Robert Kagan rightly highlights that although the Bush administration 
did not require the active participation of British forces to invade Iraq "[i]t was the 
patina of international legitimacy Blair's support provided -a legitimacy the 
American people wanted and needed, as the Bush officials well understood. , 34 The 
conclusion was to place the emphasis on the need for the United Nations to enforce 
its own resolutions and, failing that, there would be a case for the United States to act 
without a specific UN sanction along with a "coalition of the willing. " Moreover, 
through resorting to the United Nations in the first instance, the spectre of 
international legitimacy was afforded by the United Kingdom. 
On 12 September 2002, Bush declared at a speech at the United Nations that it was 
the responsibility on the international community to enforce UN resolutions on Iraq. 
Bush sent the clear message to the United Nations that if it failed to enforce the 
relevant UN Security Council resolutions the United States will be forced into action. 
Bush stated: 
My nation will work with the UN Security Council to meet our 
common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must 
move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work 
with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the 
purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security 
Council resolutions will be enforced - the just demands of peace and 
security will be met - or action will be unavoidable. 35 
In accordance with the Bush doctrine, this immediate threat had to be dealt with 
multilaterally if possible, but pre-emptively and in a unilateral fashion if the UN 
route proved ineffective. 36 A few days later on 17 September 2002 the Bush 
administration released its National Security Strategy. As has already been discussed, 
34 Kagan, Of Paradise and Power 150. 
35 George W. Bush, "President's Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly, " Remarks by the 
President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York: GPO, 12 Sept. 2002.5pp. 
17/02/02 <http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1. htnd>. 
36 United States, House, Authorization for the Use of Force against Iraq, H. R. 114, P. L. 102-1, 
(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 10 Oct. 2002) 8pp. 17/12/03 
<http: //www. iraqwatch. org/government/TJS/Legislation/ILA. htm>. 
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it controversially adopted the preventative use of force doctrine as a key method to 
prevent rogue states developing unconventional weapons which could be provided to 
terrorist groups. In terms of Iraq, this basically set out the political `rules of 
engagement' whereby launching an invasion of Iraq would occur if the United 
Nations failed to enforce its own resolutions. 
On a domestic level, Congress provided authorisation for the use of force against 
Iraq in October 2002. This sent a clear statement to the world that the United States 
was prepared to act if Iraq failed to comply with UN resolutions. This, in addition to 
Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly, prompted revised diplomatic attempts at 
the United Nations to have the inspectors returned to Iraq. 
It was following these developments that the Security Council unanimously passed 
UNSCR 1441 of 8 November 2002. The resolution recognised that Iraq had been in 
material breech of a series of previous UN resolutions, but nonetheless accorded Iraq 
a final opportunity to comply with the will of the international community. Iraq was 
required to provide a full and complete declaration of its unconventional weapons 
programmes and missile technology within thirty days. The resolution made clear 
that if Iraq failed to comply with the terms of the resolution, it would face "serious 
consequences. "37 But under international law, this does not amount to an 
authorisation for the use of force unless one interprets the case of Kosovo as 
providing the customary international legal justification required for the use of force, 
without specific authorisation from the Security Council. 
It is worth recognising at this point that in the Security Council discussions on 
Resolution 1441, it was recognised that the resolution did not contain the 
authorisation for the use of force, and that any authorisation to do so would require 
an additional resolution. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, John 
Negroponte said: 
As we have said on numerous occasions to Council members, this 
Resolution contains no "hidden triggers" and no "automaticity" with 
respect to the use of force. If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to 
37 UNSCR 1441 of 8 Nov. 2002, Para. 13. 
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the Council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA, or a member state, the matter 
will return to the Council for discussions as required in paragraph 12.38 
The recognition that Resolution 1441 did not contain the authorisation for the use of 
force against Iraq was also confirmed by the British permanent representative to the 
United Nations, Jeremy Greenstock: 
We heard loud and clear during the negotiations the concerns about 
"automaticity" and "hidden triggers" ... Let me 
be equally clear in 
response, as one of the co-sponsors of the text we have adopted. 
There is no "automaticity" in this Resolution. If there is a further Iraqi 
breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the 
Council for discussion as required in operational paragraph 12.39 
Therefore, Resolution 1441 was adopted on the provision given by its sponsors, the 
United States and United Kingdom, that the resolution did not contain the 
authorisation for the use of force, even in the event of an Iraqi non-compliance. 
Iraq resumed its cooperation with the IABA and the UN special commission on 27 
November and provided a 12,000 page declaration to the United Nations in early 
December. Iraq's declaration amounted to a statement that it was no longer in 
possession of unconventional weapons as it had unilaterally destroyed them 4° Hans 
Blix described the declaration as consisting of "reprints of declarations that had been 
sent to UNSCOM in the years before the inspectors left at the end of 1998. '41 But, 
for the United States, the declaration amounted to a material breech as it did not 
include declarations on everything it believed to be outstanding. Nevertheless, the 
38 United States, Mission to the United Nations, Explanation of Vote by Ambassador John D. 
Negroponte, (New York: United States, GPO, 8 Nov. 2002) 2pp. 12 Jul 2003 
<http: //www. un. int/usa/02print_187. htm >. 
39 United Kingdom, Mission to the United Nations, Explanation of Vote by Jeremy Greenstock, (New 
York: United Nations, 8 Nov. 2002) lpp. 12/07/03 
<http: //www. un. org/webcast/unitedkingdoml 10802. htm>. 
4° Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (London: Bloomsbury, 2004) 99-102. 
al Ibid. 107. 
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United States did not aim to bring the crisis to a close and allowed the inspections 
process to continue. 
With the inspection process continuing, both the United States and the United 
Kingdom released intelligence dossiers on Iraq's WMD capabilities in order to 
bolster domestic support against Iraq. The CIA's and British Joint Intelligence 
Committee's (JIC) dossiers asserted that Iraq was continuing its unconventional 
weapon programmes and was in possession of actual weapons. The British 
government's assessment stated that, based on UNSCOM reports, Iraq had failed to 
declare the following materials: 
Up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes 
of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, 
including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi chemical 
warfare programme, were unique to the production of VX; growth 
media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce 
over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to 
having manufactured); over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of 
chemical and biological agents. 42 
It is important to recognise here that the JIC's assessment highlighted not only the 
quantities of precursor materials Iraq had not accounted for, but also the quantities of 
actual biological and chemical weaponries Iraq was believed to be in possession of. 
But this estimate was misleading: it was the maximum potential of Iraq's capability, 
and did not account for the production wastage of precursors during manufacture; the 
actual shelf life of such weapons; or even potential stockpiles destroyed during 
bombing raids. 
In the aftermath of the apparent suicide of the British government's weapons expert, 
Dr David Kelly, the Hutton Inquiry examined the intelligence data which was 
included in the JIC's dossier on Iraq. A key finding was that Downing Street wanted 
a compelling case to be made in the dossier and that this influenced the language 
42 United Kingdom, 10 Downing Street, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the 
British Government, (ID 114567), (London: The Stationery Office, 24 Sep. 2002) 55pp. 20/10/03 
<http: //www. number-IO. gov. uk/output/Page271. asp >. 
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used by the JIC. Lord Hutton's report stated that this "may have subconsciously 
influenced... members of the JIC to make the wording of the dossier somewhat 
stronger than it would have been if it had been contained in a normal JIC 
assessment. ' 43 Overall, it allowed for a degree of misrepresentation in Iraq's 
capability, and was therefore arguably construed towards serving the political 
purpose of bolstering legitimacy for launching an invasion. In essence, the Hutton 
Report underlined that the intelligence data had been potentially politicised to serve 
the tactical policy of invading Iraq to effect regime change. 
The US and the United Kingdom interpreted Iraq's actions after the inspection 
process resumed as constituting a material breech. 44 Following the rhetoric and 
military deployments which indicated that an invasion was likely, numerous large- 
scale anti-war protests occurred across the world. By themselves, such protests had 
little bearing on altering US policy, but they did fuel the anti-war position of several 
countries, in particular France and Germany. The bearing this had on US foreign 
policy was via the United Nations in terms of the viability of having a second 
resolution passed which classified Iraq as being in material breech; this provided the 
specific authorisation for the use of force. As has already been discussed, whilst this 
would not necessarily have prevented the United States from invading Iraq, it was 
significant for US policy through the effect it had on the United Kingdom's ability to 
partake in an invasion. The problem was very much whether a credible case could be 
made at the United Nations to overcome the widespread domestic opposition to any 
potential war against Iraq. 
President Bush promised compelling evidence in his January 2003 State of the Union 
Address to allay doubts over Iraq's possession of prohibited weapons. The 
administration provided this through a public presentation of intelligence data by 
Secretary Powell at the United Nations in early February 2003. This was the 
culmination of efforts by the United States to provide a clear cut case of the need to 
`} United Kingdom, House of Commons, Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding 
the Death of Dr David Kelly C. M. G., (HC247), (London: The Stationery Office, 28 Jan. 2004) 
473sect. 25/10/04 <http: //www. the-hutton-inquiry. org. uk/content/reportl>. 
44 United Nations, UNMOVIC, An Update on Inspection, (New York: United Nations, 27 Jan. 2003) 
9pp. 19/06/04 <http: //www. un. org/Depts/unmovicBx27. htm>. 
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bring Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions. The presentation was very 
reminiscent of Secretary Adlai Stevenson's performance during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Powell's photographic and audio data indicated that Iraq was actively 
concealing and deceiving UNMOVIC. Although it was widely hailed within the 
United States as a compelling case it was also subject to a great degree of 
scepticism. 45 Indeed, Hans Blix noted that the presentation contained inaccuracies 
and was by no means a clear cut case. 46 Russia, France and China shared this 
scepticism and were unwilling to accept the British and American position that it 
provided a casus Belli against Iraq. They took the position that the inspectors should 
be accorded more time before a judgement was formulated, and thus a second 
resolution finding Iraq in material breech and authorising the use of force was seen 
as premature. However, on face value, Powell's presentation did seem convincing 
and it is reasonable to conclude that it had some effect on swaying public opinion in 
favour of the need to launch punitive action against Iraq. 
However, with Hans Blix's report to the United Nations on 6 March 2003 which 
specified a catalogue of unresolved disarmament issues, 47 the United Kingdom and 
the United States saw clear justification for a second resolution finding Iraq in 
material breech and authorising the use of force. Despite the findings in Blix's report, 
Russia and France expressed their unwillingness to authorise the use of force, and 
their willingness to use their veto at the Security Council. Crucially, Jacques Chirac 
stated that "France will vote no to a new UN resolution on Iraq whatever the 
circumstances. "48 This was important in that it ended any possibility of a vote being 
taken at the Security Council and implied that this would be the case even if Iraq was 
in clear breech of its obligations. Chirac's position, however, in effect gave political 
justification for the use of force without the specific authorisation of the Security 
45 Glen Rangwala, "Blix and Elbaradei Vs Powell, " Middle East Reference 14 Feb. 2003,10/11/04 
<http: //middleeastreference. org. uk/un03O2l4. html>. 
46 Blix, Disarming Iraq 152-57. 
47 United Nations, UNMOVIC, Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's Proscribed Weapons 
Programmes, (New York: United Nations, 6 Mar. 2003) 175pp. 13/06/04 
<http: //www. un. org/Depts/unmovic/documents/6mar. pdf>. 
48 Anonymous, "France Will Use Iraq Veto, " BBC News Online 10 Mar. 2003,11/05/03 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/world/middle-east/2838269. stm>. 
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Council. This proved to be a key issue which aided Tony Blair receiving the 
authorisation from the British Parliament as resolving the issue through the United 
Nations was no longer seen as a viable option. Therefore, France's position gave a 
degree of legitimacy to the use of force without specific authorisation for the use of 
force from the Security Council, and thus nullified any restraints the United Nations 
may have had over preventing an invasion from taking place. 
With the United Nations route effectively closed off, US policy was able to function 
with a greater degree of latitude. This culminated in an ultimatum being issue to 
Iraq. Without the inability to refer to the United Nations, the United States and a 
`coalition of the willing' subsequently launched an invasion on 20 March 2003. 
Allegations were widespread at the US subjugation of international law and political 
unilateralism. Although the invasion was not sanctioned by a specific resolution, it 
arguably relied on the customary principle of international law set by the case of 
Kosovo where both the EU and the United States acted without specific 
authorisation for the use of force; but admittedly this is by no means a resolved issue 
under international law. In terms of the allegation of unilateralism, the United States 
did act with several other countries including the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy and 
Spain, and it is therefore incorrect to refer to the invasion as a unilateral undertaking. 
Indeed, Robert Kagan is correct to highlight that France and Germany's accusation 
of unilateralism more aptly stems from their loss of influence over US policy. 
49 
It is clear that the 9/11 attacks resulted in a tactical shift in US policy which resulted 
in a military invasion to achieve the US strategic objective of reime change that had 
been applied unchanged since 1991. However, it has been shown that the official 
justifications for launching the invasion were lacking. This underscores that the 
United States had applied the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence and had used 
Iraq's failure/inability to comply with UN resolutions as a cases belli for war. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that, on a wider level, the grand strategic 
premise of the United States was to promote democracy and liberalism as a means of 
countering extremist political Islam and terrorism. As it will be shown in the next 
49 Kagan, Of Paradise and Power 105-58. 
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section, this was a key strategic objective which was arguably of more importance 
than the perceived need to act preventatively against Iraq. 
2.2 Strategic Foreign Policy Towards Iraq 
Under the rubric of the Bush doctrine, the potential threat posed by an Iraq in 
possession of unconventional weapons should not be interpreted as mandating pre- 
emptive action in the form of regime change through a military invasion: 
theoretically, it would have only become a requirement once all diplomatic channels 
had been exhausted. However, although the United States made clear its belief that 
Iraq possessed such weapons, and was in a position to comply with its international 
obligations, the truth of the matter is more sobering: Iraq's unilateral destruction of 
its prohibited weapons prior to 1995 placed itself in a position whereby it was not 
capable of fully complying with its obligations, despite the Bush administration's 
position that Iraq was capable of doing so. 50 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that given Iraq's failure to comply with its 
international obligations since 1991, the Bush administration would have taken the 
position that there was little or no realistic prospect of a willing Iraqi compliance, bar 
the exception of the threat of a subsequent invasion hanging over it like the sword of 
Damocles. But of more importance, given the nature of the intelligence data, it is 
difficult to see how the administration could have seen a full and complete 
compliance with UN resolutions as anything but a marginal possibility. When the 
factor of verifying weapons destroyed in the allied bombing campaigns are taken into 
account, or the possibility that Iraq had indeed unilaterally destroyed some of its 
weapons that were past their shelf-life, even a conservative interpretation of the data 
which was publicly released leads to the conclusion that a strict Iraqi compliance 
with UN resolutions was unlikely. In addition to this, the intelligence data, which 
was mainly provided by opposition groups, was circumstantial and laced with 
50 There is no evidence to support the view that any US administration since 1991 actually believed 
Iraq was not in possession of unconventional weapons, and therefore incapable of diplomatically 
complying with its obligations. To suggest that the Bush administration knew its intelligence data was 
incorrect, rather than simply based on inferences and circumstantial evidence, would equate to the 
charge that it was guilty of the federal felony of misleading Congress. 
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qualifiers. Therefore, it is justifiable to conclude that the logical product of the 
administration's foreign shift after the 9/11 attacks was the realisation that the 
decision to dive Iraq an ultimatum would almost certainly require a subsequent 
invasion. 51 
According to Richard Hass, after a discussion with Condoleezza Rice in early July 
2002, he was left with little doubt that a decision to go to war had already been made. 
Hass commented that: 
Condi and I have regular meetings, once every month or so - she and 
I get together for thirty or forty-five minutes, just to review the 
bidding. And I raised this issue about were we really sure that we 
wanted to put Iraq front and center at this point, given the War on 
Terrorism and other issues. And she said, essentially, that that 
decision's been made, don't waste your breath. And that was early 
July [2002] 52 
From Hass's remarks, it is reasonable to conclude that the administration recognised 
that compliance by Iraq would not be forthcoming, or was not possible, and therefore 
it was in effect planning for an invasion against Iraq. This serves to underline the 
argument that the Bush administration had changed its tactical policy towards 
achieving the unchanged strategic objective of regime change. 
In addition to this, a secret memo was leaked to the press in the run up to the British 
general election in May 2005 which confirmed Hass's remarks. The internal 
Downing Street memo listed the minutes from a meeting the Prime Minister held 
with senior cabinet members and intelligence personal on 23 July 2002. The minutes 
reported the following from the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service after 
holding talks with counterparts in Washington: 
sl Admittedly, the United States had been consistent in its position that Saddam Hussain would have 
rekindled his unconventional weapons programme if the sanctions were lifted. Therefore, although it 
can be argued that it would have made little substantive difference if Iraq had indeed complied with 
UN resolutions, the prospect of the United States leading an invasion of Iraq if it had indeed fully 
complied with its international obligations, is unlikely to have been a politically expedient option. 
52 Nicholas Lemann, "How It Came to War, " New Yorker 31 Mar. 2003,13/09/04 
<http: //www. newyorker. com/printable/? fact/03033 I fa_fact>. 
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There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen 
as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military 
action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the 
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The [US 
National Security Council] had no patience with the UN route, and no 
enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There 
was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath of military 
action. 53 
The significance of the leaked Downing Street memo is that it confirms that the Bush 
administration had decided to invade Iraq for strategic reasons and embarked on a 
tactical policy that would almost certainly result in an invasion. Indeed, this tactical 
policy hinged around misleading the general public through the selective use of 
intelligence data to justify the invasion. 
With there being a clear use of tactical foreign policy to justify the invasion of Iraq 
the key issue is what was the strategic objective which underpinned the policy 
change? As already highlighted, the root cause of Islamic terrorism was seen by 
Bush's neoconservative foreign team as stemming from the absence of liberal 
democracy in Middle Eastern countries. Therefore the universal adoption of liberal 
democracy throughout the Middle East would form the basis of a long term 
counterterrorism strategy. 54 Iraq, however, was seen as the key to a wider 
geostrategic vision of democratising the wider Middle East area. Indeed, Bush 
commented in February 2003 that: 
A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform 
that vital region, by brining hope and progress into the lives of 
millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in 
53 Matthew Rycroft, "The Secret Downing Street Memo, " Times Online 1 May 2005,02/05/05 
<www. timesonline. co. uk/article/0,2087-1593607,00. html >. 
sa The widespread adoption of liberal democracy is widely highlighted as fostering more peaceful 
relations between countries. 
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liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful 
Iraq. 55 
This approach departs from the traditional notion of the maintenance of Persian Gulf 
security through ensuring the region's stability by way of supporting pro-Western 
autocratic regimes. 
With the neoconservative interpretation of the post-9/11 context, the need to achieve 
a democratisation throughout the Middle East was a pressing concern. The manner in 
which this assessment ties in with US foreign policy towards Iraq is via the impact a 
democratised Iraq would arguably have on the greater Middle East area. 56 The logic 
of behind line of thought is that following an invasion of Iraq, the post-war 
reconstruction effort, which would necessarily include the establishment of 
democratic governmental institutions, would result in unassailable pressures on 
neighbouring authoritarian countries to indigenously democratise. The net effect is 
that the establishment of a liberal democratic regional system within the Middle East 
would safeguard US national security by countering the base level conditions that 
result in Islamic terrorist movements. In essence, the grand strategic era of the War 
on Terror dictated the primacy of national security and the widespread adoption of 
liberal democracy was seen as providing this in the long term. 
Although it is a moot point and outside the scope of this thesis, it is debateable 
whether democracy can be imposed through military force in a secure and 
sustainable manner in addition to promoting moves towards democratisation on 
neighbouring authoritarian states. 57 However, it does seem clear that this was the key 
55 George W. Bush, "President Bush Presents Vision of Middle East Peace, " Remarks by the President 
at the American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 26 Feb. 2003.6pp. 
15/09/04 <http: //tokyo. usembassy. gov/e/p/tp-20030228al. htm1>. 
56 Marina Ottway, et al., "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East, " Critical Mission: Essays on 
Democracy Promotion, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002) 
229-32. 
57 Ibid. 230-36. 
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strategic objective in the Bush administration's policy calculations towards Iraq. 58 
The unveiling of the Middle East Partnership Initiative in December 2002 underlines 
the administration's commitment to the promotion of economic, political and 
educational reform across the Middle East through the provision of developmental 
assistance. Although the investment, training and support programmes that are 
encompassed in MEPI appear a benign political initiative, in the long term they 
would arguably provide the United States with more political influence as a result of 
its economic investments. Moreover, the educational and political reform initiatives 
would conceivably result in gradual socio-political changes occurring across the 
Middle East. Whilst it is outside the scope of this thesis to assess their prospects for 
success, it is suffice to say their adoption underlines the argument that the War on 
Terror has resulted in an abandonment of the concept of containment and balance of 
power approach in favour of a widespread overhaul of the Middle East on a socio- 
political level as a means of countering terrorism. It also underscores the Wilsonian 
aspect to post-9/11 US grand strategy that has been highlighted in chapter 3. 
Therefore, the invasion of Iraq through the use of its failure/inability to comply with 
its international obligations as a justification for war was a tactical foreign policy 
initiative geared towards achieving this wider strategic objective. 
2.2.1 Post-Invasion of Iraq: Strategic Opportunity or Quagmire 
The military campaign to unseat Saddam Hussain's regime is accurately described by 
Timothy Garden as having "no formal conclusion. "59 Bush declared on I May 2003 
that "[m]ajor combat operations in Iraq have ended" and that "our coalition is 
engaged in securing and reconstructing that country. ' 60 Bush was correct that the 
Iraqi regime had been toppled and the Iraqi army had been defeated but, providing 
58 Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror, " Critical Mission: Essays on 
Democracy Promotion, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003) 
63-74. 
59 Timothy Garden, "Iraq: The Military Campaign, " International Affairs 79.4 (2003): 701. 
60 George W. Bush, "President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended, " 
Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1 May 2003.3pp. 05/05/03 
<http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15. html>. 
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security for post-war reconstruction was to be a greater task than many in the 
administration had envisaged. 
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by L. Paul Bremer III, was 
charged with the political administration of Iraq until the formal transfer of authority 
on 28 June 2004. Resulting in the main from the Bush administration's 
miscalculation and unwillingness to commit the level of forces required for Iraqi 
security needs, a guerrilla style insurgency grew unabated. 61 In the initial period after 
the toppling of Saddam Hussain's regime the Iraqi economy virtually collapsed and, 
was plagued with widespread looting, lawlessness and insecurity. Given that US 
strategy was for Iraq to be reconstructed as a functional and pluralistic democracy in 
order to foster an overhaul of the region towards democratic polity, the insecurity 
within Iraq was a clear barrier. 
The administration's initial strategy towards the post war reconstruction of Iraq was 
for it to remain under US control. The US was not prepared to cede control of Iraq to 
the UN but, nevertheless, saw it as a useful vehicle for soliciting financial aid. 62 
However the growing insurgency had underlined that the US forces were insufficient 
for restoring security to Iraq. This was compounded by the active-duty troop strength 
of the US which indicated it required some form of third party participation by early 
2004 or it would need to extend the tour of duty period. These factors prompted a 
change in tact from the Bush administration in early September as it began to seek a 
UN resolution that would provide for an internationalised military force which was 
comparable to that employed in Kosovo. 63 
Within the context of this policy change, two car bomb attacks struck the UN 
compound in Baghdad in late August and early September. The former resulted in 
the death of Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN Special Representative for Iraq. This 
raised questions within the UN that it was targeted as a result of a perceived linkage 
61 Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq, " Foreign Affairs 83.5 (2004): 34-56. 
6' Steven R. Weisman and Felicity Barringer, "US Abandons Idea of Bigger UN Role in Iraq 
Occupation, " New York Times 19 Aug. 2003, Al. 
63 David E. Sanger, "Bush Looks to UN to Share Burden on Troops in Iraq, " New York Times 3 Sept. 
2003, Al. 
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it had with the United States. 64 With the second bombing in September, the 
assessment was made by the UN that the security situation was too dangerous to 
warrant a significant commitment of personnel. 65 By October the UN began to 
significantly downsize its deployment in Iraq and this hampered the US efforts to 
garner support for an internationalised force. 
The downsizing of the UN deployment in October 2003 made the prospect of the UN 
assuming a greater role an unrealistic option. Simon Chesterman and David Malone 
aptly comment: 
The idea that the United Nations can somehow quaff the poisoned 
chalice is delusional. The present US policy reversal and UN staff 
concerns place the secretary general in a difficult position. Until 
security improves, [Koff Annan] cannot in good conscience send 
civilian staff into harm's way. But security will only improve when 
the United States looks less like an ccupying power. Many 
analysts therefore think that Iraq is going to get worse before it 
gets better. 66 
In sum, the post-invasion strategic context saw the United States descend into a 
situation where it was acting, multilaterally through a `coalition of the willing', but 
was doing so without the legitimacy afforded by the United Nations. In some 
respects, a parallel can be drawn with the Vietnam War where the US faced a similar 
form of insurgency and was acting without a comfortable level of multilateral 
legitimacy. The guerrilla warfare that began to develop throughout 2003 in the 
aftermath of the invasion was still in its infancy when compared to the scale of 
attacks witnessed in subsequent years. Nevertheless, the key challenges the post- 
invasion scenario presented the United States was how long it would take for the 
security situation to be addressed and for a functional democratic government to take 
64 Thalif Deen, "UN Bombed for Perceived US Link, Experts Say, " Inter-Press Service 19 Aug. 2003, 
03/04/04 <http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/0819unbombed. htm>. 
65 Edith M. Lederer, "Annan Wont Send UN Staff Back to Iraq, " Associated Press 18 Oct. 2003, 
12/03/04 <http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/1018annan. htm>. 
66 Simon Chesterman and David Malone, "The Iraq Tragedy: It's Too Late for the UN to Help Much, " 
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power. An assessment of the strategic impact of this aspect of US policy on Persian 
Gulf reform issues will necessarily require a medium to long term retrospective 
study. Given the time frame of this case study it is not viable to undertake this but is 
clearly an important area for future research. 
2.3 Summary Assessment 
The 9/11 attacks were highly significant in US policy towards the Persian Gulf in 
that the neoconservative vision on how the threat of terrorism should be countered 
had a direct bearing on US strategy towards achieving Persian Gulf Security. Since 
1991 a policy of dual containment had been applied in order to maintain a balance of 
power and thus ensure the security through regional security. The Bush 
administration's response to the 9/11 attacks saw the promotion of liberal democracy 
as the overarching means of countering the root causes of international terrorism. 
This made the traditional balance of power approach in the Persian Gulf no longer 
viable. Indeed, it was seen as being a contributory factor to the development of 
Islamic terrorism. Therefore, there was a need for political, economic and 
educational reforms to be applied across the Persian Gulf as part of the long term 
goal of democratisation which would provide security and stability for the Persian 
Gulf. 
The invasion of Iraq served this strategic objective in that the post-war reconstruction 
would allow nation building on-a-par with post-Second World War West Germany, 
making way for the adoption of democratic governance. More significance, a fully 
functioning democratic Iraq was believed to hold the potential for spreading 
democracy throughout the region as the position of authoritarian rulers would 
become untenable. 
Whilst this was a key strategic objective in the rationalisation behind the invasion of 
Iraq, the Bush doctrine also saw a potential future threat arising from Iraq through 
the perceived commitment by Saddam Hussain's regime to produce unconventional 
weapons in the future. The prospect of such weapons being used directly or 
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asymmetrically against the United States was taken as justification in itself for the 
preventative use of force. 
It has been suggested that the reason why these strategic objectives were not stated as 
the actual casus belli for mounting an invasion against Iraq as stemming from their 
perceived illegitimacy in the eyes of the international. Indeed, this would have posed 
practical difficulties in that it may well have jeopardised the formation of a coalition 
to launch the invasion. Even so, Iraq was a unique case in that it was unable to fully 
comply with UN resolutions. This gave the United States the opportunity to premise 
the invasion on the basis an enforcement of UN resolutions. US policy therefore used 
the case of an enforcement of UN resolutions as a tactical means of achieving its dual 
objectives that stemmed from the post-9/11 international context. It was therefore a 
clear fait accompli. 
3.0 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN 2001-2003 
The onset of the War on Terror was the unlikely conduit whereby bilateral relations 
were developed through shared geopolitical interests. Discussions on Afghanistan 
had taken place prior to the 9/11 attacks under the auspices of the United Nations' 
`six-plus-two' talks. The Iranians were fervent opponents of the Taliban and al- 
Qa'ida, and during the Clinton era they had aimed to solicit the active help of the 
United States to directly target them. However, US policy at that time had other 
priorities and thus no substantive cooperative agreement was achieved. The 9/11 
attacks fundamentally changed this contextual situation. 
The presence of Osama bin Laden and the refuge being provided to his organisation 17 
by the Taliban, gave a renewed sense of importance to US policy towards 
Afghanistan under the rubric of the War on Terror. In order to facilitate discussion 
being held in the six-plus-two talks, a sub group was created which included Italy 
and Germany for political cover. The group held meetings in Geneva, and as 
American action in Afghanistan served Iran's geopolitical interests, agreement was 
reached for it to provide logistical, intelligence and operational support for Operation 
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Enduring Freedom. 67 For Tehran, it would have been clear that the United States was 
going to take military action regardless of whether it cooperated but, given its 
interests in deposing the Taliban, it is likely that Khamene'i saw this cooperation as a 
necessary evil. 
With the end of war in Afghanistan, Iran became an active partner in the United 
Nations post-war conference held in Bonn, Germany. Khamene'i was pragmatic in 
his decision to cooperate with the post-reconstruction effort. Indeed, Iran had a 
vested interest in the United States succeeding in Afghanistan: Kenneth Pollack is 
correct to argue that a successful post-war reconstruction effort would have 
prevented a repeat of the instability caused by the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.68 By 
providing assistance and being an active partner for the United States, Iran was in 
effect securing its own national interests. 
With these shared geopolitical interests, it is only reasonable to speculate that the 
opportunity for confidence building measures towards a rapprochement would have 
been rife. However, it is important to recognise that the overarching contextual issue 
had become terrorism. With the State Department listing Iran as the a leading state 
sponsor of terrorism, it is questionable to what extent the Bush administration could 
have actually moved beyond containment without a substantive change in Iran's 
policies towards US designated terrorist groups. Moreover, given the central premise 
of the War on Terror being the spread of democracy and freedom, the Iranian regime 
was viewed within this context. Therefore a rapprochement without substantive 
reforms, which would have effectively resulted in a complete political transformation 
within Iran, would not have been viable and any cooperation the Bush administration 
was having with Iran was arguably tactical. Therefore, whilst cooperation based on 
geopolitical interests was important, it is doubtful it could have overcome the issue 
of Iranian links with terrorism. 
67 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle 345-49. 
68 Ibid. 349. 
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3.1 Unravelling the New Strategic Dynamic 
In spite of the relations with Iran being steadily built on through shared geopolitical 
interests, all of this was undone on 3 January 2002 when Israel intercepted a ship, the 
Karine A, carrying an arsenal of weaponry from Iran. The ship was captained by an 
officer in the Palestinian Authority's Navy and contained "[k]atyusha rockets, 
mortars, rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, ammunition, antitank mines, rocket- 
propelled grenades, and 2.5 tons of explosives. "69 The weapons were manufactured 
in Iran and had been loaded onto the Ship within Iranian territorial waters. 70 Israel 
and the United States found it to be a compelling case that Iran was guilty of illicitly 
supplying the weapons. Powell commented that: 
I think he [Arafat] ought to acknowledge, as the first step toward 
moving forward, acknowledge that this has happened and they bear 
some responsibility for it happening, and give the international 
community, and especially the Israelis, some assurance that this kind of 
activity is going to stop. And do it in a way that will be persuasive and 
convincing and allow us to move forward. 7' 
Whilst this did have a ramification on US diplomatic relations with the Palestinian 
Authority, it also had an impact on US foreign policy towards Iran. Within the newly 
emerged context of the War on Terror, Iran's provision of illicit armaments was seen 
by the White House and Congress as clear evidence of Iran's intention to derail the 
peace process through terrorism. Indeed, Pollack highlighted that the US intelligence 
community was convinced that Iran was "stepping up its support to HAMAS and PIJ 
to attack the right-wing Israeli government of Ariel Sharon. "72 But of more 
importance, reports came to light that Iran had allegedly allowed senior al-Qa'ida 
operatives to flee into Iran. This was in marked contrast to its initial clampdown and 
69 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle 350-51 
70 James Bennet, "Seized Arms Would Have Vastly Extended Arafat Arsenal, " New York Times 12 
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official position. With this coming to light only months after the 9/11 attacks, the 
political response in the United States to this was predictable and undid the `good 
will' developed from the shared interests in the overthrow of the Taliban. Indeed, 
Condoleezza Rice stated that "Iran's direct support of regional and global terrorism, 
and its aggressive efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, belie any good 
intentions it displayed in the days after the world's worst terrorist attacks in 
history. "73 
Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address identified Iran as being part of an `Axis of 
Evil' with Iraq and North Korea. According to Bob Woodward, both Rice and 
Stephen Hadley advised against Iran's inclusion in the speech as part of an `Axis' as 
it had a fledgling democratic movement. 74 Nevertheless, Bush insisted that Iran be 
included as he saw Iran posing, along with North Korea and Iraq, the biggest threat 
to the world in terms of terrorism and the procurement of unconventional weapons. 5 
As has already been discussed, the Bush doctrine saw the combination of these two 
factors as the greatest threat facing US national security; thus Iran's alleged 
involvement in both of these spheres resulted in it being categorised in this manner. 
For Iran, equating it with Iraq and North Korea was highly provocative and was 
greeted with condemnation by the hardliners as evidence of US provocation. Iran 
withdrew for a short period of time from the Geneva Group in protest, but later 
rejoined when it became clear that Iraq was to be targeted as the Group was useful as 
a conduit of information on US Gulf policy. 
With the onset of the Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, Iran refrained from 
hampering US policy, but was widely regarded as not having provided the same level 
of assistance that it had accorded the United States in its Afghanistan campaign. 
However, it is interesting to note that, according to Kenneth Pollack, Iran began 
moving intelligence personnel into Iraq from May 2003. He argues that an 
intelligence network was built up comprising "all of Iran's various intelligence and 
covert action organizations were represented in Iraq - the IRGC (including its Quds 
73 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle 351. 
74 Woodward, Plan of Attack 87-88. 
75 Ibid. 88. 
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Forces), Hizballah, the MOIS, Lebanese Hizballah, and assorted others. "76 But 
crucially, according to Pollack, this intelligence apparatus was not operational and 
thus not involved in hampering US activities in post-war Iraq. " The reason why this 
network was not activated to hamper US activities is speculated by Pollack as being 
a result of Iran's interest in seeing a successful post-war recovery in Iraq. More 
importantly, he also suggests that it is a tactical means by which Iran could achieve 
leverage against the United States if the Bush administration decided to take any 
preventative action against Tehran. 8 In other words, the Bush administration was 
facing a veiled threat from the hardliners in Iran through their ability to provoke 
varying degrees of instability within Iraq. 
3.1.1 Contextual Issue: Support for Terrorism 
Despite the United States having shared interests with Iran in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the main obstacle which was creating friction was Iran's perceived involvement 
with terrorism. The United States alleged that the al-Qa'ida attacks within Saudi 
Arabia on 12 May 2003, which saw three truck bombs detonated in a Western 
compound in Riyadh, killing twenty people, were actually planned in Iran. 
According to the United States, senior al-Qa'ida operatives were active in eastern 
Iran and had directed the attacks from a terrorist cell within Saudi Arabia. On face 
value, the United States saw Iran as complicit in these attacks as it had allowed 
known terrorists to freely operate within its territory. A more sober analysis, 
however, shows that these operatives were in an area of Iran which did not have a 
good governmental presence and thus it is possible to see why al-Qa'ida was able to 
function in Iran. Nevertheless, the perception by many within Congress and in media 
circles was that links somehow existed between al-Qa'ida and Iran's Sh'ia theocracy. 
Compounding this, Iran had allowed al-Qaeda operatives, who were involved in the 
attacks of 11 September 2001, free movement across Iranian territory. Indeed, the 
76 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle 355. 
77 Ibid. 352-58. 
78 Ibid. 
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9/11 Commission Report indicted that Tehran had informed its immigration officials 
to refrain from stamping their passports 79 Whilst the reports do not amount to an 
evidence of some form of substantive agreement, they are significant in that they 
made any form of co-operation based on mutual interests a politically charged option 
for the White House. 
As has already been highlighted, Iran was viewed by the US government as having 
longstanding ties to terrorist groups opposed to the existence of Israel and the whole 
concept of the peace process. Despite the newly emerged contextual situation which 
was characterised by a determined opposition to terrorism, Iran did not alter its 
policy towards such groups. In June 2002, reports came to light that Hezbollah, 
Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Islamic Jihad had 
convened under the auspices of the Iranian government in Tehran. 8° This was 
significant as it indicated that a more coordinated effort on behalf of the opposition 
groups was being promoted by Iran. As this occurred within the context of the War 
on Terror, the prospect of engagement occurring without a clear change in Iran's 
policies was a distant prospect, and underlines how Iran's policies undermined its 
relationship with the United States. 
The terrorist bombing of the Western compound in Riyadh in May 2003 was 
especially significant for the United States as seven out of the twenty fatalities were 
American citizens. With a link being established in the aftermath of the attacks with 
al-Qa'ida personnel in Iran, the United States sought their extradition. Iran's 
response was essentially a quid pro quo in that it requested that the MEK operatives 
in Iraq, who were near the Iranian border, be extradited. Iran's request was, at least 
on face value, perfectly reasonable in that the United States had designated the MEK 
as a terrorist organisation and had detained 3,800 MEK fighters in the immediate 
aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. The detention of the MEK fighters was actually a 
product of bilateral negotiations before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and was 
79 United States, National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report: The Full Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
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agreed on in order to secure Iranian cooperation in search and rescue missions in 
addition to securing the border with Iraq. 
Although the United States had detained MEK operatives, the wider contextual 
situation which implicated Iran in the Karine A illicit arms shipment to the 
Palestinian Authority, in addition to widespread allegations on Iran's failure to arrest 
al-Qa'ida operatives on its territory, resulted in the Bush administration refusing 
Iran's extradition request as part of a quid pro quo. This highlights a degree of 
hypocrisy on the part of the Bush administration in that it was refusing to extradite 
operatives of a group it had designated as an active terrorist organisation to the 
country where they had carried out their attacks. However, it is more telling on US 
policy towards Iran under the overall framework of Persian Gulf Security: Iran's ties 
with terrorism precluded mutual interests being built on bilaterally with the United 
States and ultimately resulted in the unwillingness of the Bush administration to 
extradite MEK operatives who were both terrorists and opponents of the Iranian 
regime. 
3.1.2 Iran's Nuclear Profiramme 
Although Iran's nuclear ambitions can be traced back to the purchase of a research 
reactor from the United States in 1959, the central issue for the United States has 
been whether Iran was seeking the production of a nuclear weapon despite it being a 
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Construction of Iran's 
nuclear power station at Bushehr began in 1974 by German contractors but was 
suspended in 1979. Iran signed an agreement with Russia on 8 January 1995 to 
complete the construction of the 1,000MW light water power station. As has already 
been highlighted, Iran maintained that it required this alternative source of energy as 
a result of rising oil and gas prices which it sought to sell rather than use 
domestically. Nevertheless, within the context of Iran's perceived involvement in 
international terrorism, the United States has regarded Iran's domestic nuclear 
programme as being ultimately geared towards the acquisition of a nuclear weapon, 
despite Iran being entitled to a domestic nuclear power capability under international 
law. 
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Although Iran's nuclear programme had been viewed with suspicion by the Clinton 
administration, there had been no evidence to support the conjecture that Iran was 
developing an illicit nuclear programme. This situation altered dramatically in 
August 2002 following the announcement by the National Council of Resistance of 
Iran (NCRI) that two secret nuclear facilities had been constructed in Natanz and 
Arak. 81 The NCRI claimed that a nuclear production plant and a research laboratory 
had been constructed in Natanz, and a heavy water production plant had been 
constructed in Arak. Crucially these facilities had not been declared to the IAEA. 
According to White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, the covert nature of the 
facilities underscored the administration's view that Iran was seeking a nuclear 
weapon capability. Indeed, he clarified the administrations overall view on Iran's 
nuclear programme in December 2002 as being that "there is no economic gain for a 
country rich in oil and gas, like Iran, to build costly indigenous nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities... Iran flares off more gas every year than the equivalent power it hopes to 
produce with these reactors. "82 
Within the context of the War on Terror and under the rubric of the Bush Doctrine, 
Iran's presumed illicit development of nuclear weapons was seen to pose a grave 
threat to the national security of the United States. Moreover, Iran's perceived 
involvement in international terrorism placed it in the unenviable position of having 
the potential to supply unconventional weapons asymmetrically to terrorist groups. 
Under the Bush Doctrine, the preventative use of force was justifiable once all 
diplomatic avenues had been exhausted. It is important, however, to recognise that in 
spite of the comprehensive nature of US sanctions towards Iran, the scope for 
diplomacy remained. In essence, the United States could not realistically impose any 
further punitive sanctions on Iran, so its options were essentially twofold: 
1. Use incentives as a means of achieving a moderation in Iran's nuclear policy; 
2. Rely on the good offices of other countries to negotiate a change in Iran's 
policies. 
81 The Associated Press, "Group: Iran's Nuke Program Growing, " New York Times 15 Aug. 2002, Al 
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While the options available were limited, it is important to recognise that the 
manifestation of Iran's covert nuclear programme became public in August 2002, at 
which point the administration was firmly committed to achieving regime change in 
Iraq through an invasion. With the United States engaged in Afghanistan and 
committed to an invasion of Iraq, it is reasonable to conclude that a military option 
towards Iran would not have been viable at that time. 
Given this contextual situation, the Bush administration appears to have had little 
choice but to premise its foreign policy towards Iran on non-military means. But on 
the other hand, an easing of US unilateral sanctions as part of a quid pro quo would 
have been a politically difficult option for the White House. Indeed, within the 
context of the War on Terror, the rubric of the Bush Doctrine, and the Presidential 
election campaign in 2004, it would have been politically difficult for the Bush 
administration to reduce sanctions towards Iran as an incentive for a moderation in 
Tehran's policies. Therefore, the Bush administration had little choice but to opt for 
the policy route which relied on the European Union and other countries as a means 
by which a diplomatic solution could be achieved. Indeed this point was conceded by 
Bush in December 2004 when he commented "[w]e're relying upon others, because 
we've sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran... in other words, we don't 
have much leverage with the Iranians right now. i83 In essence, United States foreign 
policy was in a position of stalemate as it did not have credible diplomatic options 
available to it, and was constrained in its ability to act punitively against Tehran. US 
foreign policy had, therefore, succumbed to the position of being essentially 
dependent on a unilateral modification of Iran's own policies, or the achievement of 
a diplomatic resolution, which was commensurate with US policy objectives, by the 
European Union. 
3.2 Summary Assessment 
US foreign policy towards Iran during the time period 2001-03 was both the nadir 
and the pinnacle of bilateral relations since 1993. The contextual situation of the War 
83 Susan Rice, "We Need a Real Iran Policy, " Washington Post 30 Dec. 2004, A27. 
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on Terror was the product of this dichotomy. The alignment of the Taliban and al- 
Qa'ida brought Afghanistan into the forefront of US foreign policy in the immediate 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. By virtue of geo-politics, Iran and the United States 
had shared national interests in the success of the Bush administration's first phase in 
the War on Terror. As a direct result of this contextual situation, the Bush 
administration achieved direct negotiations on a wide spectre of issues with the 
Iranians. This was highly significant in that this historically eluded the United States. 
This situation arguably held the potential for being built on in a fashion whereby 
bilateral difference could be resolved along the same lines as what happened with 
Libya in December 2003. 
Despite this political opportunity having so unexpectedly arisen, Iran did not refrain 
from undertaking policies which were simply provocative to the United States. 
Indeed, within the newly emerged context of the War on Terror, Iran's provision of 
armaments to the Palestinian Authority and inability to implement effective 
counterterrorism measures against al-Qa'ida operatives in Iran's eastern region was 
viewed by the executive and Congress as evidence of a simple unwillingness on 
behalf of Tehran to work with the United States. Iran's actions in this sphere undid 
the `good will' that had grown in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. This 
prompted the United States to reject Iran's application for an extradition of MEK 
operatives and thus reignited the spectre of mutual antagonism and recriminations. 
With the uncovering of Iran's nuclear facilities at Arak and Natanz, the long term 
suspicion that Iran was intent on illicitly producing a nuclear weapon came to the 
fore. Although such facilities are permissible under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty of 1968, Iran's concealment of them, coupled with its failure to declare 
several components and materials which can be used to manufacture a nuclear 
weapon, provided sufficient reason to conclude that Iran was indeed embarked on a 
programme to produce nuclear weapons. 
Given these revelations and the manner in which the United States became engaged 
in Afghanistan and subsequently in Iraq, the scope for punitive action or a relaxing of 
US policy as a diplomatic incentive were no longer viable options. This resulted in 
US policy towards Iran being in a stalemate as any diplomatic movement would 
-247- 
conceivably only have occurred from a unilateral initiative on behalf of Iran, or 
through a negotiated settlement via the European Union. Therefore, despite the 
bilateral relationship showing a degree of promise from shared geopolitical national 
interests, Iran's failure to abstain from policies which were highly provocative to the 
United States resulted in a diplomatic stalemate. 
4.0 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
What is striking from the above analysis is that following the attacks of 11 
September 2001, US policy towards Persian Gulf security fundamentally changed. 
The neoconservative response to the attacks saw counterterrorism emerge as the 
primary national interest of the United States. Crucially, the means by which the 
Bush administration saw the root causes of terrorism being, countered was through 
the promotion of freedom, liberty and democracy throughout the world and within 
the Persian Gulf in particular. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks had in essence prompted the 
rejection of the balance of power approach in favour of a wider Middle East 
transformation in order to both achieve Persian Gulf security and counter the root 
causes of terrorism. Iraq's failure/inability to comply with UN resolutions proved to 
be a tactical means of achieving this overarching strategic objective as it was 
stipulated as the casus belli for war. Indeed, Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to 
the United States but, under the rubric of the Bush Doctrine, the preventative use of 
force was seen as justifiable. 
US foreign policy towards Iran in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks held the prospect 
of an improvement in relations based on mutual geopolitical interests. Although 
these shared interests prompted the onset of direct negotiations that was simply never 
achieved by the Clinton administration, Iran failed to refrain from policies as it had 
done during the Clinton era, that were highly provocative to the United States. This 
ultimately resulted in diplomatic stalemate and rising hostility as a result 
recriminations over Iran's nuclear programme. 
Therefore, the Bush administration responded to the post-9/11 contextual 
environment with a fundamental reassessment of US grand strategy. This in turn 
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promoted a complete revision of US strategic policy towards the Persian Gulf. This 
underlines that US bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq were framed within the 
regional strategic interpretation during the Clintonian era: containment allowing for a 
balance of power. However, this regional strategic interpretation has been shown to 
have changed as a direct result of the Bush administrations adoption of a new global 
strategic agenda in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. 
The new strategic agenda of ensuring US national security through combating the 
actual root causes of political extremism was in Iraq's case the key factor which 
resulted in a change in tactics being applied for the achieving the objective of regime 
change. In the new strategic context Iraq served the new strategic function of 
allowing for, in the long term, a stable liberal democratic state to be established 
which would create unassailable pressures on the other states in the region by way of 
impacting on their civil society and ruling regimes. Indeed, for the Bush 
administration the case of Iraq allowed for a domino theory of democratic promotion 
to be applied to the wider Middle East. In essence, given the perspective of the Bush 
administration, Iraq served a key function in the global war on terror as it was 
viewed as the key means by which a regional transformation could be achieved and 
would counter the root causes of Islamic terrorism in the long term. 
Whilst this chapter has underscored that US policy towards Persian Gulf security can 
be satisfactorily located within the grand strategies of Bush administrations that have 
been outlined, the following chapter will examine the issue of US foreign policy 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This will complement the above analysis by 
showing that a departure occurred in US foreign policy in accordance with US grand 
strategy in the era of the War on Terror. 
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Chapter VII 
The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 
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"Coercion, after all, merely captures man. Freedom captivates him. " 
Robert S. McNamara 
May 1966 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The United States has had a long-standing interest in the realisation of an Arab-Israeli 
peace agreement, but its involvement is one of the most complex case studies on US 
foreign policy. This complexity stems from the specifics of the conflict itself, and from 
the differential factors, arising from varying interpretations, as being the key guiding 
force behind US foreign policy. 
The following analysis will be consistent with the metatheoretical analytical framework 
that has been set out for this thesis. The objective will be to establish whether US foreign 
policy towards the peace process in the time period 1993-2003 can be satisfactorily 
located within the grand strategic eras of the post-Cold War and the War on Terror. In 
fitting with the methodological framework of this study, the following analysis will aim 
to selectively draw from international, regional and domestic political factors which 
shaped US foreign policy. In addition to this, some attention will be paid to idiosyncratic 
factors in order to underline the micro forces behind the decisions which shaped US 
policy towards the peace process. 
The following analysis will contend that Bill Clinton's policy towards the peace process 
was consistent with the post-Cold War grand strategic era of issues being dealt with 
reactively on a case-by-case approach. The study will also show that George W. Bush's 
policy was commensurate with the new grand strategic era of the War on Terror. This 
underscores the central contention of this thesis that US grand strategy is a key factor 
that allows the conceptual and contextualisation of US foreign policy. Nevertheless, the 
more qualitative nature of the metatheory analysis will clearly demonstrate that although 
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the localised contextual situation was highly complex, US foreign policy went through 
identifiable stages. The analysis will aim to demonstrate what actually shaped US 
foreign policy and, through a clear empirical exposition, it will rationalise its deviations 
and evolution. 
It is outside the context of this study to encompass what the determining factors were 
behind the diplomatic decisions made by the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the 
focus will necessarily remain firmly premised on US foreign policy as a third party. But 
the overarching theme remains that during the post Cold War era, US policy towards the 
peace process was reactive to the dynamics and forces of various contextual factors 
whilst, with the onset of the War on Terror, US policy towards the peace process began 
to incorporate features which were commensurate with the new grand strategic era. 
The definition of the `peace process' encompasses US policy towards aiding the 
achievement of a peaceful resolution towards the state of belligerency between Israel 
and Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. As a result of Israel opting to negotiate 
bilaterally rather than multilaterally with the other parties to the dispute, the structure of 
this chapter will aim to deal with US policy in a chronological fashion, but also will 
separate US policy in terms of the specific bilateral negotiations occurring at that time. 
Although it is multifaceted, the focus of this study will mainly be towards the Israeli- 
Palestinian dispute as this was the key issue for the United States during this time 
period. 
The following analysis will show the stages in which US foreign policy can be 
characterised towards the peace process. It will underscore the trajectory of US foreign 
policy and will show the contextual origins of the change in tact. The next section will 
outline the policy of facilitation adopted by Clinton 1993-1995. 
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2.0 A POLICY OF FACILITATION (1993-1995) 
Within the international context, it is clear that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War era radically transformed the international system. This 
transformation saw the United States emerge as the sole economic and military 
superpower in the world. The end of the Cold War also signalled the necessary 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from previous Cold War strategic spheres of influence. 
When this is coupled with the involvement of the United States in the 1991 Gulf War 
and the defeat of Iraq, Clinton entered office at a time when the United States enjoyed an 
unrivalled strategic dominance within the Middle East. In addition to these factors, 
Clinton entered office with the regional political situation in his favour as Israel enjoyed 
peaceful relations with Egypt; a de facto peace with Jordan; and with Yitzhak Rabin as 
Prime Minister of Israel (widely recognised as a favourable partner for the peace 
process). ' One of the key commentators on US policy to the peace process, Bill Quandt, 
aptly comments that "[n]o President ever came to office with a more promising set of 
circumstances for promoting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors than did Bill 
"Z Clinton. 
Dennis Ross was appointed as the Senior Middle East Negotiator. Ross brought a high 
level of expertise to the position as prior to this he was the Director of the State 
Department's Policy Planning Office under George H. W. Bush and was on the National 
Security Council during the Reagan administration. Ross was later to become the 
Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
The US Presidential elections in 1992 were the first indication of Clinton's position 
towards the Arab-Israeli peace process. It became apparent as early as December 1991, 
that Clinton held pro-Israeli views. He was critical of incumbent President George H. W. 
Bush for withholding of loan agreements to pressure Israel, in order to compel it into 
' William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967,2111 
ed. (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 321. 
Z Ibid. 
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attending the Madrid Peace Conference. 3 Indeed, in the run up to the election, Clinton 
firmly committed himself towards a `pro-Israeli' position: 
In the Middle East, the [Bush] administration deserves credit for 
bringing Israel and its Arab antagonists to the negotiating table. 
Yet I believe the President is wrong to use public pressure tactics 
against Israel. In the process, he has raised Arab expectations that 
he'll deliver Israeli concessions and fed Israeli fears that its 
interests will be sacrificed to an American-imposed solution. 4 
Clinton's criticism of Bush's policy of applying pressure on Israel undoubtedly served 
the purpose of attracting the pro-Israeli vote from sympathetic voters and the American 
Jewish and Christian communities ., 
5 Clinton characterised his policy position on the 
peace process as one where the United States "can and should serve as an honest broker 
and, on occasion, as a catalyst. "6 In addition, he stated his personal conviction that he 
"7 `opposes the creation of an independent Palestinian State. 
Clinton clearly campaigned on a pro-Israeli platform that advocated the policy of the 
United States should be on facilitating the peace process as a neutral third-party 
participant, refraining from applying pressure. For that reason, through either a personal 
conviction held by Clinton or through his desire to attract the `pro-Israeli' vote, he 
firmly positioned himself on the electoral platform that his administration would not 
pressurise Israel in the peace process. It is important to recognise that Clinton's 
3 Clyde R. Mark, "Israel: US Foreign Assistance, " CRS Report for Congress, (IB85066), Washington. 
D. C.: CRS, Congress, 1 Apr. 2003,17pp., 18/06/03 <www. fas. org/asmp/resources/govern/crs- 
ib85066. pdf>. 
° William J. Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, " Speech at Georgetown University, 
Washington, D. C.: GPO, 12 Dec. 1991.3pp. 17/06/03 
<http: //www. ibiblio. or. z/ptib/docs/speeches/cl inton. dir/c28. txt>. 
5 Clinton was widely acknowledged as having received the 'pro-Jewish vote' in the 1992 election. 
6 William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, "Clinton/Gore on Israel and the Middle East, " 1992 Presidential 
Election Position paper, Washington, D. C.: 5 Nov. 1992. l3pp. 28/09/02 
<htto: //www. ib ibl io. ore/rub/docs/screeches/cl inton. d it/c83. txt>. 
' Ibid. 
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proposed policy of facilitating the peace process, rather than adopting a policy of pro- 
active mediation where the US may apply pressure on the parties to formulate an 
agreement, was in essence a policy declaration that favoured the Israeli position. This is 
on account of the unequal positions of the negotiating parties which translated to Israel 
having been able to control the timing and nature of the negotiations without fear of 
external pressure to make any concessions. 
In sum, although the platform on which Clinton campaigned does clearly indicate a pro- 
Israeli position, Clinton stressed that he would take the position of a neutral participant 
in the peace process. It cannot be overlooked, however, that the parties to the dispute 
were on an unequal footing as Israel was in the most powerful negotiating position in 
terms of both military and economic strength. Through the absence of a pro-active third 
party participant who could redress this inequality, the policy advocated by Clinton 
favoured the Israeli position even though Clinton's policy stated impartiality. A further 
benefit of this strategy was that it was less `politically risky' than a pro-active approach 
as Clinton was less implicated in the politically volatile peace process. 
It can be suggested that the reason behind Clinton adopting this policy is due to his 
desire to obtain the majority of the pro-Israeli vote which he did indeed receive. In the 
election period, Clinton demonstrated his pro-Israeli credentials through his public 
opposition to the creation of a Palestinian State, 8 but also by maintaining his 
commitment to the qualitative military, economic and strategic superiority of Israel 
within the region. But on the other hand, Rabin was seen as being 'pro-peace' and thus 
the active participation of the administration may not have been seen as a necessary 
response to the contextual situation. 
8 Clinton and Gore, "Clinton/Gore on Israel and the Middle East. " 
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2.1 The Madrid Framework 
When Clinton entered office in January 1993 the eighth round of talks in Washington 
between Israel and the Palestinians had been suspended due to the deportation to 
southern Lebanon of over 400 suspected Hamas activists .9 The deportation was carried 
out in December 1992, and was condemned in the UN as being contrary to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949. This Israeli action resulted in the adoption of UNSCR 799. 
The resolution condemned the Israeli action as contrary to international law and 
demanded an immediate return of the deportees. Clinton's involvement in the dispute 
saw a bilateral agreement reached between Israel and the United States for an acceptance 
of a gradual return of the deportees through their sentences being commuted or reduced. 
Warren Christopher commented: 
The United States believes that this process, which is being 
announced by Israel today, is consistent with UN Resolution 799 
on the deportees. As a consequence of the steps that Israel will 
take, we believe that further action by the Security Council is 
unnecessary and could even undercut the process, which is 
already underway. '° 
As this bilateral agreement saw only a partial return of the deportees, it was highlighted 
by the Palestinian negotiators in Washington as being evidence of a US bias towards 
Israel. " The unwillingness of the United States to press for a full and complete 
compliance by Israel to the resolution, and by stating opposition to any further Security 
Council action on this matter, served to underline a perceived pro-Israeli bias. It does 
seem, however, that although Washington maintained it was simply facilitating a speedy 
resumption of the negotiations by accepting this compromise, the United States cannot 
9 Kirsten E. Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Seminar Studies in History (London: Longman, 1999) 86. 
10 Warren Christopher, "Progress on Resolving Israeli Deportation Issue, " Excerpts from opening 
statement at a news conference at the US Mission to the United Nations, New York: GPO, 1 Feb. 1993. 
24pp. 12/09/02 <http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/erc/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4noO7. html>. 
11 Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace: A Personal Account (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) 230-32. 
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be viewed as having acted in an impartial manner. 12 Therefore, the failure of the United 
States to uphold international law simply served to undermine both US credibility as an 
impartial third party to the negotiations, and also Clinton's election pledge of being an 
honest broker to the peace process. 13 
Apart from the deportation issue, the Clinton administration's first main policy 
statement towards the Arab-Israeli conflict was the announcement in February 1993, 
that Warren Christopher would go to the Middle East to affirm the US commitment to 
the peace process, and to tour the countries involved in the dispute. '4 Clinton stated that: 
We cannot impose a solution in the Middle East. Only the leaders 
of the region can make peace. Theirs is an awesome 
responsibility. Those who oppose the process, who seek to 
subvert it through violence and intimidation, will find no 
tolerance here for their methods. But those who are willing to 
make peace will find in me and my administration a full partner. 15 
This statement highlights the administration's commitment to resolving the dispute 
within the same framework that began in co-operation with Russia at the Madrid Peace 
Conference. Indeed, Clinton's policy was grounded on the framework established at 
Madrid, and did not view UN General Assembly resolution 181 of 1947, which called 
for a two-state solution, as part of its policy directive. 16 More importantly, however, is 
the indication that the US saw the emphasis resting clearly on the participants rather than 
on any direct US involvement. In essence, the United States was confined to the role of 
12 The ninth round of peace talks opened in Washington on the 27 Apr. 1993. 
13 Ashrawi, This Side of Peace 230-32. 
14 William J. Clinton, "US Commitment to Advance the Middle East Peace Negotiations, " Statement by 
President Clinton released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 8 
Feb. 1993.12pp. 12/02/02 
<http J/dosfan. lib. uic. edu/erc/briefing/d ispatc h/ 1993/ht ml/D ispatchv4 noO7. html>. 
1s Ibid. 
16 Martin Indyk, "Indyk Reviews US Policy Towards Peace Process, Iran, Iraq and Maghreb, " Remarks at 
House International Relations Committee, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 8 Jun. 1999.12pp. 13/04/03 
<http: //www. usembassy-israel. org. iVpublish/peace/archives/ 1999/jtine/meG6O8a. html>. 
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facilitator rather than a mediator. This underscores Clinton's belief that the United States 
could not apply pressure to force a settlement. This policy pronouncement is not 
necessarily surprising given that Clinton had campaigned on the election platform that 
US policy towards the peace process should be mainly confined to facilitation. An 
additional dimension of US involvement in the peace process was the manner in which 
Clinton undertook to maintain the qualitative military superiority of Israel over its 
neighbors in order to offset the perceived risks of pursuing peace. '7 This was in addition 
to an agreement to improve the strategic relationship between the two countries. 18 
Therefore, although the US was committed to impartiality towards the peace process 
negotiations, the Clinton administration can be described as having demonstrated 
favouritism in its policy towards the Israeli position. 
The trip by Christopher to the Middle East was hailed as highly productive by the White 
House as it allowed the United States "to refocus the parties on resuming the 
negotiations and to sensitize the parties that it is time to delve into substance and that the 
United States will be there to assist them to reach agreements. "19 The real significance of 
the trip, however, was in the clarity it gave US policy towards the peace process in terms 
of objectives and priorities. Following his diplomatic tour of the Middle East, 
Christopher clearly outlined US policy towards the peace process: 
I want you to know that the United States is committed as a full 
partner to help these negotiations succeed. This does not mean 
that the United States plans to negotiate for the parties or to try to 
interpose itself between them. Clearly, direct negotiations, 
particularly on the issues that involve physical survival and 
political survival, remain the responsibility of the parties. The 
1' William J. Clinton and Yitzak Rabin, "Strengthening US-Israeli Relations to Benefit America's 
Interests, " Opening statements at a news conference released by the White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 15 Mar. 1993. l7pp. 12102/02 
<http: //dosfan. Iib. uic. edu/ercibriefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no 12. httnl>. 
18 Mark, "Israel: US Foreign Assistance. " 
19 Edward Djerejian, "US Policy in the Middle East, " Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and 
the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 9 Mar. 1993. l7pp. 
14/08/02 <http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/erc/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no l2. htnil>. 
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President and I have made it very clear, however, that we will do 
our part - as an intermediary, as an honest broker - provided that 
the other parties do theirs. When the Arabs, the Israelis, and the 
Palestinians put forward their views - seriously and realistically - 
we will be there to probe positions, to clarify responses, to help 
define common ground, [and] to offer what may be bridging 
ideas. This is the meaning of `full partnership, ' and it reflects our 
determination to work with all the parties to facilitate negotiations 
that will take into account the needs and concerns of Israel, of the 
Arabs, and of the Palestinians. Only in this way can we have a 
meaningful peace. 20 
The significance of this statement should not be underestimated as it clearly declared US 
policy towards the peace process as being limited to facilitation in an unbiased manner, 
and basically rejected any notion of a pro-active diplomatic involvement in terms of 
redressing the imbalance of the parties to the dispute. As has been indicated earlier, the 
adoption of a policy of facilitation, where a third party rejects the notion of redressing 
the unequal negotiating positions of the parties to the dispute, simply serves as tacit 
support for the strongest party in negotiations. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the actual pronouncement of Clinton's policy towards the peace process was pro- 
Israeli, and that this was a continuation of his election platform. 
On the international setting, an issue which commanded great importance alongside the 
post-Cold War role of Russia was the worsening crisis in the Bosnia-Herzegovina. It 
was following the breakup of Yugoslavia that its constituent regions pursued 
independence and as a result came into conflict with each other. The significance of the 
crisis for the United States was not only the reports of human rights abuses, but also the 
threat it posed to European security. The threat was an obvious indication that the United 
20 Warren Christopher, "US Committed to Israel's Security and a Real Peace, " Address before the 
American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee, New York: GPO, 23 Mar. 1993.24pp. 21/10102 
<http: //dosfan. lib. uic. ediderc/briefing/dispatch/ 1993/html/Dispatchv4no I3. html>. 
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States was needed to get involved in dealing with the crisis as "there was little reason to 
believe that Europeans could bring themselves to act in the absence of some American 
involvement. , 21 Indeed, US involvement in NATO would have necessitated 
Washington's involvement. The significance of this is that it may well have detracted 
attention away from US involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process as it would have 
made a policy of limited involvement through facilitation arguably more politically 
desirable. As the US become more embroiled in dealing with the Balkans crisis it is 
unlikely that Washington wanted simultaneous, high risk diplomatic efforts in two 
separate regions. 22 Therefore, the developing crisis in the first few months of the Clinton 
administration would have arguably reinforced the view that a low risk political strategy 
of limited involvement, directed at facilitation, was the most politically expedient 
strategy for the US to pursue towards the peace process. 
As has been touched upon earlier, Clinton was formulating his policy within the context 
of the post-Cold War period where the role of Russia was uncertain. It is noticeable that 
the Clinton administration gave a commitment to pursuing the peace process in 
accordance with the framework established at Madrid in 1992. Christopher commented 
on the announcement of the ninth round of bilateral talks that "the United States is 
prepared - along with our co-sponsors, the Russian Government - to play our role as 
partners in this process, to assist in any way we can the parties to move these 
negotiations forward. i23 It is likely that the United States did not want to engage in high 
profile diplomatic activity towards the peace process for fear of undermining their 
Russian partners. Therefore, in the newly emerged post-Cold War era, a policy of 
facilitation would have served the role of maintaining the US-Russian partnership 
towards the peace process and thus not jeopardize this fledgling bilateral relationship. 
21 Quandt, Peace Process 324. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Warren Christopher, "Secretary Welcomes Parties to Resumption of Middle East Peace Talks, " Opening 
remarks during photo opportunity with heads of Middle East peace talks delegations, Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 27 Apr. 1993.26pp. 12/12/02 
<http: //dosfan. Iib. uic. edu/erc/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no I8. html>. 
- 260 - 
The actual enactment of Clinton's policy towards the peace process occurred with the 
start of the ninth round of peace talks in April 1993. Israel made concessions in order to 
set in motion the talks by agreeing to accept Faisal Husseini as a Palestinian negotiator, 
and also by giving a positive indication that they would accept a Palestinian police force 
and grant the elected body for the interim period some legislative powers. 24 In a 
coordinated action with Russia, the United States hosted the talks in Washington and 
assisted the parties in the bilateral talks. It soon became clear, however, that the 
negotiations were impeded by "three fundamental issues: the application of Resolution 
242, the relationship between the interim phase and the final phase, and the nature and 
powers of the interim Palestinian authority. "25 The United States attempted to directly 
mediate between the parties by proposing a working paper on terms of reference for the 
negotiations. Of more significance, however, was the recognition in the working paper 
that East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza were disputed rather than occupied 
territories. For the Palestinians, this was evidence of a clear pro-Israeli bias on behalf of 
the Clinton administration as it was a reversal of a twenty-six year old policy towards 
the status of the territories in question. 26 On the other hand, the United States may be 
considered as having acted in accordance with its policy pronouncement of impartiality 
towards the talks as the interpretation of the territories as being `disputed' does not 
assert a predisposition towards the negotiations on the territorial status. 
The subsequent tenth round of peace talks took place in June-July 1993. There the 
United States acted more proactively towards the negotiations by offering proposals for 
both the Syrian and the Palestinian bilateral negotiations. For the Israeli-Palestinian 
front, Washington offered a framework for bridging the divide between the parties, but 
this proposal was rejected by the Palestinian negotiators as being unacceptable for 
negotiations. 27 On the Syrian front, the United States offered security guarantees for 
24 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin, 2000) 510. 
'5 Ibid. 511. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ashrawi, This Side of Peace" 249. 
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Israel if it withdrew from the Golan Heights. Although this was a significant offer by the 
United States, the negotiations were complicated by several factors that needed to be 
overcome before a peace treaty could be finalised. The involvement of the United States 
in the tenth round of bilateral talks can, therefore, be likened with a policy of pro-active 
facilitation which is in accordance with the administration's stated policy towards the 
peace talks. 
However, following the July 1993 rocket attacks by Hezbollah on Northern Israel from 
Lebanon, an escalation in the fighting occurred, and prompted US involvement towards 
brokering a cease-fire: 
Israel began a seven-day air, artillery, and naval bombardment of 
southern Lebanon in retaliation for the deaths of seven Israeli 
soldiers. In the ensuing exchange, three Israelis were killed and 28 
wounded, and 130 Lebanese were killed and 525 wounded. Israeli 
Prime Minister Rabin said the bombardment was intended to drive 
civilians north to Beirut where they would force the government 
to stop Hizballah. As a result of the Israeli bombardment, about 
250,000 Lebanese became refugees. 8 
Clinton was critical of all sides involved and called upon Rabin to halt Israeli 
bombardment; for Hezbollah to cease their attacks; and for Syria to exert influence to 
promote a peaceful resolution of the dispute 2.9 In terms of US involvement, Christopher 
was successful in negotiating a cease-fire and reiterated the need for the parties to reach 
a peaceful resolution with the United States acting in the capacity of an honest broker. 
Therefore, the United States did not confine its role towards the peace process as one of 
acting as a facilitator of the Madrid peace talks, but also as a mediator when broader 
disputes that threatened the overall peace talks format. 
28 Clyde R. Mark, "Lebanon, " CRS Report for Congress, (IB89118), Washington, D. C.: CRS, Congress, 
10 Oct. 2003,18pp., 18/06/03 <http: /www. au. af. miYau/awc/awcgate/crs/ib89118. pdf>. 
29 Edward Djerejian, "US Policy on Recent Developments and Other Issues in the Middle East, " Statement 
before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Washington, D. C.: GPO, 27 Jul. 1993.17pp. 24/10/02 
<http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/erc/briefing/dispatch/ 1993/html/D ispatchv4no32. htH>. 
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2 .2 Lebanon and Syria 
The talks between Israel and Lebanon differed sharply from the other negotiation fronts. 
Crucially, it was inherently linked to the Syrian negotiations on account of the influence 
Syria exercised through the troops and intelligence personnel stationed in Lebanon. 
Carol Migdalovitz remarks that the Clinton administration was faced with a near 
impossible situation: 
Israel claimed no Lebanese territory but sought security and said 
that it would withdraw when the Lebanese army controlled the 
south and prevented Hizballah attacks on northern Israel. Lebanon 
repeatedly sought a withdrawal schedule in exchange for 
addressing Israel's security concerns. The two sides never 
agreed. 30 
The essence of Washington's approach to the Israel-Lebanon front was to encourage 
negotiations in accordance with stated US policy which provided for impartial 
facilitation between the parties. 31 The United States recognised that the negotiations 
could not move forward whilst Syria was able to exert influence over Lebanon. As a 
result of Syria's ability to control the pace of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, 
the United States placed emphasis on the need for the Lebanese government to be in an 
independent position to undertake negotiations with Israel. Although the United States 
Congress had declared Syria to be in violation of the Taif Agreements which called for 
its withdrawal, the United States was only able to further withhold economic aid to 
Syria. 32 Despite this, there does not seem to be a great deal that the United States could 
have feasibly done to compel Syria into compliance. Therefore, the Israel-Lebanon front 
was seen by the United States as inherently linked to the Syrian front and thus providing 
30 Carol Migdalovitz, "Middle East Peace Talks, " CRS Report for Congress, (IB91137), Washington, 
D. C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 24 Sep. 2002,13. 
31 Christopher, "US Committed to Israel's Security and a Real Peace. " 
32 Mark, "Lebanon. " 
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the recognition that peace on two fronts could be achieved if Israel concluded a peace 
agreement with Syria. 
When compared to the Israeli-Palestinian front, the dynamic of the negotiations with 
Syria was inherently different due to the position of the parties. The Syrian position in 
the negotiations was clear: Israel must fully withdraw from the Golan Heights to the 
demarcated settlement lines of 4 June 1967, before a peace settlement can be formulated. 
Israel conversely desired the peace talks with Syria to be an incremental process 
whereby confidence building measures were undertaken first. 33 A further point of 
contention, however, was Israel's use of the international border established in 1923 by 
Britain and France as a point of reference for the talks, rather than the armistice border 
line of 1967 as was requested by Syria. 34 
The specific role of the United States in promoting a peace settlement between Israel 
and Syria was initially set on encouraging and facilitating bilateral negotiations. The US 
characterised its role as one of active engagement35 but more realistically was confined 
to using their good offices to pass diplomatic messages between the two parties. 36 For 
Rabin, Washington's involvement was welcomed, but he saw it as unproductive as he 
felt pressure needed to be applied on Syria by the United States. 37 However, it is worth 
remembering that the extent to which Washington could have actually applied further 
pressure is highly questionable as Syria was not the recipient of US economic aid, and 
only had limited levels of bilateral trade with the United States. 38 Overall, Washington's 
33 Quandt, Peace Process 326. 
34 Shlaim, The Iron Wall 531. 
35 Edward Djerejian, "Defining Issues and Producing Common Ground, " Opening remarks at press 
briefing, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 13 May. 1993.8pp. 14/06/02 
<http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/ 1993/html/D ispatchv4no21. html>. 
36 Shlaim, The Iron Wall 531. 
" Ibid. 
38 Alfred B. Prados, "Syria: U. S. Relations and Bilateral Assistance, " CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 
(1B90275), Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 14 Mar. 2002,14- 
18. 
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approach of facilitating the talks between the parties was in accordance with the overall 
US stated strategy towards the peace process of a facilitator. 39 
With the Oslo negotiations proving fruitful, Rabin believed that he had to choose 
between the Palestinian and the Syrian front, as he believed a dual track diplomatic 
engagement was not feasible. Christopher met with Rabin in Jerusalem on 3 August 
1993 and, at this meeting, Rabin raised the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from the 
Golan Heights in exchange for peace. 0 Avi Shlaim comments that "without making any 
direct commitment, Rabin wanted Christopher to explore the Syrian response to a 
suggestion of full peace with Israel leading to full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan 
Heights over a period of five years .,, 
41 It should not be forgotten, however, that in July 
1993, Israel conducted large scale attacks against the Hezbollah operating in southern 
Lebanon which resulted in the displacement of over 250,000 people. 42 This action by 
Israel would have undoubtedly hindered bilateral Israeli-Syrian negotiations due to 
Lebanon being part of Syria's sphere of influence. 
Christopher met with President Hafez al-Assad on 4 August 1993, and discussed with 
him Rabin's hypothetical proposals. Although Christopher found Assad's response very 
encouraging and positive, it was not a view shared by Rabin. Shlaim explains: 
Rabin, however, was deeply disappointed with Assad's response, 
for although Assad seemed to agree to contractual peace in return 
for full withdrawal, he expressed some significant reservations 
and conditions. He did not agree to give Israel some of the 
elements of peace before the withdrawal had been completed. Nor 
39 Christopher, "US Committed to Israel's Security and a Real Peace. " 
40 Shlaim, The Iron Wall 532. 
41 Ibid. 533. 
42 Migdalovitz, "Middle East Peace Talks, " 13. 
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did he agree to the proposed timetable of five years to completion, 
43 suggesting six months instead 
On the other front, the Oslo backchannel route had proved successful and a joint 
announcement by the PLO and Israel was within grasp. Following Secretary 
Christopher's active engagement in shuttle-style diplomacy, Rabin decided that the Oslo 
backchannel was more feasible and thus opted for it in favour of the Syrian route. Rabin 
did opt, however, to engage once more with the Syrians in Washington before officially 
announcing what had been achieved on the Oslo channel. On 24 August 1993, Syrian 
and Israeli delegations met under the auspicious of the US State Department. Following 
this meeting it became clear that further detailed and potentially protracted negotiations 
were required for a breakthrough on the Syrian front to occur. Although the United 
States was in favour of actively pursuing the Syrian track, 44 Israel chose to pursue the 
Oslo route and consequently the Israeli negotiations with Syria were put on the 
backburner. It is likely that the United States placed a greater emphasis on the Israeli- 
Syrian front as it was recognised by the Washington as being of a greater geostrategic 
importance than the other fronts, 45 and thus consequently would have had more 
importance to US national interests. Moreover, on account of the situation on the Israel- 
Lebanon front, Washington would have accorded more importance to the Syrian track as 
it was seen as the means towards achieving a peace on the Lebanon front. Thus a peace 
with Syria would have potentially killed two birds with one stone. 
2.3 The Oslo Process 
With the deadlock in the peace talks occurring in December 1992 on account of the 
deportation of over 400 suspected Hamas activist to Lebanon, the Israeli government 
43 Shlaim, The Iron Wall 533. 
"' Quandt, Peace Process 327. 
45 Edward Djerejian, "War and Peace: The Problems and Prospects of American Diplomacy in the Middle 
East, " Address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles: GPO, 30 Nov. 1993. l3pp. 
20/08/02 <http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no2l . 
html>. 
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and the PLO opted to secretly negotiate under the auspices of the Norwegian 
government. The unofficial negotiations in Oslo allowed both parties to act without a 
public media spotlight on the negotiations thus giving rise to possibilities for innovation 
and compromise. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements was the product of the Oslo negotiations. It provided a programme for 
negotiations and, crucially, issues such as the right of return for refugees, the 
demarcation of borders, and the status of Jerusalem were opted to be dealt with in the 
final stage of negotiations. These became the so-called 'final status' issues. Although the 
United States played no role in direct role in the bringing about the Oslo Accord, the 
parties opted to have the signing ceremony at the White House in Washington. 46 
Following the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO in September 1993, 
Clinton announced that the US would resume official contact with the PLO. The 
significance of this was the manner in which it influenced the bilateral negotiations 
between Israel and Jordan. It was a political obstacle for Jordan to conclude a peace 
agreement with Israel until the PLO received Israeli recognition and was actively 
involved in a meaningful dialogue with Israel towards a peaceful settlement. 7 Following 
the initialing of the Oslo Accord, Jordan was able to sign an agreed framework for future 
negotiations with Israel. The agreement was also signed in September 1993, and 
provided a comprehensive negotiating framework for the ultimate aim of concluding a 
peace treaty between the two countries. 48 The actual role of the United States in bringing 
about this framework for negotiations was fairly small, but clearly earned Clinton a great 
deal of political capital 19 It is thus more realistic to view the Israeli-Jordanian Agenda 
for peace as a product of circumstances arising from the Oslo Accord. 
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Following the signing of the Oslo Accord, Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to 
promote the peace process with Russia. 50 It would have been reasonable to assume that 
given the US reluctance to get highly involved in the peace process, the achievement of 
a framework for future negotiations, without Washington's involvement, would provide 
a justification for an overall withdrawal of the US in the peace process. Rather than a 
withdrawal occurring, the US reaffirmed its commitment to the peace process and 
asserted that the first priority of Washington was to support the implementation of the 
Oslo Accord. Christopher stated that "[i]t certainly would be a great mistake if the 
United States were now to withdraw or shrink from its full and long-standing partnership 
that it has undertaken in the peace process. Our leadership is essential if this historic 
"sl agreement is to realise its full potential. 
The political view that the Oslo Accord was a progressive and positive contribution to 
the peace process was not accepted by all. For example, Edward Said criticised the Oslo 
Accord as a disingenuous settlement as it failed to provide a comprehensive settlement 
and negativity impacted upon the position of the Palestinians as they had to base any 
future negotiations on the Oslo framework. 52 Moreover, the Oslo Accord received 
condemnation from several prominent Islamic organisations within the United States. 
Interestingly, however, as a consequence of such organisations voicing opposition to the 
Oslo Accord, there was a dramatic decline in their membership. 3 Therefore, the signing 
of the Oslo Accord resulted in a decline in the domestic support for Islamic 
organisations and thus as Michael Lewis argues, they suffered a decline of influence in 
Washington. 4 
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2.3.1 Economic Support 
In order to support the implementation of the Oslo Accord, the United States and Russia 
announced the convening of an economic conference geared towards the provision of 
financial aid towards the Palestinians. 5 The conference saw "46 donor nations pledge 
US$2.4 billion for the Palestinian entity. The US administration offered US$500 million 
(US$125 million in loans or loan guarantees and US$375 million in grants) over 5 years 
for economic development of the Palestinian entity. , 56 The United States was careful to 
ensure however that, "no US aid went directly to the PLO. "S7 Clinton also attempted to 
secure financial aid provision to the Palestinians by requesting that King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia provide economic aid. 58 Washington also encouraged the provision of aid from 
privately organised schemes such as the `Builders for Peace'. 59 Al Gore endorsed this 
scheme which was directed at encouraging US business investment. This indicates that 
the Clinton administration recognised that the success of the Oslo Accord process 
required economic investment to the area and sought to facilitate the process by actively 
organising and encouraging economic aid. 
For Israel, Christopher affirmed that "America's commitment to Israel's security and 
well-being will remain unshakable, , 60 and with this the Clinton administration proposed 
an aid package of US$1.8 billion in military aid and also USS1.2 billion in economic 
55 Warren Christopher and Albert Gore, "The Conference to Support Middle East Peace, " Statements at 
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aid. 61 The total aid package was the same as in the previous Bush administration for 
1992, which indicates a continuity of policy with regard to economic and military aid. 
Clinton did, however, inform Congress on 30 September 1993 that the annual US$2 
billion in loan guarantees for Israel were to be reduced by US$437 million for 1994 as 
this was the amount spent by Israel on developing Jewish settlements. 2 This underlines 
US policy directed at discouraging the Israeli settlement development. 
2.3.2 The Cairo Accord 
The Oslo Accord ushered in a series of talks geared towards concluding an agreement on 
the nature of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank area. Much of 
the negotiations did not feature a significant US role but rather saw Egypt playing an 
important and active role in hosting and facilitating the talks. 63 The talks consisted of 
two main committees, one at ministerial-level headed by Shimon Peres and Mahmoud 
Abbas, and the other by experts whose primary objective was to focus on the details and 
practicalities. ' The talks produced two agreements dealing with general principles and 
border crossings and were initialed by Arafat and Peres on 9 February 1994. The 
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area (the Cairo Accord) was formally signed 
at a ceremony in Cairo on 4 May 1994. 
In the interim period before the Cairo Accord was signed, an American born Jewish 
settler, Baruch Goldstein, opened fire on Muslims who were at the religious shrine of the 
Tomb of the Patriarchs at the Mosque of Ibrahim. The United States became involved in 
the issue at the United Nations where a resolution was formulated in the UN Security 
Council to condemn the massacre. Although the United States voted in favour of the 
resolution, it forced the resolution to be passed on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis in 
61 Mark, "Israel: US Foreign Assistance. " 
62 Ibid. 
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order to voice discontent at non-operative parts of the resolution concerning the status of 
Jerusalem and the other disputed territories. The United States chose to abstain on the 
paragraphs which stated the territories were `occupied' rather than of a `disputed' status, 
as it was felt by Washington that this would jeopardise the impartiality of the United 
States and any future negotiations based on the Oslo Accord framework. 65 When this 
position of the United States is examined within the context of the Oslo Accord 
framework, it does seem that Washington was simply acting with a degree of 
impartiality rather than a pro-Israeli bias. 
2.3.3 The Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty 
When Clinton entered office, the relationship between Israel and Jordan was in effect 
that of de facto peace. King Hussein was unable, although not unwilling, to conclude a 
peace agreement with Israel until some form of settlement with the Palestinians had 
occurred. 66 The reason was in essence that King Hussein's own position would have 
come under threat if he was seen to conclude a bilateral agreement with Israel while the 
Palestinian issue was still uncertain. Moreover, due to the fact that a significant 
proportion of the Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin, a premature agreement 
with Israel could well have ushered in a high level of domestic unrest amongst the 
Jordanian-Palestinian community. 
As has already been highlighted, it was through the mutual recognition between Israel 
and the PLO in the Oslo Accord that diplomacy between Jordan and Israel towards a 
final and lasting peace settlement became an actual possibility. Moreover, the wider 
regional situation of active Israeli-Syrian talks and a weakened Iraq made it conducive 
for Jordan to embark upon overt negotiations with Israel towards a final and lasting 
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peace. 67 Shortly after the signing of the Israeli-PLO mutual recognition, the Israel- 
Jordan Agenda was initialed on 14 September 1993. It provided the framework for 
future negotiations between the two parties. The United States was not directly involved 
in the Israel-Jordan Agenda for future negotiations as the agreement was more a product 
of the circumstances that the Oslo Accord ushered in. 
This agreement on the framework for future negotiations set in motion negotiations on 
water and economic cooperation, as well as on the specific text of a peace treaty 
between the two countries. 68 Two committees were set up under the auspices of the 
United States: the first was a Trilateral Economic Committee, which included the United 
States, and the second was a Bilateral Economic Committee. 9 The Trilateral Economic 
Committee saw five, two day sessions from 4 November 1993 to 20 July 1994. The final 
session was a ministerial level meeting which saw agreement reached "to continue work 
on trade, finance, and banking; civil aviation; tourism; and establishing a road link 
between the two countries. "70 
Following the successes in the bilateral and trilateral negotiations, on 25 July 1994 Israel 
and Jordan signed the Washington Declaration which officially ended the state of 
belligerency between the two countries. The United States remained an active facilitator 
between the two countries "but did not play an active mediating role... because the 
"71 leaders enjoyed direct channels of communication. 
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Clinton attended the signing of the Israel-Jordanian Peace Treaty on 26 October 1994 in 
the Arava Desert between the two countries. With peace having been achieved, it was 
believed that the format used would serve as a model for future negotiations in the peace 
process 7Z The specific role of the United States in bring about the Israeli-Jordanian 
peace has been described as modest, 73 but it would be more accurate to described it as 
facilitating the process once it had been begun by the parties themselves. In other words, 
the success of the Israeli-Jordanian peace cannot be attributed to the United States as 
Washington neither initiated the process nor actively mediated in it. 
2.3.4 Intensive US Diplomacy 
Following the signing of the Oslo Accord, negotiations on the Israeli-Syrian front 
seemed to loose momentum. Negotiations had been occurring on a bilateral basis but 
were not making significant moves forward. During Christopher's tour of the Middle 
East in December 1993, he announced in a press conference with Syrian Foreign 
Minister Shara that Clinton and Assad would meet in Geneva, Switzerland, in January 
1994. Christopher's engagement with the Syrians can be seen as productive since the 
United States was able to formulate a three stage approach with the Syrians towards 
reinvigorating the talks. It also marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the United 
States towards actively bringing about a peace agreement. Christopher announced that: 
First, I have invited Lebanon and Syria to send the heads of their 
delegation to Washington in early January for preparatory 
consultations with the United States on the key substantive issues. 
Second, following these consultations with the United States, all 
delegation heads will come to Washington on or about January 18 
to meet with their counterparts for simplified and streamlined 
talks. We and the other parties believe that these discussions are 
the best way to prepare for a fully productive next round. Third, it 
n Quandt, Peace Process 333. 
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is expected that the heads of delegations, in consultation with the 
co-sponsors, will recommend that the formal negotiations resume 
at the end of the month or in February. 4 
Clinton met with Assad on 16 January 1993 in Geneva. At the subsequent press 
conference, Assad adopted a cautious approach and merely called for an honorable 
agreement, but Clinton clearly described Assad's position as being in favour of a 
normalisation of relations. 5 Although Clinton was criticised for speaking for Assad'76 it 
was clear that despite the willingness for a peaceful resolution, peace was someway off. 
The active US involvement in the Israeli-Syrian track continued with Christopher 
touring the region in April-May 1994. Christopher engaged in shuttle-style diplomacy 
by passing and conveying messages as an intermediary between the two countries. He 
commented that: 
We are in what I would describe as an exploratory stage. Each 
party is serious about having to explore the views of the other 
parties to see if there is some way to bridge the very considerable 
gaps that exist. I don't want to in any way mislead you into 
thinking that the parties are close together. There is a long road to 
travel. But I think that there is a seriousness about the exploration 
I have not seen before. 77 
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The active engagement of the United States continued with Christopher making a tour of 
the region and acting as an intermediary between the parties in late July and in August 
1994. Despite active diplomatic engagement, it was clear by October 1994, that although 
progress had been made through the offices of the United States, a peace agreement was 
far from being achieved because of the difficulty in bridging the gaps between the 
parties. Christopher remarked that: 
The Israeli-Syrian negotiating track also has undergone important 
changes in the last year. For the first time, these once bitter 
enemies are engaged in serious negotiations to end their conflict. I 
have spent dozens of hours in intensive discussions with President 
Assad and Prime Minister Rabin. I can tell you that both men are 
deeply engaged in addressing the central issues of a settlement. 
We have succeeded in narrowing differences, but important gaps 
remain. In my view, the time is fast approaching when some very 
difficult decisions must be made. If these talks are to succeed, if 
they are to produce the "peace of the brave" of which President 
Assad speaks, then the deliberate pace of the current negotiations 
must give way to a bolder approach 78 
Christopher's comments do indicate that despite the United States being proactive in 
facilitating and fostering productive negotiations, the parties were failing to make the 
mutual concessions needed for the talks to move forward. His talks with Assad, Rabin 
and Peres in December 1994, March, June, October and December 1995 highlighted the 
parties were committed to peaceful negotiations but were unwilling to make concessions 
from their positions. 79 In addition, Dennis Ross was dispatched to region to help the 
negotiations progress in both April and June 1995.80 Despite the deadlock, some 
78 Christopher, "Pursuing Peace in the Middle East and Bosnia. " 
79 Christopher, "US Committed to Israel's Security and a Real Peace. " 
ßÖ Warren Christopher, "Renewing the Middle East Peace Process, " Opening statement at press conference 
following meeting with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, Damascus: GPO, 14 Mar. 1995.52pp. 21/10/02 
<http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/erc/briefing/dispatch/ 1995/html/D ispatchv6no 14. htn-d>. 
- 275 - 
progress was made with an Israeli and Syrian military Chief of Staff meeting in 
Washington on 27 June 1995.81 This signaled that the parties had made significant 
progress by beginning high level talks on strategic issues, and that the United States was 
actively engaged in promoting but not meditating in the negotiations. 
Therefore, although the United States proactively facilitated the negotiations, 
Washington did not mediate or apply pressure on either party in order to move the 
negotiations forward on substantive issues. The actual policy adopted by Washington to 
help move the talks forward was to openly call for a confident and concerted effort to be 
made on behalf of both parties towards the talks. Barry Rubin comments that: 
The US certainly considered the conclusion of an Israel-Syria 
agreement to be a high priority, arguing that such a breakthrough 
was necessary to bring about a comprehensive regional peace, 
including the involvement of other Arab states, especially in the 
Gulf. The Clinton administration also wanted such an accord as a 
badly needed foreign policy success for itself. 82 
It should also not be forgotten that the US Congressional elections in 1996 would have 
made the attainment of a significant foreign policy achievement a political incentive, in 
addition to it being in the wider strategic interests of the United States in the Persian 
Gulf. 
3.0 FACILITATION WITH PROACTIVE MEDIATION (1995-1999) 
The United States continued to actively facilitate the negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians after the signing of the Oslo and Cairo Accords. This was achieved by 
Washington assisting but not mediating between the parties. In addition, Al Gore 
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announced additional aid for the West Bank and Gaza Strip in March 1995.83 The United 
States therefore facilitated the progress of the Oslo Accord by assisting and encouraging 
the parties to negotiate, whilst also providing economic aid to further support the 
implementation of the agreement. 
The upcoming US Presidential elections in 1996 was also important for Clinton as it 
made the achievement of progress on the Oslo track a political incentive. 
84 Rabin was 
also to face the electorate in 1996 and thus, for both the Americans and the Israelis, the 
motivation to achieve progress after the Cairo Accord was significant. 
85 
Progress in accordance with the Oslo framework continued actively following the 
signing of the Cairo Accord in May 1994. The role of the United States continued as that 
of a facilitator and it was with the encouragement of Washington that the parties were 
able to formulate the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip on 28 
September 1995. The Oslo II Accord stated that it: 
Provided for elections to a Palestinian council, the transfer of 
legislative authority to this council, the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the Palestinian centers of population, and the division 
of the West Bank into three areas - A, B and C. Area A consisted 
of Palestinian towns and urban areas; area B consisted of 
Palestinian villages and less densely populated parts; and area C 
consisted of the lands confiscated by Israel for settlements and 
roads. Area A was placed under exclusive Palestinian control and 
area C under exclusive Israeli control, and in area B the 
Palestinians exercised civilian authority while Israel continued to 
be in charge of security. 86 
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But following the assassination of Rabin on 4 November 1995, in a joint address with 
Clinton, Peres demonstrated a continuation in Israeli policy by appealing for peace with 
Syria. 87 There seemed to be a renewed impetus to the talks following the assassination of 
Rabin which can probably be attributed to the political desire for the progress made 
towards peace not to die with Rabin. Ambassadorial level talks began between Israel and 
Syria under US auspices in December at the Wye River Plantation, but following a 
terrorist attack in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah in March 1996, the talks were 
suspended. Despite this, as Shlaim explains, "Peres concluded that there was no chance 
of reaching an accord with Syria before October of that year. He therefore decided to go 
for an early election, and the date was fixed for 29 May 1996. "88 
The attacks by Hezbollah against Israel from southern Lebanon in April 1996 and the 
forthcoming Israeli elections made the political climate ripe for Operation Grapes of 
Wrath against southern Lebanon. The foreign policy of the United States towards the 
dispute was clear: Hezbollah was responsible for instigating it through their rocket 
attacks on Israel, and that the Israeli response should be restrained, but proportionate. 
89 
The fierce Israeli military offensive against southern Lebanon began on 11 April 1996. 
Shlaim comments: 
The idea was to put pressure on the civilians of southern Lebanon, for it 
to pressure the government of Lebanon, for it to pressure the Syrian 
government, and, finally, for the Syrian government to curb Hizbullah 
and grant immunity to the IDF in southern Lebanon. In short, the plan 
was to compel Syria to act as an Israeli gendarme in Lebanon. 90 
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The United States did not actively prevent the operation from occurring as Washington 
simply called for restraint and a proportional response. 
91 Although the United States was 
proactive in bringing about a ceasefire between the parties, 
92 it should not be forgotten 
that the Clinton administration condoned the operation in the first place. 93 
Overall, Washington's involvement in the Israeli-Lebanese negotiation front can be 
classed as of marginal foreign policy significance on account of the dynamic of the 
situation between the parties. The US did continually encourage negotiations between 
the parties, but quite rightly chose to concentrate their attention on the Syrian front. 
Success on the Syrian front was the key to achieving a peaceful resolution between 
Israel and Lebanon. Washington did, however, mediate proactively both in 1993 and 
1996 when Israel launched incursions against Lebanon on account of Hezbollah attacks. 
This action by the United States was in fitting with their stated policy of facilitation, 
although Washington could have done more than simply urge restraint by Israel in order 
to avert the crises in Lebanon from occurring in the first place. 
Within the context of the Israeli Grapes of Wrath operation and the announcement of an 
Israeli-Turkish strategic relationship, the bilateral relations with Syria and the prospects 
for peace had suffered a serve blow. The Israeli strategic relationship with Turkey was 
viewed as a threat from Damascus, and lessened the likelihood of fruitful negotiations 
occurring. The real significance of the Grapes of Wrath operation, and the continuing 
terrorist attacks on Israel, was in the manner in which Israeli domestic politics was 
affected. Peres lost popular support in the crucial run-up period to the election and 
consequently lost to his rival Binyamin Netanyahu. 
Whilst the United States did maintain an active commitment in terms of facilitating talks 
between the Lebanese and Israeli governments, real progress was not forthcoming 
throughout the first term of the Clinton administration. Washington did, however, 
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become actively involved in brokering a ceasefire after the Israeli response to Hezbollah 
attacks in July 1993. The campaign resulted in over 250,000 people fleeing southern 
Lebanon as a direct result of Israeli attacks. 
In spite of US efforts to facilitate negotiations for peace, the dynamics of the Arab- 
Israeli dispute had undone much of what had been achieved. Significantly, the United 
States had done little to diffuse the escalating crisis which led to the Grapes of Wrath 
campaign, but it is speculative as to what the application of pressure would have 
achieved. In any case, the Clinton administration condoned it. It was with the election of 
Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel, that the prospects for the United States 
facilitating peace negotiations between Israel and Syria effectively ended. Netanyahu 
adopted a new strategic approach to the negotiations, which was commensurate with the 
guidelines set out in a report by the Israeli think-tank: the Institute for Advanced 
Strategic and Political Studies. 4 The report, entitled: "A Clean Break A New Strategy 
for Securing the Realm" was the product of a working group, headed by Richard Perle, 
which also acted as official advisors to Netanyahu. The report was significant as it 
rejected the Oslo approach and the land for peace formula. It stated: 
We have for four years pursued peace based on a New Middle East. We 
in Israel cannot play innocents abroad in a world that is not innocent. 
Peace depends on the character and behavior of our foes. We live in a 
dangerous neighborhood, with fragile states and bitter rivalries. 
Displaying moral ambivalence between the effort to build a Jewish state 
and the desire to annihilate it by trading "land for peace" will not secure 
"peace now. " Our claim to the land - to which we have clung for hope 
for 2000 years - is legitimate and noble.... Negotiations with repressive 
regimes like Syria's require cautious realism. One cannot sensibly 
assume the other side's good faith. It is dangerous for Israel to deal 
naively with a regime murderous of its own people, openly aggressive 
toward its neighbors, criminally involved with international drug 
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traffickers and counterfeiters, and supportive of the most deadly terrorist 
organizations... We believe that the Palestinian Authority must be held to 
the same minimal standards of accountability as other recipients of U. S. 
foreign aid. A firm peace cannot tolerate repression and injustice. A 
regime that cannot fulfill the most rudimentary obligations to its own 
people cannot be counted upon to fulfill its obligations to its neighbors. 
95 
Netanyahu adopted these recommendations which saw the official rejection of the `land 
for peace' equation that had been the cornerstone of previous negotiations with Syria. 
With this change in policy, negotiations hit an impasse. 
96 Despite US efforts to persuade 
Netanyahu to reengage, it became clear that this was in vain. This was further 
compounded by Netanyahu's rejection of the `Aims and Principles of Security 
Arrangements' which was the key achievement of US sponsored talks. Christopher had 
little choice but to accept that Netanyahu's position that it was not binding under 
international law, and thus was obliged to accept the derailing of the key product of US 
diplomatic efforts on this front. 7 
3.1 The Hebron Agreement 
The negotiations between the parties progressed at a slower pace following the election 
of Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel in May 1996. Netanyahu actively undermined 
the progress by pursuing policies designed to increase Israeli security, which at the same 
time were highly antagonistic and harsh towards the Palestinian people 
98 It was, 
however, with his decision to open an archaeological tunnel near the al-Aska Mosque, 
which linked the Wailing Wall to the Dome of the Rock, on 25 September 1996 which 
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saw the climax of the deteriorated relations. For Palestinians, this was highly 
antagonistic and instigated a violent confrontation which involved Palestinian Authority 
police being engaged in skirmishes with Israeli soldiers. 
Clinton intervened directly by hosting a summit meeting designed to defuse the 
tensions 99 Dennis Ross played a key role in the negotiations and, despite the proactive 
efforts of the United States "the meeting ended without any agreement being 
reached. "100 With Washington being faced with the prospect of the progress made on the 
Oslo track being undone, and also Netanyahu showing an uncompromising attitude, 
Clinton adopted a more proactive position by sending Ross to the region to broker an 
agreement on Hebron. Hebron was the only Palestinian city that had a small Jewish 
settlement within it, and the evacuation of Jewish settlers was required by the Oslo 
agreement. Within the context of the intifadh, which was sparked by the opening of the 
tunnel under the al-Aska Mosque, Hebron took on a renewed importance as "Arafat 
wanted to know that Netanyahu would not walk away from Oslo, and many in Bibi's 
[Netanyahu] right-wing base wanted to see that he would. "lot In essence, the success or 
failure of Oslo depended on a breakthrough being achieved over Hebron. Shlaim 
characterizes the diplomacy over Hebron: 
It took the parties three and a half months to reach agreement. The 
process itself was noteworthy both because of the active part played by 
the United States and because this was the first time that the Likud 
government engaged in negotiations with the Palestinians on the basis 
of the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement. 102 
The foreign policy of the United States was, therefore, clearly challenged by the election 
of Netanyahu on the grounds that he was not in favour of pursuing peace according to 
99 Nicholas Burns, Department of State, "Daily Press Briefing, " Washington, D. C.: GPO, 30 Sep. 1996. 
19pp. 21/10/02 <http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960930db. htnil>. 
10° Shlaim, The Iron Wall 577. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 579. 
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the Oslo framework which the United States was diplomatically committed to. In the 
absence of a willing partner on the Israeli side, Clinton's policy of facilitation was 
rendered ineffective, especially in the face of the high stakes involved over Hebron. As a 
result, Washington departed slightly from the role of impartial facilitator towards a 
mediating role in resolving this impasse. Moreover, this provides an indication that the 
United States was willing to act beyond its role as an impartial facilitator when there was 
a prospect of the peace process becoming completely derailed. This unstated flexibility 
in policy by the United States was productive as the parties were, after difficult 
discussion, able to reach an agreement on Hebron. The Protocol Concerning 
Redeployment in Hebron was a diplomatic achievement for the US because of the active 
role they played in concluding it. It was signed on 15 January 1997, just days before the 
end of the first Clinton administration. 
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Washington was prepared to engage in this 
active manner by virtue of the realisation that a failure to have done so would have 
potentially have signaled the end of progress on the Oslo front, and also that a greater 
degree of engagement was more politically feasible now that Clinton had won a second 
term of office. But crucially, the diplomatic engagement over Hebron, which was 
prompted by the localized contextual, had resulted in the Clinton administration moving 
beyond a policy of facilitation. 
3.1.1 Wye River II 
Clinton's convincing re-election held promise for US diplomatic engagement in the 
peace process: for the first two years of a second term, presidents are at the zenith of 
their influence and power. With a movement towards engagement, rather than simple 
facilitation, which occurred around the time of Clinton securing a second term of office, 
there was ample reason to believe that concerted engagement would stem from the 
White House. 
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Although Clinton was at the pinnacle of his power, allegations surfaced in early 1998 
that he had had an affair with a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. More 
importantly, further allegations surfaced that Clinton had lied about the affair and had 
attempted to get Ms. Lewinsky to commit perjury. As Bill Quandt wrote, "a cloud was 
hanging over the Presidency during much of 1998. "103 While the Lewinsky scandal and 
the prospect of Congressional impeachment potentially held a detrimental impact upon 
Clinton's willingness to engage in `high risk' diplomacy, it appears that the opposite is 
true. In spite of Clinton's domestic political problems, US foreign policy towards the 
Middle East became more `high profile' in general, especially with regard to Iraq, and 
culminated in Operation Desert Fox in December 1998; this coincided with Clinton's 
impeachment proceeding. In a similar regard, Clinton's foreign policy towards the peace 
process was not distracted by his domestic political situation. Indeed, the move away 
from facilitation towards engagement deepened further. 
Following the signing of the Hebron Agreement, Netanyahu came under political 
pressure from the right-wing elements within his government. Although he was under 
pressure by the United States to make the withdrawals that had been agreed by the 
previous government, neither he nor most of his Likud government were in favour of the 
land for peace formula. Netanyahu's formula was based on the slogan of reciprocity: 
security provisions were required before Israel made withdrawals. Although this 
provision allowed extremists to basically derail any diplomacy, the key issue facing the 
negotiations was the willingness of Netanyahu to make concessions to his right-wing in 
spite of pressure from the United States. A key concession made by Netanyahu after the 
Hebron Agreement allowed the building of Israeli settlements on the land of East 
Jerusalem. Specifically, permission was granted for the building of 6,500 new homes in 
the Arab area of Jabal Abu Ghunaym, known by the Israelis as Har Homa. Not 
surprisingly, this `concession' resulted in a breakdown in the negotiations and the onset 
of diplomatic stalemate. 
103 Quandt, Peace Process 352. 
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The White House had come to see Netanyahu as an unwilling partner for peace as his 
government's policies towards the Palestinians had resulted in this breakdown of 
diplomacy. Moreover, the administration's "regional interests were being damaged as 
Arab leaders and Europeans alike complained that Bibi [Netanyahu] was killing any 
prospect for peace. i104 When this is viewed within the context of the diplomacy over 
Iraq, Israel was arguably a diplomatic liability on account of Netanyahu. The response of 
the White House to this quagmire contrasted with the general policy of facilitation 
characteristic of the first Clinton administration, as pressure tactics were used as part of 
the overall policy of engagement. Netanyahu was informed by Ross of a package of 
steps Clinton saw as enabling a reinvigoration of the peace process. Crucially, Ross saw 
this as presenting Netanyahu with two problems: "[h]e would either have to respond to 
us, enraging the Israeli right, or he could try to resist our proposal, enraging the 
mainstream in Israel. "los 
Despite the United States having raised the diplomatic stakes, Hamas conducted a 
double terrorist bombing in Jerusalem on 30 July 1997 which killed sixteen Israelis. This 
altered the contextual situation in which US foreign policy was operating as the 
application of diplomatic pressure on Netanyahu to implement Israel's obligations was 
rendered an ineffective approach. Indeed, Madeline Albright visited the region shortly 
afterwards and found that little pressure could be applied on Netanyahu whilst terrorist 
attacks continued. 106 
In an effort to bring the peace process back on track, the Clinton administration opted 
for summit diplomacy. The Wye River summit was convened in October 1997, in order 
to overcome the deadlock that had arisen after the Hebron Agreement. According to 
Quandt, the concessions required were straightforward: 
104 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: 
Farrar, 2004) 350. 
'05 Ibid. 353. 
106 Ibid. 354-56. 
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Arafat would have to make a major effort on security and perhaps once 
again reject the parts of the National Charter that challenged Israel's right 
to exist; and Nethanyahu would have to agree to further withdrawals from 
Zones B and C, totaling at least another 13 percent of the West Bank: and 
Gaza. 107 
Although Clinton was not present for the entire summit, once an agreement was within 
sight he personally became fully engaged and pulled his famous "all-nighter" in order to 
achieve an agreement. On 24 October, and agreement was achieved although it 
amounted to little more than the Palestinian's recommitting themselves to the provision 
of security whilst Israel agreed to small scale withdrawals as a confidence building 
measure. Nevertheless, it was a significant achievement as it reinvigorated the peace 
process and, crucially, this was achieved through direct engagement and mediation. 
4.0 MEDIATION WITH INTENSIVE TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 
(1999-2001) 
On 4 May 1999, the five year deadline for the Oslo Accord and the declaration of 
Palestinian statehood expired without it having been achieved. The main reason why 
Edward Said's notable prediction on the inevitable failure of the Oslo process was 
ultimately realized was because of a complex interplay of localized, regional and 
international factors. 
Shortly after the Wye River negotiations, the House Judiciary Committee voted in 
favour of four articles of impeachment on Clinton for his conduct in the Lewinsky affair. 
From January 1999, the Clinton administration was preoccupied with the Congressional 
trial. Although Clinton survived the impeachment which took place in early February. 
during that period of time his Presidency was vulnerable to the domestic political 
environment given his need for support in the Senate. With Netanyahu's position 
107 Quandt, Peace Process 353. 
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suffering politically from the right-wing within his own government, he announced, 
during the congressional trial, his decision to hold an early general election on the 17 
May 1999. Given the context of the impeachment, it can be concluded that Clinton could 
not have realistically afforded a diplomatic standoff with Netanyahu over the 
implementation of the Oslo Accord and the scheduling of the Israeli elections. But, for 
Netanyahu, the date he selected for the election was a shrewd political move: a 
premature declaration of statehood by Arafat would have created a political crisis only 
two weeks before the Israeli elections, and thus enhanced Netanyahu's prospects of re- 
election. 
The Clinton administration pressed Arafat to refrain from declaring statehood as they 
had little desire to see Netanyahu re-elected for a second term. With Arafat postponing 
the declaration, Ehud Barak won the Israeli election. Barak was the most decorated 
general in Israeli history, and a well known advocate of peace who was seen by many as 
a successor to Rabin. The outcome of the election fitted well with US interests as 
Barak's mandate in the Knesset was seen as allowing for greater diplomatic scope. 
Clinton commented that "Barak's large victory margin had given him the chance to have 
a governing coalition in the Knesset that would support the hard steps to peace, 
something Prime Minister Netanyahu never had. "108 
The election of Barak was significant in that, unlike Netanyahu, he was widely viewed 
as a credible proponent for the peace process. During the stalemate which ensured from 
Netanyahu's policies, the United States was forced to move at times beyond facilitation 
towards direct mediation and intervention. In some respects, Barak's victory resulted in 
the emphasis returning to the two parties of the dispute resolving the crisis themselves. 
However, the United States did not backtrack towards a policy of facilitating the 
negotiations, and indeed became more committed towards constructive engagement and 
mediation. 
108 William J. Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004) 855-56. 
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4.1 Camp David II 
The initial sign that US policy had become fully committed to mediation was following 
Albright's persuasion of Hafiz Al-Assad to resume Syria's negotiations with Israel. 
Discussions were held in Washington in late 1999, and in Shepardstown, West Virginia, 
in January 2000. Crucially, Clinton intervened directly and produced a draft peace treaty 
for consideration by Al-Assad. The treaty's provisions were by no means as far reaching 
as what Rabin had floated with Al-Assad, as Barak did not feel his political standing was 
capable of achieving a pullback to the 1967 lines. It is interesting, however, that Clinton 
opted to present a draft treaty directly to Al-Assad which included conditions which 
failed to meet the longstanding Syrian demand of a full withdrawal. James Baker 
criticised Clinton for failing to offer Syria a return to the 1967 border, in order to allow 
for a full restoration of relations. 109 Indeed, Baker did not see any other means of 
achieving an agreement. Even though diplomacy failed with Syria, Barak kept his 
election pledge on Lebanon as Israeli troops were withdrawn by the end of May 2000. 
Nevertheless, without an agreement with Syria, the Israeli border with Lebanon was far 
from being resolved. Although Clinton's proposal was flatly rejected by Al-Assad, it 
serves to underline that the administration had come to interpret its role as that of a 
direct mediator rather than a simple facilitator. 
With diplomacy reaching an impasse on the Syrian route, attention turned back to the 
Palestinian question. Clinton hosted a summit in Camp David in July 2000, which was 
widely billed his final effort at resolving the dispute. The United States engaged itself in 
the negotiations mainly through providing a series of proposals, but did not give its 
position on final status issues. 110 Although Barak was willing to concede 92% of the 
disputed territory, the key divisions occurred over final status issues: the full right of 
right of return for refugees and the status of Jerusalem. Barak was willing to allow for a 
partial right of return for the refuges, and a degree of Palestinian sovereignty over East 
109 James Baker, "Peace, One Step at a Time, " New York Times 27 Jul. 2000, A27. 
110 Ross, The Missing Peace 650-711. 
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Jerusalem. Although these concessions by Barak were far reaching and more than what 
the United States had expected, Arafat was unwilling to compromise over Jerusalem or 
the right of return issue. The summit's press release reflected that Arafat's 
unwillingness, or inability, to compromise had killed the possibly of an agreement being 
reached. Ross aptly writes, "I knew the [press release] would be seen as an implicit 
criticism of Arafat - something his performance at Camp David warranted. " 
111 
The Clinton administration did not see Camp David as a complete failure, but the key 
question was why was Arafat so unwilling to compromise, especially given the 
concessions Barak had made? Whilst Clinton initially put it down to Arafat's 
brinkmanship, 112 Ross was more scathing in that he saw it simply as Arafat's inability, 
or willingness, to make the tough decisions required. True, Arafat's support base rested 
mainly on his uncompromising position, but politicians also have to be realistic. The 
prospect of Arafat achieving his demands without compromise was simply not a viable 
option. The reason for this is that despite the legitimacy of Arafat's demands, the 
contextual situation on the ground had altered to such an extent that it was no longer 
realistic for a full return of refugees, or indeed a complete Israeli withdrawal from the 
West Bank: such an undertaking was simply not a politically viable option for Barak, 
and the proportional representative nature of the Israeli political system was unlikely to 
result in a strong and stable government that could carry through such proposals in the 
future. Therefore, given Arafat's uncompromising position on final status issues, and his 
failure to go beyond his historic concession in 1993 where he recognized Israel - the 
Oslo process, or indeed any incremental process - was unlikely to succeed until a degree 
of diplomatic latitude could be undertaken by both sides on final status issues. 
The Clinton administration's efforts at securing an agreement did not dwindle with the 
failure at Camp David as Clinton subsequently put forward a framework to both Arafat 
Ross, The Missing Peace 710. 
112 Clinton, My Life 916. 
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and Barak based on the Camp David formula in October 2000.113 However, since Camp 
David, violence had broken out in the occupied territories following a visit by Likud 
party leader, Ariel Sharon, to the Haram al-Sharif. The visit was particularly poignant 
for the Palestinians as Sharon's police escort was seen as underlining Israel's 
illegitimate control over the religious site. Violence broke out the following day with 
Jews being stoned at the walling wall. This prompted the onset of a new intifadh and 
widespread violence on a daily basis. The prospects of building on Camp David were 
clearly tainted by this violence but, more significantly, it undermined the position of 
Barak. Indeed, the outbreak of violence made the granting of concessions by Barak a 
politically more difficult option. It placed a greater importance on concluding an 
agreement before the concessions Barak was willing to grant became a politically 
unrealistic option. 
Clinton even departed from his traditional role and sought Crown Prince Abdullah and 
Mubarak's agreement to apply pressure on Arafat. Nevertheless, despite Barak agreeing 
to Clinton's framework, which enjoyed widespread support amongst the leaders of Arab 
countries, the same problem occurred in that Arafat was not willing to commit to a 
compromise on final status issues despite being under pressure from Arab leaders. 114 As 
a direct result of Arafat's position, the prospect of a settlement which had been within 
sight was beyond reach. Clinton's final conversation with Arafat before leaving office is 
noteworthy: 
[Arafat] thanked me for all my efforts and told me what a great man I was. 
"Mr Chairman, " I replied, "I am not a great man. I am a failure, and you 
have made me one. " I warned Arafat that he was single-handedly electing 
Sharon and that he would reap the whirlwind. ' 15 
113 Ross, The Missing Peace 752-53. 
114 Clinton. My Life 937-38. 
115 Ibid. 944. 
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Clinton's prediction was accurate in that Ariel Sharon won a sweeping victory at the 
subsequent Israeli election, and this had a far-reaching effect on the schisms of the peace 
process. Overall, when Clinton left office, the peace process was in diplomatic 
stalemate, and the ongoing intifadh and the newly elected Likud government held little 
prospect other than a worsening of the contextual situation within the occupied 
territories. In sum, it appears Clinton is justified to write, "Arafat's rejection of my 
proposal after Barak accepted it was an error of historic proportions. "' 16 
The key question, however, was why did Clinton become so engaged in the peace 
process towards the end of his Presidency? The generally accepted explanation is that 
Clinton was simply thinking of his legacy. Although this was indeed a factor, it is an 
interpretation which overlooks the contextual situation which had evolved since the 
death of Rabin. The onset of the Netanyahu government resulted in a move away from 
the Oslo process, and thus a more proactive policy was required in order to prevent the 
total collapse of the peace process. Significantly, this coincided well with Clinton's 
second term of office: his administration was politically more able to become actively 
engaged in high risk diplomacy. With the election of Barak, who was widely regarded as 
Rabin's protege, the US found a new Israeli government committed to the peace process. 
Barak's election crucially allowed the US and Israel to formulate a degree of agreement 
over what were acceptable concessions that could be made to the Palestinians. 
Therefore, the onus shifted on `selling' the agreement to Arafat within the finite 
'window of opportunity' whilst Barak was in power. The overall product was that the 
contextual situation resulted in the United States recognizing that mediation and the 
application of pressure was required in order for an agreement to be achieved before any 
Barak lost his political mandate. 
116 Clinton, My Life 945. 
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5.0 DISENGAGEMENT 
Following the failure of the Clinton administration's high profile initiative, the 
contextual situation inherited by George W. Bush was that of a fractured and stagnant 
peace process. According to former Secretary to the Treasury Paul O'Neill, at Bush's 
first meeting of the National Security Council on 30 January 2001, the decision to 
change tact and disengage was made as a result of the new context. Bush is reported as 
having said, [i]f the two sides don't want peace, there's no way we can force them. "'" 
The essence of Bush's decision to depart from Clinton era policy stemmed from his 
belief that Clinton pressed for peace prematurely. 
118 Specifically, the parties' failure to 
reach an agreement despite the United States having unveiled a final status framework 
indicated that, at a base level, they were not ready to take the hard choices required for 
an agreement. A further factor, however, was the election of Ariel Sharon. Ross 
highlights that "the Sharon-led government in Israel meant little would be possible 
diplomatically. "' 19 Nevertheless, this altered contextual situation coincided with the 
administration handover, and thus adequately explains why this fundamentally new 
policy direction was taken. 
While in some respects the Bush administration's strategy was a prudent policy 
response, its complete withdrawal from the peace process also had the potential to make 
things go from bad to worse. The problem of US disengagement was that it removed the 
central arbitrator who could have eased tensions, and prevented a substantive 
deterioration of the situation. Although an agreement was not foreseeable given the 
divergent positions of the two sides, diplomatic engagement at least had the potential to 
maintain a degree of semblance of the status quo. 
117 Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul 
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With the publication of the Mitchell Report in May 2001, a series of recommendations 
were made to both the Israelis and the Palestinians as a means of countering the causes 
of the intifadh. Senator George Mitchell had been given a mandate in late 2000 to 
investigate the causes of the Palestinian uprising shortly after Camp David, and to 
provide proposals to stem the ongoing violence. The report was significant in that it did 
prompt the resumption of negotiations but, crucially, the United States did not facilitate, 
or engage in diplomacy to aid the talks. Whilst this was commensurate with the Bush 
administration's disengagement policy, it predictably resulted in the talks quickly ending 
in failure. 
The problem with the absence of any diplomacy to resolve the crisis was that it fueled 
the use of violent extremism as a means of achieving political objectives. Indeed, on 31 
May 2001, a Palestinian suicide bomber attacked a nightclub in Tel Aviv, resulting in 
over twenty fatalities. The net effect of such attacks was that it demonstrated the 
inadequacy of Arafat's security assurances, and fueled political pressure on Sharon to 
distance his government away from diplomacy with Arafat along with the need to take 
punitive action against the Palestinians. 
With the breakdown of security being a key underlying issue, the Bush administration 
sent CIA Director George Tenet in June 2001 to the region with the mandate of 
developing proposals to reestablish a level of security which could allow for the parties 
to diplomatically reengage. Although Tenet engaged in shuttle-style diplomacy, his 
proposals were confined to issues pertaining to security. His mandate did not encompass 
negotiations over a peace settlement. But even though Tenet did publish a range of 
proposals to combat insecurity, the administration cannot be described as taking a 
proactive approach in that Tenet left the area shortly after publishing his proposals. In 
some respects, Tenet was a poor choice who, as the Director of the CIA, had other 
pressing concerns and served to underline the nature of the Bush administrations 
commitment. 
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With the violence continuing unabated, Colin Powell was dispatched shortly after 
Tenet's departure in order to broker a ceasefire. 120 Although Powell's active 
participation demonstrates a mediating role, his mandate was confined to bringing a halt 
to the violence. His mission ultimately achieved little as Arafat was not prepared to 
move against the militant factions. Indeed, Arafat commented, "I am not looking for 
Hamas or Islamic Jihad because we respect all these parties and there is a union between 
all of us. "lzl 
By late July 2001, the stalemate in the peace process had resulted in the White House 
coming under increasing pressure from European and Arab countries to reengage. '" The 
US policy of disengagement was not a solution to the problem and was arguably not 
diplomatically sustainable. What is interesting is that in August 2001, Bush set out a 
change in US policy to Crown Prince Abdullah in a private letter, which stated that the 
United States would engage proactively for a two-state solution between the Palestinians 
and the Israelis. 123 This was an important policy move as the Clinton administration had 
never officially supported a two-state solution. Although Clinton's framework for peace 
shortly after the failure at Camp David in 2000 saw two-states as an end product, Bush's 
position clarified the US position as favouring a particular outcome, rather than simply 
leaving the two parties to come to an agreement themselves. But, it also marked a shift 
away from disengagement towards a policy of proactive engagement. 
In terms of why the Bush administration adopted this position, it has been widely 
speculated that it was a direct result of the diplomatic pressure the United States was 
under to reengage in the peace process. Nevertheless, according to Robert Kaiser, the 
US disengagement from the peace process and the escalation of the intifadh had a direct 
120 Jane Perlez, "Powell Backing Plan to Monitor Mideast Truce, " New York Times 29 Jun. 2001, Al. 
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bearing on US interests in the Persian Gulf area. Crown Prince Abdullah had reportedly 
threatened a fundamental reassessment of US-Saudi relations if the United States did not 
take a more proactive and evenhanded approach to the peace process. 
124 On a wider 
level, the policy of disengagement was having detrimental ramifications on US policy 
towards Iraq where the administration was soliciting support for a revitalization of the 
sanctions and inspection mandate. Indeed, disengagement was widely equated with a 
pro-Israeli policy which made support from the GCC more difficult to obtain. The 
significance, however, is that wider contextual issues, in addition to US relations with 
Saudi Arabia and US interests in the Gulf region, forced a reversion back to Clinton era 
diplomacy. Disengagement was therefore a short-lived policy undertaking. 
6.0 SUMMARY ASSESSMENT 
The policy of the United States towards the peace process from 1993-2001 can be 
separated into four distinct stages: 
1. Facilitation (1993-1995) 
2. Facilitation with mediation to resolve the stagnant peace process (1995-1999) 
3. Mediation and intensive triangular diplomacy (1999-2000) 
4. Disengagement (2001) 
What can be concluded from these four stages is that they were both a product of the 
nuances specific to the Arab-Israeli dispute in addition to contextual factors on a 
domestic political level within the United States. The main influencing factor, however, 
was the localized dynamics of the Arab-Israeli peace process. This is telling as it 
indicates that US policy within this timeframe lacked a clear and coherent strategy, and 
thus was mainly a reactive based foreign policy. Although the United States was an 
active participant in the peace process throughout, the use of triangular diplomacy to 
resolve the dispute only really came into being with the election of Ehud Barak. 
124 Kaiser and Ottway, "Bush's Response Eased a Deep Rift on Mideast Policy; Then Came Sept. I I. " 
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As has already been discussed, the Clinton administration initially opted for facilitation 
as it saw the Israelis being pro-peace under Rabin, and thus facilitating the negotiations 
was seen as the most prudent policy response. Moreover, it was in fitting with the 
domestic political environment within the United States as this policy was, in essence, 
biased towards the Israeli position as it did not correct the inherent imbalance between 
the two parties. 
The second phase was marked by the assassination of Rabin. The election of Nretanyahu 
saw the adoption of a more nationalistic Israeli foreign policy which placed the 
implementation of the Oslo Accord into a secondary concern after security. With the 
diplomatic stalemate that ensued, the Clinton administration opted for a limited policy of 
mediation designed to `kick-start' the negotiations. Again, the main reason why the 
Clinton administration moved beyond a policy of facilitation was that the dynamics of 
the dispute required some form of mediation in order to end the stalemate. 
The third stage was marked by the election of Ehud Barak, who was seen by the White 
House as epitomizing the aspirations Rabin had held. Although the Clinton 
administration moved towards a policy of direct mediation and intensive triangular 
diplomacy, culminating in the Camp David summit, the key question remains as to why 
then, and not before? A reasonable explanation to take is that the election of Barak 
signaled the onset of a new contextual climate which was more conducive to peace. Of 
course, this raises the question: why did Clinton not resort to the policy of facilitation 
that he had undertaken when Rabin was alive? The most reasonable explanation is that 
the onset of a promising contextual climate with the election of Barak offered the 
potential of a historic diplomatic coup for Clinton. With the conditions appearing rife for 
an agreement, it is likely that the Clinton administration saw both the need to act quickly 
to achieve it, and was motivated by his desire to leave a historic legacy by brokering an 
agreement through meaningful triangular diplomacy. 
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Aithou h Clinton's effort; towards the peace process in the final years of his 
admiri; trjtion are % cthv of recognition, it is important to understand why he ultimately 
failed in hi, effort: to achieve a settlement. Despite the offer made by Barak in the 
aftermath of Camp David, it is important to recognize that although it was more far 
reaching than had c%cr been offered, Arafat's failure to accept Barak's proposal 
ultimatclv ended any prospect for an agreement. The reasons why Arafat refused 
Barak's Proposal are outside the context of this thesis, but it is worth recognizing that 
Arafat may ha%c lo-, t his own powerbase if he had accepted Barak's terms. His 
poucrba., c was lirmiv grounded in not compromising over final status issues. Overall, 
Arafat's position uas structurally incompatible with diplomatic compromise: only 
through l alestinian leadership which had a sufficient mandate and power base, which 
alloucd for some degree of diplomatic compromise, could an agreement be achieved. 
This is especially pertinent as it is arguably unrealistic to see a complete Israeli 
Compliance %kith Arafat',. demands on final status issues, and thus a degree of diplomatic 
compromise wa required. 
But, with the on, ct of the Bush administration, it appears that the realities of the peace 
pro ce., and the high profile failure of the Clinton's efforts at Camp David, resulted in 
Bush seeing di, enua-ement as the most prudent political choice. This was a significant 
dcpsnure in a long-standing US position towards the peace process. With Clinton's 
failure at Camp Da% id and the election of Ariel Sharon as a successor to Barak even the 
contextual 'situation of the ground made the prospect of some form of 
agreement very 
remote. Indeed, it was not realistic to view Sharon as being willing to go beyond Barak's 
offer so flu-, h'.,. decision to disengage was a realistic foreign policy given the situation 
inherited from Clinton. It is therefore reasonable to view Bush's policy as a reasonably 
pra, inatic, but it %% w;. however, a short-lived policy. 
The impact of the II September 2001 terrorist attacks fundamentally changed the 
contextual situation. The following section will analyze the manner in which the grand 
Wate, }" of the War on Terror altered the ad hoc reactive policy characteristic of the post- 
Cold War era. 
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Overall, one can deduce from Clinton era foreign policy towards the peace process that 
it was reactive based to the localised geopolitical situation of the conflict itself, whilst 
also taking into consideration various contextual issues within the region. Indeed, this is 
in fitting with the interpretation of US grand strategy during the Clinton administration 
offered in this thesis. Specifically, with Clintonian grand strategy being based on 
geoeconomics it resulted in political policy being reactive based and ad hoc: this offers 
an original level of explanation on US foreign policy towards the peace process. This is 
an important observation in that it will be shown to be in contrast with the Bush 
administration's policy in the post-9/11 context. This will underscore that in the 
aftennath of 9/11 terrorist attacks US foreign policy became guided by a new grand 
strategic concept which impacted upon the manner in which the Bush administration 
approached its involvement in the peace process. 
7.0 THE WAR ON TERROR: PEACE AFTER POLITICAL REFORM 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 marked the onset of a new grand strategy in US 
foreign policy. `loving away from the incoherence and case-by-case approach that was 
present during the post-Cold War era, the 9/11 attacks resulted in the adoption of a grand 
strategy which would ultimately guide US foreign policy as had occurred with the onset 
of the Cold \v'ar. The initial priority became transfixed on Afghanistan, and the peace 
process was relegated in importance. The undertaking that Bush had made to Crown 
Prince \bdullah was thus not announced as expected since US priorities had clearly 
shifted. With Bush's diplomatic initiative now on hold, the policy of disengagement 
continued. 
As has already been discussed, without the active involvement of the United States, the 
reestablishment of security was uncertain at best. In a similar fashion to the previous 
diplomatic initiative with George Tenet, the White House dispatched the retired General 
Anthony ? inni at the end of 2001 to broker a diplomatic settlement over security. 
Zinni's mandate was also limited to security and did not encompass issues relating to the 
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peace process per se. Although Zinni's involvement was more high profile and he 
engaged in the issue more than Tenet, little real progress was achieved. The reason why 
no cessation could be reason was seen by members of Congress as being that Arafat was 
neither effectively providing security nor working towards ending the intifad/x. 125 But on 
the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Sharon appeared to be using the political 
cover of the War on Terror to justify an aggressive repression of the Palestinian intifadh. 
Indeed, Arafat had been effectively marginalized by the Israelis as he was confined to 
his Presidential compound in Ramallah. 126 Indeed, Israel's policy was effectively 
weakening Arafat's position and making it less likely that he would be either politically 
or realistically able to effectively end the intifadh and fulfill Israel's security demands. 
In the context of this, Israel uncovered an illegal weapons cache onboard the ship the 
Karine-A which had sailed from Iran. The discovery of the weapons was highly 
significant as it underlined suspicions that Arafat was not a committed partner for peace. 
It has to be remembered that this occurred within the context of the War on Terror and, 
as the Palestinian Authority was clearly implicated, Arafat had lost a great deal of 
diplomatic credibility with the United States and had served to provide some legitimacy 
of Israel's actions in the eyes of the Bush administration. 
With Colin Powell having been dispatched on what was to be an unsuccessful mission to 
the region in April 2002 to broker a ceasefire, it was clear that disengagement was 
proving wholly ineffective. Given that Arafat had been implicated in the Karine-A affair 
and little progress had been made in brokering a ceasefire, it quickly became clear after 
Powell's unsuccessful mission that Arafat was seen as the root cause by the Bush 
administration. Interestingly, this was a position which mirrored the Clinton 
administration's view after the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000. But on a 
wider contextual level, the administration was coming under clear international pressure 
to change course on its policy towards the peace process: this had a great deal of 
1'5 United States, House. Foreign Affairs Committee. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, US 
Policy Towards the Palestinians Part 2,107th Cong., Sess. 1st, (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 25 Sep. 2001) 
43pp. 11/12/03 <http: //commdocs. house. gov/committees/intlret/hfa74233.000/hfa74233_I. HTM>. 
126 Ibid. 
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poignancy as the White House was attempting to broker wider diplomatic support for its 
campaign against Iraq. Overall, there was a pressing need for reengagement, but Arafat 
was not seen as having diplomatic credibility. 
The Bush administration announced its departure from the policy of disengagement on 
24 June 2002. Bush outlined his vision for a two-state solution to the conflict and called 
upon Israel to end "the Israeli occupation that began in 1967... through a settlement 
negotiated between the parties, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli 
withdrawal to secure and recognized borders. " 127 Bush's proposal went clearly beyond 
what Clinton had proposed. The proposal was in line with Bush's private undertaking to 
Crown Prince Abdullah in August 2001; however, there was now a caveat: the 
Palestinian Authority had to undertake reform and new leaders had to be elected who 
were not implicated in terrorism. This caveat, different from the undertaking Bush had 
made to Crown Prince Abdullah, is most likely a product of the localized contextual 
situation where Arafat was seen as the key obstacle preventing an agreement being 
reached. Nevertheless, the new contextual underpinnings of the War on Terror 
underscored the need for political reform: the underlying belief that freedom, liberty and 
democracy need to be universally adopted in order to combat the root causes of violent 
political extremism. When applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict, political reform held the 
prospect of combating the grass root support base of Hamas and other radical political 
Islamic movements. Therefore, Arafat had effectively fallen from grace as a result of 
Washington seeing him as having no diplomatic credibility or intention to achieve a 
peace settlement. The emergence of a new grand strategic era which saw the promotion 
of freedom and democracy as the primary guides of foreign policy underlined the need 
for new Palestinian leaders. 
127 George H. W. Bush, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership, " The Rose Garden, 
Washington, D. C.: 24 Jun. 2002.3pp. 27/08/2002 
<http: //www. whitehouse. go v/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3. htn-d>. 
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7.1 Tactical Multilateral Diplomacy 
With the Bush administration calling for reform and the democratic election of new 
Palestinian leaders before it reengaged in diplomacy towards the now stated goal of a 
two-state solution, there was little likelihood that any movement would occur until this 
condition had been fulfilled. The response from the Arab league was predictable in that 
whilst the two-state solution was widely welcomed, the onus on the Palestinians to 
effectively sideline Arafat and elect new leaders was generally seen as too ambitious and 
was viewed with some degree of skepticism. More specifically, Bush's plan maintained 
the position of disengagement until these conditions had been fulfilled, and this was the 
key problem for the Arab league: disengagement inflamed the situation and made a 
resolution more problematic. In a similar fashion, the EU was reasonably united in its 
calls on the United States to reengage in the peace process. 
Within the context of international pressure to reengage in the peace process, the Bush 
administration duly announced that it would work with the other Quartet member states: 
the UN, EU, and Russia, to develop a roadmap for the peace process. Although this went 
someway to meet the demands being levied on the White House from the international 
community, it would be a mistake to presume that it was a policy gesture stemming 
solely from this wide spectrum of diplomatic pressure. It has to be remembered that the 
White House was perusing an additional strategic objective towards Persian Gulf 
security: Iraq. Specifically, the response of the Bush administration to the 9/11 attacks 
had added the strategic objective of a political and social transformation of the Middle 
East in order to combat the root causes of radical political Islam and terrorism. The point 
being made here is that the Bush administration was moving towards mounting an 
invasion of Iraq and its recommitment towards the Quartet was a diplomatic gesture to 
help it garner support for its Iraq policy. 
The product of the Quartet negotiations was a "roadmap" for resolving the dispute 
between Israel and the Palestinians. Although an initial unveiling of the project was 
announced in September 2002, it was not until shortly after the invasion of Iraq in the 
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end of April 2003, that it was published. It gave a series of recommendations to Israel 
and the Palestinians on final status issues and a timetable for achieving them by 2005. 
The roadmap was: 
[B]ased on the foundations on the Madrid Conference, the 
principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242,338 and 1397, 
agreements previously reached by the parties, and the 
initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah - endorsed by the 
Beirut Arab League Summit - calling for acceptance of Israel 
as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a 
comprehensive settlement. 128 
But on a wider level, it was viewed as a means of promoting "a comprehensive peace on 
all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks. "129 Crucially, 
however, neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority was involved in formulating these 
proposals. Ross is right to highlight that the construction of the proposals without 
reference to the parties was an inherent flaw: the plan neither reflected what the parties 
were prepared to do nor what outcome they sought. 130 However, in terms of US foreign 
policy, it is important to recognize that without `new leadership' within the Palestinian 
Authority, the Bush administration remained disengaged from direct mediation between 
the two parties. Therefore, the roadmap was a useful diplomatic endeavor which 
garnered some degree of support for US policy towards the Persian Gulf, and clarified 
what settlement the international community desired from the peace process. 
Nevertheless, US policy remained firmly positioned on disengagement from direct 
mediation until reforms had been undertaken which allowed for the democratic election 
of new Palestinian leaders. 
128 United States, et al., A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict, 1 May 2003) 6pp. 25/09/03 <http: //www. mideastweb. org/quartetrm3. htm>. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ross, The Missing Peace 789. 
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7 .2 Structural Barriers to Political Reform 
Following the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime by a coalition led by the United 
States, it seems appropriate to recognize that the Bush administration had affirmed its 
dominant position with the region and this underscored its diplomatic leverage. 131 
Although one can argue that the Bush administration was in a unique position which was 
comparable with the leverage the United States had after the liberation of Kuwait in 
1991, it is noticeable that a reengagement similar to the Madrid peace talks was not 
adopted. Although Bush personally participated in summits at Aqaba and Sharm al- 
Sheikh in June 2003, which specifically focused on the peace process, the US 
involvement cannot be described as having departed from the position of 
disengagement. The end result of the summits basically affirmed the primacy of the 
roadmap as a means of resolving the dispute. Nevertheless, with the Bush administration 
having maintained its position that it would only reengage once new Palestinian leaders 
had been elected who delivered an effective response to Israeli security concerns, the 
likelihood of any real progress being made on the roadmap was thwarted. Indeed, 
without the active engagement of the United States, it is difficult to see how any 
substantive progress could have been made. 
The key issue was, therefore, why did the United States fail to reengage despite the 
positive contextual situation in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq? Whilst it is true that 
the United States was in a unique diplomatic position in the immediate aftermath of the 
invasion of Iraq, one cannot overlook that the prospects of the successful application of 
US pressure was unlikely to be forthcoming while Arafat was in power. It is true that the 
general unwillingness of the Israelis to make concessions unilaterally without the 
Palestinian Authority having made progress on security matters first was a key 
additional problem, but Arafat's position after Camp David showed that he was either 
unwilling or unable, to compromise. In either case, Arafat's position towards the 
Clinton-Barak framework showed that he was not going to compromise over final status 
issues, or the land for peace formula, and thus diplomacy held little real prospect of 
131 Ibid. 794. 
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success while he remained in power. Bush's response was, therefore, reactive to the 
contextual situation in that further negotiations with Arafat were not a credible 
diplomatic option. The policy of disengagement was maintained. 
The policy of disengagement was upheld by the Bush administration consistently 
throughout the remaining time period of this study. Although reforms were implemented 
under Arafat which resulted in the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as Prime Minister, 
his power and authority was limited by Arafat. 132 But, even then, Ross is critical of the 
Bush administration for not having moved beyond this disengagement policy in order to 
provide a degree of support for Mahmoud Abbas position. 133 Whilst there may be some 
degree of truth in this, it is debatable how effectively Arafat could have actually been 
marginalized whilst he retained the Presidency. 
8.0 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
From the above analysis of United States foreign policy towards the peace process it can 
be deduced that it was mainly reactive to the localized context of the dispute. Although 
US domestic politics was a key factor which influenced the character and bias of 
Clinton's foreign policy, this study shows that it was a secondary issue to the dynamics 
of the peace process itself. In other words, although there was an inherent bias in 
Clinton's policy in favour of Israel, whether Clinton merely facilitated or engaged was 
mainly determined by the dynamics of the local context of the peace process. Indeed, 
Clinton only moved beyond facilitation when it was clear that without a degree of 
mediation to resolve a diplomatic stalemate, the peace process would effectively grind to 
a halt. Whilst it is possible to infer that Clinton only moved beyond facilitation once he 
had secured a second term of office, this approach overlooks the fact that the Oslo 
process had become stagnant and was unraveling because of the counterproductive 
132 Jerrold Kessel, "Abu Mazen Confirmed as Palestinian Prime Minister, " CNN Online I May. 2003. 
17/08/04 <http: //www. cnn. com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/29/palestinian. cabinet/>. 
133 Ross, The Missing Peace 792-96. 
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policy of Netanyahu. The localized context thus required third party intervention to 
mediate over the issues which were preventing the two parties from actually engaging in 
constructive diplomacy. 
Clinton's decision to actively mediate between Barak and Arafat was surprising in that 
one would have expected Clinton to revert to facilitation as he had done when Barak's 
likeminded predecessor was in power. Although it is tempting to explain Clinton's 
proactive engagement and triangular diplomacy as a simple product of his desire to 
reach a historic agreement before his Presidency ended, this overlooks significant 
aspects of Barak's election: it presented a unique opportunity which had a finite 
timeframe. Given this finite window of opportunity, the available evidence indicates that 
the administration opted for this particular foreign policy response as a means of 
achieving an agreement while possible. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the 
prospect of resolving the Palestinian question was a significant motivating factor for 
Clinton. But the underlying reason why Clinton failed in his efforts to achieve an 
agreement following the Camp David Summit in 2000 was as a result of the inability, or 
unwillingness, of Arafat to compromise over final status issues. Therefore, during the 
Clintonian post-Cold War era up until the onset of the War on Terror, US foreign policy 
was, more often than not, reactive to the localized contextual situation of the Arab Israeli 
dispute. 
The reactive nature of Clintonian era policy indicates that there was no overarching 
global political strategy dictating US policy towards the peace process. This is 
commensurate with the post-Cold War grand strategic pillar of geoeconomics which has 
been identified. Indeed, this was continued in the Bush administration up until the new 
grand strategic era of the War on Terror was adopted. 
With the onset of the War on Terror, the Bush administration's decision to maintain its 
position of disengagement appears to have also been a product of the localized 
contextual situation. This shows a degree of consistency from post-Cold War era policy. 
However, the call for political reform was also a radical departure for US foreign policy. 
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The available evidence indicates that this was not a policy position prior to the onset of 
the War on Terror. It is true that it was a policy response which fitted in well with the 
underlying reasons behind disengagement, but also was in fitting with the new grand 
strategy of the War on Terror: the promotion of freedom and democracy in order to 
counter the support base of terrorist groups. Given the propensity of radical political 
Islamic groups within the dispute, it can be concluded from the rubric of post-9/11 grand 
strategy that the promotion of such values was seen as countering such groups hindering 
the peace process. 
In addition to Bush's post-9/11 approach being commensurate with combating the root 
causes of extremism as has been outlined in chapter four, the promotion of such ideals 
also served a key secondary purpose of equal importance: conflict resolution. Within the 
context of the neoconservative school of thought and the Reaganism which resonated 
within the Bush administration, the promotion of democracy through political reform 
was seen as a key means of promoting a resolution to the conflict itself. This primarily 
stems from the view that negotiations would be more meaningful and productive given 
the belief that compromise was more feasible when those negotiating have a legitimate 
mandate from the people. So in certain respects Bush's approach could be considered 
pragmatic if this optimistic analysis is accepted. However, it is important to recognise 
that the promotion of democracy in Palestine also held the risk that political groups such 
as Hamas could gain power over the ruling Fattah party which could further lessen the 
likelihood of reconciliation. 
Given the above analysis it seems reasonable to conclude that whilst Clinton era foreign 
policy towards the peace process was representative of a geoeconomic grand strategy 
which was lacking a political strategy and was thus reactive based, on the other hand US 
policy post-9/11 actually encompassed the guiding tenets of the War on Terror and was 
a clear political strategy that then guided US involvement in the peace process. This 
underscores the manner in which grand strategy can impact upon a geopolitical foreign 
policy. 
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Overall, this chapter has underscored that US policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace 
process can be satisfactorily understood through the lenses of the grand strategies of the 
Clinton and Bush administrations that have been outlined. Therefore this allows for the 
conclusion that the 9/11 attacks resulted in the adoption of a new grand strategy and this 
was indeed applied to US policy towards the Arab Israeli peace process. Moreover, the 
ad hoc and reactive based policy of the Clinton era which stemmed from its own grand 
strategic approach was wholly commensurate with the character of its foreign policy 
towards the peace process. This indicates that the issue of US grand strategy is a key 
factor which can be used for analytical interpretations and predictive generalisations. 
Also this form of interpretation of US foreign policy towards the peace process is an 
original framework for conceptualizing US involvement as a third party to this conflict. 
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Chapter VIII 
Concluding Comments 
- 308 - 
"Power consists in one's capacity to link his will with the purpose of others, to lead 
by reason and a gift of cooperation. " 
Woodrow Wilson 
September 1913 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This case study has underscored that the Middle East is one of the most complex 
political arenas for United States foreign policy. Not only does US foreign policy 
have to navigate the complex schisms based on religion, history and culture, it also 
has to find an appropriate balance between US national interests and those of 
regional actors. Nevertheless, given the Bush administration's response to the 9/11 
attacks, the new approach under the War on Terror indicates that it is an arena which 
has taken on an even greater strategic significance for the United States. 
In terms of the importance of the specific conclusions that can be made from this 
study, the following section will provide a clear account of both what has been 
achieved from this research, and what contribution it has made to the current 
scholarship on this area. The final section will highlight some areas for additional 
research based on the findings of this study. 
2.0 THESIS REVISITED 
This study's examination of US foreign policy has been revealing not only for the 
complexity in which US foreign policy was formulated, but also for the markedly 
different observations that can be made when comparing the presidencies of Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush. The first substantive section concerned a comparative 
foreign policy analysis of Bill Clinton and George Bush in chapter three. The very 
character and priorities of the administrations formed a near dichotomy and this was 
reflected in the idiosyncrasies of the key people in the bureaucracies and foreign 
policy. As with the onset of the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras, the very 
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character of the Bush administration has given rise to the new grand strategic era of 
the War on Terror in the wake of the trauma of the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks. 
The comparative foreign policy analysis on the idiosyncrasies, bureaucratic 
character, and foreign policy of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in chapter three 
has provided a significant contribution to the current body of scholarship. It was the 
first comprehensive foreign policy analysis to deal with the idiosyncratic and 
bureaucratic factors which shaped the foreign policy of both administrations. It has 
provided a clear analysis of the Clinton presidency and the initial years of the first 
Bush administration in order to show that a fundamental transitional phase in US 
international relations occurred as a response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks. Moreover, it has tested these prescriptions through a case study of US 
foreign policy towards key policy issues within the Middle East and thus can claim 
validity. 
The post-Cold War era was characterised by no readily identifiable overarching 
strategic threat to US national security as had been the case in the Cold War. The 
optimism this period held was a golden age for US foreign policy as it was premised 
on geoeconomics and resulted in unprecedented global economic growth. This 
Hamiltonian foreign policy, which characterised the Clintonian era, had clear 
advantages but also lacked a political strategic purpose that relegated decisions to an 
ad hoc and reactive level as geoeconomics is not an effective substitute for a political 
strategy. 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were the catalyst for a radical departure 
from the post-Cold War order. The policy response to the 9/11 attacks was 
commensurate with the idiosyncrasies of George W. Bush and key members of the 
administration. However, the impact of the attacks had a more telling affect as the 
issue of safeguarding US national security through combating terrorism and the risks 
posed by unconventional weapons became a commonly held strategic purpose for 
American polity. As with the onset of the Cold War era, the far-reaching domestic 
and foreign policy context resulted in the emergence of a readily identifiable threat to 
US national security which required a comprehensive response from the state 
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apparatus. With this perception resonating within domestic society, terrorism with 
global reach had emerged as a defining factor for grand strategy. In essence, the era 
of the War on Terror had emerged. 
The Bush Doctrine emerged as the administration's policy framework under the 
strategic rubric of the War on Terror. The doctrine underlined the strategic departure 
from Clintonian geoeconomics and that a radical change in US foreign policy and 
had occurred. The central pillar of the Bush Doctrine was for the global promotion of 
liberal democracy. Admittedly, this is an agenda which has a historical vintage in US 
foreign policy. However, its promotion under the Bush Doctrine was deemed a 
national security requirement given the intellectual interpretation adopted on the root 
causes of political extremism and terrorism. The issue of US policy towards political 
Islam is thus of critical importance for understanding the nature of the Bush Doctrine 
and the new grand strategic era. 
As secondary key aspect to the Bush Doctrine was for the use of anticipatory self 
defence in cases where hostile states attempt to acquire unconventional weapons and 
fail to be dissuaded through diplomacy. This is the most controversial aspect to the 
Bush Doctrine and also the one which poses scope for additional research. The 
central issue is whether this will be applied universally by the Bush administration 
towards the other countries listed as part of an axis of evil, namely North Korea and 
Iran. If the Bush administration refrains from applying this pillar to other applicable 
cases, its official use against Iraq is brought into question. Specifically, it would 
underline the point that the invasion of Iraq was carried out for the strategic purpose 
of promoting liberal democracy as a long term counterterrorism initiative. 
In order to test these prescriptions this thesis has used a case study approach of US 
foreign policy towards key arenas concerning US foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Two key interrelated areas of US foreign relations towards the Middle East were 
selected: Persian Gulf security and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The question of 
political Islam was also addressed in chapter four but here the purpose was not to 
provide a case study analysis but rather to demonstrate the strategic element in the 
Bush administration's effort to combat the root causes of political extremism. In 
essence this was to underscore and clarify the very character of the grand strategy in 
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the War on Terror era. This formed a key part of the thesis in that it demonstrated the 
nature and external threat that US grand strategy in the era of the War on Terror was 
a response towards. Specifically it showed the linkage between the promotion of the 
universal ideals of freedom, equality and human rights, and how they link in with the 
US national interest of combating the root causes of terrorism and thus countering 
terrorism and securing US national security in the long term. 
The case study on Persian Gulf security was subdivided into two distinct chapters. 
Chapter five examined US policy during the Clinton administrations which was 
symbolic of the grand strategic era of the post-Cold War. Here the definition of 
Persian Gulf security was defined as US foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq as a 
means of ensuring actual security of this strategically important area. Chapter six 
examined US policy towards Persian Gulf security in the era of the War on Terror in 
order to underscore the differential nature of US foreign policy since the redefinition 
of US grand strategy occurred in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
The analysis of US foreign policy towards Iraq and Iran has served the purpose of 
demonstrating the validity of the conceptualisation offered in chapter three on US 
grand strategy. Moreover, it has also provided for a contribution to the existing body 
of scholarship on the trajectory of US foreign policy towards each country. In the 
case of Iraq, this thesis has uncovered original information that allows for a 
significant reinterpretation of US foreign policy. Whilst the current body of 
scholarship has been shown to suggest various interpretations on US foreign policy 
trajectory towards Iraq; this thesis has offered a distinction between strategy and 
tactics by way of showing that the United States sought regime change in Iraq since 
1991. The commitment towards an Iraqi compliance with sanctions was, therefore, a 
tactical means of achieving this strategic objective. Therefore, this underscores the 
level of continuity in US foreign policy from the George H. W. Bush presidency. 
Indeed, the only departure from the tactics for achieving this objective was shown to 
have occurred in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks which saw a military 
invasion used rather than the traditional containment leading to regime change 
equation. 
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In the case of Iran the analysis indicates that Clintonian policy was commensurate 
with the grand strategic framework identified in chapter three. However the driving 
force of US foreign policy was the domestic political level which usurped the foreign 
policy prerogative of the executive. Although the Clinton administration was 
premised on containment leading to reconciliation subject to a change in provocative 
Iranian policies, Congressional legislation limited the options available to Clinton. 
Iran's opposition towards Israel was the main factor which drove this. Nevertheless, 
the objective of Clintonian US foreign policy towards Iran can be interpreted as 
commensurate with the US grand strategy at the time: containing Iran in order to 
ensure the security of the Gulf States in order to further Hamiltonian interests. The 
departure from this only occurred after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The promotion of 
liberal democracy and prevention of Iran acquiring unconventional weapons became 
the key issue for the Bush administration. This shows that US grand strategy in the 
War on Terror resulted in a alteration of US policy towards Iran. 
For the Clinton presidency, debate has been shown to exist on its character, but this 
thesis firmly holds the position that Clinton had reduced his foreign policy to 
geoeconomics; and arguments suggesting that it also incorporated the Jeffersonian 
pursuit of democracy seem not to apply in the case of the Persian Gulf. Indeed, it 
appears that a distinction between rhetoric and substance exists in Clintonian grand 
strategy. The importance of the Persian Gulf security case study in chapter four is 
that US geostrategy fundamentally changed in the context of the global War on 
Terror. The objectives of the post-Cold War era were for maintenance of the regional 
balance of power but, following the 9/11 attacks, US geostrategy fell under the rubric 
of US grand strategy and thus a complete rejection of the long standing balance of 
power approach was witnessed. This underscores the validity of the comparative 
foreign policy analysis conducted in chapter three. 
The second case study examined was US foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
peace process in chapter five. The findings from this examination underscored that 
the idiosyncratic factors of the Clinton administration had a clear correlation with the 
nature of US foreign policy towards conflict resolution. Moreover, this was 
compounded by domestic political factors within the United States. Clinton's 
approach inherently favoured the Israeli position as the emphasis on facilitation 
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equated to a support for the process dictated by the dominate party to the 
negotiations. Clinton's policy has been shown to have evolved through stages where 
mediation was used selectively until its culmination at Camp David in 2000. The 
manner in which this equates with the interpretation offered in chapter three is that 
the absence of a clear grand strategy that went beyond geoeconomics resulted in an 
ad hoc approach towards the peace process. This underscored the approach adopted 
by Clinton. 
The contextual situation inherited by Bush was of a stagnant peace process and the 
realisation that Arafat's unwillingness or inability to compromise made a resolution 
even with American mediation an unrealistic conception. The manner which the 
Bush administration approached the peace process after the 9/11 attacks has been 
shown to be in fitting with the international context of the War on Terror. 
Specifically, the emphasis on democratic elections and new Palestinian leadership 
not only reflected the post-Camp David scenario but also was in fitting with the Bush 
Doctrine. The foreign policy analysis showed that the emphasis on new democratic 
elections and new Palestinian leadership was increased following the 9/11 attacks 
and thus underscores the manner in which the grand strategic design of the War on 
Terror permeated throughout US foreign policy. This interpretation is original in that 
it offers an interpretation of US foreign policy towards the peace process through a 
wider conceptual lens than the current scholarship has offered on this subject as 
indicated in chapter two. This demonstrates that whilst there has been a discernable 
change in grand strategy, this has so far impacted more upon tactics employed than 
The final case study concerned US foreign policy towards political Islam. This is an 
academic area which is of fundamental importance for understanding and 
conceptualising the central aspects of the transition always from the post-Cold War 
era. The analysis of US foreign policy has confirmed the accuracy of the current 
body of scholarship on the Clintonian approach towards political Islam. Specifically, 
the empirical evidence supports the conjecture that the Clinton administration 
recognised that the promotion of liberal democracy was the most effective means for 
combating the extremist and unrepresentative element of political Islam. However, 
the case study offered in chapter four and five on the Persian Gulf has underscored 
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that the Jeffersonian/Wilsonian pursuit of democracy was subordinated against US 
Hamiltonian interests within the Persian Gulf area. Therefore, even though Clinton 
articulated a dual grand strategy of geoeconomics and the promotion of liberal 
democracy, this thesis has shown that combating the root causes of extremist 
political Islam was a secondary policy concern. 
With the onset of the Bush administration, this policy position was maintained until 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The administration's response to the attacks was geared 
towards combating the immediate concerns of the combination of unconventional 
weapons and terrorism but, most crucially, it recognised that the lack of legitimate 
avenues for political expression with the Middle East was the root cause of extremist 
Islamism. Therefore, political extremism became an issue of primary concern in US 
foreign policy and was equated with the grand strategic objective of safeguarding US 
national security through combating its root causes in the long term. The 
longstanding US policy towards maintenance of a balance of power within the 
Persian Gulf was thus rejected at the expense of the ambitious proposal of reordering 
the Middle East through a radical political reform process. Indeed, the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 was shown to have been carried out in order to achieve this ambitious 
strategic objective. 
The contribution of this study's analysis to the scholarship of US foreign policy 
towards political Islam is that it offers an interpretation of the change that occurred in 
the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It also shows how this equates with the Bush 
Doctrine and the grand strategic era of the War on Terror. As this thesis analyses US 
foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli peace process, it also 
emphasises the degree to which it has become a primary policy issue for US foreign 
policy. 
In sum, this thesis has demonstrated that a period of fundamental change has 
occurred in US foreign policy following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The 
position of this study is that a new grand strategic era of the War on Terror has 
emerged and has replaced the post-Cold War. Bush's agenda is fundamentally 
optimistic and ambitious and can be equated with a neo-Wilsonian vision for the 
international system. By using case studies, this thesis has shown the validity of this 
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conjecture in addition to the nature, trajectory and contextual origins of US foreign 
policy towards the Middle East in the time period 1993-2003. 
The reflections that can be made on this evolution of US policy are that the future 
trajectory of US policy, for the duration that it continues to be based on this position, 
will result in unprecedented changes in the international system. The desire to rework 
the international environment through US exceptionalism clearly has a strong 
vintage; however, the manner in which such a strategy has been defined as being the 
essence of providing for US national security is a very new and potentially 
destabilising agenda. But whilst US foreign policy makers would recognise this 
potential instability, the logic of the doctrine would see it as a necessary evil as the 
outlook for US grand strategy in the era of the War on Terror is fundamentally long 
term in its outlook. The challenge for US foreign policy will be whether such a 
change is controllable in times of flux. But overall, such a strategy would be well 
advised to seek a level of empathy by way seeking an understanding other countries 
situations: without this key ingredient in US foreign policy, it will reduce itself to a 
zero-sum game where diplomacy becomes a facade for unilateralism and ultimatums. 
Indeed, this is especially pertinent when dealing with scenarios of unconventional 
weapons being produced by states that are perceived as hostile actors by the United 
States. ' 
2.1 Assessment of Grand Strategy 
The concept of grand strategy in US foreign policy is a highly useful and informative 
proposal in understanding the nature and contextual origin of foreign policy. Whilst 
foreign policy may often be tactical, only through understanding the objective 
through the lens of grand strategy can one gain an approximation with a degree of 
validity on what the given policy may be. During the Cold War it was clear that the 
ideological and military threat posed by the Soviet Union was the accepted key 
1 Wright, S. M., H. Huuhtanen, et at. (2005,8 Mar. ). "Briefing Paper: US and Iran on a 
Confrontational Course. " 2005, from http: //www. upi- 
fiia. f i/j ulkaisut/muut/Briefing%2OPaper%208 %20March%202005. pd f. 
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external threat to US national security. With this it is understandable in international 
relations that the grand global chessboard was dictated by the maxims of Cold War 
era grand strategy. But with the implosion of the Soviet Union and unopposed fall of 
the Berlin Wall by the Soviet block, the end of this grand strategic era had effectively 
ended. In the post-Cold War era which encapsulated the two terms of office of Bill 
Clinton, this thesis has demonstrated that although Clinton articulated a dual grand 
strategy of geoeconomics and democratic promotion, the later was merely a 
rhetorical pronouncement and it is thus accurate to view geoeconomics as being the 
strategic maxim. Given the absence of a key external threat to US national security, 
or at least a rival competitor, the United States' unrivalled global dominance in all 
spheres resulted in the Hamiltonian goal of a global promotion of economic 
investment and trade - geoeconomics - forming the essence of US grand strategy. 
Whilst geoeconomics as a grand strategy for a superpower such as the United States 
was a welcome agenda by other nation-states, it also resulted in there being no 
clearly defined strategic political agenda. In essence, foreign policy is reduced to 
operating on a reactive and ad hoc basis to political events. This point has been 
underscored by this thesis's examination of US engagement in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process during the Clinton era. Moreover, in areas of instability the lack of a clear 
agenda by the United States results in a lack of leadership from the sole superpower 
and thus weakens any multilateral response as an alternative. 
The interpretation of grand strategy is a highly useful concept for analysing and 
understanding the nature and direction of US foreign policy. For the post-Cold War 
era it underscores the need to view US foreign policy as reactive towards the 
localised geopolitical context which allows us to provide more valid interpretations. 
However, the response of the Bush administration to the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 saw the spectre of terrorism defined as the key national security 
threat to the United States. The adoption of a political agenda towards combating the 
root causes of political extremism in the long term thus became the new grand 
strategy which replaced that characteristic of the post-Cold War. 
The grand strategy of the War on Terror has been shown in this thesis to be based on 
the recognition that the overriding cause of radical extremism stems from the lack of 
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freedom, equality, human rights and equality which resonates in varying degrees 
across the world. With the understanding from a neoconservative perspective that 
these are fundamentally universal values in their applicability and that their absence 
actually is the cause of terrorism, their promotion under the grand strategy of the War 
on terror is thus clearly a national security interest. Indeed, historically speaking the 
promotion of these values have been a key aspect in US foreign relations, however, it 
was only in the post-9/11 context that they have been identified as being a national 
security imperative. 
The concept of grand strategy in the War on Terror has been shown by this thesis, 
through Ikenberry's methodological framework, to be a highly useful and 
informative means of understanding US foreign policy. Importantly it allows for 
foreign policy to be separated on tactical and strategic levels which in the case of the 
Iraq invasion in 2003 allowed this thesis to provide a rich analysis of the logic behind 
the war. Here key comparisons can be made with the onset of US involvement in 
Vietnam during the Cold War. 2 But more importantly, the concept of grand strategy 
in the era of the War on Terror is of critical importance to understanding US foreign 
relations per se: it is clearly a political strategy unlike that of the post-Cold War era 
and thus is an overarching reference point and lens to which foreign policy is 
formulated. So whilst during the post-Cold War it was appropriate to view foreign 
policy within geopolitical and regional geostrategic sense where each event was ad 
hoc, foreign policy in the War on Terror for the United States is guided by an 
overarching framework which shapes the maxims of its policy. 
Nevertheless, the concept of grand strategy cannot be used as a carte blanche to 
which all aspects of US foreign policy can be related to. Some aspects of foreign 
policy may simply not be motivated by the agenda of achieving a grand strategic 
objective and this would not be able to offer a satisfactory explanation. Nevertheless, 
Ikenberry's approach is useful in that a foreign policy is evaluated against the 
concept of grand strategy so through this framework there is the allowance for this 
shortfall: therefore the analyst's objective is to ascertain whether this is the case or 
not. 
2 Gelb, L. H. and R. K. Betts (1979). The Irony of Vietnam: the system worked. Washington. 
Brookings Institution. 
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Overall, this thesis has found that an analytical methodology on US foreign relations 
which uses the concept of grand strategy is a highly effective means of understanding 
US foreign policy. Through using this concept this thesis has been able to offer 
original interpretations of US foreign policy during the two presidencies through the 
use of key case studies towards the Middle East. 
3.0 SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The nature of this study has been to provide for a greater understanding of US 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, in addition to a contextualisation and 
interpretation that has wider applicability within international relations scholarship. 
As this study has provided a geopolitical account of US foreign policy towards the 
Middle East in addition to observations on a global strategic level, there is scope for 
further research on a cross regional comparative level. By conducting an analysis of 
US foreign policy within the same time period but within a different regional 
geostrategic arena, it will be possible to test the applicability of both conclusions on 
US grand strategy within the post-Cold War era and the War on Terror. Indeed, to 
what extent is US Middle Eastern geostrategy commensurate with the strategic issues 
of Eurasia? 3 
A second area for further study is a more in-depth examination of the bureaucratic 
decision making process on particular issues within this timeframe and scope of this 
case study. Key decisions could be isolated from this study and explored in great 
depth through documentary evidence once it is declassified. This will provide a 
further complementary level of analysis which will show the bureaucratic reasoning 
and internal debates that occurred in making foreign policy decisions. 
A third area is the manner in which the Bush administration approaches the issue of 
Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programmes. Whilst North Korea is widely 
3 Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. 
New York, Basic Books. 
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regarded as having acquired nuclear weapons, Iran's legitimate pursuit of a nuclear 
power programme allows it to have the potential for acquiring a nuclear weapon 
capability through enrichment or reprocessing. As indicated above, the Bush 
Doctrine is clear that in cases where diplomacy fails to dissuade a country presumed 
by the United States as intent on producing nuclear weapons it would be subject to 
the preventative use of force. In essence this is a zero-sum approach to nuclear 
proliferation. The case of Iran's nuclear programme is a key area for future research 
as the manner in which the United States approaches this potential impasse will 
allow for a comparative study with the case of Iraq on the application of the Bush 
Doctrine. 
A final issue which could be explored through additional research is the nature of the 
policy review that was conducted by the Bush administration in the time leading up 
to the 11 September 2001. To what extent were changes in policy strategy being 
planned? This will allow for a greater understanding of the true impact the 9/11 
attacks actually had on US foreign policy. Nevertheless, such a level of analysis is 
still dependent on the declassification of material on this subject. 
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